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‘"'[EJveiy great problem is like the precious stone which thousands walk over before one
finally picks it up. ” “  Nietzsche
“The old Christian dogmatic terminology is like an enchanted castle where the most 
beautiful princes and princesses rest in a deep sleep— it needs only to be awakened, 
brought to life, in order to stand in its full glory. — Kierkegaard
"The ‘great man ’ is great owing to the free play and scope o f his desires and to the yet 
gi'eater power that Imows how to press these magnificent monsters into sei'vice.
— Nietzsche
"I am fighting almost like a Don Quixote— it never occurs to them that it is ChristianityK
— Kierkegaard
“But he said to me, ‘My grace is sufficient for you, for [my] power is made perfect in 
wealmess. ’ So I  will boast all the more gladly o f my weaknesses, so that the power of 
Christ may dwell in me. ” — II Corinthians 12:9 (NRSV)
UM214.
JP461 [July 8, 1837].
WP 498 [1877].
JP #283 [1849]. Cited in Ziolkowski 130.
ABSTRACT
Of the malting of compai'ative analyses of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, there is no 
end. However, this project pursues a unique ti*ajectory in its assumption that both 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche devoted significant attention to the issue of power as it 
pertained to life in nineteenth-centuiy Christendom. Although Nietzsche’s concept of 
power has been vigorously examined since the late 1800s, scholars have only recently 
begun to explore thoroughly the social and political implications of Kierkegaard’s thought. 
While certain treatments accomplish this by isolating their ‘political thought’ from their 
(a)theological presuppositions or exhibit a tendency to politicize Kierkegaaifi’s theology, I 
seek to demonstrate how the political dimensions of their thought flows from the 
(a)theological core of their respective Weltanschauungen. By attempting to formulate 
Kierkegaard’s concept of power, I aigue that, not only do the two thinkers respond to 
similar factors and identify similar crises in the waning authority of Chi'istendom, but 
Kierkegaard also effectively anticipates and critiques Nietzsche’s position.
The body of the project is divided into tliree main sections. The first section will 
present a summai y of Nietzsche’s cosmology, anthropology, and concept of power. The 
next section will aificulate Kierkegaard’s cosmology and anthropology before 
reconstmcting his concept of power from diverse references throughout the pseudonymous 
authorship, religious writings, journals, and personal papers. The final section will attempt 
to compaie and contrast the two perspectives under the auspices of a dialogical exchange. 
The conclusion will present the strengths and weaknesses of both positions and outline 
their implications and relevance for broader contemporary discourse on issues of power.
This project concludes that Kierkegaard’s concept of power successfully 
withstands the challenges which Nietzsche’s perspective raises, while exposing the 
precarious foundations upon which the latter is based. In pailicular, Kierkegaard 
demonstrates that the designations o f ‘master power’ and ‘slave power’ are mythological 
constructs.
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Chapter 1: Introduction: The Problem with Power:
I. Is Power ‘Unchiistian’?
Throughout the twentieth century, humankind has been preoccupied with the 
notion of power.* In the wake of philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel 
Foucault, this theme has spanned the conceptual ‘divide’ between modernism and 
postmodernism, and has increasingly dominated such diverse academic fields as 
philosophy, economics, political science, English literature, anthropology, international 
relations, and the social sciences. Within the field of theology, much attention has been 
focused on power and its various manifestations within the world in general and the 
Christian Church in particular. This emphasis has been spearheaded by feminist, 
liberation, two-thirds world, and other theologians belonging to groups who have been 
historically marginalized from mainstream Christian scholarship. Much of the work done 
by feminist and liberation theologians concentrates on the historical treatment of and 
attitudes towards an identifiable group o f ‘disempowered’ people, whom they usually 
represent. Theological responses to power can be loosely categorized under two headings: 
those which accept existing definitions and structural manifestations of power— or at least 
leave them significantly unchanged— seeking inversions and/ or inclusions within ‘the 
powers that be’; and those who reject existing modes of power in search of a better or 
‘more Christian’ approach.^
In the Stob Lectures of 1989-90, Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga challenged 
his audience to reconsider the Christian/ non-Christian bifurcation of reality as it pertained 
to the area of academics: “Is there really such a thing as Christian scholarship— or is there 
only scholarship simplicitei% which can be practiced by Christians and non-Christians, 
though perhaps practiced in a Christian and in a non-Christian way?”  ^ Using Plantinga’s 
poignant wording, the purpose of this project is to investigate whether there is such a thing
' The Routledge Encyclopaedia o f  Philosophy defines ‘power’ as “the capacity to produce or prevent 
change”. [Green 610]
 ^Many o f the latter focus on “mutual enhancement” [Ruether 30] or “enabling” [Fiorenza 143] models of 
power. See the brief overview in Jolmson 270.
as ‘Christian power’—or whether there is only 'power simpliciter\ which may be exercised 
employing Christian and non-Chiistian methods towards explicitly Christian and 
non-Christian goals. To this end)Ais project will compare the respective concepts of 
power of two prominent thinkers, both of whom lived on the margins of nineteenth-century 
Christendom and were largely overlooked by their contemporaries. Both men were 
responding, in part, to a common threat- the dissimulation of all personal power and 
individuality through Hegel’s systematic banishment of particularity in the evolutionary 
self-actualization of Spirit.'* And yet, although Friedrich Nietzsche attacked Christianity as 
one of the direst obstacles to personal freedom and power, another brilliant thinker, Soren 
Kierkegaard, regarded the Christian faith as the only true refuge for the sanctity and 
liberation of the individual.^
II. The Two Dialogue Partners:
Nietzsche’s thought has provided an integral contribution to modern discussions on 
the topic of power, a conversation which many feel he initiated.^ However, this project 
will attempt to establish that Kierkegaard, facing similar pressures of Christendom’s 
conformism, widespread spiritual lethargy, growing populist movements, and intellectual 
ostracism,^ has equal claim as an authority on power. Part of the reason why Kierkegaard 
is easily overlooked in this regard is due to the non-systematic nature of his corpus. His 
concept of power is not consolidated in one or two books, but rather unfolds throughout his 
entire body of writings. Hence, a significant component of this project involves composing 
a holistic account of his concept of power. Although Kierkegaard never wrote a
 ^Plantinga 6.
Hegel I 371. Another fascinating parallel is that botli men prided themselves on tlieir ‘acting’ abilities and 
the adoption o f masks. See Salome xviii: “If I were not such a good example o f a play-actor, I could not beai* 
to live another hour.” Cf. PV 79, where Kierkegaard described “the equally great magnitude of my 
depression and o f my dissimulative art”. Saffanski posits that Nietzsche’s “imperative for 
self-configuration” led to his adoption o f various epistemic ‘masks’ [26], though Clark suggests a strategy 
closer to Kierkegaard’s pseudonyms: “He uses different affective stances [...] in order to show us features of  
reality that are visible fi'om them.” [850]
 ^Comparisons between Nietzsche and Kierkegaard are not novel. Brobjer aclcnowledges more than thirty 
studies which “extensively” examine them together. [252]
 ^Foucault 96.
 ^Accordingly, both men regarded their thought as ahead of its time and, therefore, misunderstood by their 
contemporaries. See TM 101 andUMxlv.
comprehensive treatise on power, his entire life and corpus were diffused with issues 
concerning its uses and abuses. On the political front, in 1848, Denmark went to war with 
Prussia over two important duchies, and their eventual loss led to national and financial 
impoverishment.* That same year, under immense pressure from rising populist 
movements, the Danish king ended the traditional monarchy by inaugurating a 
constitutional monarchy. As a self-financed authoF and monarchist,*” Kierkegaard reeled 
from the impact of these momentous events.
On the cultural and intellectual front, Kierkegaard wrestled valiantly against the 
epistemological juggernaut of Hegelianism, an all-inclusive system which threatened to 
assimilate all fonns of individual expression-- including faith— within the bounds of 
reason. For Kierkegaard, this philosophical ‘blitzkrieg’ constituted an “objection against 
Christianity”.** Climacus disdainfully described this systematic violence as being 
“world-historically butchered, salted, and packed in a paragraph”.*^  Although Kierkegaard 
was not opposed to logic or logical systems as such, he mounted a blistering offensive 
against those that presumed to encapsulate all of existence.**
The political, economic, and philosophical ‘power surges’ during this period were 
paralleled by similar upheavals within the state church. Had he believed that unawareness 
of Christian tmth was the main problem plaguing the nineteenth-century Protestant church, 
Kierkegaard would likely have prescribed widespread dissemination of Christian 
teachings. Instead, he believed that the real problem was not ignorance of the truth but an
* CD xi. He also was keenly aware of the upheavals in France. Westphal argues persuasively that 
Kierkegaard’s political perspective was not merely a response to 1848 but developed over the course of his 
writing career. [“Politics” 325] The tumultuous events o f 1848 also exerted a monumental impact on 
4-year-old Nietzsche, whose father, Pastor Karl Ludwig Nietzsche, a staunch monarchist who named his son 
after King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia, grew “extremely despondent” following the political upheavals 
and died the following year. [Salome xii] Interestingly, Kierkegaard was bom in 1813, the same year as 
Richard Wagner and Nietzsche’s father.
” PV 207 [1849]: “In a matter o f months 1 was in the situation where tomorrow, perhaps, 1 would not own a 
thing but be literally in financial straits. It was a severe drain on me. My spirit reacted all the more strongly. 
1 wrote more than ever, but more than ever like a dying man.”
*” Kierkegaard once instructed King Christian V lll on the threat of communism and how to be a king. See JK 
155-157 [1849].
’* W L ll.
**UP1 107.
** See UP 1 109: “[Zl] logical system can be given [...] but a system o f  existence cannot be given.”
T v  r,X
active rebellion against truth that was known to all. Subsequently, authority became a 
pivotal issue within Kierkegaard’s polemical attack on the Danish church.*'* He regarded 
the institutional church’s growing political power and subsequent loss of spiritual authority 
with increasing dismay, and bitterly opposed the squelching of personal risk-taking and 
sacrifice by the oppressive confoiinity of false coimnunitarianism which had blighted 
Western Europe.
Kierkegaard’s familiarity with power dynamics on macroscopic levels was 
accompanied by tremendous conflict and confrontation on a personal level. In addition to 
the guilt and fear which his profoundly devout but melancholic father had indelibly 
imprinted upon his childhood,** Kierkegaard’s aloofness, pride, and eccentricities made 
him an irresistible target in one of the earliest and most celebrated examples of character 
assassination by the media. By bravely confronting the tyranny of The Corsair, whose 
slanderous accusations were protected from legalities by anonymous journalism, 
Kierkegaard unleashed an unrelenting onslaught of written and illustrated caricatures 
against himself.*” As Walter Hong obseiwed, the attack was devastatingly effective due to 
the “power of an unprecedented kind of journalism in a small city of 125,000 and the 
uncommon sensitivity of the object of the personal attack.”*’ By the time it was over, the 
media circus had inspired no fewer than thiee Scandinavian plays featuring buffoon-like 
characters named ‘Soren’, and Kierkegaard could no longer walk the streets of his beloved 
city in peace— one of his favourite and most fhaitful pastimes—** without being heckled by 
the people or mobbed by flocks of mocking children.
*'* See Hong’s sizable list o f references to authority within Kierkegaard’s writing. [BA viii]
** Kierkegaard once mused, “As a child, I was rigorously and earnestly brought up in Cliristianity, insanely 
brought up, humanly speaking [....]” [PV 79] Kimimse also describes the lifelong straggle between the 
Tittle broüier’ and the eldest brother, Peter. [“Out” 35] Perkins observes that Kierkegaard’s first publication 
was an ironic article on women’s emancipation. [“Politics” 33]
*” Kierkegaard emphasized that his decision to oppose the rising media power o f The Corsair was carefully 
calculated; “As for myself, I believe that I have specific qualifications for this. I am single, I have no wife to 
grieve [....]” [TC 174(1846)]
*’ TC xxxi. The unkindest cut o f all was indubitably not that of his trouser-legs. Over the better part o f a 
year, this shameless assault lambasted everything, including his imagined treatment of women, his physical 
posture (the capital-K-like crease in his back caused by a spinal injuiy he suffered as a child), his supposed 
‘God-like’ supremacy placing himself in the centre o f the cosmos around which everything revolved, and 
even the length of his trousers.
'* See WL [revised] 474-475 [1847]: “/  have walked myself into my best thoughts, and I Imow o f  no thought 
so burdensome that one cannot walk away from it.”
1Following the furor, his public feud and ostracism by the Danish church accelerated 
after the death of Bishop Mynster. Kierkegaard’s own death ended a sophisticated 
polemical counter-offensive that incoi*porated irony, pseudonymous authors, and vigorous 
intellectual scrutiny.*” All this time, Kierkegaard struggled to reconcile his physical and 
psychological toiments with his Chi istian faith in a loving God. Mustering all of his 
considerable energies, he fought to come to grips with the foundational paradox of 
Christianity, the Incarnation— the greatest display of divine power which the world has 
never seen— and the radical impact which occurs when the rationality of the ‘autonomous’ 
individual experiences a ‘head-on collision’ with this divine truth. When he finally 
succumbed to his weakened constitution in 1855, Kierkegaard died a publicly and privately 
battle-scarred man. On account of all of these factors, Kierkegaard was spectacularly 
well-acquainted with the uses and abuses of power and offers an extremely valuable and 
vital contribution to the ongoing discussion.
III. Preliminary Considerations:
A. Towards a Provisional Definition of Power:
In Kierkegaard’s seminal discourse, “Purity of Heart is to Will One Thing”, power 
may be defined as ‘the ability to implement one’s desires, protect one’s interests, or attain 
one’s ends.’^  ^ As such, power includes intellectual, spiritual, emotional, and not merely 
physical m eans.N ietzsche would apparently concur, though he would add that the drive 
or instinct to exert and extend one’s power constitutes the foundation for all life and 
organic growth.^^ As such, all cultural endeavours, ethical or religious enterprises, societal 
institutions, and personal involvements are reflections of power. According to Nietzsche, 
power is autonomous, amoral, self-serving, and innovative. In an elegy to architecture as
*” He was primarily inspired by Socrates’ intellectual dismembennent of the Sophists o f his day.
UV 32.
’* Hence, Nietzsche distinguished Macht as “power of higher quality and greater vitality” from Kraft 
(“physical force”). [Golomb “Autlienticity” 244] For the word’s ‘constructive’ overtones with machen, see 
Schacht 225. See also Habemias 95.
Nietzsche’s view is somewhat amorphous, as reflected by passages where the will to power is one of
the purest aesthetic expression of power, he asserted.
The highest feeling of power and security finds expression in that which 
possesses grand style. Power which no longer requires proving; which disdains to 
please; which is slow to answer; which is conscious of no witness around it; 
which lives oblivious of the existence of any opposition; which reposes in itself, 
fatalistic, a law among laws: that is what speaks of itself in the fonn of grand 
style.
The ability to accomplish one’s chosen task is juxtaposed by what might be 
provisionally labelled ‘authority’: the ability or right to will the task which is to be 
accomplished. Kierkegaard employed the analogy of a carriage and driver: while the 
‘horses’ seiwe as the locus of power, the will serves as the ‘driver,’ Just as the driver can 
lose control by allowing the diverse elements of power to dissipate through lack of 
coordination,
so also are we distressed to see the same thing happen to a human being. He does 
not lack power— a person never really does— but he mismanages himself. The 
person who is to be the master (it is, of course, he himself) ruins it; such a person 
works with perhaps scarcely a third of his power in the right place and with more 
than two-thirds of his power in the wrong place or against himself. Now he gives 
up working in order to begin to deliberate all over again, now he works instead of 
deliberating, now he pulls on the reins in the wrong way, now he wants to do both 
at the same time— and during all this he does not move from the spot [....] Ah, if 
one looks at people’s lives, one often must say in s o i t o w : They do not themselves 
know what powers they have; they more or less keep themselves from finding that 
out, because they are using most of their powers to work against themselves.’'*
Hence, Kierkegaard concluded that power is powerless without the authority to harness 
and direct it properly.
B. Chapter Outline:
It is a tantalizing mystery as to how well Nietzsche Icnew Kierkegaard’s writings, 
who died when Nietzsche was ten years old. Hollingdale contends that a diatribe against 
“afterworldsmen” in Thus Spoke Zarathustra contains several clues which suggest that
several “grand affects”. See, for example, WP 62 [1887].TI 85.
’“* UV 295-296.
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Nietzsche was repudiating Kierkegaard’s philosophy.’* In a letter from Georg Brandes, 
dated January l F \  1888, the Danish scholar wrote: “There is a Nordic writer whose works 
would interest you. Soren Kierkegaard’, he lived 1813-1855 and is in my view one of the 
most profound psychologists of all time [ . . . On February 19^**, Nietzsche responded: “I 
have decided that during my next trip to Gennany I want to study the psychological 
problem of Kierkegaard [....]”, but Kaufinann adds, “[H]e never got around to reading 
Kierkegaard.”” Consequently, any engagement between the two writers will necessarily 
be an imaginative reconstruction,^^ but one that will provide a fr uitful cross-pollination on 
the topic of power while respecting and retaining the integrity of each man’s original 
thought.
Because Nietzsche’s concept of power is comparatively more formulated and 
familiar than Kierkegaard’s, his position will be examined first in order to serve as a 
springboard and counterpoint to Kierkegaard’s view. This order is also intended to 
highlight the extraordinary precision with which Kierkegaard anticipated and countered 
the latter’s point of view. Chapters 2 and 3 will explicate Nietzsche’s concept of power 
within the broader context of his thought. Chapters 4 and 5 will reconstruct Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of power from the multitudinous fragments and references which proliferate 
his corpus. Chapters 6 and 7 will then compare the two concepts of power. The final 
chapter will contain a brief summary of the strengths and weaknesses of both perspectives 
and articulate their relevance for contemporary discussion on issues of power. The thesis 
statement of this project is that Kierkegaard’s theory of power is more coherent and 
consistent than Nietzsche’s position, which he foresaw and forswore with uncanny 
accuracy.
’* Hollingdale argues that one statement in particular, “Weariness, which wants to reach the ultimate with a 
single leap, with a death-leap, a poor ignorant weariness, which no longer wants even to want: that created all 
gods and afterworlds” [Z 59], strongly alludes to Kierkegaard, “who advocated a return to Cliristianity by 
means o f a Teap’ from unbelief into belief’ [Z 339 n. 6]
’” Brandes 69.
”  WP 53 n. 48. In a recent article, Brobjer lists six books which would have exposed Nietzsche to key tenets 
of Kierkegaard’s thought. [253]
’* In addition to the similarities of historical and cultural context, such a dialogue is infonned by the attitudes 
both men displayed when interacting with the other’s intellectual Tcindred spirits’: KierkegaarTs 
engagement with Feuerbach and the ‘free-thinkers’, and Nietzsche’s response to Pascal.
IV. Methodological Limitations:
A. Scope:
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche exclaimed, “[T]here are truths that are singularly 
shy and ticklish and cannot be caught except suddenly— that must be surprised or left 
alone.”^^  Both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard shared a remarkable sensitivity and child-like 
wonder towards the subtle complexities of existence. Subsequently, they employed a rich 
an ay of narrative strategies and techniques to portray its iridescent ‘flutterings’ without 
impaling its intricate dynamics within the intellectual ‘display cases’ of abstract thought. 
On account of their sophisticated analyses and creative fonnats, this project will focus 
exclusively on primary sources, both published and unpublished during the writers’ 
lifetimes. Although this strategy is intended to provide a holistic account of their concepts 
of power, this approach invites certain risks. Some scholars, such as Michael Tanner, 
contend that the amorphous and ft agmentary nature of Nietzsche’s writing seriously 
jeopardizes any attempt to construct a coherent account of his cosmology or 
anthropology.^^ Others, like Walter Kaufinann, warn of the editorial tampering which 
transpired when Nietzsche’s notebooks were published by his anti-Semitic sister, Elisabeth 
Forster-Nietzsche.^^ However, rather than abandon iheNachlass altogether, Kaufinann 
cogently suggests that they can offer great insights by allowing glimpses into “the
29 GS 345.
*” See Lowith 192 and Tanner Me/z^cAe 4, 64. Nevertheless, Taimer posits that it is possible to trace “the 
underlying unity o f  his concerns”. [8] There is widespread disagreement on tlie degree to which Nietzsche’s 
perspective shifted during his life. Clark contends that motifs such as ‘will to power’, eternal recunence, and 
the Ubennensch were downplayed and/ or abandoned towards the end of his career. [856-859] By contrast, 
Mandelbaum argues that, “there was a considerable degree of unity in Nietzsche’s thought”, [338] while 
Nietzsche’s fonner companion, Lou Salome, obseives “clearly worked out lines o f a ‘system’” m his thought. 
[Salome xi] See also Houlgate Hegel 38, 54 ,and Davey 142. In a letter to his publishers in the mid-1880s, 
Nietzsche wrote; “I now need profound tranquility, for many, many years to come, because I am facing the 
elaboration of my entire system o f thought [....]” [Safranski 158] As late as March 24, 1887, Nietzsche felt 
compelled “to build up a coherent structure o f thought over the next few years”. [Safi anski 284] Houlgate 
states that, although Nietzsche “cannot develop an ontology”, he “sketches a hypothetical ontology using the 
scientific notion o f force {Ki^aft) and the analogy o f human will” {Hegel 6Q] Richardson, howe ver, insists 
that Nietzsche retains all o f the categories and stnjctures integral to an ontology. [65] On Nietzsche’s 
‘essentialism’ and ‘ fbundationalism ’, see Houlgate “Power” 123. On his “metaphysics o f conflict”, see 
Burkitt 63 and Ansell-Pearson 161.
** For a useful synopsis, see WP xiii-xv. Tanner states that these “undeveloped” thoughts allow unsciiipulous 
interpreters to project their own thoughts into his writing. [Nietzsche 5]
workshop of a great thinker”.^ ^
The situation with Kierkegaard is, likewise, complicated on account of the rather 
contested relation between his pseudonymous writings and his signed works. He himself 
forbade readers from attributing pseudonymous quotations to himself.^^ Furthermore, 
scholars have argued that his use of irony and hyperbolic polemics similarly frustrate any 
attempts to elucidate his ‘true’ position on a given topic. '^  ^ However, Kierkegaard also 
regarded his authorship as a coherent whole under the direction o f‘religious’ concerns, and 
was careful to maintain a balance between pseudonymous publications and ‘directly’ 
authored works.^^ He once predicted that there would be no completed analysis of his 
work during his lifetime, “for no one has sufficient faith in it, or time or competence to look 
for a comprehensive plan in the entire production.”^^  Though the pseudonyms personify 
perspectives which Kierkegaard did not personally endorse, as Munay Rae writes, “[W]e 
should not assume that there is nothing in the pseudonymous works to which Kierkegaard 
himself might consent.”^^  In response to the aforementioned scholarly concerns, 1 will 
endeavour to support unpublished or pseudonymous statements with citations from 
published or signed works when possible, in order to emphasize the continuity of thought 
in each man’s corpus.^^ Moreover, this approach respects both writers’ expressed desire to
WP xvi. See also Clark 848.
** FS 240-241 [1851], UP I 625, TC 5.
Hence, Poole criticizes a “blunt reading” which reduces Kierkegaard to didactic, prepositional 
truth-statements and downplays the ironic, dialectical, and playful dimensions o f his writing, [60-61] Clearly 
one must steer a central course between systematicized atiophy and deconstructive ‘misreadings’. Westphal 
observes, “Those who stress the postmodern tendencies in Kierkegaard usually want to filter out the religious 
element, while those who emphasize the religious heart o f his writings are, for this vei*y reason, usually leery 
of linking him with postmodeniism.” [“Hegel” 121 n. 1] Dooley illuminates how the argument for 
Kierkegaard’s ‘postmodemity’ revolves upon whether one views deconstruction as his methodological 
imiovation or rather the offshoot o f German romanticism, which he opposed. [152] See also Norris 87-90. 
Evans contends, “He seems ‘postmodern’ in his account o f knowledge, yet ‘modern’ or really ‘premodern’ in 
his understanding o f  faith.” [“Realism” 169]
** FS ix, PV 6-7, 30; CD 415 [1848]. Kierkegaard, however, admitted tliat he did not possess this 
comprehensive understanding o f his authorship at the time o f writing the early pseudonymous works. [UP II 
166-167 (1850)] Gardiner doubts whether his initial purposes for wr iting were as straightforward as 
purported in his overview. [Kierkegaard 43] For a contrasting view, see Plekon “Theologian” 3, and Pletsch 
169.
*” BA 323 [February 19, 1849].
*’ Rae X. See also Evans Fragments 7. Gardiner contends that pseudonymous books where he appears as 
editor “expressed views that were basically his own.” [“Kierkegaard” 240]
** In light of his importance to the present topic, a brief clarification is necessary for the pseudonym H. H., 
‘author’ o f  “Two Ethical-Religious Essays”, which Kierkegaard was reluctant to include within his
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sentence their readers to hermeneutical ‘hard labour’ and invite them to participate in 
rigorous engagement with their texts.^^
Finally, it is important to reiterate that this project focuses primarily upon the 
writings of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard themselves. It in no way purports to undertake a 
comprehensive overview of the staggering plethora of secondary material on these vastly 
popular thinkers.'^® Rather, it is a concerted attempt to crystallize the core concepts behind 
their respective understanding of power and contrast their strengths and weaknesses via a 
creative dialogue between the two perspectives. This endeavour will hopefully illuminate 
issues of authority within contemporary debate and enhance our theological understanding 
of power. In particular, this project seeks to augment the tremendous insights presented by 
Kierkegaard, whose thought has only recently been explored with regards to socio-political 
concerns, by providing a comprehensive reconstmction of Kierkegaard’s concept of 
power.
B. Structure:
In light of the rich complexities and organic nature of the thought-worlds of two 
tried and tested anti-systematicians such as Nietzsche and Kierkegaard,"^’ it is impossible to 
impose a systematic framework without accusations of theoretical violence and arbitrary 
dissection. For the purposes of analysis, I have adopted a three-tiered stmcture. The 
cosmological tier will address the overall workings of the universe at large, according to 
each man. In the anthropological tier, the focus will then concentrate more specifically on
‘authentic’ canon. [WA xv] Kierkegaard explained that his reluctance stemmed not from fundamental 
disagreement with H. H.’s perspective, but thiough misgivings that readers may misinterpret him to be 
presenting himself as an ‘apostle’ rather than a ‘genius’. [WA 237-240 (1849)] Kierkegaard wrote of H. H.: 
“He rightly understood and explained perhaps the most important ethical-religious concept: authority.” [cited 
in Duiming 19]
*” One o f Kierkegaard’s favourite images for the trath-seeker was that o f a relentless detective pursuing his 
quany. See TM 130, UP I 239, TA 80, SW 311. For the hermeneutical demands which Nietzsche’s 
aphorisms place upon readers, see Z 67 and GM 10.
Tanner claims of Nietzsche that “more books appear on him each year than on any other thinker”. 
[Nietzsche 2]
Cf. UP I 107, cited above, with TI 35; “I mistrast all systematizers and avoid tliem. The will to a system is 
a lack o f integrity.” Lowith warns; “Because Nietzsche develops his thought in a thousand aphorisms and not 
as a system, one can find in him in particular whatever one wishes; matters startingly timely and matters
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how humankind fits within this broader context. Finally, each man’s concept of power will 
be further examined in the tier of authority. The inadequacies of this model are readily 
apparent, since certain articulations on the nature of power— such as Nietzsche’s principle 
of universal conflict, or Kierkegaard’s account of the Incarnation— could easily be 
included under all three categories. However, the purpose of this stmcture is two-fold: 
first, to underscore the importance of situating their statements upon power within the 
broader context of their (a)theological world views in order to gain a deeper understanding 
of the subtleties and elegance of their thinking and, in the case of Kierkegaard, to avoid 
politicizing his theology; second, to illustrate how vitally the topic of power resonates 
within their corpora at all levels. Due to the organic, almost nodal nature of their 
thought-worlds, the investigation will often proceed in a spiralling rather than strictly 
linear progression in an attempt to preseiwe the reticular interconnectedness of their 
concepts with a minimum of repetition.'*’ The three-fold stmcture will hopefully admit 
greater insights than impediments into comprehending the writings of these two 
extraordinary thinkers.
amazingly untimely.” [192]
“*’ Although, given the predominance o f repetition/ recurrence in their thinking, this may be somewhat
apropos.
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Chapter 2: For the Taking: Nietzsche’s View of the Universe:
I. The Cosmological Tier;
A. Nietzsche’s ‘Natural’ Monism:"’^
The theme of power fulminates throughout the entirety of Nietzsche’s thought and 
attains key prominence in the articulation of his cosmology. The fundamental tenet of 
Nietzsche’s view of the universe is literally, ‘What you see is what you get:’ the natural 
universe in all of its wondrous beauty is all there is to behold or be held. Nietzsche 
vociferously denied the existence of any divine creator, higher metaphysical reality,"’"’ or 
implicit structure in the universe— whether moral or otheiwise— because, “[N]ature is 
always value-less”.'** Hence, he insisted, “There are no moral phenomena at all, only a 
moral interpretation of phenomena.. .”“*” Truth itself is a human construct, a ‘necessary lie’ 
which enables humans to project their own standaitis of order upon an essentially amoral 
universe, an equally enchanting yet foreboding environment which remains majestically 
indifferent to human existence: “Think of a being such as nature is, prodigal beyond 
measure, indifferent beyond measure, without mercy or justice, at once fi*uitful and ban en 
and uncertain [....]””  Homo sapiens thus becomes "homo hermeneiiticus'”!^ ^
'** Houlgate obsei-ves that Nietzsche rejects monism in so far as it posits a “comprehensive unity” 
[iibergreifende Einheit], but espouses it as an expression o f the “wholeness” of the universe. [Hegel 42]
'*'* Such assertions inevitability devalue the natural universe and entail deplorable escapism for Nietzsche, 
who condemned “those peiverse wizards who, instead o f creating the world out o f nothing, create nothing out 
o f the world.” [HA 259] Nietzsche echoed the words o f Goethe— “Stinted things, self-mortifying,/ Maldng 
life a means o f dying.”— [Goethe II 94] and Feuerbach 161: “Where the heavenly life is a tmth, the earthly 
life is a lie; where imagination is all, reality is nothing. To him who believes in an eternal heavenly life, the 
present life loses its value [....]” It has been rigorously debated whether Nietzsche is, in fact, the ‘last 
metaphysician’ or tlie first post-metaphysician. See Richardson 5-6 and Pippin 252-278.
'** GS 242. See also HA 16. For the development of Nietzsche’s naturalism, see Clark 847.
“*” BG 96. Cf. Feuerbach 81 : “This cosmogonical process is nothing else than the mystic pafaplirase o f a 
psychological process [....]”
“*’ BG 39. Thus Zarathustra derided the ‘tmth-tellers’ o f society: “You first want to make all being 
conceivable: for, with a healthy mistrust, you doubt whether it is in fact conceivable. But it must bend and 
accommodate itself to you! Thus will your mind have it [....] That is your entire will, you wisest of men; it 
is a will to power; and that is so even when you talk of good and evil and of the assessment o f  values.” [Z 136] 
It is evident to the critic that ‘nature’ becomes a useful polemical constnict for Nietzsche, His own 
antliropomdrphization o f nature is manifest in statements like UM 221 : “Nature is in its depths much richer, 
mightier, happier, more dreadful [....]” See also UM 76, where he described ‘life’ as “that dark, driving 
power that insatiably thirsts for itself.”
'** CaiT 87. For nihilism as “hemieneutical malaise”, see Can' 88.
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Furthennore, Nietzsche deprivileged humankind as the pinnacle of this monistic universe, 
who receives no preferential smiles of affection from “the ciuel and desolate face of 
nature”;"’^
Man is absolutely not the crown of creation: every creature stands beside him at 
the same stage of perfection.... And even in asserting that we assert too much: 
man is, relatively speaking, the most unsuccessful animal, the sickliest, the one 
most dangerously strayed from its instincts— with all that, to be sure, the most 
interesting
Against a world devoid of providential guidance or teleological progress, human
culture in general and philosophy in particular launch their brave formulations, striving to
bind nature to will: “[PJhilosophy is this tyramiical drive itself, the most spiritual will to
power, to ‘creation of the world’, to causa prima Notions of metaphysics and ‘tmth’
represent previous human attempts to gain mastery, all of which must be constantly
challenged and overcome in order to expand human potential. In a very real sense,
cosmology must elide into anthropology, according to Nietzsche:
[T]hat every elevation of man brings with it the overcoming of narrower 
interpretations; that every strengthening and increase of power opens up new 
perspectives and means believing in new horizons— this idea penneates my 
writings. The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not à fact but a 
fable and approximation on the basis of a meager sum of observations; it is ‘in 
flux’, as something in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but 
never getting near the tmth: for— there is no ‘tmth’.”*’
Even science falls under Nietzsche’s censure:
We operate only with things that do not exist: lines, planes, bodies, atoms, 
divisible time spans, divisible spaces. How should explanations be at all possible 
when we first turn everything into an image, our image! It will do to consider
49 UM 149.
*” TI 136. See also WP 169 [1888]: “[M]an a little, eccentric species of animal, which— fortunately— has its 
day [...] something of no importance to the general character o f the earth [....]” Nietzsche did not, however 
want to denigrate humankind to mere animal status, since humans alone seek to perfect the species by 
“conscious willing”. [UM 164] He criticized Schopenhauer for this excess in WP [1887] 52: 
'^’Schopenhauer’s basic misunderstanding o f the will (as if  craving, instinct, drive were the essence o f will is 
typical: lowering the value of the will to the point of making a real mistake [...,] Great symptom o f the 
exhaustion or the wealmess o f the will: for the will is precisely that which treats cravings as their master and 
appoints to them tlieir way and measure.” A wholesale rejection of humankind would have veered too 
perilously close to Christianity’s ‘defamation’ o f the species, as reflected by Calderon de la Barca’s 
[1600-1681] dogmatic declaration that “the greatest guilt o f man is that he was bom.” [HA 98]
*' BG 39.
*’ WP 330 [1885-1886].
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53science as an attempt to humanize things as faithfully as possible
He once complained that faith in a rationally constructed, coherent universe brings the 
scientist uncomfortably close to the role o f ‘shaman’ since, “The thinldng of men who 
believe in magic and miracles is bent on imposing a law on nature [.. Subsequently,
he advised, “Let us beware of saying that there are laws in nature. There are only 
necessities: there is nobody who commands, nobody who obeys, nobody who trespasses.” '^
Such a cosmos constitutes a realm of ten or and uncertainty for the weak, but a
veritable playground for the ‘gods.’^  ^ God himself, however, remains a chimerical
projection, whose death is famously celebrated in Nietzsche’s “Parable of the Madman”:
“God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him.”^^ By this, he meant that the
idea of God is becoming no longer tenable, though this radical notion is only just
“beginning to cast its first shadows over Europe”.®^ Although Nietzsche commended the
Greek and Roman pantheons as reflections of ‘healthy’ human self-confidence and
self-projection,^^ he vehemently attacked the nonsensical banalities of the Christian God,
who supersedes and simultaneously devalues the material world, and denigrates
humankind’s natural powers:
A god who conceives children with a mortal woman; a wise man who calls upon 
us to work no more, to judge no more, but to heed the signs of the imminent
GS 172-173. A primary, underlying concern was that scientific presuppositions o f natural order implied 
the existence of a universal ‘law-giver.’ Hence, “I beware o f speaking o f chemical ‘laws’: that savors of 
morality.” [WP 336 (1885)]
HA 82.
GS 168. Nietzsche employed the notion o f ‘necessity’ with extreme caution to avoid implying an implicit 
imperative within nature. His teleological queasiness over the term is evident in WP 229-300 [1887]: “That 
the apparent ‘purposiveness’ (‘that puiposiveness which endlessly suipasses all the arts o f man’) is merely 
the consequence o f the will to power manifest in all events; that becoming stronger involves an ordering 
process which looks like a sketchy puiposiveness; that apparent ends are not intentional but as soon as 
dominion is established over a lesser power and the latter operates as a function o f the greater power, an order 
of rank, o f organization is bound to produce the appearance o f an order o f means and ends. Against apparent 
‘necessity’:— that is only an expression for tlie fact that a force is not also something else. Against apparent 
‘purposiveness’:-- the latter only an expression for an order o f spheres of power and their interplay.”
For Nietzsche’s rejection of a con espondence theoiy o f truth in favour o f epistemological courage, see 
Mandelbaum 341.
GS 181. Nietzsche took credit for his active role in this ‘theocide’; “Truly, I myself do not believe tliat 
anyone has ever looked into the world with such deep suspicion, and not only as an occasional devil’s 
advocate, but every bit as much, to speak theology, as an enemy and challenger o f God.” [HA 4]
GS 279.
HA 85; GS 195. He noted that the concept o f pantheon itself reflected a cultural embrace o f diversity as 
opposed to the homogenizing tyranny o f monotheism.
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apocalypse; a justice that accepts the innocent man as a proxy sacrifice; someone 
who has his disciple drink his blood; prayers for miraculous interventions; sins 
against a god, atoned for by a god; fear of the afterlife, to which death is the gate; 
the figure of the cross as a symbol, in a time that no longer Icnows the purpose 
and shame of the cross-- how horridly all this wafts over us, as from the grave of 
the ancient past! Are we to believe that such things are still believed?^"
In conti'ast to the chaotic vitality of the Greek gods, “these child-minds with the 
courage of lions’’,^ ' Nietzsche deplored a God who ruled over every jot and tittle of the 
universe- “some spider of finality and morality which is supposed to exist behind the great 
net and web of causality”—“ while pandering to the slavish whims of the plebeian masses: 
“What sets us apart is not that we recognize no God, either in history or in nature or behind 
nature— but that we find that which has been reverenced as God not ‘godlike’ but pitiable, 
absurd, harmful, not merely an error but a crime against life. . In place of a 
disembodied “spiritualized God”, reflecting humanity’s vain attempts to devalue the ‘evil’ 
world of nature, Nietzsche lauded the Hellenistic anthropomorphized deities which were 
forged by “the Greeks of the strongest epoch, who were not afraid of themselves but 
rejoiced in themselves, brought their gods close to all their own affects— Although the 
idea o f ‘God’ as a self-celehration of ‘master’ values would prove useful to his 
philosophical project, Nietzsche possessed no personal belief in a transcendent deity. 
Hence, in his ‘ autobihliogi aphy’, Ecce Homo, Nietzsche wrote: “I have absolutely no 
knowledge of atheism as an outcome of reasoning, still less as an event: with me it is 
obvious by instinct.”^
HA 84-85, In a notebook entry, he outlined tluee distinct stages in human development. The Classical or 
Pagan Stage reflects the life-enhancing celebration of the natural instincts, the “expression o f the ‘will to 
power’ itself’. The Idealist Stage drains the natural world o f meaning in an attempt to confine the instincts 
within ethical restraints. The Decadent Stage negates the natural world entirely, projecting the ideal into the 
‘anti-natural’ realm of the afterlife. He located Cliristianity midway between the second and third stage. [WP 
187 (1887-1888)]
GM 74.
GM 92. Nietzsche criticized the arbitrariness o f formulations o f causality: “Before the effect one believes 
in different causes than one does aftemard.” [GS 210] See also HA 22 on causes as a posteriori imaginings.
TI 174-175. He lambasted the ‘divine domicile’ in T I 182: “Even the slightest trace o f piety in us ought to 
make us feel that a God who cures a head cold at the right moment or tells us to get into a coach just as a 
downpour is about to start is so absurd a God he would have to be abolished even if he existed. A God as a 
domestic servant, as a postmen, as an almanac-maker- at bottom a word for the stupidest kind o f accidental 
occuiTence....”
^W P308 [1888].
'  I_________   '
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B. Space: Nature’s Telos:
In place of belief in a fictitious deity, Nietzsche advocated an ecstatic embrace of
the natural world in its entirety. This closed universe did not possess Taws’, ‘principles’,
‘purposes’, or other value-laden ‘facts’ as such. He contended:
[T]his entire teleology is predicated on the ability to speak about man of the last 
four thousand years as if he were eternal, the natural direction of all things in the 
world from the beginning. But everything has evolved: there are no eternal facts, 
nor are there any absolute truths. Thus historical philosophizing is necessary 
henceforth, and the virtue of modesty as well.^
Humankind must, therefore, become accustomed to the role of a “wanderer” who delights 
in “change and transitoriness”, instead of “a traveller towards a final goal, for this does not 
exist.”^^  According to Nietzsche, no element in the natural universe is stable or static in 
itself: everything is in a perpetual state of flux— changing, growing, destroying or being 
destroyed.^* And so it ought to be, he exclaimed, once a person grasped the ‘Dionysian’ 
truth that the natural order is in constant spin, producing astonishing new configurations 
and then indifferently smashing them into atoms while engendering an infinite array of 
alternatives. The universe offers no preferential treatment to humans, who are merely 
swept up in the ''''bellum omnium contra omnes"'-- ‘the war of all against all.’^  ^ Unlike 
classical notions of fate, which accepted such cosmic ‘cruelty’ with an air of noble 
resignation and/ or tragedy, Nietzsche regarded this ‘reality’ as a cause for celebration— 
“the will of life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility through the sacrifice of its highest
EH 21.
^  HA 14-15. For parallels with Democritus, see Safianski 150-152.
HA 266. Nietzsche employed the metaphor o f drama to denounce the ‘unhealthy’ fixation upon ‘ends’; “If 
the value of a drama lay solely in its conclusion, the drama itself would be merely the worst wearisome and 
indirect way possible of reaching this goal.” [UM 92] For the fecund suggestion o f Nietzsche’s 
epistemological ‘homelessness’, see Salome 15.
Nietzsche was influenced by Heraclitus in these matters. [UM 242] For a summary of Nietzsche’s views 
on the pre-Socratics, see Strong 152-161.
UM 30. See also UM 214. For paiallels with Hobbes, see Zeitlin 11 and Safi-anski 71. Unlike Hobbes, 
however, power for Nietzsche constitutes an end in itself. See Ansell-Pearson 48. One commentator 
obseives: “In his philological studies Nietzsche concentrated on the agon (the contest)”. [Bergmann 4] In 
tliis, Nietzsche proved to be a child of his time. For parallels with “the militarist spii'it o f his age”, see 
Bergmann 180, though Nietzsche assiduously stripped such themes o f their nationalistic and particularist 
overtones. Like Empedocles, Nietzsche, too, could claim, “I tmsted in mad Strife [....]” [Barnes 194] When 
he was only seventeen, he wrote: “Strife is the perpetual food of the soul.” [Hollingdale Nietzsche 109]
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types’’^ ® The strange vicissitudes and variances recorded by human history reinforced for
Nietzsche that humanldnd is simply a product of nature:
But the strange fact is that all there is or has been on earth of freedom, subtlety, 
boldness, dance and masterly certainty, whether in thinking, or in ruling, or in 
speaking and persuasion, in the arts as in morals, has evolved only by virtue of the 
‘tyranny of such arbitrary laws’; and, in all seriousness, there is no small 
probability that precisely this is ‘nature’ and ‘natural.” ^
However, Nietzsche did not banish all traces of teleology from his world view— 
merely those teleologies which contradicted the observably ‘natural’ universe/^ In a 
notebook entry, he once stated that an accurate theory must account for the universe in its 
entirety: “In order to understand what ‘life’ is, what kind of striving and tension life is, the 
formula must apply as well to trees and plants as to animals.’”  ^ The German philosopher 
fervently argued that the will to power, the intractable desire to expand one’s boundaries 
against the holdings of all others, constitutes the necessary foundation of life: “Life itself is 
essentially appropriation, injury, overpowering of the strange and weaker, suppression, 
severity, imposition of one’s own forms, incorporation and, at the least and mildest, 
exploitation Nietzsche carefully qualified the amorality of this ‘exploitation’:
“‘Exploitation’ does not pertain to a cormpt or imperfect or primitive society: it pertains to 
the essence of the living thing as a fundamental organic function, it is a consequence of the 
intrinsic will to power which is precisely the will to life.”’^
EH 50. Even the Übermensch was subject to this intractable ‘rule’ o f nature: “A people is a detour of  
nature to get to six or seven great men.— Yes: and then to get round them.” [BG 99]
BG 110.
See Kain 136.
WP 374 [1887-1888].
“^BG 194.
BG 194. One might cannily adduce the world o f Nietzsche scholarship to verify the agonistic nature o f  the 
cosmos— for every scholarly reaction there is an equal and opposite reaction! Houlgate writes: “ [T]here is 
overwhelming evidence that Nietzsche rejected the idea that will to power constitutes a unified monistic 
principle”, maintaining that such a formulation would reek of metaphysics and veer towards Hegel’s unholy 
Geist, [Hegel 66] Thus, he regards it as “an antlu'opomoiphic metaphor for what Nietzsche calls the ‘pathos’ 
within existing forces”. See also Kaufmann Nietzsche 420. In a later article, Houlgate objects to the 
‘domestication’ of Nietzsche’s terms when they are regarded as ‘open’ metaphors, resulting in ah authorial 
self-negation and empowerment o f the reader’s response which Nietzsche would have deplored. [“Power” 
122] Most traditional scholarship devotes major sections to the “pivotal notion’’ o f will to power. [Golomb 
“Nietzsche” 244] See also Burkitt 65, and Safianski 185, where he avers, “The ominous ‘will to power’ [...] 
builds up to a cosmic explanation and directive of grand-scale politics in Nietzsche’s later years”. Foucault 
credits Nietzsche with ‘specifying the power relation as the general focus [...] o f philosophical discouise.’ 
[Power 53] According to Schacht, Nietzsche developed the will to power as a means to avoid agency while 
explaining “the tendency to organization” in the natural world as “some characteristic rooted in the specific
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By equating life with the will to power, Nietzsche regarded all fonns of moral and
religious restraints as provisional blockages of the grand universal ‘drive’ which
encompasses everything from bacteria to baccalaureates:
To talk of right and wrong as such is senseless; in themselves, m]my, violation, 
exploitation, and destruction can of course be nothing ‘wrong’, in so far as life 
operates essentially— that is, in tenns of its basic functions— through injury, 
violation, exploitation, and destruction, and cannot he conceived in any other 
way. One is forced to admit something even more disturbing: that, from the 
highest biological point of view, legal conditions may be nothing more than 
exceptional states o f emergency, partial restrictions which the will to life in its 
quest for power provisionally imposes on itself in order to seiwe its overall goal: 
the creation of larger units of power.’*^
Subsequently, he strongly disagreed with Darnin’s ‘enoneous’ presupposition concerning 
the primary instinct of biological life: “Physiologists should think again before postulating 
the drive to self-presei*vation as the cardinal drive in an organic being. A living thing 
desires above all to vent its strength— life as such is will to power—: self-preservation is 
only one of the indirect and most frequent consequences of it.”^^
According to Nietzsche, his grand schema of power had an explanatoiy scope that 
was second to none, and could even explain natural life on the cellular level: “Is it virtuous 
when a cell transforms itself into a function of a stronger cell? It has no alternative. And is
nature o f force itself.” [212] Clark gives tlu ee reasons for rejecting the view that Nietzsche personally 
subscribed to the belief that, “reality consists o f fields of force or dynamic quanta, each o f which is 
essentially a drive to expand and thus to increase its power relative to all other quanta.” First, most support is 
derived from the nebulous, unpublished notebooks; second, this view contradicts Nietzsche’s questioning the 
“causality o f the will” and would entail a cosmic anthropomoiphism which he utterly abhors; [Clark 857] 
third, the ‘will to power’ was originally fonnulated as “one human drive among others”. [858] However, the 
unpublished materials are not so easy to discount as ‘rejects’, given the abrupt termination o f his writing 
career. Though Nietzsche obviously disdained the Schopenhauerian and CHistian myth o f the will as a 
centre for causality, he clearly endorsed a recalibrated use o f the term— Schacht suggests an inference of 
‘drive’ or ‘dispositional orientation’, [221] Furtheimore, Nietzsche’s thought continued to develop over 
time, and the teim’s original parameters were radically expanded. Despite its metaphysical ‘baggage’, the 
word ‘will’ arguably served Nietzsche’s puiposes for inspiring human effort to greatness while 
simultaneously undermining metaphysical objections to the fundamentally “egoistical” nature of all living 
forces [Houlgate Hegel 67] thiough use of a pivotal and familiar component of the contemporary Zeitgeist. 
See Safi anski 108. Salome believed that, “Nietzsche’s theoiy of the will points to a merging o f his former 
metaphysical views with a scientific deteiminism.” [106]
GM 56.
BG 44. See also Z 138: “[L]ife sacrifices itself— for the sake of power!” As Kaufmaim deftly exclaims, 
Nietzsche was “not a Darwinist, but only aroused from his dogmatic slumbers by Darwin”. [Nietzsche xiii]
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it evil when the stronger cell assimilates the weaker? It also has no alternative; it follows 
necessity, for it strives for superahundant substitutes and wants to regenerate itself.”’® 
Because the will to power is “[t]he most universal and basic instinct in all doing and 
willing”, Nietzsche explained that it has been previously unnoticed by theorists, “because 
in praxi we always follow its commandments, because we are this commandment.”’^
C. Time: Eternal Recurrence:
Although he intended to write a book on eternal recuixence, Nietzsche never
developed a completed foiinulation of this concept.®” One notebook entry illuminates how
the tenet flowed naturally from his belief in a universe devoid of telos.*
If the world had a goal, it must have been reached. If there were for it some 
unintended final state, this also must have been reached. If it were in any way 
capable of a pausing and becoming fixed, of ‘being’, if in the whole course of its 
becoming it possessed even for a moment this capability of ‘being’, then all 
becoming would long since have come to an end, along with all thinking, all 
spirit’. The fact of ‘spirit’ as a form of becoming proves that the world has no 
goal, no final state, and is incapable of being.®'
The theory of eternal recurrence was introduced as part of the essential ‘psychosophicaT 
makeup of the ‘preparatory’ human being who provides the foundation for the 
Übermensch: “[TJhere is no longer any reason in what happens, no love in what will 
happen to you; no resting place is open any longer to your heart, where it only needs to find 
and no longer to seek; you resist any ultimate peace; you will the eternal recun ence of war 
and peace [ .,..]”®’ In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, existence is portrayed as an indestmctible,
’® GS 175-176. Even mitosis could be explained by his grand theoiy: “A protoplasm divides in two when its 
power is no longer adequate to control what it has appropriated: procreation is the consequence o f an 
impotency.” [WP 345 (1885-1886)] See also WP 403 [1882].
’”WP 356 [1887-1888].
For a planned outline, see WP 544 [1883-1888].
®‘ WP 546 [1885]. Later, he described liis doctrine as ‘reconciling’ “[t]he two most extreme modes of 
thought— the mechanistic and the Platonic”. [WP 546 (1887-1888)]
GS 230. This later becomes a curse uttered by a demon! [GS 273] Kaufmami obseives that the idea is not 
original to Nietzsche. Probable sources include the Pythagorean notion that ten'estriial events recur when 
celestial configurations are repeated, [UM 70] Empedocles, [See Barnes 166], Schopenllauer, the myth of  
Dionysus, the natural science o f Julius Robert Mayer, [Safianski 223-225] and poet Heimich Heine: “Now, 
however long a time may pass, according to the eternal laws governing the combinations o f the eternal play 
of repetition, all configurations that have previously existed on this earth must yet meet, attract, repulse, kiss, 
and coiTupt each other again [....]” [cited in GS 16]
-.v- ‘U-Y- xY..''. . -a'V VU Y: 'Y- ......
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perpetually inverted ‘hourglass’:
But the complex of causes in which I am entangled will recur— it will create me 
again! I myself am part of these causes of the eternal recurrence. ‘I shall return 
with this sun, with this earth, with this eagle, with this serpent— not to a new life 
or a better life or a similar life: ‘I shall return eternally to this identical and self­
same life, in the greatest things and the smallest, to teach once more the eternal 
recurrence of all things, ‘to speak once more the teaching of the great noontide of 
earth and man, to tell of the Superman once more.®®
It is a dizzying piece of logic to conceive of someone who is ‘the first’ to proclaim 
the infinite repetition of existence! For similar reasons, Maudemarie Clark has argued that 
eternal recurrence should be considered as a heimeneutical ideal or ‘philosophical test 
case’ for evaluating the vitality of new values, as opposed to a cosmological statement.^"* 
However, Nietzsche’s erstwhile companion and commentator, Lou Salome maintains: 
“[I]n fact, Nietzsche’s logic, ethics, and aesthetics must he regarded as building blocks for 
his teaching of the eternal recurrence.”^^  It is important to situate the doctrine of eternal 
recurrence within Nietzsche’s overabundant enthusiasm to embrace unconditionally all of 
life in its entirety: “Tome [...] everything seems far too valuable to he so fleeting: I seek an 
eternity for everything: ought one to pour the most precious salves and wines into the sea? 
—My consolation is that everything that has been is eternal: the sea will cast it up again.”®” 
The themes o f ‘anti-telos’ and unconditional embrace were united in the figure of “the 
suprahistorical man, who sees no salvation in the process and for whom, rather, the world 
is complete and reaches its finality at each and every moment.”^^
Because all events are inextricably interconnected, Nietzsche argued that a person 
cannot nullify any ‘negative’ without negating all of existence. Hence, Zarathustra 
proclaimed, “All things are chained and entwined together, all things are in love; if ever
®® Z 237-238.
®‘* Clark 858-859. See also Houlgate Hegel 85, Strong 258, and Nehamas 142-143. Tanner contends that 
Nietzsche’s musings on the topic are too obtuse to foim a comprehensive cosmological theory, [Nietzsche 53] 
while Kaufmann argues that it is “less an idea than an experience”, a state of ‘anivaT wherein man “gives 
meaning to his own life by achieving perfection and exulting in the moment.” [Nietzsche 323, 324]
®” Salome 129.
86 [1887-1888]. There seems to be an intriguing parallel between the strong man’s embrace of
eternal recurrence and the ‘wealaiess’ represented by an allusion in Feuerbach’s The Essence o f Christianity, 
wherein Pamy relates the response of a dying Negro slave who refused ‘immortality’ by baptism: “Je ne veux 
point d’une autre vie, car peut-être y serais-je encore votre esclave.” [179]
 :___
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you wanted one moment twice, if ever you said, ‘You please me, happiness, instant, 
moment!’ then you wanted eveiything to return!”®® While ‘lower’ men shun suffering and 
loss, the ‘higher-minded’ comprehend that, “[a]ll joy wants the eternity of all things.”®'* 
Conti ary to the ‘life-deprecating’ tenets of Christianity or Stoicism, Nietzsche declared.
My formula for greatness in a human being is amorfati: that one wants nothing to i
be other than it is, not in the future, not in the past, not in all eternity. Not merely :
to endure that which happens of necessity, still less to dissemble it— all idealism ;
is untruthfulness in the face of necessity— hut to love it..
In theory, the doctrine thus allowed Nietzsche to savour heartily the kaleidoscope of 
variations in existence without resorting to a stultifying teleology which necessarily 
negated variables deemed ‘umiecessary’ or ‘undesirable.’ Hence, he compared the joyous 
‘strains’ of existence to a ‘music box’ that “repeats eternally its tune which may never be 
called a melody.” '^
II. The Anthropological Tier:
In a letter written on October 25, 1874, Nietzsche expressed his desire to 
comprehend “the whole highly complex system of antagonisms that make up the ‘modern 
world’”.^  ^ He once explained his major thrust as follows: “My task is the dehumanization 
of nature and then the naturalization of humanity once it has attained the pure concept of 
‘nature’ The pathos behind this gargantuan yet paradoxical undertaking is
reminiscent of Goethe:
I gather heart to risk the world’s encounter.
To bear my human fate as fate’s sunuounter [.
Having outlined Nietzsche’s understanding of the universe in broad strokes, it is necessary 
to focus more specifically upon how humankind responds to its decidedly decentred
®’ UM 66.
®® Z 332.
®”Z332.
EH 37-38.
GS 168. This unconditional embrace o f everything ironically exposes Nietzsche to his own criticism of 
David Strauss’s doctrine of Providence: if  all events “contain a revelation of eternal goodness itself ”,
Nietzsche requires “a complete cosmodicy”, not merely a theodicy. [UM 32]
Safianski 156.
Safi-anski 227.
 : : : : : : \
position in the cosmos.
A. Episteraology as Power:
1. Reality Under Construction:
One of Nietzsche’s primary principles is the notion that ‘notion’ itself is not hased
upon external ‘truth’ hut rather stems from the psychological needs and desires of the
truth-sayer.”® Because humankind inhabits a world of hostile indifference, devoid of a
universal Caretaker, cultures and civilizations strive for mastery by remaking the world in
their own imagery:
That which we now call the world is the result of a number of errors and 
fantasies, which came about gradually in the overall development of organic 
beings, fusing with one another, and now handed down to us as a collected 
treasure of our entire past— a treasure: for the value of our humanity rests upon 
it.””
Nietzsche contended that, despite their variety and contradictions with one another, the 
diversity of systems of thought, metaphysics, and morality are united in their 
self-presumed ‘goodness’: “Socrates and Plato are right: whatever man does, he always 
acts for the good; that is, in a way that seems to him good (useful) according to the degiee 
of his intellect, the prevailing measure of his rationality.””’ Rather than sinking into a 
despairing agnosticism over epistemological relativism,^^ by classifying the will to truth as
Goethe 146.
”” BG 39, Z 136, WP 267 [1883-1888].
”” HA 24.
”’ HA71.
”® CaiT carefully distinguishes Nietzsche’s perspectivism: “It is not to be understood as a denial o f meaning, 
of Imowledge per se, only as a denial that there is any one meaning undergirding the world as it is in and of  
itself.” His view is not as individualist as first appears, since tlie myriad inteipretations are fostered “in terms 
of the drives and needs he postulated as common to all human beings”. [Carr 90] Nehamas adds an 
unNietzschean egalitarian and/ or individualist spin on the matter: “Perspectivism does not result in the 
relativism that holds that any view is as good as another; it holds that one’s own views are the best for oneself 
without implying that they need be good for anyone else.” [72] Although Nietzsche believed it is wrong to 
impose universal mores regardless of class and other qualitative divisions among individuals, he 
unapologetically contended that his views are best for the human race, hence, the tremendous vitriol he 
exuded towards opposing view points such as utilitarianism, nationalism, and liberalism. Hence, I favour 
Richardson’s obseivation that, “Nietzsche replaces the bivalent notion of truth with a graded hierarchy of 
perspectives [....]” [290]
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will to power,Nietzsche possessed a universal standard by which to measure all human
‘truths’: a precept was good— i.e., ‘natural’ and therefore ‘healthy’— to the extent that it
expressed and/ or augmented one’s degree of power, primarily by liberating man’s
instincts,^^^ and embraced life in the material world:
Every philosophy that ranks peace above war, every ethic with a negative 
definition of happiness, every metaphysics and physics that knows some finale, 
some final state of some sort, every predominantly aesthetic or religious craving 
for some Apart, Beyond, Outside, Above, permits the question whether it was not 
sickness that inspired the philosopher. The unconscious disguise of physiological 
needs under the cloaks of the objective, ideal, purely spiritual goes to frightening 
lengths
In The Gay Science, Nietzsche observed that humankind lives its entire life on a
‘must-know’ basis: “Gradually, man has become a fantastic animal that has to fulfill one
more condition of existence than any other animal: man has to believe, to know, fr om time
to time w h y  he exists: his race cannot flourish without a periodic trust in life— without faith
in reason in /i/g.”'”’ Like the ancient Greeks, Nietzsche cherished an attitude of reverent
wonder towards the natural world:
But to stand in the midst of this rerum Concordia discors and of this whole 
maiwellous uncertainty and rich ambiguity of existence without questioning, 
without trembling with the craving and the rapture of such questioning, without at 
least hating the person who questions, perhaps even finding him faintly amusing— 
that is what I feel to be contemptible, and this is the feeling for which I look first
Nietzsche cautiously approved o f will to truth “[o]nly insofar as the truthful man possesses the 
unconditional will to justice [...] whereas in the eyes of less clear-sighted men a whole host o f the most 
various drives— curiosity, flight from boredom, envy, vanity, the desire for amusement, for example— can be 
involved in the stiiving for truth”. [UM 88-89] As Richardson thoroughly points out, Nietzsche’s life work 
as a philosopher reflects his personal endorsement o f the will to tinth. [220-231]
Clark con ectly asserts that Nietzsche did not reject morality for ‘restricting the satisfaction of natural 
impulses’: “He finds what is natural and ‘inestimable’ in any morality in the hatred it teaches o f simply 
following one’s impulses, o f any ‘all-too-great freedom’: it teaches ‘obedience over a long period o f time and 
in a single direction’.” [853] However, I would qualify her statement by contending that Nietzsche rejects 
those moralities which suppress rather than strengthen what he regards as ‘essential’, life-enhancing 
instincts. Despite the flirtatious bravado exhibited in an 1882 letter to his darling Lou— “Mind? What is 
‘mind’ to me? What does knowledge matter? I treasure nothing except impulse [....]”— [Salome 91] he 
neither envisioned nor desired an ethical ‘free-for-all’— merely a ‘free-for-some’.
GS 34. See also HA 213. For genuine “truth” as “life-enhancing”, see UM 71. In addition to Chiistianity, 
Buddhism, and other ‘life-defeating’ tenets, Nietzsche identified an ‘oversaturation o f history’ as ‘disrupting 
the instincts of a people’ thi ough a paralysis-inducing self-consciousness. [UM 83] For the “unfree man” as 
“a disgrace to nature” and ‘unnatural’, see UM 252: “If it should become aware of itself, unnature can only 
long for nothingness [....]”
102 GS 75.
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Hence, he advised humanity to renounce its ‘childish ways’ and shed any cognitive
‘exoskeletons’ which formerly protected life but now constrict it:
But perhaps this error [repressing the instincts] was as necessary for you then, 
when you were still a different person— you are always a different person as are 
all your present ‘truths’, being a skin, as it were, that concealed and covered a 
gi*eat deal that you were not yet pennitted to see. What killed that opinion for you 
was your new life and not your reason: you no longer need it, and now it 
collapses and unreason crawls out of it into the light like a worm.'”'*
The problem of epistemology simply is the over-vaunted, untenable position of 
‘tmth’ itself, which plagued scientists and Salvationists alike: “the same overestiination of 
the tmth (more accurately: the same belief that the tmth is above evaluation and 
criticism).”'”® Subsequently, Nietzsche unleashed his ‘battle cry’: “[T]he value of truth 
must for once, by way of experiment, be called into qiiestionC^^^ It must be emphasized 
that Nietzsche was not a proponent of nihilistic relativism, but merely opposed those 
traditional formulations of tmth which he deemed as ‘diseased’ or ‘life-inhibiting’, 
prefening openness to a multiplicity of perspectives. Hence, he could still exclaim with 
near-evangelical fervour: “Tmth has had to be fought for every step of the way, almost 
everything dear to our hearts, on which our love and our trust in life depend, has had to he 
sacrificed to it. Greatness of soul is needed for it: the service of truth is the hardest 
service.” '”’
2. Dis-Ontologizing Being:
Because ‘truth’ is ineluctably conditioned by the conscious and unconscious drives 
of the tmth-seeker, Nietzsche contended that it was impossible to distinguish appearances 
versus ‘things-in-themselves ’, “for we do not ‘Icnow’ nearly enough to be entitled to any 
such distinction.”'”® Even the ‘clear sight’ of Zarathustra reflects the collapse of ontology
GS 76-77.
'”" GS 246.
'”® GM 128.
GM 128. Nietzsche even suggested that the ‘will to tmth’ “might be a concealed will to death”. [GS 282] 
'”’ TI 179.
‘”® GS 300. See also HA 13 and UM 27: “[I]t is precisely reason that ought to tell him [Strauss] how little of
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into human subjectivity when he pontificated: “And whatever may yet come to me as fate
and experience— a wandering and a mountain-climbing will be in it: in the final analysis
one experiences only oneself.”'”” For this reason, Nietzsche once sketched in his notebook
that a self-critical stance was illusory:
The intellect cannot criticize itself, simply because it cannot he compared with 
other species of intellect and because its capacity to know would be revealed only 
in the presence o f ‘tme reality’, i.e., because in order to criticize the intellect we 
should have to be a higher being with ‘absolute knowledge’. This presupposes 
that, distinct fiom every perspective kind of outlook or sensual-spiritual 
appropriation, something exists, an ‘in-itself. —But the psychological derivation 
of the belief in things forbids us to speak of ‘ things-in-themselves.
Without an Archimedean comprehension o f ‘being’, there can be no absolute certainty of 
human knowing.'" The appeal to ‘fact’ is a cultural fable because, “All meaning is will to 
power (all relative meaning resolves itself into it).”"’ Facticity merely entails what 
previous generations have found useful to their specific contexts and agendas."®
For Nietzsche, existence consists of a never-ending swirl of force and 
counter-force, an orgiastic, eternally dynamic— if restless— endlessness of ‘becomings’, 
which humankind has puiposeflilly ossified into ‘beings’ for the purposes of human 
s ta b i l i ty . ‘Being’, therefore, lacks ontological status: objects do not exist in and of 
themselves— value-laden ‘editors’ have merely dissected the reel-to-reel ‘film’ of 
becoming into motionless ‘ffeeze-frames’ of being: “In the world of becoming, ‘reality’ is 
always only a simplification for practical ends, or a deception through the coarseness of
the in-itself o f things can be determined by reason.”
‘””Z173.
"”WP263 [1886-1887].
'" WP 269 [1885-1886]: “One would have to Icnow what being is, in order to decide whether this or that is 
real (e.g., ‘the facts of consciousness’); in tlie same way, what certainty is, what imowledge is, and tlie like. -  
But since we do not loiow this, a critique o f the faculty o f knowledge is senseless: how should a tool be able 
to criticize itself when it can use only itself for a critique? It cannot even define itself!”
WP 323 [1885-1886]. Cf. Feuerbach: “A fact[...]  is a conception about the truth o f  which there is no 
doubt, because it is no object of tlieoiy, but of feeling, which desires that what it wishes, what it believes, 
should be tine.” [205]
"® GS 300.
' Nietzsche used the example o f lightning to demonsti ate how humans reified the transient ‘becoming’ into 
a solidified ‘being’ by imposing the narrative o f intentionality [will] upon it: “If I say ‘lightning flashes’, I 
have posited the flash once as an activity and a second time as a subject, and thus added to the event a ‘being’ 
that is not one with the event but is ratlier fixed, is, and does not ‘become’— To regard an event as an 
‘effecting’, and this as being, that is the double error, or interpretation, o f which we are guilty,” [WP 288
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organs, or a variation in the tempo of becoming.”"® Nietzsche assiduously endeavoured to 
prevent his emphasis on ‘becomings’ from being assimilated within traditional teleological 
categories:
Becoming must be explained without recourse to final intentions; becoming must 
appear justified at every moment (or incapable of being evaluated; which 
amounts to the same thing); the present must absolutely not be justified by 
reference to a future, nor the past by reference to the present [....] More strictly, 
one must admit nothing that has being— because then becoming would lose its 
value and actually appear meaningless and superfluous."”
In summary, a fundamental ambivalence characterizes Nietzsche’s thought with 
regards to the notion of truth. While he adamantly sought to deny an ontology of being, 
which presupposes a greater, metaphysical Being or higher reality to which man and nature 
must submit, he approved of truth claims insofar as they represent manifestations of 
humankind’s will to power: “To impose upon becoming the character of being— that is the 
supreme will to power.”"’ His response to fossilized ontologies of being was to advocate 
journeys without arrivals and joyfully acknowledge the endless flux of cosmic synergy 
without nailing ‘becomings’ and potentialities onto the ‘crosses’ of brute facts and 
ideologies: “That everything recurs is the closest approximation o f a world o f becoming to 
a world o f being:— high point of meditation.”"®
3. Philosophical Eugenics:
a. Countering Nihilism:
“What are man’s truths ultimately?” Nietzsche once thundered. “Merely his 
irrefutable errors While weaker individuals panic at the notion of a semantic abyss
(1885-1886)]
"®WP 312 [1887].
"” WP 377 [1887-1888]. See also WP 546 [1885] where teleology implied an exhaustion o f becoming, an 
end to “all thinking, all ‘spirit’”. Thus, the puipose of Hellenistic tragedy was not a purgative for negative 
passions (Aristotle) but a transcendence o f  such passions— “fo realize in oneself the eternal joy o f becoming— 
that joy which also encompasses jo y  in destruction...’'' [TI 121]
"’ WP 330 [1883-1885].
"® W P330 [1883-1885].
"” GS 219. Such ‘errors’ are necessary for supporting human prosperity, forming a ‘breathable’ planetary 
‘atmosphere’ “dominated not by knowledge but by instinct and powerful illusions.” [UM 97] Nietzsche
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separating the ‘knower’ from the objective world, Nietzsche rejoiced: “There is no ‘reality’
for US" not for you either, my sober friends.’’”” This ‘ontological freedom’ allows
humanity to modify the world at will by altering one’s interpretative lenses: “[I]t is enough
to create new names and estimations and probabilities in order to create in the long run new
‘things’.”” ' Although many human ‘tmths’ are fallacious, they are still useful for human
mastery of the environment:
The falseness of a judgment is to us not necessarily an objection to a judgment: it 
is here that our new language perhaps sounds strangest. The question is to what 
extent is it life-advancing, life-preserving, species preserving, perhaps even 
species-breeding; and our fundamental tendency is to assert that the falsest 
judgments (to which synthetic judgments a priori belong) are the most 
indispensable to us [.
Such ‘necessary lies’ include the beliefs “that there are enduring things; that there are equal 
things; that there are things, substances, bodies; that a thing is what it appears to be; that 
our will is free; that what is good for me is also good in itself.””®
For Nietzsche, the history of ideas, like the history of the universe, is a saga of strife 
and insun ection:
Woe to him who seeks to darken it [a ‘cherished idea’]; unless it itself should one 
day become suspicious to us:-- then, unwearying king-makers in the history of the 
spirit that we are, we hurl it from the throne, and immediately raise its opponents 
in its place.”"'
One response to the fallaciousness of ‘truth’ and nature’s ongoing dissolution of existing 
power configurations is n ih ilism .N ietzsche once identified three ‘psychological states’
seems to be drawing strongly upon Feuerbach, who contended that every fact “expresses a want, and is for 
that reason an impassable limit of the mind.” [205]
'G S 121.120
121 GS 122.
BG 35. Though one’s capacity for new ideas was limited by one’s capacity for power: “One hears only i
those questions for which one is able to find answers.” [GS 206] This is how Nietzsche explained the poor 1
reception o f his own writings. [EH 40] *
”® GS 169. He singled but the fallacy o f free will as intrinsic to many of humanity’s most lasting j
accomplishments: “It is a step in the development o f the feeling o f power itself to have caused one’s own I
exalted states (one’s perfection)— consequently, one immediately concludes, to have willed them—” [WP 
162-163 (1888)] j
NR 31. See also HA 154. Furthermore, he contended that past taboos typically become current :
conventions. [GS 170-171] :
Nietzsche ingenuously attributed nihilism to the will to tmth, which ironically sln eds the tissue of lies !
upon which it is based. Hence, “Christian piety demands we give up Clir istianity; our commitment to the
28 j
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which give rise to nihilism: the awareness that ‘becoming’ has no goals; the awareness that 
there are no “grand unities” or cosmic schemes in which man participates; and a disbelief 
in the existence of truth.”” Rather than regarding nihilism as a theoretical irruption, he 
viewed it as a natural and necessary outcome of man’s ‘fatal’ will to get to the bottom of 
things, the umnasking of venerated falsehoods which enable humankind to subsist in an 
artificially benevolent universe which caters to human whims: “The faith in the categories :
of reason is the cause of nihilism. We have measured the value of the world according to 
categories that refer to a purely fictitious For Nietzsche, the philosophical ;
‘therapy’ for humankind’s epistemological pathology is clear: in order to liberate the 
Dionysian appreciation of ‘becoming’, the world of ‘being’ would have to be sublated: •
Overcoming o f philosophers through the destmction of the world of being: intennediary j
period of nihilism: before there is yet present the strength to reverse values and to deify 
becoming and the apparent world as the only world, and to call them good.””® Thus, 
nihilism was endorsed by Nietzsche only as a means of demolition to clear the ground for ;
new philosophical constructions, hut never as an end in itself.
b. The Philosopher’s Role:
The intricate organicism of Nietzsche’s thought parallels the intrinsic 
interconnectedness of every element in the natural universe. The role of philosophy is, 
consequently, to facilitate an unconditional acceptance and exuberance for all aspects of ;
nature. In his notebooks, he once wrote, “In the actual world, in which everything is bound -
to and conditioned by everything else, to condemn and think away anything means to 
condemn and think away everything. The expression ‘that should not be’, ‘that should not ;
tmth compels us to admit that our concept o f God is a lie.” [Can* 95] Richardson cogently indicates how the 
dissolution of strength aligns with Nietzsche’s view of a universe in flux: “As the master’s mle brought about 
his degeneration [thiough decadence], so there’s a logic to the dominance o f the slave morality, which leads 
to its own dissolution [into nihilism].” [65]
””WP 13 [1887-88].
”’ WP 13 [1887-88]. Habermas wiites, “Like all who leap out o f the dialectic o f enlightenment, Nietzsche 
undertakes a conspicuous levelling.” [87]
” ® WP 319 [1887, 88].
Hollingdale claims that Nietzsche’s ultimate aim was “the transcendence of modern nihilism”. [Nietzsche 
115]
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have been’, is farcical--’’”” However, Nietzsche’s concept of a universe ‘closed off from
any transcendent interference invoked an ardent conservationism. Because there is no
infusion of new energy from ‘beyond’, no creation ex nihilo, all of nature’s resources are
limited; therefore, new ‘becomings’ are only possible given the demise and reconstitution
of older forms. Such henneneutical recycling is pivotal to the role of philosopher as
Nietzsche conceived it. Like a Nordic god standing warily victorious over his prehistoric
‘kill’, he has to ensure that every metaphysical ‘rib’ and drop of semantic ‘blood’ is
judiciously employed to fashion new stmctures from the corpses of the vanquished ‘titans’.
Subsequently, a form of ‘epistemological cannibalism’ becomes the hallmark of the
genealogical approach to history:
[Ajnything which exists, once it has somehow come into being, can be 
reinteipreted in the service of new intentions, repossessed, repeatedly modified to 
a new use by a power superior to it; that everything which happens in the organic 
world is part of a process of overpowering, mastering, and that, in turn, all 
overpowering and mastering is a reinterpretation, a manipulation, in the course of 
which the previous ‘meaning’ and ‘aim’ must necessarily be obscured or 
completely effaced.” '
According to Nietzsche’s ‘Third Law of Spiritual Thermodynamics’, nothing can 
disappear-- it can merely be re-circulated.'®’ Hence, the great philosophical mission is to 
challenge the ‘powers that be’ in order to prepare the way for the ‘powers that become’.'®®
It is noteworthy that Nietzsche did not personally promulgate a specific societal 
blueprint or political model for goveniment.^ '^^ Such undertakings may have been
'®” W P316[1888].
'®' GM 57-58.
'®’ WP 323 (1883-1886)]: “There is no stmggle for existence between ideas and perceptions, but a struggle 
for dominion: the idea that is overcome is not amiihilated, only driven back or subordinated. There is no 
aimihilation in the sphere of spirit--”
'®® Concerning the concepts o f ‘God’, ‘progress’, ‘eternity’, and ‘tmth’, Zarathustra proclaimed, “All that is 
intransitory— that is but an image! And the poets lie too much. But the best images and parables should 
speak o f time and becoming: they should be a eulogy and a justification o f all transitoriness.” [Z 111]
'®"* In this qualified sense, Kaufmann is correct in calling attention to Nietzsche’s ‘antipolitical’ nature 
regarding his relentless opposition o f “the idolatry o f the state”, political liberalism, and sectarianism on any 
level. [Nietzsche 412] Golomb and Wistrich state that Nietzsche later wanted his publisher to remove the 
contentious statement in Ecce Homo which “supposedly declared himself to be a non-political thinlcer.” [11] 
Perhaps Nietzsche’s political ‘silence’ is a Zarathustran move, reminiscent of Plotinus’ view of Heraclitus: 
“[H]e leaves us to conjecture and omits to make his argument clear to us, no doubt because we should inquire 
for ourselves as he himself inquired and found.” [Barnes 117] Houlgate argues that Nietzsche’s rejection of 
ontology means he can only provide “a metaphorical description of reality whose pictorial content is more
■'f-V.(T- ,'..'.,.."1'
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considered too banal or ineffectual for implementing his epistemological revolution-- an 
overturning of conventional fbnuulations of tmth in order to expand both the imaginational 
frontiers of the species and surpass the bounds of what it means to be human. Therefore, 
to establish another creed or political system would merely be to fall into the trap of 
petrifying ‘becomings’ into ‘beings’ beneath the withering Medusan glare o f ‘objective 
truth’. What he sought, rather, was to alter the definitions and existential parameters of 
what it means to be human. Hence, in an essay on philosophical education, Nietzsche 
contended that the tme educator’s role is neither to nurture a pupil’s greatest strength to the 
neglect of all other faculties, nor to strengthen all of one’s forces and coral them into a 
hamionious order, but to identify “the central force” in each pupil and “prevent its acting 
destmctively on the other forces: his educational task would, it seemed to me, be to mould 
the whole man into a living solar and planetary system and to understand its higher laws of 
motions.” '
Nietzsche’s understanding of humankind was chai acterized by a significant degree 
of ambivalence. As a species which is intractably embedded in the cosmic surge towards 
greater units of power, humankind involuntarily participates in the great felos" of nature. 
Like a vibrant tree, humankind must gi'ow in all directions at once, pressing downwards
appropriate to the chaotic nature o f life than the description yielded by metaphysics.” [Hegel 47] As such, the 
reader is “invited” to supply the experiential-based content for Nietzsche’s metaphorical vision. [Hegel 55]
Given humankind’s historical tiack-record, I don’t believe Nietzsche possessed such overwhelming 
confidence to justify such generous hermeneutical liberties with his work, particularly given his fear o f being 
misunderstood. [EH 96, 104] See Ansell-Pearson for a fascinating overview of how Nietzsche was ;
appropriated by the “purely power-political interests” or Machtpolitik which he rigorously opposed. [29-32] j
See Golomb and Wistiich’s usefol i f  overstated distinction between Macht [“spiritual power“] and Kraft I
[“brute political force”] [8], and Golomb “De-Nazify 20-24. Golomb writes: “The distinction between !
‘ force’ and ‘power’ is based on the assumption that that power is a sublimated f o r c e . [“De-Nazify” 21] ;
Sadly, the distinction seems obscured by a ‘liberal’ dichotomization between public and private, the :
reification o f  power as something possessable which may be harnessed and directed at will— a Zeusian ;
‘thunderbolt’ as opposed to a ‘static electrical’ shock which is generated inadvertently [or not!] between two i
bodies shuffling across a carpet on a mid-winter’s day in the Canadian prairies- and an atomistic definition j
o f the individual as isolated entity who defines rather than is defined by the complicated nexus of ;
relationships which constitute her broader community or communities. In reality, the divisions are more =
bluiTed, and I seriously doubt whether power can be heimeneutically sealed. For example, John F.
Kennedy’s vision of lunar colonization was simultaneously an inspired deployment o f ‘spiritual power’ as 
well as a political coup over the Soviet Union. Similarly, the lines are less clear in Nietzsche’s writings when i
tlie artist exerts force when crafting his medium. For a more synonymous use of ‘ force’ and ‘power’, see WP ■
229-300 [1887]. :
”” UM 131. Î
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into the subterranean murk while clutching at the stratosphere of ethereal excellence.”’ ;
Happily, the tree can be pruned. Hence, Zarathustra declared, “Our way is upward, from f
the species across to the superspecies.””® The notion of ‘human becomings’ energized ■
Nietzsche and preserved him from nihilistic despair, particularly when viewing his
contemporaries: ;
So far they [Geimans] are nothing: that means, they are all sorts of things. They
will become something: that means, they will stop some day being all sorts of i
things. The latter is at bottom a mere wish, scarcely a hope; fortunately, a wish ;
on which one can live, a matter of will, of work, of discipline, of breeding, as
well as a matter of annoyance, of desire, of missing something, of discomfort,
even of bitteiment [....]””
Nietzsche’s timely appearance boded well for the development of the species, ;
which had fallen prey to certain life-enervating obstmctions: “I take it for a piece of good •
fortune of the first rank to have lived at the right time, and to have lived precisely among
Gennaiis, so as to be ripe for this work Philosophy’s gieatest service to '
humankind lies in deteimining which part of nature is unalterable and then 'Hmproving that
part o f it recognized as alterable with the most mthless courage.” '"" The German
philosopher valiantly strove to hold back the ‘sea’ of natural determinism via a program of
cultural ‘dam-building’: “The best we can do is to confront our inherited and hereditary
nature with our knowledge, and through a new, stem discipline combat our inborn heritage •
and implant in ourselves a new habit, a new instinct, a second nature, so that our first nature ;
withers away.” '"*^  By altering the spiritual ‘genome’ of the human race, the role of the ;
philosopher is extended to that of ‘breeder’:
The philosopher as we understand him, we free spirits-- as the man of the most 
comprehensive responsibility who has the conscience for the collective evolution 
of mankind: this philosopher will make use of the religions for his work of 
education and breeding, just as he will make use of existing political and
” ’ GS 331-332.
” ® Z 100.
”” W P68 [1885].
EH 31.
UM 208.
UM 76. Golomb conectly obseives, “Nietzsche rejects crude naturalism and does not believe that the 
innateness o f one’s nature, be it even an individualistic essence, completely determines one’s self.” [Golomb 
“Nietzsche” 244] Otherwise, Nietzsche’s entire project would be nonsensical. I’m not so sure Nietzsche’s 
optimism for change didn’t wane towards the end of his life, rendering his philosophical vision more tragic 
than inane.
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economic conditions.”®
This united the philosopher with the singular focus of human civilization: ‘To promote the 
production o f the philosopher, the artist and the saint within us and without us and thereby
to work at the perfecting o f nature. ,144
B. Comprehending the Universal: The Fallacy of Free Will:
After examining the implications of Nietzsche’s thought for epistemology, 
ontology, and the task of philosophy, it is necessary to elucidate further his views on 
humankind. Nietzsche’s comprehension remains consistent with his universal rubric of 
nature as the ceaseless conflict of “all against all”.”® As Saftanski notes, man is not 
regarded as an “individuum” but a “dividuum”.'"'^  Subsequently, he represents a 
conglomeration of drives and instincts waging perpetual warfare for mastery of the self, 
wherein a “sovereign instinct” emerges which temporarily subordinates the weaker 
instincts as ‘tools’.”’ Even self-knowledge becomes a dubious prospect at best.'"'^ 
Nietzsche did not, however, allow individuals to excuse their self-anarchy, but rather urged 
his reader to “organize the chaos within him by thinking back to his real needs.” '"'^  Human 
‘health’-- a significant theme in light of Nietzsche’s recurring bouts with illness-- is
143 BG 86.
UM 160. Nietzsche’s enthusiasm towards the saint as the paradigm for personal transfoimation from the 
base to the glorious [UM 161] waned in later years. See Kaufmann Nietzsche 280.
145 UM30.
”” Safr anski 184. The meaning is two-fold: a person is divided by competing instincts; a person experiences 
himself via reflection as a “living self-counterpart”. [302]
” ’ WP 203 [1883-1888], BG 37. Such passages do not quite entail “the nuclear fission o f the individual” pe/' 
se, as pithily plu ased by Safranski, [26] but do reflect the dissolution of the individual as postulated by 
traditional metaphysical and ethical systems. Oddly, the divided-self theme finds a parallel in certain 
Christian formulations, and self as straggle was a familiar motif in Paul, Augustine, and Luther [e.g., 
“Selections” 31] I concur with Gemes’ warning against a postmodernist championing o f Nietzsche’s 
‘decentred se lf  in light of his opposition to umestrained nihilism: “Nietzsche typically stresses the 
importance of finding a unitary voice, o f  finding a means to retell history as a pathway to one’s own 
constracted self.” [338] Tanner contends that Nietzsche is “the first person to insist that there is no such thing 
as a substantial self, which can view the world with dispassion, uncontaminated by its environment.” [63] 
Unlike certain postmodern deconstractive projects, Nietzsche is ultimately not interested in epistemological 
Schadenfreude, but in reconstiuction and revaluation. See Detwiler 86.
”® UM 129: “How can man know himself? He is a thing dark and veiled; and i f  the hare has seven skins, man 
can slough o ff seventy times seven and still not be able to say: ‘this is really you, tliis is no longer shell.’” In 
Daybreak, he claimed: “If we would wish and dare to construct an architecture coiTesponding to the nature of 
our soul we would have to take the labyrinth as a model.” [cited in Salome 22]
””UM 123.
WP 408 [1888]. In a bizarre ‘biologization’ o f  tlie will, however, he traced contemporary weakness of  
will to the intermingling o f races and classes: “The man of an era of dissolution which mixes the races 
together and who therefore contains within him the inheritance of a diversified descent, that is to say contrary 
and often not merely contrary drives and values which struggle with one another and rarely leave one another 
in peace— such a man of late cultures and broken lights will, on average, be a rather weak man: his 
fundamental desire is that the war which he is should come to an end; happiness appears to him, in 
accordance with a sedative (for example Epicurean or Christian) medicine and mode o f thought, 
pre-eminently as the happiness of repose, o f tranquility, o f satiety, o f unity at least attained, as a ‘Sabbath of 
Sabbaths’ [....]” [BG 121]
BG 37.
WP 263-264 [1887-1888]. Moreover, one could not attribute a thought to wilful action: “[A] thought 
comes when ‘it’ wants, not when ‘I’ want; so that it is a falsification of the facts to say: the subject ‘I’ is the 
condition o f the predicate ‘think’.” [BG 47]
TI 103.
154 UM200.
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predicated upon one of the “dominating passions” governing the “multiplicity of ‘souls in
one breast’”.”” Nietzsche contended that such drives “have all at some time or other
practiced philosophy— and [...] each one of them would be only too glad to present itself as
the ultimate goal of existence and as the legitimate master of all the other drives.”” '
Thought itself is an artifice dictated by and dictated over the instincts:
‘Thinking’, as epistemologists conceive it, simply does not occur: it is a quite 
arbitrary fiction, arrived at by selecting one element from the process and 
eliminating all the rest, an artificial arrangement for the purpose of intelligibility-- 
The ‘spirit’ something that thinks: where possible even ‘absolute, pure spirit’-- 
this conception is a second derivative of that false introspection which believes in 
‘thinking’: first an act is imagined which simply does not occur, ‘thinking’, and 
secondly a subj ect-substratum in which every act of thinking, and nothing else, 
has its origin: that is to say, both the deed and the doer are fictions.'®’
Even ‘freedom’ for Nietzsche represents the domination of certain instincts:
For what is freedom? That one has the will to self-responsibility. That one 
preserves the distance which divides us. That one has become more indifferent to i
hardship, toil, privation, even to life. That one is ready to sacrifice men to one’s ^
cause, oneself not excepted. Freedom means that the manly instincts that delight =
in war and victory have gained mastery over the other instincts-- for example, i
over the instinct of ‘happiness’. '
The necessity of a centralized will or ‘master drive’, which entails “an end to 
fumbling, straying, to the proliferation of secondary shoots”, came to Nietzsche’s attention i
in the music of Wagner: “[WJithin the most convoluted courses and often daring 
trajectories assumed by his artistic plans there rules a single inner law, a will, by which 
they can be explained”.'^ "' Initially, Nietzsche used the term ‘spirit’ to express “a force Ï
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wholly pure and free”, which can direct “the precipitate current of a vehement will which 
as it were strives to reach up to the light through every runway, cave and crevice, and 
desires power.” '^  ^ This central direction or “higher self does not merely repress the 
tumultuous instincts in the manner of Freud’s ‘superego’, but exhibits “loyalty out of free 
and most selfless love, the creative, innocent, more illuminated sphere to the dark, 
intractable and tyrannical.”'T h i s  remains consistent with Nietzsche’s rejection of 
ontological ‘opposites’, contending rather that there are merely gradations of ‘becomings’ 
rather than clear-cut dualities in ex is tenc e .L ike  the will, Wagner’s “overwhelming 
symphonic intelligence” becomes a ‘sorcerer’s apprentice’, which temporarily secures a 
harmony of the elements and “out of all this conflict brings forth concord”. S u c h  
respites among the instincts are fleeting, for the most part, in light of Nietzsche’s 
conception of the stonn of self
Contraiy to thousands of years of intellectual endeavour, Nietzsche believed that 
humanity owes its existence to instinct rather than to consciousness or rationality.” ' As 
one of the most recent innovations of evolution, consciousness contains the most glitches 
in humanity’s biological ‘software’: “Consciousness is the last and latest development of
'®® UM 201. Although the ‘spirit’ was elevated above the ‘will’ which ‘raged below’, Nietzsche identified 
them as “two drives or spheres” in Wagner. Undoubtedly, the Cliristian and Hegelian ‘baggage’ associated 
with the former term led to its absence in later writings.
'®”UM228.
'®’ UM 203. Î
'®® With regards to ontological ‘opposites’, metaphysical philosophies were most guilty o f “denying the
origin of the one from the other” and “assuming for the more highly valued things some miraculous origin”. ;
[HA 13] His antipathy to antipodes stems, in par t, fr om Heraclitus. See Barnes 102. Houlgate observes this »
‘shared affinity’ with Hegel. [Hegel 22] ’
UM 242. He continued, “Wagner’s music as a whole is an image o f the world as it was understood by the !
great Ephesian philosopher [Heraclitus]: a harmony produced by conflict, the unity o f justice and enmity.”
For Heraclitus’ views on the universality o f conflict and the transformation o f opposites, see Barnes 102-107. ;
The ‘master drive’ provided a parallel to “the ruling idea" [UM 227], which will gain importance in 
Nietzsche’s later thought. See BG 171.
GS 84-85: “If the conserving association o f the instincts were not so very much more powerful, if  it did 
not seive on the whole as a regulator, humanity would have to perish of its misjudgements and its fantasies i
with open eyes, o f its lack o f thoroughness and its credulity- in short, o f its consciousness.” Nietzsche traced ?
the rise o f consciousness to the need to communicate dangers and wants to others. As a result, consciousness 
became a communal canopy o f desires and insecurities: “This is the essence o f phenomenalism and 
perspectives as /  understand them: Owing to the nature o f animal consciousness, the world o f which we can 
become conscious is only a surface and sign-world, a world that is made common and meaner; whatever
becomes conscious becomes by the same token shallow, thin, relatively stupid, general, sign, herd signal :
[....]” [GS 299-300] See also WP 357 [1883-1888]: “We learn to think less highly of all that is conscious; we
unlearn responsibility for ourselves, since we as conscious, puiposive creatures, are only the smallest part o f *
^iinî' iNMiîr
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the organic and hence also what is most unfinished and unstrong.””’ Knowledge itself is 
the product of the instincts, the ‘white flag’ of a temporary truce hoisted above the 
subliminal shadows into the rays of conscious thought.”® Maintaining purity of instinct 
and avoiding “the many lower and more short-sighted drives which are active in so-called 
selfless actions” comprise “the test, the final test perhaps, which a Zarathustra has to pass-- 
the actual proof of his strength.. By contrast, repressed dominant instincts vent their 
fury in acts of self-dissolution and ‘bad conscience.’”®
Nietzsche was, however, extraordinarily wary of using the term, ‘will,’ on account
of its metaphysical associations. Hence, in ajournai entry, he once wrote:
Weakness o f the will: that is a metaphor that can prove misleading. For there is 
no will, and consequently neither a strong nor a weak will. The multitude and 
disgi'egation of impulses and the lack of any systematic order among them result 
in a ‘weak will’; their coordination under a single predominant impulse results in 
a ‘strong will’: in the first case it is the oscillation and the lack of gravity; in the 
latter, the precision and clarity of the direction.””
At the same time, however, Nietzsche wanted to avoid the despair arising fiom volitional 
entropy-- a flaw in Schopenhauer’s thought-- so he emphasized that the will can be 
modified regardless of its unconscious content.”’ Hence, this carefully nuanced tenn 
allowed him to consolidate the ‘opposites’ of subject and object, chaos and order, world 
and Weltanschauung, reflecting the power which “transfonns moments of pathos into 
interpretations and perspectives through which they become enduring creations.” '^ ^
In Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche identified three components in human
us.
”’ GS 84.
”® GS 261: “Since only the last scenes o f reconciliation and the final accounting of this long process rise to 
our consciousness, we suppose that intelligence must be something conciliatory, just and good- something 
that stands essentially opposed to the instincts, while it is actually nothing but a certain behavior o f the 
instincts towards one another." For reason as “a system of relations between various passions and desires”, 
see WP 208 [1887-1888]. Nietzsche regarded philosophy as a '^'misunderstanding o f  the body" insofar as it 
misapprehends the “unconscious disguise of physiological needs under the cloalcs of the objective ideal”. 
[GS 34]
EH 14. Failure to do so resulted in “a man of profound mediocrity.” [WP 359 (1883-1888)]
” ® GM 65-67.
” ” WP 28-29 [1888].
” ’ GM 7.
” ® Golomb “Nietzsche” 255.
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volition. First, there is a physiological component, “a plurality of sensations, namely the 
sensation of the condition we leave, the sensation of the condition towards which we go, 
the sensation of this ‘leaving’ and ‘going’ itself, and then also an accompanying muscular 
sensation”. Second, there is an unconscious psychological component, an intersection of 
diverse emotions and thoughts which coalesce to form “the commanding thought”. Third, 
there is “the affect of command”, the conscious attribution of action to personal volition, 
the glorious-- if at times specious-- self-proclamation, ‘I willed it thus’.”” The person who 
attributes intentionality to an action thus bolsters a particular ‘dominating instinct’. 
Nietzsche concluded: “He who wills adds in this way the sensations of pleasure of the 
successful executive agents, the seiwiceable ‘under-wills’ or under-souls— for our body is 
only a social stmcture composed of many souls— to his sensations of pleasure as 
commander.’’””
It is within this third component of willing that the notion of domination is rooted. 
According to Nietzsche, “What is called ‘freedom of will’ is essentially the affect of 
superiority over him who must obey: ‘I am fi*ee, “he” must obey’.”” ' Such illusions of 
control even apply to one’s own body: “A man who wills— commands something in 
himself which obeys or which he believes obeys.”'” Nietzsche asserted that belief in a 
governable body, whether one’s own or one’s subordinate, is vital to the existential quality 
of human life:
All feeling suffers in me and is in prison: but my willing always comes to me as 
my liberator and bringer of joy. Willing liberates: that is the true doctrine of will 
and freedom- thus Zarathustra teaches you. No more to will and no more to 
evaluate and no more to create! Ah, that this gieat lassitude may ever stay far 
fr om me!
The German philosopher personally doubted whether a person can ever be said to will
BG 48. Ironically, this appears to be a secularized mantra tom from Nietzsche’s Lutheran past. Cf. 
Luther’s teaching on a Christian’s ‘spiritual power’: “fl]n all things I can find profit toward salvation so that 
the cross and death itself are compelled to sei*ve me and to work together with me for my salvation. This is a 
splendid privilege and hard to attain, a truly omnipotent power, a spiritual dominion in which there is nothing 
so good and nothing so evil but that it shall work together for good to me, if  only I believe.” [Luther 
“Selections” 63-64]
”” BG 49.
” 'BG 48.
172
173
BG 48. 
Z 111.
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intentionally an action without engaging in henneneutical gymnastics:
A quantum of force is also a quantum of drive, will, action— in fact, it is nothing 
more than this driving, willing, acting, and it is only through the seduction of 
language (and through the fundamental enors of reason petrified in it)— language 
which understands and misunderstands all action as conditioned by an actor, by a 
‘subject’— that it can appear otherwise. Just as the common people distinguish 
lightning from the flash of light and take the latter as doing, as the effect of a 
subject which is called lightning, just so popular morality distinguishes strength 
fi om expressions of strength, as if behind the strong individual there were an 
indifferent substratum which was at liberty to express or not to express strength. 
But no such substratum exists; there is no ‘being’ behind doing, abting, becoming; 
‘the doer’ is merely a fiction imposed on the doing— the doing itself is 
everything.”"
Nietzsche believed that the volitional ‘hard drive’ within every individual is
dictated by generations of biological and behavioural elements: “But at the bottom of us,
‘right down deep’, there is, to be sure, something unteachable, a granite stratum of spiritual
fate, of predetermined decision and answer to pre-detennined selected questions.””®
However, he was able to smuggle a volitional ‘file’ into the dungeon of spiritual
determinism: though the instincts themselves are ‘constants’, the temporary hierarchies
among the instincts are transitional and established primarily through the imaginative
faculties.”” Since knowledge is a product of the instincts, it is possible to reverse the flow:
To this day the task of incorporating knowledge and making it instinctive is only 
beginning to dawn on the human eye and is not yet clearly discernible; it is a task 
that is seen only by those who have comprehended that so far we have 
incorporated only our errors and that all our consciousness relates the errors.””’
This imaginative category of ‘willing’ provides a means whereby humankind might be 
moulded and influenced by a cunning philosopher, provided that the species can be 
liberated from the sociological and metaphysical ‘shackles’ which currently restrain the 
instincts of modern Europeans. One cannot but marvel at the audaciousness of a man who 
fiercely contended: “You know these things as thoughts, but your thoughts are not your 
experiences, they are an echo and an after-effect of your experiences: as when your room
”" GM 29. See also TI 60: “The ‘inner world’ is full o f phantoms and false lights: the will is one of them 
[....] Merely a surface phenomenon of consciousness, an accompaniment to an act, which conceals rather 
than expresses the antecedentia o f the act.”
”® BG 162-163.
”” WP 263-164 [1887-1888].
■ ■ ■________________________________________ ~ a.,.;,.,.':;.; ^
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trembles when a carriage goes past. I however am sitting in the carriage, and often I am the 
carriage itself.””®
C. Combatting the Christian Obstruction:
Nietzsche identified many pernicious movements within the nineteenth century 
which he blamed for smothering the instincts which benefit the spec ies ,s ince  he 
attacked any politic, creed, or ideology which appeared “not as a means in the struggle 
between power-complexes, but as a means against stmggle itself’.'®” Such principles 
deemed “hostile to life” were embodied in communism,'®' socialism,'®’ liberalism,'®® 
democracy,utilitarianism,'®® populist-driven nationalism,'®” women’s movements,'®’ 
and most contemporary foims of ethics and rel ig ion.However,  Nietzsche was a 
particularly vociferous opponent of Christianity and its doctrine of fiee will. '^  ^ He first 
theorized that the doctrine had originated as “an invention of ruling classes”, who merely 
projected their socio-political fi’eedoms onto the metaphysical domain.'”” Nietzsche
GS 85. 
Z 12.
WP 77 [1885].
BG 52, WP 462 [1888]. 
GM 129,
’” It is essential to emphasize that Nietzsche did not desire an unleashing of all instincts, but merely those 
hat he deemed “ascending instincts”. [WP 217(1888)]
®” GM 57.
®' GM 57.
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®® TI 80. He similarly attacked the Rousseauian view o f social contract, arguing that no two actions can have 
equal value, thus obviating any exchangeability. [WP 489 (1887-1888)]
®” BG 171.
®’ BG 166.
®® GM 129,
®” Nietzsche did attribute Clu'istianity’s decline into mediocrity in part to its seiwitude to “the mills o f state 
power”. [UM 166] Ironically, had he read Luther more closely, he would have found an unexpected ally: 
“[W]e do everything of necessity, and nothing by ‘free-will’”, though Nietzsche would have despised tlie 
inference o f human sinfulness and accompanying appeal to divine grace for genuine liberty. Contra 
Erasmus, Luther attributed free will to God alone. {Selections 188] In his introduction to Lou Salome’s book, 
Mandel helpfully situates Nietzsche’s views o f Cliristianity within the chaos that ensued following his 
father’s death when his family relocated to Naumburg, whose “tenifying bourgeois cbriventionality, 
confor-misrn, and religious conservatism seeped into his being as afflictions he Called 'NaUmburger Tugend\ 
a superficial decorum or respectability”. [Salome xiv] Ironically, Bergmann claims that his father’s death 
was instigated by the failed political reforms of Friedrich Wilhelm IV, and their religious accoutrements, 
with which he strove to revitalize the German state. This led to mass discrediting of Cluistianity. [180-181] 
Safranski insightfully links Nietzsche’s drive for self-discipline to the vacuum of paternal authority in his 
life. [32]
'””NR57.
a-:-;: .3' .
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attributed the widespread dissemination of this most powerful illusion to human arrogance:
[M]an is the fi*ee being in a world of unfreedom, the eternal miracle worker 
whether he does good or ill, the astonishing exception, the superbeast and almost- 
god, the meaning of creation which cannot be thought away, the solution of the 
cosmic riddle, the mighty ruler over nature and the despiser of it, the creature 
which calls its histoi*y world history\-- Vanitas vanitatum homo^^^
However, free will had become a coiTupted tool in the hands of the rabble for the sole 
purpose of ritual condemnation: “[0]ne has deprived becoming of its innocence if being in 
this or that state is traced back to its will, to intentions, to accountable acts: the doctrine of 
will has been invented essentially for the puipose of punishment, that is offinding 
guilty''^^^
Nietzsche maintained that the core Christian doctrines of sin and guilt, reward and 
punishment, were consti*ucted upon the false attribution of causal relations between man’s 
actions and his conscious will— “a magically effective force”— without due 
consideration for the intractable nature of human instincts ,the inescapable bias of the 
injured person who judges the ‘perpetrator’, the unalterable variables of biological lineage 
and culture, and the ‘pinball’ erraticisrn of any given action on account of conflicting wills 
and unpredictable consequences in the natural w o r ld ,n o t  to mention the duplicitous 
means by which the ‘righteous’ victim gains power over the ‘simrer’T'^ In light of the 
knowledge that “the history of moral feelings is the history of an error, an err or called 
‘responsibility’, which in turn rests on an error called ‘freedom of the will’”,^ ^^  Nietzsche 
declared that the very act of judging is, itself, the greatest injustice.'®  ^ Because Nietzsche’s 
philosophical project to exhume the ‘evil’ instincts and return the species to a more
NR 199.
TI 64. See also NR 58; “Now, belief in freedom o f the will is incompatible precisely with the idea o f a 
continuous, homogeneous, undivided, indivisible flowing: it presupposes that every individual action is 
isolate and indivisible', it is an atomism in the domain o f willing and knowing.”
GS 183.
BG 63.
HA 43-44.
“Oh, how much superfluous cruelty and vivisection have proceeded from those religions which invented 
sin! And from those people who desired by means o f it to gain the highest enjoyment o f their power!” 
[Daybreak, cited in Golomb “De-Nazify” 33] Cf. Feuerbach 74; “Supplication is the means, under the guise 
of humility and submission, of exercising one’s power and superiority over another being.”
HA 43. He later declared that, “[t]me modesty” entails the awareness that “we are not our own creations” 
and therefore not responsible for our actions. [HA 248]
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‘natural’ evolutionary trajectory conflicted with the conventional morality of the
nineteenth century, he sought to undermine the transcendental truth claims of Christian
e th ics .Hence ,  he argued,
[BJetween good and evil actions there is no difference in type; at most, a 
difference in degree. Good actions are sublimated evil actions; evil actions are 
good actions become coarse and stupid. The individual’s only demand, for self­
enjoyment (along with the fear of losing it), is satisfied in all circumstances: man 
may act as he can, that is, as he must, whether in deeds of vanity, revenge, 
pleasure, usefulness, malice, cunning, or in deeds of sacrifice, pity, knowledge.^”®
Because Nietzsche regarded Christianity as the venomous prodigy of ressentiment
by the masses against the privileged c las ses ,he  exclaimed: “I call Christianity the one
great curse, the one great intrinsic depravity, the one great instinct for revenge for which no
expedient is sufficiently poisonous, secret, subterranean, I call it the one immortal
blemish of mankind.. By contrast, Nietzsche forbade men from judging the will to
power: “For this is the doctrine preached by life itself to all that has life: the morality of
development. To have and to want to have more— growth, in one word— that is life
i t s e l f , B e c a u s e  of the close interrelationality of the world and its events, one cannot
condemn an action without condemning the entire man,^”* or even the world itself:
The concept ‘reprehensible action’ presents us with difficulties. Nothing that 
happened at all can be reprehensible in itself: for one should not want to eliminate 
it: for everything is so bound up with everything else that to want to exclude 
something means to exclude everything. A reprehensible action means: a
UM 35, HA 44.
The Genealogy o f  Morality exposed the relativity and transience o f seemingly ‘timeless’ values. See also 
NR 91; “Whoever has overtlu own an existing law o f custom has hitherto always first been accounted a bad 
man: but when, as did happen, the law could not afterwards be reinstated and this fact was accepted the 
predicate gradually changed;— history treats almost exclusively o f these bad men who subsequently became 
good menV Nietzsche’s obseiwation was not a novel one, however, as he was ‘scooped’ by Pascal two 
hundred years earlier! See Pascal 46; “Larceny, incest, infanticide, panicide, everything has at some time 
been accounted a virtuous action.” Nietzsche highly regarded “Pascal, whom I almost love, since he has 
taught me such an infinite amount; the only logical Cluistian.” [Brandes 94]
HA 75. Principles of pain and pleasure are, o f course, rooted in one’s feelings o f power. See WP [1888] 
371.
HA 68-69. Because people wrongly believe that a transgressor could have chosen not to commit the 
infi-action, Nietzsche wrote, “This belief in his choice arouses hatred, thirst for revenge, spite, the whole 
deterioration o f our imagination; whereas we get much less angry at an animal because we consider it 
iiTesponsible.” [HA 69] Ironically, here Nietzsche agreed with Christ in saying, ‘Judge not!’ [NR 81]
202 y j c f  Feuerbach, who regarded religion with its illusory nature as “profoundly injurious in its effect 
of mankind”. [274]
203 W P77 [1885].
WP 180 [1887-1888].
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reprehended world—
In contradistinction to an exuberant acceptance of the world and all of its contingencies, 
Cluistianity sacrifices the temporal for tlie eternal, thus ‘depriving life as such of its centre 
of g r a v i t y . T h i s  ‘myth’ of the afterlife is merely “a moral optical-illusion”, a 
metaphysical asylum from the natural world whereby, “[W]e revenge ourselves on life by 
means of the phantasmagoria of ‘another’, a ‘better’ life.” °^^  Hence, Nietzsche deplored 
Christianity as a “thoroughly thought-out method of psychological counterfeiting” 
“Nothing but imaginary causes (‘God’, ‘souT, ‘ego’, ‘spirit’, ‘free will’— or ‘unfree will’): 
nothing but imaginary effects (‘sin’, ‘redemption’, ‘grace’, punishment’, forgiveness of 
sins’).” °^^
D. Concerning the Particular: Nietzsche’s ‘Magnificent Monsters’:
In light of his dismissal of societal conventions and emphasis on liberating the 
instincts, it is easy to portray Nietzsche as a histrionic revolutionaiy, bent on civilization’s 
plunge into anarchy. However, Nietzsche’s rallying cries were intended for a select 
audience only, his calls for freedom limited to ‘nobler’ ears.^‘° Within any human 
community, he identified three distinct yet interdependent ranks of individuals: “the most 
spiritual human beings”, who break old barriers to found new religions, customs, and 
mores; “the guardians of the law”, who safeguard a culture’s venerated traditions and 
include both royalty and the nobility; and the working classes, who engage in “the crafts, 
trade, agriculture, science, the greater part of art, in a word the entire compass of 
professional activity”, and all of whom would be “out of place among the elite”.^ '^  The
165 [1888].
°^®T1 167. See also Z 42.
Tl 49.
WP 212 [1887-1888]. See also HA 85, 94, 230 
Tl 137. See also EH 67.
Z 299, EH 24.
211
207
208
209
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Tl 191. Zarathustra compared the three classes to ‘camels’ [society’s ‘beasts o f burden’], ‘lions’ 
[society’s rulers], and a ‘child’-  “innocence and forgetfulness, a new beginning, a sport, a self-propelling 
wheel, a first motion, a sacred Yes.” [Z 54-55] Cf. Heraclitus: “Eternity is a child at play, playing draughts: 
the kingdom is a child’s.” [Barnes 102] Richardson also identifies a three-fold “typology” in Nietzsche’s 
antln opoldgy, though he regards them as “types of directed behavior: basic different ways the complex 
practices making up a person’s life can be organized and enacted.” [52] For ‘master’ and ‘slave’ as “basic 
modalities o f individual existence”, see White 683. Golomb quotes Nietzsche’s statement that mediation
________ :____ ;______ =______ !__ i_z__ L 1
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last and most populous class uniformly seeks happiness through service, “the kind of 
happiness of which the great majority ai e alone capable, which makes intelligent machines 
of them. For the mediocre it is happiness to be mediocre; mastery in one thing, 
specialization, is for them a natural instinct.”^Attempts  to impose universal standards 
and mores over all humankind constitute the ultimate injustice for Nietzsche, since
different classes of men are subject to different standards and ‘necessities’:
Over one man necessity stands in the shape of his passions, over another as the :
habit of hearing and obeying, over a third as a logical conscience, over a fourth as
caprice and a mischievous pleasure in escapades. These four will, however, seek
the freedom of their will precisely where each of them is most firmly fettered :
[....] How does this happen? Evidently because each considers himself most free :
where his feeling o f living is greatest; thus, as we have said, in passion, in duty, in
knowledge, in mischievousness respectively.^'^
As a result of his ‘class’ consciousness, Nietzsche’s philosophy is peiwaded by a 
sociological and ethical consei*vatism which prohibits movement beyond one’s natural 
ranlc and advocates different laws for different echelons of society. '^*' Humankind must 
come to the conclusion that, “it is immoral to say: ‘What is good for one is good for 
a n o t h e r .T h i s  way, humanity realigns itself with what Nietzsche observed in the natural i
world: “Order of rank among capacities; distance; the art of dividing without making 
inimical; mixing up nothing, ‘reconciling’ nothing; a tremendous multiplicity which is 
none the less the opposite of chaos— tliis has been the precondition, the protracted, secret 
labour and artistic working of my instinct.” '^^  In an effort to shape the future, Nietzsche 
identified the discipline and skills he cherished within the elevated caste of the past, the 
nobility, whose members “inherited and cultivated a proper mastery and subtlety in
between master and slave morality occurs within “all higher and mixed cultures” and “even within the same 
man”. [BG 195, cited in “De-Nazify” 33]
212 Ygi Nietzsche defined slaves according to otinm: “Today as always, men fall into two groups: slaves
and free men. Whoever does not have two-thirds o f his day for himself, is a slave, whatever he may be: a
statesman, a businessman, an official, or a scholar.” [HA 171]. See also GS 91.'^^NR57.
TI 134, and WP 162 [1883-1888]: “My philosophy aims at an ordering of rank: not an individualistic 
morality. The ideas o f the herd should rule in the herd— but not reach beyond it: the leaders o f the herd 
require a fundamentally different valuation for their own actions, as do tlie independent, or the ‘beasts of  
prey’, etc.” This social conservatism is traceable to Plato: “Plato explained [...] it should be impossible ever 
to mingle or confound the order of castes [....]” [UM 119]
BG 151.
EH 35.
BG 122.
218 I will follow Gemes in employing the untranslated teim, Ubennensch, with its emphasis on ‘overcoming’, 
rather than the pluase “higher man”. See Gemes 358 n. 34.
Nietzsche unflatteringly refened to scholars as “the spiritual middle-class”! [GS 334] Scholarship 
represented the nadir o f creativity: “Like those who stand in tlie street and stare at the people passing by, so 
they too wait and stare at thoughts that others have thought.” [Z 147]
BG 142-143.
Clark 859.
UM 111. Salome contends that “the cult o f genius”—i.e., “[t]he representation of the single, noble
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conducting a war against oneself, that is to say self-control, self-outwitting.” '^’ It is 
necessary to examine Nietzsche’s historical interpretations of the aristocracy of the past in 
order to elucidate the plight of the slave-dominated present and Nietzsche’s hope for the 
future, the arrival of the Ûbermensch?^^
1. Masters of the Past: j
Throughout his writing career, Nietzsche identified the ereation of new values as
the primary task of the philosopher. However, he ascribed different labours to different ;
classes within a spiritual ‘caste’ system:
It is the duty of these scholars [“philosophical labourers and men of science’” '^ ] ;
to take everything that has hitherto happened and been valued, and make it clear, 
distinct, intelligible and manageable, to abbreviate everything long, even ‘time’ 
itself, and to subdue the entire past: a tremendous and wonderful task in the Î
service of which every subtle pride, every tenacious will can certainly find i
satisfaction. Actual philosophers, however, are commanders and law-givers: they j
say ‘thus it shall be! ’, it is they who determine the Wlierefore and Whither of ;
mankind, and they possess for this task the preliminary work of all the !
philosophical labourers, of all those who have subdued the past— they reach for ;
the future with creative hand, and everything that is or has been becomes for them i
a means, an instrument, a hammer. Their ‘knowing’ is creating, their creating is 
a law-giving, their will to tmth is— will to power
In an encyclopaedia article on Nietzsche, Clark explains that Nietzsehe’s relationship to
history is revisionist, not restorational: he seeks to free the future from the fundamental
valuational errors of the past.’’' In effect, Nietzsche’s revaluational mastery of history
consists of the redefinition of what is truly ‘human.’ Although all humans instinctively ;
pursue the furtherance of their personal power, histoiy testifies to men of refinement who
cultivated that pursuit to the level of art, men who ‘lived contemporaneously with one
another’ “across the desert inteiwals of time” like Schopenliauer’s “republic of genius”.^ ^^  '
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Such ‘proud’ men
feel good only at the sight of unbroken men who might become their enemies and 
at the sight of all possessions that are hard to come by. Against one who is 
suffering they are often hard because he is not worthy of their aspirations and 
pride; but they are doubly obliging toward their peers whom it would be 
honourable to fight if the occasion should ever arise. Spurred by the good feeling 
of this perspective, the members of the Icnightly caste became accustomed to 
treating each other with exquisite courtesy.’”
According to Nietzsche, the actions of the nobility remain consistent with the amoral will 
to power which courses tliroughout the natural universe and whose emanations they more 
purely embody:
Even that body within which, as was previously assumed, individuals treat one 
another as equals— this happens in every healthy aristocracy— must, if  it is a 
living and not a decaying body, itself do all that to other bodies whieh the 
individuals within it refrain from doing to one another: it will have to be the will 
to power incarnate, it will want to grow, expand, draw to itself, gain ascendancy- 
not out of any morality or immorality, but because it lives, and because life is will 
to power.”'*
Nietzsche accepted the existence of a ruling elite over the vast majority as essential 
to the development of ‘high’ culture. Hence, in a preface to an unpublished work entitled, 
“The Greek State”, he wrote: “In order to have a broad, deep and fertile soil for artistic 
development, the overwhelming majority must be slavishly subjected to the necessities of 
life in order to serve a minority beyond the measure of its individual needs [..
Through his philological excavations, Nietzsche uncovered an ancient value system in 
which the good consisted in what was ‘noble’ and the bad consisted in what was
solitary, for whose sake alone the remaining ‘mass products o f nature’ exist”-  is a Schopenliauerian theme 
which Nietzsche “never relinquished”, [46] though it was greatly truncated during his period o f disaffection 
from Wagner. [66] For parallels with Hegel, see Kaufinann Nietzsche 329. Kaufmaim distinguishes 
Nietzsche from the lurking utilitarian sentiments o f Carlyle’s “hero-worship”, since Nietzsche’s heroes 
justify the existence of society— not vice versa. [Nietzsche 313] For “[h]is basic principle o f antliropodicy, 
according to which mankind and history are justified only by the birth of a genius”, see Safi anski 191. 
Bergmann attributes the rise o f the ‘cult o f the superior man’ to the collapse of “the liberal dreaiii o f an 
enlightened public opinion guided by the educated element in society” following the upheavals o f 1848. 
[181]
’”  GS 87. Such passages seemingly refute Taimer, who claims that Nietzsche harboured “lifelong doubts” 
about “the concept o f the heroic”, [Nietzsche 8] although Nietzsche clearly rejected Romanticism proper with 
its metaphysical undercaniage by the time o f Human, All Too Human [24]
BG 194.
Safianski 74.
.............................. .................................................................... ................
45
‘ common:
The judgment ‘good’ does not derive from those to whom ‘goodness’ is shown! 
Rather, the ‘good’ themselves— that is, the noble, the powerful, the superior, and 
the high-minded— were the ones who felt themselves and their actions to be good 
— that is, as of the first rank— and posited them as such, in contrast to everything 
low, low-minded, common, and plebeian.”’
The strength of this ‘master-based’ value system was a reflection of the physical and 
psychological vibrancy of the upper echelons of society. Hence, Nietzsche wrote, “The 
Icnightly-aristocratic value-judgments presuppose a powerful physicality, a rich, 
burgeoning, even over-flowing health, as well as those things which help to preserve it— 
war, adventure, hunting, dancing, competitive games, and everything which involves 
strong, free, high-spirited activity.’”” In summary, master morality encapsulated an 
unrestrained, unapologetic lust for life, and the nobility itself came to personify “a 
complete automatism of instinct”, which, for Nietzsche, constituted “the precondition of 
any kind of mastery.’””
According to Nietzsche, the preservation of the aristocratic ideal was a combination 
of careful cultural nurturing- “the accumulatory labour of generations”- ’”  and sudden, 
unexpected avatarial emergences. In addition to the gentry’s attempts to cradle a small 
flicker of human excellence within the ‘cupped hands’ of “the pathos of distance”,” ' far 
from the ‘madding crowds’, a ‘phoenix’ like Napoleon could rise inexplicably from the
Mandel highlights a monograph Nietzsche wrote on the Greek oligarch Theognis, who praised the 
morality o f his fellow leaders as “good” versus the “bad” morality o f the commoners. [Salome xvii] White 
posits that the master is modeled after Kant’s view o f God, who “is not commanded to good actions because 
everything he does is ipso facto a creation o f ‘the good’,” [688-689]
GM 12. See also HA 47. Like Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, Nietzsche did not locate this morality clash 
within a specific historical context. Rather, he ascribed it to “those extended periods o f the ‘morality of 
custom’ which preceded ‘world history’”. [GM 93] Reflecting his love of pre-Socratic Greece and disdain 
for Chiistianity, he once asserted, “[E]verything essential in human development occuned in primeval times, 
long before those four thousand years with which we are more or less familiar.” [HA 14]
GM 19. Nietzsche also juxtaposed biological and cultural factors, attributing wealth as the deciding factor 
for securing beautiful mates, solid education, cleanliness, and physical exercise without “dulling physical 
labour.” [HA 231]
” ^TI 189.
’” TI 112.
” ' Nietzsche defined “pathos of distance” as “the chasm between man and man, class and class, the 
multiplicity o f types, the will to be oneself, to stand out”, and claimed that it “characterizes every strong age.” 
[TI 102] He later described it as the mark o f a ‘gentleman’, the “first thing in which I ‘test the reins’ o f a 
person”. [ÉH 93] For its centrality to self-overcoming, see BG 192.
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GM 36.232
BG 189. Examples o f “the strong German type” included Handel, Leibniz, and Bismarck, [WP 471-472 
(1887)] Houlgate adds an important qualifier: “When he does praise political figures, however, it is usually 
because o f their ‘heroic’ style, rather than because o f specific political achievements [ ....]” [Hegel 245 n. 
180]
GS 84. However, preseiwing class and cultural boundaries becomes essential since, “It is pre-eminently in 
the generations and castes that consei've a people that we encounter such reciudescences of old habits while 
such atavisms are improbable wherever races, habits, and valuations change too rapidly.” In contrast to 
northern Europe, Nietzsche identified a contemporary ‘nobility’ in Italy which transcended class; In 
speaking o f  Genoa, he wrote: “But what you find here upon turning any comer is a human being [...] who 
l<nows the sea, adventure, and the Orient; a human being who abhors the law and the neighbor as a kind of 
boredom and who measures everything old and established with envious eyes.” [GS 234]
This allowed Nietzsche to distinguish himself firom his own humble origins: “One is least related to one’s 
parents [.,..] Higher natures have their origins infinitely further back, and with them much had to be 
assembled, saved and hoarded. The great individuals are the oldest: I don’t understand it, but Julius Caesar 
could be my father- or Alexander, this Dionysos incarnate...” [EH 12]
plebeian ashes of post-Revolution France.”’ The great men who foreshadowed the
momentous changes in the species were not confined to the hereditary gentry, and included ;
men like Goethe, Beethoven, Stendhal, Heine, Schopenhauer, and— at times— Wagner.’” s
Furthermore, Nietzsche did not consider all aristocrats to be higher types of men. Rather,
the aristocratic institutions acted as an ‘incubator’ for those rare and exceptional,
era-embodying specimens, whom he regarded as “suddenly emerging late ghosts of past
cultures and their powers- as atavisms of a people and its morej.’”” Instead of focusing
on the aristocrats themselves, Nietzsche esteemed the ideal they represented, a ‘spiritual ,
nobility’ which seeks to embrace and master life and all of its vicissitudes.’”  Yet such
‘noble’ souls were the paradoxically acculturated prodigies of natural instincts, who alone
were destined to scale Olympian heights on the wings of philosophy:
In the last resort there exists an order of rank of states of soul with which the 
order of ranlc of problems accords; and the supreme problems repel without
mercy everyone who ventures near them without being, thiough the elevation and Î
power of his spirituality, predestined to their solution [....] For every elevated
world one has to be bom or, expressed more clearly, bred for it: one has a right
to philosophy— taking the word in the grand sense- only by virtue of one’s origin; ;
one’s ancestors, one’s ‘blood’ are the decisive thing here too. Many generations
must have worked to prepare for the philosopher; each of his virtues must have
been individually acquired, tended, inherited, incorporated, and not only the bold,
easy, delicate course and cadence of his thoughts but above all the readiness for
great responsibilities, the lofty glance that rules and looks down, the feeling of
being segregated from the mob and its duties and virtues, the genial protection
and defence of that which is misunderstood and calumniated, be it god or devil,
the pleasure in and exercise of grand justice, the art of commanding, the breadth
of will, the slow eye which seldom admires, seldom looks upward, seldom
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loves...’”
Throughout his writings, Nietzsche highlighted several distinctive traits of the
aristocratic ideal, which would become pivotal in his formulations of the masters of the
future. First, members of the nobility embody a leisurely principle towards life- nothing
‘forces’ their hand, whether decadence or duty, country or courtesan.”’ This bolsters a
second essential attribute, genuine independence; “Few are made for independence— it is a
privilege of the strong. And he who attempts it, having the completest right to it but
without being compelled to, thereby proves that he is probably not only strong but also
daring to the point of recklessness.’”” Independence flows from and into a third aspect, a
super-abundance of power which is its own justification and has nothing to prove:
The born aristocrats of the spirit are not overeager; their creations blossom and 
fall from the trees on a quiet autumn evening, being neither rashly desired, not 
hastened on, nor supplanted by new things. The wish to create incessantly is 
vulgar, betraying jealousy, envy, and ambition. If one is something, one does not 
actually need to do anything— and nevertheless does a gieat deal. There is a type 
higher than the ‘productive’ man.’”
Based on these traits, the spiritual aristocracy will transcend conventional morality 
and metaphysics, giving free range to their instincts at the expense of societal mores, 
religion, and reason itself.’'*” Hence, they will act as existential ‘fl ontiersmen’ of the
BG 145-146. Kaufmaim argues against accusations o f ‘biologism’ against Nietzsche, citing his belief that *
“race mixture might favor the attamment of culture— both in nations and individuals.” [Nietzsche 288] He ;
also contends that Nietzsche’s myth o f Polish ancesti y reflects his desire to be of mixed blood. However, :
surely his growing aversion to all things Gennan motivated the Polish myth. Furthermore, his passion for •
pui ity and abhoirence o f hybrids are underlying cuixents in his thought. See, for example, Z 258, BG 40, ;
136-137, 182,W P[1888]461,EH 14, 18. j
” ’ WP 479 [1887]. ;
’”  BG 60. ?
” ” HA 126. It must be obseived that the true nobleman has nothing to prove by either creation or destruction. ;
Hence, he does not become an anti-hero or poster-boy o f nihilism. Nietzsche conceded that the nobleman 
would pass tiu ough a ‘youthful’ stage o f breaking away from his contextual nonns— the “will to
self-determination”-  however, the tumultuous growth spurts o f this ‘spiritual puberty’ are a means, not an ■
ends, [HA 6-7] Kaufinann observes that this non-revolutionaiy tlirust is commonly misapprehended in many j
expositions of Nietzsche. [WP 468 n. 5] J
’“*” GS 77: “Compared to them [the “common type”], the higher type is more unreasonable, for those who are .
noble, magnanimous, and self-sacrificial do succumb to their instincts, and when they are at their best, their 5
reason pausesT  His indebtedness to Machiavelli is most evident here. In a notebook entry, he wrote: “Now, t
no philosopher will be in any doubt as to the type o f perfection in politics; that is Machiavellianism.” [WP i
170 (1887-1888)] Like Machiavelli, he advocated the usefrilness o f an external allegiance to religious i
convention when beneficial to ruling. [BG 86] Cf. Machiavelli 56. Nietzsche once observed that, when ^
religion is no longer a useful tool for a particular state, it will “treat religion as a private matter and consign it !
1
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human spirit, blazing new trails across previously untraveled regions of politics, aesthetics,
and experience, “preserving the species” from the banalities of the staid and stagnant
“farmers of the spirit”:
The strongest and most evil spirits have so far done the most to advance 
humanity: again they relumed the passions that were going to sleep— all ordered 
society puts the passions to sleep— and they re-awakened again and again the 
sense of comparison, of contradiction, of the pleasure in what is new, daring, 
untried; they compelled men to pit opinion against opinion, model against model. 
Usually by force of aims, by toppling boundary mai'kers, by violating pieties- 
but also by means of new religions and moralities
In this way, the aristocratic class will cultivate autonomous, instinctual spiritual 
innovators, the “noble type of man” who “feels himself io be the determiner of values; he 
does not need to be approved of, he judges ‘what harms me is harmful in itself, he knows 
himself to be that which in general first accords honour to things, he creates values 
Ultimately, he will airive at the pinnacle of human development, the banishment of all 
hatred in place of the ‘creator-god’s’ unconditional love for the natural universe,”’
that enormous, overflowing certainty and health which cannot do without even 
illness itself, as an instrument and fishhook of knowledge; [...] that mature 
freedom of the spirit which is fully as much self-mastery and discipline of the 
heart, and which permits paths to many opposing ways of thought [...], the inner 
spaciousness and cosseting of a superabundance which precludes the danger that 
the spirit might lose itself on its own paths and fall in love and stay put, 
intoxicated, in some nook; [...] that excess of vivid healing, reproducing, reviving 
powers, the very sign of great health, an excess that gives the free spirit the 
dangerous privilege of being permitted to live experimentally and to offer himself 
to adventure: the privilege of the master free spirit!’”
to the conscience and habits o f each individual.” [HA 224]
GS 79.
BG 195.
GM 24: “For the réssentiment o f the noble man himself, if  it appears at all, completes and exhausts itself in 
an immediate reaction. For that reason, it does not poison [....] To be incapable o f taking one’s enemies, 
accidents, even one’s misdeeds seriously for long— such is the sign o f strong full natures, natures in 
possession of a suiplus of the power to shape, form, and heal, o f the power which also enables one to forget
’”  HA 7-8.
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2. The Present Plight: The Herd is the Word:
The image of the noble spirit reaches titan-ian heights in Nietzsche. After asking
what makes a person ‘noble’, he answered that it was a supreme passion, “the feeling of
heat in things that feel cold to everybody else; the discovery of values for which no scales
have been invented yet; offering sacrifices on altars that are dedicated to an unknown god;
a courage without any desire for honors; a self-sufficiency that overflows and gives to man
and things.”’” Because these noble spirits are rare indeed, no tenet or principle must be
allowed to squelch the sheer exceptionality of such persons. In an intriguing ‘marriage’ of
physiological and cultural detenninants, Nietzsche regarded the aristocracy’s will to power
as something inherited, preseiwed, and concentrated from generation to generation,
provided that classes and races aren’t diluted through interbreeding.’”  Hence, he derided
the contemporary malaise of Europe as,
the most spiritual expression of a certain complex physiological condition called 
in ordinary language neiwous debility and sickliness; it arises whenever races or 
classes long separated from one another are decisively and suddenly crossed. In 
the new generation, which has as it were inherited varying standards and values in 
its blood, all is unrest, disorder, doubt, experiment; the most vital forces have a 
retarding effect, the virtues themselves will not let one another grow and become 
strong, equilibrium, centre of balance, upriglit certainty are lacking in body and 
soul. But that which becomes most profoundly sick and degenerates in such 
hybrids is the will [....] Our Europe of today, the scene of a senselessly sudden 
attempt at radical class— and consequently race— mixture, is as a result sceptical 
from top to bottom [....]’”
Originally, the “masses” were unremarkable for Nietzsche apart from three 
considerations: “first as faded copies of great men produced on poor paper with worn-out 
plates, then as a force of resistance to gi*eat men, finally as instmments in the hands of great
men 248 In an ironic twist of ‘feat’, the current scenario in which slave culture and
morality predominates over master morality and culture was inadvertently precipitated by
GS 117. Cf. Goethe’s griffin: “Let us then grasp for beauties, empire, gold,/ For fortune smiles on him 
whose grip is bold.” [Goethe II 109]
’”  Conti'ary to Nazism, however, Nietzsche did not restrict ‘master races’ to Aiian nations, but included 
“Roman, Arab, Gennan, Japanese nobility, Homeric heroes, Scandinavian Vikings”. [GM 26]
BG 136-137. See also BG 152, 199; GM 109. Zarathustia likewise denounced ‘the herd’ for its 
interbreededness: “Rabble-hotchpotch: in that everything is mixed up with everything else, saint and 
scoundrel and gentleman and Jew and every beast out o f Noah’s Ark.” [Z 258]
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the strength of the masters. Nietzsche contended that, as the historical aristocracy brought 
more power to bear upon their vassals, “a vast quantity of freedom” was “forcibly made 
latent” and began compounding across the centuries.”  ^ In addition, the slaves’ ‘natural’ 
faith in the superiority of the masters was tarnished by the con uption of certain Roman 
emperors: “For at bottom the masses are willing to submit to slavery of any kind, if  only the 
higher-ups constantly legitimize themselves as higher, as born to command- by having 
noble manners.’’”” Hence, the slaves were ripe for revolt, although their subjugation 
benefited both the species in general and the slaves themselves.” '
In an apparent excerpt from the sermon dossier of Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor, 
Nietzsche declared that the majority of men covet the collective security which a 
hierarchical society offers: “To be alone, to experience things by oneself, neither to obey 
nor to rule, to be an individual— that was not a pleasure but a punishment; one was 
sentenced ‘to individuality’.””’ Moreover, slaves need to be mastered— both physically 
and spiritually— in order to thrive, a craving which manifests itself particularly in 
religiosity among slaves: “If one considers what need people have of an external regulation 
to constrain and steady them, how compulsion, slavery in a higher sense, is the sole and 
final condition under which the person of weaker will, woman especially, can prosper; then 
one also understands the nature of conviction, ‘faith’.””’ His peculiar conception of 
‘existential heredity’ whereby one inherits habit and psychology approximated a subtle 
strand of ‘spiritual predestination.’ Hence, Nietzsche wrote.
UM 113.248
GM 67.
” ” GS 107. See also WP 468 [1884]: “When Nero and Caracalla sat up there, the paradox arose: ‘the lowest 
man is worth more tlian that man up there! ’ And the way was prepared for an image o f God that was as 
remote as possible from the image o f the most powerful— the god on the cross!” Decadence not only incites 
the slaves, it also minimizes the masters’ powers of resistance. See Richardson 64.
” ' On the “joy” that ensues for “the weaker that wants to become a function”, see GS 176. Richardson 
formulates a three-stage process o f subjection, resentment, and nihilism tlnough which the slave passes, [58] 
but this seems a bit stilted given that réssentiment always appears to characterize the slaves.
” ’ GS 175. See Dostoyevsky 295, where the Inquisitor argued that the crowds begged the clergy to spare 
them the ‘hoixific’ freedom which Cluist unleashed upon them. Nietzsche believed that Chiist inadvertently 
helped to eradicate genius when he “furthered men’s stupidity, took the side of the intellectually weak, and 
kept tlie greatest intellect from being produced”. [HA 145]
’53 j j  For master power as the necessary locus o f faith for the slaves, see GS 289: “Faith is always 
coveted most and needed most urgently where will is lacking, for will, as the affect of command, is the 
decisive sign o f sovereignty and strength. In other words, the less one knows how to command, the more 
urgently one covets someone who commands, who commands severely— a god, prince, class, physician,
■ ■  ' . V .  . V '  w  C  l "  3 ,  A .  - : . " ' i :
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That which his ancestors most liked to do and most constantly did cannot be 
erased from a man’s soul [....] It is quite impossible that a man should np/ have 
in his body the qualities and preferences of his parents and forefathers: whatever 
appearances may say to the contrary. This constitutes the problem of race.^ '^*
Because slavery was presupposed in the amoral ‘natural’ universe in which 
humankind dwells, the cultural and political slave uprising was inherently ‘unnatural’ and 
inimical to life i t s e l f . I n  addition to numerical advantages, the slave revolution received 
crucial assistance in their victory over the nobility. Nietzsche believed that the main factor 
which eventually led to the spectacular collapse of master values was a schism among the 
nobility itself whereby a disenfranchised group of aristocrats, crippled by physical and/ or 
political weakness, sought power in a new way.^^  ^ Initially, the religious sphere was 
derived from the political in accordance with “the rule that the political concept of rank 
always transforms itself into a spiritual concept of ranlc”.” ’ However, at some point, the 
priests unleashed a devastating, psychological warfare upon their own class, instigating an 
ethical revolution: the ‘poisoning’ of master values (strength, power, pride, vengeance, 
autonomy) as ‘evil’, and the elevation of slave values (subjugation, humility, compassion, 
industriousness, weakness) as ‘good’.”* Furthermore, the priests dissolved the previous 
valuational boundaries which had formerly restricted master virtues to masters and
father confessor, dogma, or party conscience.”
BG 203. Nietzsche listed tlnee traits— “untoward intemperance”, “naiTow enviousness”, and “obstinate 
self-assertiveness” as endemic to “the plebeian type”, asserting that “qualities of this sort must be transfeixed 
to the child as surely as bad blood; and the best education and culture will succeed only in deceiving with 
regard to such an inheritance.” According to Schacht, Nietzsche unquestioningly embraced “the Lamarckian 
notion of the biological heritability or transmission o f  acquired characteristics”. [335] See also Kaufinann 
Nietzsche 304.
Slaves were useful to society, so long as they remembered their place. Slavery provided a vital historical 
counter-weight to the excess o f will to power which tlireatened to destroy sixteenth-century Europe. [BG 
144] Furthermore, the prosperity of the nobility depended upon the well-being o f the lower classes; thus, 
Nietzsche forbade the exception from trying to become the rule, [GS 131] He also derided rampant 
individualism, which squandered the societal ‘power supply’ by producing many ‘individualettes’ rather than 
one extraordinary individual: “What does the Renaissance prove? That the reign of the individual has to be 
brief.” [WP 57 (1888)]
” ” On the direct connection between priesthood and ill health, see HA 88, GM 18. Clark cites envy as a 
contiibuting cause in the revolt. [854]
” ’ GM 17.
” * GM 18, A similar obseivation on priests is made by Goethe: “Tliey, more than other men, were 
implicated:/ Revolt arose, revolt was consecrated;” [Goethe II 223] The priests were another painful 
reminder of Darwin’s enoneous theory: “Species do not grow more perfect: the weaker dominate the strong 
again and again— the reason being they are the great majority, and they are also cleverer. ... Darwin forgot the 
mind (— that is English!): the weak possess more mind. ...” [TI 87]
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conferred slave virtues solely upon slaves.^^  ^ In place of this two-tier system, the priests 
advocated slave morality as a universal moral code regardless of rank or class. 
Consequently, the priest rose to supremacy and the ‘herd’ became the word throughout 
Europe:
Men not noble enough to see the abysmal disparity in order of rank and abysm of 
rank between men and man— it is such men who, with their ‘equal before God’, 
have hitherto ruled over the destiny of Europe, until at last a shrunken, almost 
ludicrous species, a herd animal, something full of good will, sickly and mediocre 
has been bred, the European of today..
Nietzsche was unsurprisingly infuriated by this ‘unfortunate’ turn of events, 
particularly since it constituted a direct rejection of the ‘natural’ order: “To demand of 
strength that it should not express itself as strength, that it should not be a will to overcome, 
overthrow, dominate, a thirst for enemies and resistance and triumph, makes as little sense 
as to demand of wealcness that it should express itself as strength.”” ' The actions of the 
priests were not motivated by extreme munificence— like those of the higher nobles- but 
by disease, frailty, and the most sordid hatred of life and health.’”’ This réssentiment was 
concentrated in the ultimate weapon of cruelty against instinct and one of the purest 
manifestations of will to power, though deplorably directed against life itself,^^  ^the ascetic 
ideal:
It is again important to stress that slave morality, when confined to slaves, is good and proper for tlie 
well-being of civilization, according to Nietzsche: “As soon as tliere is a desire to take this principle further, 
however, and if  possible even as the fundamental principle of society, it at once reveals itself for what it is: as 
the will to the denial o f life, as the principle of dissolution and decay.” [BG 193-194]
BG 89. He also blamed universal education for providing commoners with the opportunity to pee in the 
intellectual gene pool: “Life is a fountain of delight; but where the rabble also drinks all wells are poisoned.” 
[Z 120] When properly administered, however, education is useflil in converting men into ‘intelligent tools’ 
by divorcing pleasure from duty and inculcating the “sublime monotony” of routine, repetitive tasks. [WP 
474 (1887, 1888)]
’”' GM 29. For tliis reason, I disagree with Tamier’s statement that Nietzsche does not condemn the 
herd-men and is “simply not interested in them”. [44] Altliough they are not the primary focus of his 
‘breeding’ project, [Houlgate Hegel 244 n. 161] their relationship to the ‘higher man’— and ability to thwart 
liis arrival — is more dialectical than first appears. A stronger, better disciplined slave class can only enhance 
a stronger elite. Houlgate’s dichotomization between Nietzsche’s endorsement o f the strong and his 
opposition o f  the weak is a bit oversimplified. See Hegel 72.
Hence, he exclaimed, “Priests are, as is well-known, the most evil enemies— but why? Because they are 
the most powerless. From powerlessness their hatred grows to take on a monstrous and sinister shape, the 
most cerebral and most poisonous fonn.” [GM 19] Ironically, it would seem that aggression mounted against 
persons of higher rank qualifies as réssentiment, whereas aggression towards peers and ‘worthy’ adversaries 
forms an essential part o f true mastery for Nietzsche. See EH 17.
’63 {.Q attack the passions at their roots means to attack life at its roots: the practice o f the Church is
hostile to life...” [TI 52] See also GS 287, BG 88, GM 118-119.
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The ascetic ideal has a goal— and this goal is sufficiently universal for all other 
interests of human existence to seem nan ow and petty in comparison; it 
relentlessly interprets periods, peoples, men in terms of this goal, it allows no 
other interpretation, no other goal, [...] it subordinates itself to no other power, it 
believes rather in its prerogative over all other powers, in its absolute seniority o f 
rank with respect to all other powers— it believes that no power can exist on earth 
without first having had confeiTed upon it a meaning, a right to existence, a value 
as an instrument in the service of its work, as a path and means to its goal, to its 
single goal...’”^
Nietzsche concluded that this “morality of unselfing” is an atrocity against nature which 
must be extirpated at all costs.^^  ^ In light of these developments, Nietzsche lamented, “The 
declining instincts have become master over the ascending instincts— The will to 
nothingness has now become master over the will to life!”^^ ^
The priests’ legacy both haunted and inspired Nietzsche by unequivocally 
demonstrating that actual power can be overcome by something even greater— the desire 
for unpossessed power. Hence, he could not help but grudgingly admire the ‘morality 
manoeuvre’, which had led to the banishment of his beloved aristocratic ideal and 
peiwaded nineteenth-centuiy Europe with the mediocrity of Christendom:^*’^  “In 
comparison with the ingenuity of priestly revenge, all other intelligence scarcely merits 
consideration. Human history would be a much too stupid affair were it not for the 
intelligence introduced by the powerless.””* In addition to highlighting the value of 
revaluation and the danger of desire, religion had assisted the aristocracy by instilling 
self-discipline, honour, and the ability to keep promises into them— the better to rule- and 
by cultivating a more compliant ‘herd’ of humanity— the better to be ruled.”” With
” '* GM 123-124. When an instinct “seeks not to master some isolated aspect o f life but rather life itself its 
deepest, strongest, most fundamental conditions”, then it must be opposed. [GM 97]
” ” EH 67.
266 WP 217 [1888].
” ’ For faith as a substitute for will, see GS 289. For faith as an excuse for not thinking, see WP 248 [1888], 
and EH 21: “God is a crude answer, a piece of indelicacy against us thinkers— fundamentally even a cmde 
prohibition to us: you shall not think!”
268 Qjyj 1 9  Ironically, the latter statement smacks of inadvertent self-revelation. Nietzsche’s relation to the 
church was not simple rejection. He obviously recognized that the church had historically been a gymnasium 
for gently to exercise power and practice tlieir insouciance o f superabundance. Sadly, Luther— a man devoid 
of “instinct for power”— mistook as coiTuption “that luxuiy o f skepticism and tolerance which every 
triumphant, self-assured power permits itself.” [GS 311]
The benefits to the nobility are paramount to “the sovereign individual, the individual who resembles no 
one but himself, who has once again broken away from the morality o f custom, the autonomous supramoral
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Machiavellian optimism, even the ascetic ideal can be useful in purifying the will to power, 
protecting society from nihilistic despair, pooling the societal reservoir of available 
physical and spiritual resources, and thus preparing the way for a self-mastery which 
would be exemplified by the Übermensch}^^
3. The Hope of the Future: Rise of the Übermensch:
Across his survey of human history, Nietzsche had obseived a miasma of
mediocrity. Through this spiritual smog, however, the towering figures of great men rose
mountainous above the tumult, fomiing “a kind of bridge across the turbulent sti eam of
becoming.”^^  ^ These giants transcended their forebears, participating in an “exalted
spirit-dialogue” with their equals, “undisturbed by the excited chattering dwarfs who creep
about beneath them”.^ ^^  This great “chain” of human exemplars served to unite the species
and supply “the fundamental idea of faith in hunianity”.^ ^^  Despite the travesty of the
domination of “the lower species,” who had all but eradicated the “higher species [...], i.e.,
those whose inexhaustible fertility and power keep up the faith in man”,^ "^^  Nietzsche
conceived of a being who w as- along Anselmian lines- simply too good not to be real:
Conversely, one could conceive of such a pleasure and power of self- 
determination, such a freedom of the will that the spirit would take leave of all 
faith and eveiy wish for certainty, being practiced in maintaining himself on 
insubstantial ropes and possibilities and dancing even near abysses. Such a spirit 
would be the free spirit par excellence.^^^
A concept of ‘spiritual evolution’ provided a metaphorical means of linking the 
erratic yet spectacular specimens of the past— like Caesar and Napoleon- to a future which
individual (since ‘autonomous’ and ‘moral’ are mutually exclusive)- in short, the man with his own 
independent, enduring will, the man who is entitled to make promisesP [GM 41]
GM 105-106, 136; WP 9-10 [1886-1887].
UM 111. Nietzsche employed similar images of an archipelago of greatness in describing Wagner’s 
growing ‘chain’ of great operatic characters. [UM 202]
” ’ UM 111.
UM 68.
WP 19 [1887].
GS 289-290. Hollingdale argues that this is, in part, how Nietzsche personally resisted the will to 
nihilism. [Z 25] Nietzsche’s portrayal of the Übermensch was strongly infomied by his awe of the artistic 
supremacy o f “Wagner’s overflowing nature”. [UM 223]
■ !
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overshadowed the present mediocrity which Nietzsche despised.^^^ Though it would be a 
gross inaccuracy to accuse Nietzsche of seeking to return to a ‘Golden Age’, despite his 
constant urge to ‘press ahead’, there is no shortage of nostalgia and sentiment when he 
gazes at the past?^^ Hence, Houlgate writes: “Nietzsche does not wish to bring about the 
resurrection of the ‘blond beast’, but the sublimation of him”,^ *^ to which Strong adds, 
“[W]hat men have learned in slave morality must not be rejected, but rather 
transfigured.”^^  ^ As Tanner rightly points out, Nietzsche attempts to combine the 
‘incorrigible health’ of the rather ‘simplistic’ master \Herr\ with the cleverness and 
complexity of the slave {Sklave\?^^ However, it would be an overstatement to reduce 
Nietzsche’s vision of humanity to a message of interior self-overcoming for a general 
audience. Hence, the German philosopher delightfully embraced Brandes’ description: 
“The expression ‘aristocratic radicalism’, which you employ, is very good. It is, permit me
WP 471 [1887,1888]: “[I]t is perhaps part o f the economy o f human evolution that man should evolve 
piece by piece.”
Tdimer Nietzsche 46. However, Ansell-Pearson states: “Nietzsche’s aristocratism seeks to revive an older 
conception o f politics, one which he locates in the Greek agon [....]” [33-34] White contends that Nietzsche 
is attempting “to inspire us with an urgent longing for ‘the Master’s return’.” [685] He continues: “It follows 
that ‘the return o f the Master’ coijesponds to tlie overcoming o f nihilism, with the destraction of tlie Priest in 
histoiy, and the Slave within ourselves.” [Wliite 693] However, this would bring the conflict to an end, 
something untenable for Nietzsche. Rather, he would seek to instigate straggle with stronger and more 
challenging opponents, having no time for an ‘eschatological’ state of peipetual Sabbath peace. 
Ansell-Pearson identifies Nietzsche’s failure to provide legitimization for his political theoiy as a ‘fatal flaw’ 
which, thus, perpetuates class conflict between the aristocracy and the lower classes. [41] Habermas blames 
this on the logical fallacy o f his dismissal o f reason, without which he camiot “legitimate the criteria o f  
aesthetic judgment that he holds on to” [96] In light o f Nietzsche’s optimism in the constructive output of  
conflict. I’m not sure it constitutes, from Nietzsche’s view, either an oversight or a flaw. For Kaufmann’s 
existentialist yet enoneously egalitarian reading, see Nietzsche 297: “Nietzsche’s own ethic is beyond both 
master and slave morality. He would like us to conform to neither and become autonomousT -Nehamas 
rightly remarks that the choice of the title “Beyond Good and Evil” reflects Nietzsche’s aristocratic 
sympathies. [206]
” * Houlgate Hegel 13. Kain rejects tlie “obvious” conclusion that, “the Übermensch develops out of, or on 
the model o f the master, not the slave.” [123] However, Kain downplays tlie invective which Nietzsche 
directed towards the slaves and their mediocre values. Furthermore, the priests who engineer the revolt are 
actually a splinter from the master class. [GM 17] Richardson is right to point out that an important 
distinguishing trait is that the masters form a coherent group or caste, while the Übermensch is a rare and 
solitary species. [54] I would disagree with the schematic tidiness- and overtly Hegelian nature— of 
Richardson’s formulation of “a sort o f dialectical progression from master to slave to ovennan.” [68] The 
Übermensch’s arrival seems far more random and accidental than Nietzsche would like.
Strong 258.
Tamier Nietzsche 71. See also Richardson 68. Detwiler obsewes a marked absence o f aristocratic politics 
and “more sympathetic” treatment o f democracy during Nietzsche’s ‘middle period’ [16] Tanner argues that 
Nietzsche “gave up on the Übermensch, turning increasingly to Goethe as a model for the ‘higher man’. 
[Nietzsche 79] I would suggest that Goethe’s influence on the Übermensch [e.g., as autonomous artist and 
self-creator, well-spring of joyous trust, etc.], has been evident from the very beginning and, thus, does not 
support an abandonment o f  one for the other.
i
to say, the cleverest thing I have yet to read about myself.”^^  ^ As Detwiler insightfully 
observes,
His radicalism flows from his ability to embrace Romanticism’s aesthetic revolt 
against the optimism and the rationalism of the Enlightenment while 
championing the uncompromising intellectual conscience that arose out of the 
Enlightenment but that in his view leads to the death of God and the advent of 
Western nihilism.^^^
To escape fr om this world of plebeian pettiness, Nietzsche strove to captivate the
imagination with an artistic model for e m u l a t i on , a  new image of human destiny, “a
higher type that arises and preserves itself under different conditions from those of the
average man.”^^ '* Although Zarathustra stated that such a being has yet to appear in human
hi story,Nietzsche placed his hope in the utter unpredictability of the natural universe in
producing ‘exceptions’:
One does not reckon with such beings, they arrive like fate, without motive, 
reason, consideration, pretext, they anive like lightning, too fearful, too sudden, 
too convincing, too ‘different’, even to be hated. Their work is an instinctive 
creation and impression of form, they are the most involuntary, most unconscious 
artists there are— wherever they appear, something new quickly grows up, a living 
structure of domination, in which parts and functions are demarcated and 
articulated, where only that which has first been given a ‘meaning’ with respect to 
the whole finds a place.^^^
True to Machiavellian fonn, Nietzsche viewed entire civilizations, races, classes,
and religions as useful means to this supreme end- the emergence of the superspecies. In a
notebook entry, he once summarized his philosophical project as follows:
My ideas do not revolve around the degree of power that is gianted to the one or 
to the other or to all, but around the degree ofpower that the one or the other 
should exercise over others or over all, and to what extent a sacrifice of fr eedom.
Brandes 3. This was written on December 2, 1887.
282 Detwiler 190.
Golomb “Nietzsche” 255, See Ii-win’s rich suggestion that Nietzsche’s treatment o f human history 
parallels the Renaissance artists’ use of Hellenistic culture, “drawing inspiration from the Greeks, but also 
allowing themselves enough freedom and forgetting to produce traly great and original art.” [42-43] 
Nehamas portrays the Übermensch as an ideal literary character, “a framework within which many particular 
lives, each one o f which exhibits the unity and coherence he finds so important, can fit.” [167] Bufkitt’s 
notion o f the Übermensch as “violent fantasy” is a bit overstated. [62]
WP 463 [1887-1888].
Z 117. Hence, the nobility had to content themselves with their roles as ‘foreranners’: “But you could 
surely create the Supeiman. Perhaps not you yourselves, my brothers! But you could transform yourselves 
into forefathers and ancestors o f the Superman: and let this be your finest creating!” [Z 110]
GM 66-67.
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even enslavement, provides the basis for the emergence of a higher type. Put in ;
the crudest fonn: how could one sacrifice the development o f manldnd to help a ;
higher species than man to come into existence?^^^ j
!
All of the dejection, human stupidity, and suffering in existence can be endured, even !
justified, if they are swept under a higher cause. Hence, when speaking of the ‘man of j
science’, Nietzsche stated: i
The objective man is an instrument, a precious, easily damaged and tarnished j
measuring instrument and reflecting apparatus which ought to be respected and Î
taken good care of; but he is not an end, a termination and ascent, a I
complementary man in whom the rest of existence is justified, a conclusion— and |
even less a beginning, a begetting and first cause, something solid, powerful and 1
based firmly on itself that wants to be master: but rather only a delicate, empty, \
elegant, flexible mould which has first to wait for some content so as ‘to fonn’ :
itself by it i
This ‘termination and ascent’ was the Übermensch: the ‘supeiman’ or ‘ovennan’ ;
which, Kaufinann contends, was inspired by the concept of the ‘over-soul’ from an essay J
by Ralph Waldo Emerson.^^^ Safi*anski identifies Nietzsche’s first usage of the term when *
he was a teenager, describing Byron’s “Manfied” as an "^Übermensch who commands the i
spirits”.^ *^^ “/  teach you the Superman f  a post-transfigurational Zarathustra announced:
“Man is something that should be overcome. What have you done to overcome him?”^^ *
At the same time, however, Nietzsche specified that the Übermensch is dependent upon the
human herd, who comprise the very ‘power generators’ fi'om which the super-indiyiduals !
‘spike’, as long as society is not inhibited by metaphysical ‘surge protectors’: i
Great men, like great epochs are explosive materials in whom tremendous energy 
has been accumulated; their prerequisite has always been, historically and j
physiologically, that a protracted assembling, accumulating, economizing and !
preserving has preceded them— that there has been no explosion for a long time. ;
282 [1883-1888]. See also WP 464 [1887-1888]. Salome argues that, in Nietzsche’s understanding,
“‘victory’ equals self-destruction of mankind to make possible the creation of a superior mankind”. [19]
” * BG 135. See also Z 44: “What is great in man is that he is a bridge and not a goal; what can be loved in 
man is that he is a going-across and not a going-down.
GS 11. Brandes contends that Nietzsche’s vision was stiongly influenced by Renan’s Dialogues 
Philosophiques, [36] while Kaufinami highlights parallels with Aristotelian “greatness o f soul”. [Nietzsche 
382-384] Kaufinann dates the word back to second century C.E. usage by Lucian, and lists occunences in 
Heimich Müller, J. G. Herder, Jean Paul, and Goethe. [Nietzsche 307-308] Another influential usage comes 
from Goethe’s Mephistopheles: “You prayed with might, with depth that has controlled me,/ And here I 
am!— What horror now can chase/ The colour from your lips, my supennan?” [Goethe 147]
Safianski 35.
29] Z 41.
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If the tension in the mass has grown too gieat the merest accidental stimulus 
suffices to call the ‘genius’, the ‘deed’, the great destiny, into the world?^^
Like the idealized nobleman, the Übermensch radiates cool indifference from a 
glacial core of invulnerable superabundance after having defeated his strongest foes: 
“What is best about a great victory is that it liberates the victor fiom the fear of defeat. 
‘Why not be defeated some time, too?’ he says to himself; ‘Now I am rich enough for 
that.’”^^  ^ The Übermensch will remain impervious to opposing forces, whether external or 
internal, and will thereby epitomize true fieedom.^^"  ^ Unlike the self-negation of 
Christianity, the Übermensch's self-conquering will be merely a means to higher feats of 
m a s t e r y . H e  will implement new values and revaluations while simultaneously
292 rpj iQg The mechanics of Nietzsche’s master-slave dialectic appear far more insidious than that of Hegel, 
since proponents o f Hegel— unlike Nietzsche— may argue that his dialectic is descriptive, not prescriptive. 
See Norman 50, Rice 367, Lynch 43, Nietzsche’s necessitation o f slaveiy is fairly unequivocal, given his 
response to contemporary labour issues— “[I]f one needs slaves, one is a fool if  one educates them to be 
masters.” [Tl 106]— and the treatment of women— “as if  slavery were a counter-argument and hot rather a 
condition o f every higher culture, o f eveiy enliancement o f culture”. [BG 168] However, the eschatological 
actualization of Hegel’s thought- the extinction o f all particularity— may be far more deleterious in tlie long 
ran. As Houlgate notes, the Nietzschean slave at least preseives his particularity by never abandoning the 
desire to reassert power over the master, whether by value inversions or by other means. [Hegel 130-131]
GS 199. For the endorsement o f ‘stoic’ heroics, see also WP 490 [1887-1888].
294 is freedom measured, in individuals as in nations? By the resistance which has to be
overcome, by the effort it costs to stay aloft. One would have to seek the highest type o f free man where the 
greatest resistance is constantly being overcome: five steps from tyramiy, near the tlireshold o f the danger of 
servitude. This is trae psychologically when one understands by ‘tyrants’ pitiless and dreadful instincts, to 
combat which demands the maximum of authority and discipline towards oneself- finest type Julius Caesar 
[....]” Nietzsche’s vision o f autonomy bears a strong resemblance to Hegel’s description o f the ‘two modes 
of consciousness’: “The one is independent whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is dependent 
whose essence is life or existence for another. The fomier is the Master, or Lord, the latter the Bondsman.” 
[Hegel I 182]
NR 233. I disagree with commentators like Kain who attempt to argue for a ‘kinder, gentler 
Übermensch', who thereby becomes a paragon o f ‘self-repression, sublimation and self-overcoming’. [134] 
See also Kaufinann Nietzsche 309-310, Hollingdale Nietzsche 97-99, Golomb and Wistrich 8. Such 
theorizing hinges, in part, upon a false dichotomy between ‘private’ and ‘political’; hence, Hollingdale 
insists; “[T]he consequences following from the theoiy of will to power are, in fact, not social at all, [...] they 
are concerned with what takes place within a single ‘soul’.” [Nietzsche 95] It is evident even fiom the 
example Kain cites as “the best example o f the Übennensch", King Vishvamitra, that such ‘internalized 
power’ is not confined to a mythical ‘private realm’ but achieves external expression in building “a new 
heaven, that is, a new religion, a new religion, new meaning and values.” [135] Nietzsche himself was aware 
o f the subtle elision between public and private, as reflected in an 1876 statement: “Craelty is often a sign of 
troubled inner disposition that yearns for repose, as well as a certain crael relentlessness o f thought [....]” 
[Safianski 157] He also recognized this in his genealogical analysis o f how the self-imposed cruelty of the 
priests manifested itself in an overtly external ethical onslaught against master morality. Furthennore, 
Nietzsche may be accused of many things, but political quietism isn’t one o f them- hence, his rhetorical 
attacks on Bismarck’s ‘grand politics’ and the rights o f women. The Übermensch, like Zarathustra, is not 
destined to stay in his ‘cave’. Kain goes on to acknowledge that the carte blanche ‘poetic license’ which the 
Übermensch receives, combined with Nietzsche’s silence on specified exercises of that power is, indeed.
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inspiring them. Contrary to fascist appropriations of Nietzsche’s writings, one scholar 
rightly emphasizes: “The epitome of Nietzschean strength and self-expression is thus not 
to be conceived as the crude, material manifestation of physical or political power, but 
rather as an internalized, spiritualised (vergeistigt) fonn of aesthetic wholeness and 
creat ivi ty .Moreover ,  this ultra-human could soar over the darkest abysses like a bird, 
tear through human values faster than a speeding bullet, boldly go into the vast realms of 
undiscovered human experience, resisting the black holes of nihilism, probing the nebulae 
of ‘evil’, and emerging victorious, cold and distant as a god, tom and bloodied as only a
foreboding. [135] He writes, “The only kind o f power Nietzsche is after, the sort of power the Übermensch 
must have, is the power to create meaning— a new heaven, a new vision, new cultural values.” [Kain 143] It 
is one thing to extol the ‘creation of new values’, but whose meaning and for whom do they apply? Though 
Schacht argues that Nietzsche envisioned “an ordering transformation, which under different circumstances 
takes such different forms as subjugation, regulation, stiuctural articulation and fixation, and the functional 
integration and harmonization o f constellations o f  forces”, [228] this would be little consolation for those 
who were powerless to resist their ‘harmonization’. For a longer rebuttal o f attempts to minimize the 
‘domination o f  others’ theme in Nietzsche, see Detwiler 157-162.
Houlgate Hegel 74. Houlgate later states: “Nietzsche’s celebration of heroic, cavalier, creative 
self-affiraiation is not mindless or bratish, but [,..] includes—and is deepened by— his appreciation o f the 
value of more mild, other-regarding virtues such as gentleness, responsiveness, and magnanimity.” [ 
“Power” 132] I concur with Ansell-Pearson in dismissing J. P. Stem’s assertion that Hitler was the closest 
embodiment of Nietzsche’s anthropological ideal. [Ansell-Pearson 33] This does not, however, distance 
Nietzsche entirely fi'om the fascist politics which commandeered his thoughts. As Detwiler observes, 
“Nietzsche’s artistic vision carries with it a willingness to aestheticize politics in ways that suggest distinct 
affinities with fascism,” [113] See also Gemes 356: “While Nietzsche scholars may believe that his many 
positive accounts of mixtures, his continual disparagement o f  German nationalism, and his many positive 
comments about Jews exonerate him fiom responsibility [...] I think those who take seriously Nietzsche’s 
dictum that a thing is the sum of its effects and understand how destructive the biologistic rhetoric of  
degeneration has been for Europe will find little solace here.” Though Nietzsche opposed a tyrannical 
nation-state, bmte force, and military coercion, his derision o f Christian mediocrity, cultural lassitude, liberal 
ethics, and the wide-ranging and politically portentous creative liberties which he ascribed to the 
Übermensch— “in Nietzsche’s hands the question o f annihilation becomes an artist’s question” [Detwiler 
109]— suggest that Nietzsche clearly endorsed power over others, albeit a less-than-physical one. Many 
would argue that “a very indirect domination”— [Daybreak #113, cited in Hollingdale Nietzsche 84] whether 
it be aesthetic, spiritual, or emotional— would be far more insidious on account o f its cloaked nature. For 
Kaufmann’s clarification o f Nietzsche’s use o f ‘war’ imagei-y, see Nietzsche 386-389. Hollingdale attributes 
this ‘unfortunate’ choice o f terminology to his naivete in failing to “appreciate the depth o f sordidness to 
which Europe would descend.” [Nietzsche 6] Nietzsche was clearly no fascist; however, to argue for the 
‘metaphorical’ status o f his choice o f terms does little to obviate his bellicose attitudes towards perceived 
agents o f ‘weakness’. See, for example, TI 128: “The weak and ill-constituted shall perish: first principle of  
our pliilantlu'opy. And one shall help them to do so.” Ansell-Pearson concludes: “Given that the aim is to 
produce greatness by rendering the majority, in Nietzsche’s own words, ‘incomplete human beings’, it is 
difficult to see how Nietzsche’s aristocrats could maintain their rale without recourse to highly oppressive 
instruments o f political control and manipulation.” [154-155] For a fascinating collection o f essays by 
Nietzsche scholars and historians on the relations o f Nietzsche and fascism, see Nietzsche, Godfather o f  
Fascism? On the Uses and Abuses o f  a Philosophy, ed. Jacob Golomb and Robert S. Wistrich. The editors 
conclude: “While almost any philosophy can be propagandistically abused (as Hans Sluga has shown, Kant 
was a particular favourite among academic philosophers of the Third Reich!), Nietzsche’s pathos, his 
imaginative excesses as well as his image as a prophet-seer and creator of myths, seems especially conducive
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man can be, bleeding immortality:
Another ideal runs ahead of us, a strange, tempting, dangerous ideal [...] of a 
spirit who plays naively— that is, not deliberately but from overflowing power and 
abundance— with all that was hitherto called holy, good, untouchable, divine; for 
whom those supreme things that people naturally accept as their value standards, 
signify danger, decay, debasement, or at least recreation, blindness, and 
temporary self-oblivion; the ideal of a human, superhuman well-being and 
benevolence that will often appear inhuman— for example, when it confronts all 
earthly seriousness so far, all solemnity in gesture, word, tone, eye, morality, and 
task so far, as if it were their most incarnate and involuntary parody— and in spite 
of all of this, it is perhaps only with him that great seriousness really begins, that 
the real question mark is posed for the first time, that the destiny of the soul 
changes, the hand moves forward, the tragedy begins
The deliberate elision of the human and the divine lies at the heart of Nietzsche’s
vision, the energy of heaven flung in playful, childlike fury upon the earth.^^  ^ For the
German philosopher, the heavens were empty because the earth was full. Hence, he wrote,
It is richness in personality, abundance in oneself, overflowing and bestowing, 
instinctive good health and affinuation of oneself, that produce great sacrifice 
and great love: it is strong and godlike selfhood from which these affects grow, 
just as surely as do the desire to become master, encroachment, the inner certainty 
of having a right to everything.^^^
However, unlike the universal message of Chiistianity or the egalitarian auspices of liberal 
and utilitarian e t h i c s , t h e  promulgation of a “dangerous knowledge” ®^ ‘ which reveals the 
‘true’ meaning of appearances— religious and otherwise— to a select elite of readers^^^ and 
is shrouded from the vast majority of people suggests that Nietzsche’s philosophical
to such abuse by fascists.” [Golomb and Wistrich 4]
GS 347. Tanner attributes the fact that Nietzsche failed to spell out any particular coui*ses o f action for the 
Übennensch to its ‘idealistic’ nature which is “so-far removed from the squalidly real”. [51] White 
persuasively argues that Nietzsche must leave his account open-ended since this ultimate autonomy must, by 
definition, “exceed all conceptual determinations”. [694]
” * Zarathustra thus styled himself “a prophet of the lightning [...] called Superman." [Z 45] Hollingdale 
argues, “The superman is not man’s successor but rather God’s.” [Nietzsche 98] See also Richardson 66 n,
103. !
WP 209 [1887].
See Ansell-Pearson 55: “Nietzsche’s anti-humanist political thinking does not give equal value to every j
individual human life, but assesses the value of an individual life in terms o f whetlier it represents an |
ascending or descending mode of life [....] If individuals cannot attain greatness, they should at least serve it. î
This is the essence of Nietzsche’s aristocratism, as well as the principle on which he bases his unorthodox, !
illiberal, and anti-Christian notion o f justice.” See also Detwiler 113. !
BG 53. :
BG 61, Z 299, EH 24. :
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project was closely modeled after the Greek Mystery religions.^*^  ^ For Nietzsche, 
individualism clearly isn’t for everyone.^ *^ "^
In conclusion, it is difficult to overestimate the sheer existential worth which this 
ideal injected into life for Nietzsche. As Zarathustra proudly proclaimed, “The Superman 
is the meaning of the earth. Let your will say: The Superman shall be the meaning of the 
earth The Übermensch became a mote of meaning in the swirling vortex of eternal 
reeurrence, redeeming his vision from eternal redundancy: “I do not want life again. How 
did I endure it? Creating. What makes me stand the sight of it? The vision of the overman 
who affirms life. I have tried to affiim it myself— alas!” *^^  ^ Hence, the Übermensch 
constitutes both motivational exemplar as well as “biological product of deliberate 
breeding”/*^  ^satisfying Nietzsche’s penchant for the heroic: “Heroism is the cast of mind 
of a person who strives toward a goal which regards him with utter indifference. Heroism 
is the well-intentioned will toward self-destruction.” *^^  ^ Like an alpine lake, humankind 
needs to be eternally dammed in order to be deepened, or so Nietzsche dared to dream: 
“[Pjerhaps man will rise ever higher as soon as he ceases to flow out into a god”.^ *^  ^ To this 
end, Nietzsche laboured vigorously. In light of his vision of the past, present, and future of 
humankind, the next chapter will examine more closely Nietzsche’s specific validations of 
power ‘properly exercised’.
See Barfield 99: “[T]hey revealed in some way the inner meaning of external appearances, and secondly, 
that the ‘initiate’ attained immortality in a sense different fi'om that o f the uninitiated.”
See Detwiler 105: “Nietzsche champions the individualism o f tlie highest type but not that o f all man.”
Z 42.
GS 19. Salome insightfully obseives tliat the Übermensch is ‘an intensely personal and stylized man’, 
dubbing him an “Über-Nieîzsche". [139]
Safianski 271. In keeping with Nietzsche’s rejection o f body/ soul dichotomies, Kaufinann observes that, 
“‘breeding’ is at least as spiritual as it is physical.” {Nietzsche 326] For this reason, I disagree with Golomb’s 
statement: “Nietzsche valued the psychic and the spiritual more highly than the physical and the biological.” 
[Golomb “De-Nazify” 21] For Zucht and Ziichtiing as ‘discipline, breeding, or cultivation’, see Kaufinann 
Nietzsche 304. While commentators such as Kaufinann and Hollingdale argue that the warn of motif was 
supplanted by the ‘new philosopher’ in Nietzsche’s mature thought, Zeitlin argues that, “the fact that 
Nietzsche’s examples o f ‘higher types’ are so often individuals like Alcibiades, Julius Caesar, Cesare Borgia, 
and Napoleon, raises serious doubts whether he merely had philosophers in mind.” [15] A crucial 
hermeneutical factor lies in whether one believes that Nietzsche conflated the role o f philosopher with the 
Übermensch, or whether one aigues that, despite obvious overlap in function, the coveted ‘new philosopher’ 
remains a distinct yet crucial role which prepares the way for the coming Übermensch, Because Nietzsche 
never identified himself as an Übermensch, I favour the latter inteipretation,
” * From an August 1882 note to Salome. [Salome 19]
GS 230.
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Chapter 3: Appropriating Power: Nietzsche’s Concept of Power:
III. Tier of Authority: Valid Exertions of Power:
After embarking upon a brief survey into the secondary literature, the contention of
Keith Ansell-Pearson appears somewhat as an understatement: “Inquiry into the political
dimension of Nietzsche’s thought still remains the most contentious and controversial
aspect of Nietzsche studies.”  ^ Peter Bergmann observes that, whereas “his accusers have
placed him outside his time” by deeming him ‘unpolitical’, “his defenders have placed him
above his time” by regarding him as ‘antipolitical’.^ ** It is highly significant that
Nietzsche did not articulate key roles for particular positions in society. Because he was
preoccupied with humankind as a species and not individuals per se, he refrained fiom
providing tangible measures for societal reconfiguration. The masters must merely be
allowed to rule as masters, coordinating new monuments to moral craftiness and ingenuity.
The slaves must continue to serve as slaves, comprising the stable ‘easel’ upon which the
master-pieces will be displayed. And all must be subject to the ‘aesthetic’ authority of the
Übermensch, whenever one should alight upon the stage of human history. Nietzsche did,
however, emphasize certain exemplaiy enactments of the will to power, most of which
were strongly infonned by his own life. In a notebook entry describing “him that has
turned out well”, Nietzsche declared:
He enjoys the taste of what is wholesome for him; his pleasure in anything ceases 
when the bounds of the wholesome are crossed; he divines the remedies for 
partial injuries; he has illnesses as stimulants of his life; he knows how to exploit 
ill chances; he gi ows stronger through the accidents that threaten to destroy him; 
he instinctively gathers from all that he sees, hears, experiences, what advances 
his main concern— he follows a principle of selection- he allows much to fall 
thi'ough; he reacts with the slowness bred by a long caution and a deliberate pride 
— he tests a stimulus for its origins and its intentions, he does not submit; he is 
always in his own company, whether he deals with books, men, or landscapes; he 
honors by choosing, by admitting, by tmsting.^*^
This highlights a central, pivotal, overarching authority, who oversees slave, master, even 
the Übermensch— the philosopher himself, who acts as grand overseer of the species, noble
Ansell-Pearson 2. For a brief overview, see Detwiler 1, 200 n. 13. 
Bergmann 2.
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“architect of the future”, P l a t o ’s ‘philosopher-kiug’ who rules from an invisible throne.
Under the rather unassuming subtitle, “Why I am a Destiny”, Nietzsche once 
predicted:
I know my fate. One day there will be associated with my name the recollection 
of something frightful- of a crisis like no other before on earth, of the 
profoundest collision of conscience, of a decision evoked against everything that 
until then had been believed in, demanded, sanctified. I am not a man, I am 
dynamite.^
He regarded the unleashing of epistemological ‘ Aiinageddon’ under the same rubric as any
other human act— whether cunningly heinous or seemingly altruistic, all human activities
are exclusively amoral designs for furthering personal power:
Benefiting and hurting others are ways of exercising one’s power over others; this 
is all one desires in such cases. One hurts those whom one wants to feel one’s 
power, for pain is a much more efficient means to that end than pleasure [....]
We benefit and show benevolence to those who are already dependent on us in 
some way (which means that they are used to thinking of us as causes); we want 
to increase their power because in that way we increase ours, or we want to show 
them how advantageous it is to be in our power; that way they will become more 
satisfied with their condition and more hostile to and willing to fight against the 
enemies of owr power.^*^
According to Nietzsche, even historically disempowered people can regain power through 
‘hypocritical and shrewd’ avenues such as obedience, submission, fatalism, ‘objectivity’, 
self-tyranny, criticizing the authorities, and existential detachment.^
Despite the apparent amorality of all human action, are were at least two 
manifestations of power which Nietzsche utterly abhorred. The first is any thought or 
action which transgresses the ‘natural’ categories of class, race, and ‘blood’ and blurs all 
gradations of distinction into one dispiriting herd. The second is any thought or action 
which obstructs the ongoing evolution of the species by miring it within the ‘stasis-quo’ of
WP 520 [1888]. 
UM 94.
EH 96.
315 GS 86, For ‘pity’ as a sign of contempt, see NR 155, GS 176. One of Kierkegaard’s meditations seems 
hauntingly apt: “O f all suffering none is perhaps so great as to be marked out as the object o f compassion, 
none with tempts man so strongly to rebel against God.” [JK 125 (1847)]
W P384 [1887].
64
‘being’, antiquated conventionality, and/ or religious domestication. To ‘fi'eeze’ such
valuable assets— human and otherwise— can scarcely be tolerated within a closed universe
where former values and tmths must be slain for new ones to take their place in the
epistemological ‘food chain’ No metaphysical or religious truths can be privileged in
this god-eat-god world in which mastery of the other is the primary, inescapable goal and
means of life.^'^ Hence, Nietzsche announced,
[We] are delighted with all who love, as we do, danger, war, and adventures, who 
refuse to compromise, to be captured, reconciled and castrated; we count 
ourselves among conquerors; we think about the necessity for new orders, also for 
a new slavery— for every new strengthening and enhancement for the human type 
also involves a new kind of enslavement.^
Zarathustra thus commanded that peace should be esteemed “as a means to new wars. 
And the short peace more than the long.”^^®
With his stylistic aloofness from contextualized particulars, Nietzsche endorsed no
specific political models— whether monarchy, oligarchy, etc. Instead, he cited
Machiavelli’s claim that, “the fonn of governments is of very slight importance, although
semi-educated people think otherwise. The great goal of politics should be permanence,
which outweighs anything else, being much more valuable than heedom.” He then added:
“Only when permanence is securely established and guaranteed is there any possibility of
constant development and ennobling inoculation, which, to be sure, will usually be
opposed by the dangerous companion of all pennanence: authority.”^^ ’
With no small disdain, he once declared that the state had usurped the role formerly
occupied by the medieval church:
In the hands of despots and money-makers, the state certainly makes an attempt to 
organize everything anew out of itself and to bind and constrain all those mutually 
hostile forces: that is to say, it wants men to render it the same idolatry they 
fonnerly rendered the church.^^^
In keeping with his predilection for biological imagery, Nietzsche once compared the spirit to a 
“stomach”, amorally ingesting whatever agreed with it and disgorging the rest. [BG 161]
WP 193 [1888]: “[W]hat good is it to hold with all one’s strength that war is evil, not to do harm, not to 
desire to negate! One wages war nonetheless! One cannot do otherwise!”
GS 338. See also T I31. On the virtue o f slavery, see BG 112, where he described it as “the indispensable 
means also for spiritual discipline and breeding.”
320 2  7 4 . For the many types o f peace, see TI 54.
HA 139.
UM 150.
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On account of Nietzsche’s faith in the constmctive and positive role of conflict in
‘natural’ g r o w t h , h e  generally sanctioned those actions which destabilized old ‘orders’
and re-established new and more powerful ones in their wake: “For wherever the great
architecture of culture developed, it was its task to force opposing forces into harmony
tlirough an oveiwhelming aggregation of the remaining, less incompatible powers, yet
without suppressing or shackling them.”^^"^  Once again, it is important to emphasize that
he did not glorify ‘mindless’ destmction or epistemological anarchy as an end in itself.
The hammer strokes he directed at the hallowed edifices of civilization were aimed and
delivered with ‘science-like’ precision as part of his overarching project of human
amelioration. The vaunted higher-species to which humankind is being urged will not
resort to brute force, but will rather personify the richness and gracefulness of a
meticulously measured self-control. Hence, Zarathustra exclaimed.
To stand with relaxed muscles and unharnessed wills: that is the most difficult 
thing for all of you, you sublime men! Wlien power grows gracious and descends 
into the visible: I call such descending beauty. And I desire beauty hom no one 
as much as I desire it from you, you man of power: may your goodness be your 
ultimate self-oveipowering.^^^
The genuine hero cannot define himself exclusively based on external conflict “under the
impulse of a moment” but must personify the coldest potency under the sway of no
occipital goals or mores, acting purely for its own inscrutable sake; for, Nietzsche believed:
Blind indulgence of an affect, regardless of whether it be a generous and 
compassionate or belligerent affect, is the cause of the greatest of evils.
Greatness of character does not consist in not possessing these affects— on the 
contrary, one possesses them to the highest degree- but in having them under 
control. And even that without any pleasure in this restraint, but merely 
because—
This chapter will examine six key strategies endorsed by Nietzsche in the
See, for example, EH 17: “[E]veiy growth reveals itself in the seeking out o f a powerfol opponent— or 
problem: for a philosopher who is warlike also challenges problems to a duel.”
HA 168. Nietzsche regai'ded socialism as ‘despotic’ since it desires a ‘despotic’ degree o f executive 
power and seeks to destroy the individual by reducing him to “an expedient organ o f the community'' [HA 
226]
32: Z 141.
326 WP 490 [1887-1888].
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performance of his vital task of salvaging humankind from its current existential plight.
These six dispensations of power contain at least one unifying factor- the ratification and
‘spiritualization’ of adversity in light of Nietzsche’s fundamental motto fi*om “the military
school of life”— “What does not kill me makes me stronger.”^^  ^ He argued:
A new creation in particular, the new Reich for instance, has more need of 
enemies than fiiends: only in opposition does it feel itself necessary, only in 
opposition does it become necessary.... We adopt the same attitude towards the 
‘enemy within’: there too we have spiritualized enmity, there too we have grasped 
its value. One is fruitful only at the cost of being rich in contradictions; one 
remains young only on condition the soul does not relax, does not long for peace 
[....] one has renounced grand life when one renounces war..
The major activities which comprise the exercise and expansion of power include the 
deteimination of new values, the destruction of antiquated mores, the embracing of 
suffering, the employiuent of cruelty, the aestheticizing of the world, and the breeding of 
the species.^^^
33.
328 rpj Naturally, Nietzsche traced belligerence to the instincts: “All associations are good that make one 
practice the weapons of defense and offense that reside in one’s instincts.” [WP 486 (1888)] See also TI 103: 
“Freedom means that the manly instincts that delight in war and victory have gained mastery over the other 
instincts— for example, over the instinct o f happiness.”
329 j-gj -g Yuinei-abje to the criticism that I am playing Nietzsche as a philosophical ‘heavy’ by neglecting 
‘lighter’ exercises such as celebration [BT xviii, Z 98-99], play, [GS 347, EH 37,72, WP 419 (1885-86)] joy, 
[Z 111, 332, WP 62 (1887)] dancing, [GS 164,289-290, Z 227, BG 110] and laughter, [GS 163-164, Z 68, 
GM 79] which he equally condoned as expressions o f abundant strength. Such activities are omitted on 
account o f space limitations and the parameters o f this project, altliough they may be given a darker edge by 
Nietzsche himself— e.g., “the eternal joy o f becoming— that joy which also encompasses jo y  in 
destruction....'" [TI 121]— and his commentators. See, for example, Babich 114: “For Nietzsche, the few are 
those individuals physically and spiritually constituted with power to face what is no ultimate vision o f truth 
but only the emptiness behind the masks o f culture, to see reality and to savour this raw reality in the moment 
purchased by laughter and delight, until, as it eternally recurs, the balance of life shudders and decays.” 
Ansell-Pearson identifies in Nietzsche a lesser-known “‘politics o f suiwivaT, which consists not o f legislating 
new values and law-tables for men, but o f playing in parodie and ironic fashion with the ideals o f humanity”, 
in addition to his “politics o f cruelty”. However, due to tire fragmentary nature o f his final writing, he argues 
that it is impossible to deteimine which politics Nietzsche favoured more and, thus, identifies thé latter as 
“the only overt or explicit politics which it is possible to associate with him.” [Ansell-Pearson 147] A further 
objection could be raised as to why 1 omit the predominant theme o f ‘self-mastery’ fi om the list. My reasons 
are two-fold: first, the topic has been thoroughly covered by recent scholars attempting to divorce 
Nietzsche’s concept of power fi-om formulations o f oppressive power over others j which 1 don‘t find 
convincing; second, 1 believe that, as important as self-discipline was to Nietzsche, it is merely a means for 
consolidation in order to exert one’s influence upon externalities, and not an end in itself.
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A. The Task of Revaluation:
As several commentators have previously warned, it is frightfully easy to caricature 
Nietzsche’s will to power as a maudlin endorsement of brute strength and overlook the 
subtle nuances of his thought/^^ In a notebook entry, Nietzsche identified the fiitility of 
unleashing brute force without a cognitive or hermeneutical accompaniment: “[W]hile a 
crude injury done him [an adversary] certainly demonstrates our power over him, it at the 
same time estranges his will from us even more— and thus makes him less easy to 
subjugate. Nietzsche harboured little optimism that something as Ubiquitous and 
amorphous as the will to power could be encapsulated within a specific empire, nation, or 
political system. For this reason, the surging military might of the Pmssian Empire under 
Otto von Bismarck elicited scant attention fiom the philosopher. He viewed such ‘grand 
politics’ as a prescription of “blood and iron” to combat German ‘anaemic’ taste, “ a 
dangerous therapeutic which has certainly taught me how to wait but has not yet taught me 
how to hope”.^ ^^  Although the fickle crowds may worship at “another Tower of Babel, 
some monstrosity of empire and power”, Nietzsche espoused “the old belief that it is the 
great idea alone which can bestow greatness on a deed or a cause.”^^  ^ The real stmggle for 
supremacy took place on the battlefield of the mind. Invoking the symbolism of 
Christopher Columbus’ brave forages beyond the horizons of Europe, Nietzsche 
exclaimed:
Embark!— Consider how every individual is affected by an overall philosophical 
justification of his way of living and thinking: he experiences it as a sun that 
shines especially for him and bestows wannth, blessings, and fertility on him; it 
makes him independent of praise and blame, self-sufficient, rich, liberal with 
happiness and good will; incessantly it re-fashions evil into good, leads all 
energies to bloom and ripen, and does not permit the petty weeds of grief and 
chagrin to come up at all. In the end one exclaims: How I wish that many such 
new suns were yet to be created! Those who are evil or unhappy and the
I also owe this timely exhortation to Dr. Leslie Stevenson following a paper delivered at St. Maiy’s 
College on October 23, 2002.
WP 404 [1888].
BG 187.
BG 171, This is one reason why Nietzsche denigrated the false-triuinphalism snn onnding Geimany’s 
victory in the Franco-Prussian War o f 1870-1871: the ensuing celebration of Germany’s ‘cultural 
superiority’ and the stupor of smugness constituted “the power to extiipate the Gennan spirit”. [UM 4] 
Military supremacy clearly did not entail cultural supremacy. On Nietzsche’s outrage over the subordination 
o f culture to ‘the state’, see Safranski 70 and Bergmann 3.
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exceptional human being— all these should also have their philosophy, their good 
right, their sunshine! What is needfol is not pity for them [...] what is needful is a 
new jiisticel And a new watchword. And new philosophers. The moral earth, 
too, is round. The moral earth, too, has its antipodes. The antipodes, too, have 
the right to exist. There is yet another world to be discovered— and more than 
one. Embark, philosophers !^ "^^
The “ruling idea”^^  ^became central to Nietzsche’s species-impacting project, entmsted to 
the apostolic zeal of fellow ‘Columbaustian’^ ^^  philosophers: “To prepare a reversal o f 
values for a certain strong kind of man of the highest spirituality and strength of will and to 
this end slowly and cautiously to unfetter a host of instincts now kept in check and 
calumniated— whoever reflects on this becomes one of us, the free spirits [..
Because there are no transcendent or privileged ‘t r u t h s N i e t z s c h e  regarded the
creation of values as a more sophisticated mode of will to self-empowerment. Hence, he
once exclaimed, “The great epochs of our life are the occasions when we gain the courage
to rebaptize our evil qualities as our best qualities.”^^  ^ This sentiment lay at the heart of his
summons for a new breed of philosophers, “spirits strong and original enough to make a
start on antithetical evaluations and to revalue and reverse ‘eternal v a l u e s H o w e v e r ,
Zarathustra’s maxim, “Nothing is true, eveiything is permitted”, was a privilege reseiwed
only for these ‘higher’ types of men.^ "*^  The German philosopher did not advocate a
value-free world, but rather a world in which values are pragmatically subordinated to the
expansion of personal power bases. Nietzsche’s ‘prince’, like Machiavelli’s, is
characterized by a radical ‘objectivity’,
understood not as ‘disinterested contemplation’ (which is a non-concept and a 
nonsense), but as the capacity to have all the arguments for and against at one’s 
disposal and to suspend or implement them at will: so that one can exploit that 
very diversity of perspectives and affective interpretations in the interest of 
knowledge.^^^
GS 231-232. 
UM 227.
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335
A combination o f Columbus and Faust. 
WP 503 [1885].
HA 45.
BG 97.
^^°BG 126.
Z 285.
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The primary objective behind Nietzsche’s strategy of revaluation is to enhance 
existential commitment to and aspirations for the material world in keeping with his 
monistic dismissal of the supernatural/'^^ Hence, Zarathustra sought to repatriate those 
‘natural’ instincts which embodied the universal drive towards building larger power units: 
sensual pleasure, the lust for power, and selfishness/'*'^ Such summarily dismissed ‘sins’ 
as “hatred, envy, covetousness, and lust for domination” were re-transcribed as healthy and 
natural, “life-conditioning” instead of life-effacing/'*^ The greatest revolution of 
revaluation which Nietzsche initiated was the supplanting of ‘truth for truth’s sake’ by 
‘tmth for species’ sake’/'*^
B. The Destruction of Antiquated Idols: Nietzsche’s Qualified Nihilism:
Closely allied with the action of revaluation is the destraction of ideals and ‘lies’
which no longer serve to enhance and advance the human species. Such intellectual
violence is neither immoral nor deplorable, but rather ‘natural’. Hence, Nietzsche wrote:
[Ejvery past, however, is worthy to be condemned— for that is the nature of 
human things: human violence and weakness have always played a mighty role in 
them. It is not justice which here sits in judgment; it is even less mercy which 
pronounces the verdict: it is life alone, that dark, driving power that insatiably 
thirsts for itself.
In the life of every “high and select kind of man”, there comes a time of violent breaching 
with custom: “[T]he young soul is devastated, torn loose, tom out- it itself does not know 
what is happening. An urge, a pressure governs it, mastering the soul like a command: the 
will and wish awaken to go away, anywhere, at any cost Nietzsche, however,
offered no short-term relief for a soul spasmed by existential ‘giowth spurts’: “The last 
thing I  would promise would be to ‘improve’ mankind. I erect no new idols; let the old
342 GM 98.
Both Platonism and Chiistianity contributed to this abhorrent devaluation o f the material world. [BG 32] 
Zarathustra acknowledged the danger of merely substituting one ahistorical being for another. Hence, he 
insisted, “My will clings to mankind, I bind myself to mankind with fetters, because I am drawn up to the 
Supeiman: for my other will wants to draw me up to the Superman.” [Z 164]
Z 206.
BG 53.
“^^ BG 35.
UM 76.
HA 6.
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idols learn what it means to have legs of clay. To overthrow idols (my word for ‘ideals’)— 
that rather is my business.” '^*^
It would be easy to dismiss this inevitable ‘idol-smashing’ as adolescent
indulgence, the spiritual ‘vandalism’ of a teenager who has been allowed to live ‘rent-free’
too long in his parents’ epistemological ‘basement’. With an air of indulgent
Schadenfreude, Nietzsche exclaimed, “I know joy in destruction- in both I obey my
Dionysian nature, which does not know how to separate No-doing from Yes-saying. I am
the first immoralist: I am therewith the destroyer par e x c e l l e n c e However, he
contended that destruction is essential to the natural order of life: the old forms of truth
must be shredded like a ‘cocoon’ in order for new metamoiphoses to emerge:
[I]n hindsight, all our behavior and judgments will appear as inadequate and rash 
as the behavior and judgments of backward savage tribes now seem to us 
inadequate and rash. To understand all this can cause great pain, but afterwards 
there is consolation. These pains are birth pangs. The butterfly wants to break 
through his cocoon; he tears at it, he rends it: then he is blinded and confused by 
the unknown light, the realm of fr eedom. Men who are capable of that sorrow 
(how few they will be!) will make the first attempt to see if mankind can 
transform itself ftom a moral into a wise mankind.^^*
In response to accusations of existential immaturity, Nietzsche might have 
responded that his ‘youthful’ prodigy has taken an epistemological ‘vow of poverty’: “He 
is poor today, but not because one has taken everything away from him; he has thrown 
away everything. What is that to him? He is used to finding things. It is the poor who 
misunderstand his voluntary poverty.”^^  ^ From Nietzsche’s perspective, a man must 
empty his hands in order to take hold of even greater prizes. Within a closed universe in 
which there is neither Creator nor creation ex nihilo, power is a limited resource which can 
only be culled or carved from existing power stmctures. Hence, he declared, “In order for 
a shrine to be set up, another shrine must be broken into pieces: that is the law.”^^ ^
EH 3-4. I take this as a sign o f growing disillusiomnent that the race itself may be beyond improvement. 
EH 97.
HA 75. In Daybreak, he wrote: “The snake which cannot shed its skin will perish. It is the same with 
minds which are prevented fi-om changing their opinions: they cease to function as minds.” [cited in Salome 
31]
GS 204.
GM 75. G ernes differentiates between postmodernism’s apparent rejection of authority and Nietzsche’s
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Unsurprisingly, Christianity became the primary target of demolition on account of 
its hostility against ‘natural’ life, repression of the instincts, and the decaying, 
mediocrity-harbouring façade of this once-fonnidable repository of moral and existential 
power which dominated Europe. Nietzsche was particularly incensed by its duplicitous 
pretence of unconditional love, which protected “an ecclesiastical order with priesthood, 
theology, cult, sacrament; in short, everything that Jesus of Nazareth had combattedT^^^ 
Nevertheless, such destruction has to be careful and selective, motivated by cold 
calculation rather than hatred and ressentiment. Hence, it took an able philosopher to wield 
“an ecstatic nihilism” masterfully “as a mighty pressure and hammer with which he breaks 
and removes degenerate and decaying races to make way for a new order of life, or to 
implant into that which is degenerate and desires to die a longing for the end.”^^  ^ In fact, 
the hammer became an emblem for the form in which Nietzsche’s philosophical activity 
was actualized- the short, swift strokes of his sledge-like aphorisms, patiently chipping 
away at society’s monolithic idols of ‘truth’.
Nietzsche carefully qualified the use of nihilism, which he defined as “the radical 
repudiation of value, meaning, and desirability”, as a means and never an end in itself.^^  ^
There were at least four reasons why he could not condone rampant nihilism. First, he 
recognized that ‘idols’ as such represent power sources which must be re-configured into 
more useful forms in the service of a ‘ruling thought’ rather than wantonly destroyed. 
Second, nihilism must have remained ideologically repulsive to him on a deeper level, 
since he regarded it as the logical outcome of Christianity’s will to truth, which, having 
uncovered its own duplicity, lurches wildly from “‘God is truth’ to the fanatical faith ‘All is
rejection of certain types o f authority while leaving room for “an immanent authority, an authority that conies 
within.” [342] 1 am sceptical that the postmodernist theorists he is targeting have passed up such authority— 
or even believe they have done so. As Nietzsche demonstrated, it takes authority to reject authority.
354 I [1887-1888]. Nietzsche once quipped that this supreme historical irony could pass as evidence 
for the existence of “an ironical divinity”. [TI 160] See also WP 97-98 [1888].
355 WP 544 [1885].
He was initially attracted to Sallust’s epigrams, which were “[c]ompact, severe, with as much substance as 
possible”. [TI 116] Aphorisms also formed a direct link between Nietzsche and the Classical/ Roman ideal, 
which he regarded as '‘'noblepar excellence".
WP 7 [1886-1887].
_ _____
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false’”/^^ Third, Nietzsche recognized an inherent lack of philosophical sophistication,
and fundamental inconsistency within nihilism:
A nihilist is a man who judges of the world as it is that it ought not to be, and of 
the world as it ought to be that it does not exist. According to this view, our 
existence (action, suffering, willing, feeling) has no meaning: the pathos of ‘in 
vain’ is the nihilists’ pathos— at the same time, as pathos, an inconsistency on the 
part of nihilists.^^^
His point is a cogent one: if the world is truly meaningless, then why should nihilists care? 
Finally, Nietzsche indiscriminately attacked any attempt to devalue the natural world, 
whether it be Christian, Buddhist, or nihilist. He insisted that man’s attitude towards 
existence must be characterized by a radical exuberance— not the sour rejection, despair, 
and ressentiment personified by many nihilistic tendencies.
C. Embracing Suffering: Heroic Heimeneutics:
A third essential exercise of power involves the conscious will to suffer. From his 
earliest writings the evolving self became a central motif in Nietzsche’s unfolding theory 
of will to power. A nascent formulation of the contention that willing entails ‘becoming’ 
over ‘being’ appeared in The Wanderer and His Shadow: “Active, successful natures act, 
not according to the dictum ‘know thyself, but as if  there hovered before them the 
commandment: will a self and thou shalt become a self,”^^® Nietzsche did not believe that 
one’s goals emanate uncontrollably from the core of one’s being, but rather that one’s goal 
is to learn to detennine that core as much as humanly possible. does your
conscience say?’" Nietzsche asked. “‘You shall become the person you are.’”^^ * Hence, a 
man does not merely will his actions- he wills himself to grow beyond and yet 
paradoxically ‘into’ himself. Nietzsche became a champion for “the spectacle of that 
strength which employs genius not for worlds but for itself as a wort, that is, for its own 
constraint, for the purification of its imagination, for the imposition of its order and choice
358 WP 7 [1886-1887].
WP318 [1887, 1888].
NR 232.
GS 219. Nietzsche traced this doctrine to Pindar. [HA 161]
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Upon the influx of tasks and impressions.”^^  ^ The ‘refined’ will to power constitutes, in 
effect, the will to self-determination despite the seemingly intractable constants of race, 
gender, and class.
Perhaps the most heroic tenet of Nietzsche’s will to power lies in its response to 
one’s own human frailties, ill health, and suffering.^In his 1886 second preface to The 
Gay Science, Nietzsche observed that the book was saturated with ‘the joy of a 
convalescent’:
‘Gay Science’: that signifies the saturnalia of a spirit who has patiently resisted a 
terrible, long pressure— patiently, severely, coldly, without submitting, but also 
without hope- and who is now all at once attacked by hope, the hope for health, 
and the intoxication of convalescence.^ '^*
The sheer authenticity, which punctuates his writings with the exclamation marks of joie 
de vive and the ellipses of unmitigated anguish, stems fi om the remarkable effort by which 
Nietzsche’s personal optimism was birthed through the contractions of umnitigated 
pain.^^  ^ Early in his writing career, he lauded the benefits of possessing “the Gorgon gaze 
that instantaneously petrifies everything into a work of art: that gaze from a realm without 
pain.” *^’^  But Nietzsche refused to sunender to his suffering. His imagination feverishly 
sought an interpretative framework with which to snatch victory from the ever-present 
abyss of defeatism.^^^ Hence, he once queried, ""What makes one heroic?— Going out to 
meet at the same time one’s highest suffering and one’s highest hope.”^^ ^
NR 234.
Salome states, “Suffering and loneliness then are the two great lines o f fate in Nietzsche’s biography [....] 
And they bear the strange double face o f an exteriorly fated life and at the same time a purely psychologically 
detennined willed inner necessity^” [12] Tamier contends that, “Nietzsche’s fundamental concern tliroughout 
his life was to plot the relationship between suffering and culture, or cultures.” {Nietzsche 27] Safi-anski 
argues that Nietzsche ‘pharmaceutically’ tested concepts by the strength of their relief fiom his physical 
afflictions. [55] In Januaiy, 1880, he wrote to his doctor, “My existence is an awful burden— I would have 
dispensed with it long ago, were it not for the most illuminating tests and experiments I have been conducting 
in matters o f mind and morality [....]” [Safiranski 178]
GS 32.
As his syphilitic symptoms worsened, resulting in severe migraines and failing vision, he resigned his 
professorship at Basel by the time he was thirty-six, unable to see “tliree paces in front o f me.” [EH 8] See 
also GS 252 n. 42. His illness culminated in insanity and eventual paralysis. [Tturner Nietzsche 25]
Safranski 27.
For example, he later credited his inability to read as “the greatest favour I have ever done myself.” [EH 
62]
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Nietzsche identified a dialectical relation between his genius and his illness: “I 
have a subtler sense for signs of ascent and decline than any man has ever had, I am the 
teacher par excellence in this matter— I know both, I am both.”^^  ^ Furtliermore, the 
potentiality of losing life at any moment increased his ardour for living: “I know more 
about life because I have so often been on the verge of losing it; and precisely for that 
reason I get more out of life than any of you.”^^** Nietzsche maintained that, in gouging its 
glacial girth across the bedrock of the ‘higher’ soul, suffering excels at deepening the 
human spirit:
Only great pain, the long, slow pain that talces its time— on which we are burned, 
as it were, with gieen wood- compels us philosophers to descend into our 
ultimate depths and to put aside all trast, everything good-natured, everything that 
would interpose a veil, that is mild, that is medium— things in which fonnerly we 
may have found our humanity. I doubt that such pain makes us ‘better’; but I j
know that it makes us more profound?^ ^
However, Nietzsche was selective in his application of the benefits of this :
interpretative coup d'état', for, suffering in and of itself is not sufficient to endow one’s life f
with profundity. Rather, one has to seize the opportunity voraciously, tenaciously, •
henneneutically— one has to wrestle life’s difficulties and setbacks into the nanative 
framework of the will.^^  ^ Contrary to the modem man who transfonns suffering into “the 
foremost argument against existence”,^ ^^  the ‘higher’ man liberates himself from such |
slavish hatred by refusing to be defeated by h i s t o r y . A s  Zarathustra jubilantly espoused, ;
“To redeem the past and to transform every ‘It was’ into an ‘I wanted it thus! ’ — that alone l
do I call redemption.”^^  ^ Hence, a strong man is able to rise above the vicissitudes and j
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  i
GS219. :
EH 8. Hence, during the writing o f Daybreak in 1880, he discovered that, after “an uninterrupted 
tiuee-day headache accompanied by the laborious vomiting o f phlegm [ .. .] !  possessed a dialectical clarity i
par excellence and thought my way veiy cold-bloodedly thi'ough tilings for which when I am in better health |
I am not enough of a climber, not refined, not cold enough.” [EH 9] ’
GS 243-244.
GS 36. In particular, suffering liberates a person fi om the shackles of “enduring habits” and mundane i
mediocrity. [GS 237] See also UM 221. :
Nietzsche traced this henneneutical tactic to both ‘early man’ and Cluistianity, which staves off despair by ;
assigning meaning to suffering because, “The aspect of suffering which actually causes outrage is not 
suffering itself, but the meaninglessness of suffering [....]” [GM 49]
GM 49.
UM 106. Zarathustra attributed all thirst for vengeance to “the will’s antipathy towards time and time’s ‘It 
was’.” [Z 162] :
Z 161. However, this situates the past in tension— if not outright animosity— with the will: “‘It was’: that
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petty pains of life, and suffering becomes the vehicle of this ascension: “[F]or life must be 
harder and harder for you. Only thus, only thus does man grow to the height where the 
lightning can strike and shatter him: high enough for the lightning!
To summarize, suffering is not merely beneficial to the ‘higher’ man — it is
essential. In opposition to the peddlers and meddlers of mediocrity, who seek to avoid
discomfort at all costs, Nietzsche proclaimed.
We think that severity, force, slavery, peril in the street and in the heart, 
concealment, stoicism, the art of experiment and devilry of every kind, that 
everything evil, dreadful, tyrannical, beast of prey and seipent in man serves to 
enhance the species ‘man’ just as much as does its opposite— we do not say 
enough when we say even that much [.. ..]^ ^^
It would, therefore, be counter-productive for a tme proponent of the human species to 
eliminate the catalyst for all that is g  eat, noble, and upright in man, “the discipline of geat 
suffering”:
That tension of the soul in misfortune which cultivates its strength, its terror at the 
sight of g*eat destraction, its inventiveness and bravery in undergoing, enduring, 
interpreting, exploiting misfoitune, and whatever of depth, mystery, mask, spirit, 
cunning and geatness has been bestowed upon it— has it not been bestowed 
tlii'ough suffering, through the discipline of geat suffering?^^^
Like ‘sin’ and ‘redemption’, pain becomes a value judgnent existing primarily in the mind, 
to be re-evaluated within a more promising metananative/^^ for, mighty spirits only 
emerge fiom the ‘smithies’ of unrelenting anguish and adversity.^^®
is what the will’s teeth-gnashing and most lonely affliction is called.”
Z 299. For life as “a craft which must be learned from the ground up and practised remorselessly”, see 
UM 118.
BG 72. See also WP 206 [1887, 1888]: “I assess the power o f a will by how much resistance, pain, torture 
it endures and knows how to turn to its advantage; I do not account the evil and painful character of existence 
a reproach to it, but hope rather that it will one day be more evil and painfril than hitherto—”
BG 155.
HA 77: “When a misfortune strikes us, we can overcome it either by removing its cause or else by 
changing the effect it has on our feelings, that is, by reinteipreting the misfortune as a good, whose benefit 
may only later become clear.” In a notebook entry, Nietzsche even denied ontological reality to ‘pain’, which 
he considered “an intellectual occun ence in which a definite judgment is expressed- the judgment 'harmfur 
in which a long experience is summarized. There is no pain as such.” [WP 371 (1888)]
380 4 ^ 5  [1887-1888]; “[0]ne must be faced with the choice o f perishing or prevailing. A dominating race
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D. Employing ‘Cruelty’:
It becomes unnei-vingly evident that Nietzsche’s attitude towards suffering elides 
eerily into the subject of domination and the necessity of ‘cruelty’ for the perfecting of the 
species. Suffering becomes, for Nietzsche, an integal distinction in the widening rift 
between higher and lower types of men, an elitist means of advancement over the shallow 
masses:
The spiritual haughtiness and disgust of every human being who has suffered 
deeply— how deeply human beings can suffer almost determines their order of 
rank— the harrowing certainty, with which he is wholly peiineated and colored, 
that by virtue of his suffering he knows more than even the cleverest and wisest 
can know, that he is familiai- with, and was once ‘at home’ in, many distant, 
tenible worlds of which "you know nothing! ’... this spiritual, silent haughtiness 
of the sufferer, this pride of the elect of knowledge, of the ‘initiated’, of the 
almost sacrifice, finds all fomis of disguise necessary to protect itself against 
contact with importunate and pitying hands and in general against everything 
which is not its equal in suffering. Profound suffering ennobles; it separates.^^*
Because adversity is so essential to the foimation of an exceptional man, Nietzsche wished 
“suffering, desolation, sickness, ill-treatment, indignities, [...] profound self-contempt, the 
torture of self-mistmst, the wretchedness of the vanquished” on those he showed ‘concern’ 
fbr/^^
Once suffering has been necessitated within a philosophical project for species 
succession, it takes an alarmingly small step to conclude that the instigation of and/ or
can grow up only out o f ten ible and violent beginnings.”
BG 209, In an alaimingly racist passage, Nietzsche suggested that human ancestors had a higher tolerance 
to pain, given recent findings that Tess-evolved’ Negroes experience less internal inflammation than 
Europeans. [GM 49] Rather than denigrating existence on account of suffering, Nietzsche insisted, “[W]e 
would do well to remember the times when exactly the opposite conclusion was drawn, because mankind did 
not want to forgo the infliction o f suffering, seeing in it an enchantment o f the first rank, an actual seduction 
and lure in favour o /life.”
382 \yp  4 3  j [1887]. Tamier is right to warn of not misinteipreting his condemnation on ‘pity’ as condoning 
“neglect of others’ basic requirements”: “His attack is concerned with pity as a full-time occupation of 
sorting out people’s lives, with a noble neglect, as we are taught, of one’s own interests.” {Nietzsche 43] 
Houlgate usefiilly calls attention to “tlie Schopenliauerian ideal of pity with which he confiised Cluistian 
love”. {Hegel 68] Safiansld argues that Nietzsche attempted to compensate for the self-loathing he felt fi-om 
a personal “excess o f forgiveness” and compassion. [167] It is rather telling that Nietzsche’s final collapse 
may have been precipitated by witnessing the vicious beating o f a mare in Turin, which he halted by hugging 
tlie horse.
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refusal to alleviate suffering benefits the species by engendering hardier specimens/^^
Moreover, by inteipreting all human actions, regardless of their altruistic appearances, as
attempts to gain power over the other,^ '^* craelty in action and intent appears both
ubiquitous and unavoidable. Nietzsche aveired that, without “the spiritualization and
intensification of ameltÿ'' towards foiiner ideals and ‘tmths’, higher culture cannot
progi'ess or even exist:
Wliat the Roman in the arena, the Christian in the ecstasies of the Cross, the 
Spaniai'd watching burnings or bullfights, the Japanese of today crowding in to 
the tragedy, the Parisian suburban workman who has a nostalgia for bloody 
revolutions, the Wagneriemie who, with will suspended, ‘experiences’ Tristan 
iind Isolde— what all of these enjoy and look with secret ardour to imbibe is the 
spicy portion of the great Circe ‘cmelty’.^ ^^
From Don Quixote to the penitentiary, Nietzsche observed the inevitable welding of 
civilization and barbarity, cruelty and culture, the promulgation of toughness for the 
promise of longevity: “To witness suffering does one good, to inflict it even more so— that 
is a harsh proposition, but a fundamental one, an old, powerful, human all-too-human 
proposition, one to which perhaps even the apes would subscribe [..
Such tolerable cmelty does not entail the wanton use of physical force, however, 
since such unsophisticated deployment of power constitutes “a sign that we are still lacking 
power, or it shows a sense of fimstration in the face of this poverty”.^ ^^  Rather, in 
Nietzsche pondered how to make a virtue of “refined cmelty”,^ ^^  while 
Zarathustra advocated the Jacob-ian art of combat: “I wrestled long and was a wrestler, so 
that I might one day have my hands fiee for blessing.Furthermore,  Nietzsche warned 
of the dangers of self-dissolution fiom constant conflict: “He who fights with monsters
Kain hypothesizes that the deliberate infliction o f suffering legitimates cultural myths, thus ‘keeping the 
tme evil— meaningless suffering— at bay’. [142-143]
For example, GS 86.
BG 159. He once declared tliat no action o f distinction is possible without an injustice to the past wherein 
the actor “recognizes the rights only of that which is now to come into being and no other rights whatever.” 
[UM 64] History itself shows no kindness to the past: “[A]s long as the study o f history serves life and is 
directed by the vital drives, the past itself suffers.” [UM 74]
GM 48.
GS 87.
Safranski 187.
186. Cf. Gen. 32:24-30.
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should look to it that he himself does not become a monster.”^^*^ However, the philosopher
seemed all-too-willing to relax this principle with regards to the Ûbermensch. Hence, he
instructed all “preparatory human beings”:
[T]he secret for haiwesting from existence the gi*eatest fiuitfulness and the 
gi'eatest enjoyment is— to live dangerously\ Build your cities on the slopes of 
Vesuvius! Send your ships into uncharted seas! Live at war with your peers and 
yourselves! Be robbers and conquerors as long as you cannot be rulers and 
possessors, you seekers of knowledge!^^'
This explains why he remained a staunch opponent of egalitarian movements. With
regards to women’s rights, he once exclaimed,
[T]o deny here the most abysmal antagonism and the necessity of an eternally 
hostile tension, perhaps to dream here of equal rights, equal education, equal 
claims and duties: this is a typical sign of shallow-mindedness, and a thinker who 
has proved himself to be shallow on this dangerous point— shallow of instinct!— 
may be regarded as suspect in general [..
Nietzsche might have offered the following responses to defend the necessitation of
cruelty within his philosophical project. First, ‘cmelty’ is a henneneutical rather tlian
ontological reality and, as such, a highly relative valuation reflecting the self-interests of
the inteipreter.^^^ As part of the natural world, humankind and all of its ‘civilized’
stmctures are inextricably embedded in the ‘cmelty’ necessary to survival, advancement,
and innovation. Thus, savagery is inescapable:
The whole past of the old culture is built on violence, slavery, deception, eiTor; 
but we, the heirs of all these conditions, indeed the convergence of that whole 
past, cannot decree ourselves away, and cannot want to remove one particular 
part. The unjust frame of mind lies in the souls of the ‘have-nots’, too; they are 
no better than the ‘haves’, and have no special moral privilege, for at some point 
their forefathers were ‘haves’, too.^ '^*
102.
GS 228. Similarly, Zarathustra exclaimed: “Thus commands my great love for the most distant men: Do 
not spare your neighbourl Man is something that must be overcome [....] Overcome yourself even in your 
neighbour: and a right that you can seize for yourself you should not accept as a gift!” [Z 215-216]
^^^BG 166.
Hence, in contiast to the ‘slave morality’ of Cluistianity, which condemned the liberties of the aristocratic 
‘predators’ to safeguard bovine security, Nietzsche asserted that, “the healthier, stronger, richer, more 
fiuitful, more enteiprising a man feels, the more ‘immoral’ he will be, too.” [WP 213 (1887-1888)] He also 
maintained that, “[fjrightful energies— that which is called evil— are the Cyclopean architects and path 
makers of humanity.” [HA 151]
HA 216. Nehanias obseiwes that, although Nietzsche does not admire the “barbarian nobles” primarily for 
their cruelty, “neither, to be fair, does he criticize them on that account”. [215]
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Social niceties such as gratitude, morality, and dialogue are merely ‘milder’ 
interpretations of attaining distinction and dominating others/^^
Second, cmelty is ubiquitously embodied within the material universe and is a
‘natural’, unavoidable means by which power is consolidated/®^ Nietzsche maintained
that sociological cmelties such as class injustice and oppression plays a pivotal role in the
development of psychological distinctions:
Without the pathos o f distance such as develops from the incarnate differences of 
classes, from the ruling caste’s constant looking out and looking down on subjects 
and instruments and fr om its equally constant exercise of obedience and 
command, its holding down and holding at a distance, that other, more mysterious 
pathos could not have developed either, that longing for an ever-increasing 
widening of distance within the soul itself, the fonnation of ever higher, rarer, 
more remote, tenser, more comprehensive states, in short precisely the elevation 
of the type ‘man’, the continual ‘self-overcoming of man’, to take a moral 
formula in a supramoral sense/®®
He argued that the impact of Christianity in demonizing suffering (“the will to 
misunderstand suffering”), promulgating existential ‘coziness’, and binding cmcial 
life-promoting instincts in a ‘strait-jacket’ of endless guilt, constitutes genuine crPelty 
towards nature and humankind. Cruelty to particular individuals and classes is, therefore, 
negligible if it constitutes a gr eater kindness to the species as a whole.'*^ ®
Third, to defend the role of cruelty in his project, Nietzsche would probably insist
HA 46.
HA 69: "Force precedes morality; indeed, for a time morality itself is force, to which others acquiesce to 
avoid unpleasure. Later it becomes custom, and still later fiee obedience, and finally almost instinct: then it is 
coupled to pleasure, like all habitual and natural things, and is now called virtue."
HA 50. On tlie essentiality of war, see HA 230.
See HA 10: “You had to leani to grasp the necessaiy injustice in every For and Against; to grasp that 
injustice is inseparable fi om life, that life itself is determined by perspective and its injustice.” The 
universality o f self-cruelty within human culture alone encompasses all areas “wherever man allows himself 
to be persuaded to self-denial in the religious sense, or to self-mutilation, as among Phoenicians and ascetics, 
or in general to desensualization, decamalization, conti ition, to Puritanical spasms of repentance, to 
conscience— vivisection and to a Pascaliaii dell’intelletto". [BG 159-160] Nietzsche regarded the
hyperbolic etliic in the Sennon on the Mount as an instance o f man taking “a voluptuous pleasure in violating 
himself by exaggerated demands and then deifying this something in his soul that is so tyi amiically taxing.” 
[HA 95]
BG 192.
GM 118-119. Nietzsche once suggested, "{W\hen one makes men more evil, one makes them better— and 
[...] one caimot be one without being the other”. [WP 416 (1887)] There can be no “superhuman” without 
tlie “superbeast”. [WP 531 (1887)]
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that he was not advocating wanton violence or anarchical instability, but a selective and 
highly sophisticated, controlled ‘croelty’ directed at outmoded institutions and fabricated 
‘tmths’ which were, in actuality, cruelly obstracting the species from higher development 
and preserving society’s ‘miscamages’/*** Moreover, such will to cmelty is restricted to a 
minority of elite and well-cultivated individuals in any given society
Finally, Nietzsche did not endorse any outward cruelty which wasn’t first and 
foremost directed inwaids by the higher individual himself/®^ He adamantly emphasized 
that the key to higher humankind consists first and foremost of ""mature freedom of the 
spirit which is fully as much self-mastery and discipline of tlie heart, and which pennits 
paths to many opposing rays of thought.”'***'* Nietzsche once distinguished the category of 
genius by its exceptional self-severity, which lies at the heart of all remarkable 
achievements: “The genius— in his works, in his deeds— is necessarily a prodigal: his 
greatness lies in the fact that he expends himself. ... The instinct of self-preservation is as it 
were suspended; the overwhelming pressure of the energies which emanate fi om him 
forbids him any such care and pmdence.”'***^
The will to self-cruelty takes several fonns in Nietzsche’s writings. First, it 
manifests itself in relentless self-scmtiny. Since life in its entirety has become “a means of 
loiowledge”,'***^ the ‘scientific’ explorer subjects himself to rigorous testing and 
self-vivisection: “Our attitude towards ourselves is one of hubris, for we experiment with 
ourselves in a way which we would never allow ourselves to experiment with any animal,
40‘ 3 8 9  [1888]: “Society, as the great trastee o f life, is responsible to life itself for eveiy miscanied life —
it also has to pay for such lives: consequently it ought to prevent them [....] Life itself recognizes no 
solidarity, no ‘equal rights’, between the healthy and the degenerate parts of an organism: one must excise the 
latter— or the whole will perish.” He contested the universal right to exist in WP 467 [1884]. In GS 129, a 
holy man once advised a father to kill a severely handicapped newborn arguing, “But is it not cruder to let it 
live?”
Hence, after the conunon men, the “fanners o f the spirit”, have settled and “exploited” all available land, 
“the plowshare of evil must come again and again” to break up the over-packed soils. [GS 79]
See UM 119, where he advocated that “each one o f this generation must overcome himself”; that is, “the 
nature already educated into one.”
HA 7.
TI 109.
GS 255.
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we derive pleasure from our curious dissection of the soul of a living body.”'***^ However,
this spiritual experimentation, unfettered by conventional morality and driven by “genius
not for works but for itself as a w o r f—^^^  ^opens the door to explorations of human
brutality beyond the self:
Who will attain anything great if he does not find in himself the strength and the 
will to inflict gieat suffering? Being able to suffer is the least thing; weak women 
and even slaves often achieve virtuosity in that. But not to perish of internal 
distress and uncertainty when one inflicts gi eat suffering and hears the cry of this 
suffering— that is great, that belongs to greatness.'***®
Second, self-cruelty is incarnated in all ‘ascetic’ tendencies, which originate in men whose 
efforts at external mastery have failed: “[I]t finally occurs to them to tyrannize certain parts 
of their own being, as if they were sections or stages of their selves.”'**** However, 
self-cruelty is also championed as a means for actualizing the commanding idea which 
benefits the race— the sacrifice of both the one and the many for the gi*eater 
accomplislunent of the superspecies.'** *
E. Aestheticizing the World:
Tlnoughout Nietzsche’s writings, there is a tendency for the ‘transcendental 
givenness’ of the world to be supplanted by a henneneutical tabula rasa of becomings and 
limitless potentialities: the aestheticization of the humanly perceived ‘world’. In The Birth 
o f Tragedy, he contested Schopenhauer’s belief that the efficacy of music pertains to the 
interaction between the ‘subjective’ listener and the ‘objective’ purity of the acoustic 
stimuli. Instead, Nietzsche argued that the distinction between ail and artist, ‘subjective’
‘’"'GM92. See also GS 253. 
NR 234.
409 GS 255. Kaufiiiami tempers this section by interpreting this inflicted suffering as the grief which 
Nietzsche’s radical views caused his family and friends. [GS 255, n. 52]
'”°H A 95. See also UM 163. Asceticism is not confined to Cluistianity, however. Nietzsche criticized 
Stoicism for entertaining “tlie Bedlamite hope that, because you know how to tyraimize over yourselves [...] 
nature too can be tyr annized over”. [BG 39]
WP 380 [1888]: “[M]ankind is merely the experimental material, the tremendous surplus o f failures: a 
field o f ruins.” See also WP 360 [1883-1888]: “The basic phenomenon: countless individuals sacrificed for 
the sake of a few, to make them possible.— One must not let oneself be deceived; it is just the same with 
peoples and races: they constitute tlie ‘body’ for the production of isolated valuable individuals, who cany on 
the great process.” Clark suggests that Nietzsche’s “main complaint” against herd morality is that, “there is 
nothing in it to play the role o f tlie ascetic ideal”. [856]
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and ‘objective’ realities breaks down:
[B]ut we can indeed assume for our own part that we are images and aitistic 
projections for the tme creator of that world, and that our highest dignity lies in 
the meaning of works of art— for it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that 
existence and the world are eternally justified— while of course our awareness of 
our meaning differs hardly at all from the awareness that warriors painted on 
canvas have of the battle portrayed/*^
If the natural universe is, in fact, overlaid with an aesthetic veneer to become ‘the world as
we know it’, the world can be embraced for its beauty,'**  ^the standards of which are open
to a rich variety of inteipretations which are not predetermined to be ‘good’ or ‘evil’ in and
of themselves/*'* In The Gay Science, he observed that the ‘higher man’ needs assistance
to dispel the illusion o f ‘external’ tmth:
The higher human being always becomes at the same time happier and unhappier. 
But he can never shake off a delusion: He fancies that he is a spectator and 
listener who has been placed before the great visual and acoustic spectacle that is 
life; he calls his own nature contemplative and overlooks that he himself is really 
the poet who keeps creating this life/*^
This accorded Nietzsche a great deal of optimism:'**  ^if human beings are self-generated/ 
self-generating works of art, then the species can theoretically be shaped within the hands 
of a capable philosophical ‘potter’, so long as he receives pristine materials with which to 
work/*^ An important polemical offshoot is that an ‘aestheticized’ world allows 
previously ‘transcendent’ and ‘God-given’ mores to be subverted, with ""taste as the sole
4i2 gY 32. However, Nietzsche somewhat inconsistently still maintained that this aesthetic reality can be 
distinguished from the foundations of nature upon which it was based: “[A]rt is not only an imitation o f the 
tmth o f nature but a metaphysical supplement to that tmtli o f nature, coexisting with it in order to overcome 
it.” [BT 114] Nehamas creatively endeavours to reconcile Nietzsche’s perspectivism with his many apparent 
truth-claims by arguing that Nietzsche resolved this paradox by ‘creating an aitwork out o f himself, a literary 
character who is a philosopher’. [8] Though an intriguing premise, it is difficult to reconcile this view with 
Nietzsche’s avowed aversion to idealization: how can he oppose the idealization o f the whole world yet 
completely idealize himself?
In a notebook entiy, Nietzsche once ascribed ‘the highest sign o f power’ to beauty, “because in beauty 
opposites are tamed; the highest sign o f power, namely power over opposites; moreover, without tension;— 
that violence is no longer needed”. [WP 422 (1883-1888)]
The aesthetizing of the world provides a useful corollary in suspending the importance o f historical effect: 
as with a ‘work o f art’, it is no longer fair to “appraise tlie value o f a man according to how useful he is to 
men, or how much he costs, or what harm he does to them”. [WP 469 (1887)]
GS 241.
On art as “the only superior counterforce to all will to denial o f life, as that which is anti-Clnistian, 
anti-Buddhist, antinihilist excellence", see WP 452-453 [1886].
Some commentators suggest that Nietzsche’s writing is itself an exercise in self-creation. Thomas Mann 
exclaims: “[D]own to his self-mythologizing in his last moment, down to madness, this life was an artistic
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means of arbitrating between values”/*^ It also counters the sting of reality’s most biting
tragedies by injecting an aitistic distance:
As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us, and art furnishes us 
with eyes and hands and above all the good conscience to be able to turn 
ourselves into such a phenomenon. At times we need a rest from ourselves and, 
from an artistic distance, laughing over ourselves or weeping over ourselves.'*’®
Furthermore, the ‘aesthetic’ epistemology fosters a structure conducive to elitism and 
hierarchy by generating a ‘canon’ of men whose evaluation is determined exclusively by 
‘experts’, and who, subsequently, merit the highest pedestals of privilege and freedom.
Nietzsche’s aesthetic emphasis encompassed many of his predominant themes: 
instincts over reason, the necessity of conflict, the celebration of the sensual, coiporeal 
world, the superabundance of the ‘higher’ man, the privileged status of genius, and the 
supplanting of ontology by heimeneutics. From The Birth o f Tragedy onwards, Nietzsche 
esteemed the Dionysian aesthetic— based upon “the desire for destiaiction, for change, for 
becoming"'— over the Apolline aesthetic— based upon “the desire for rigidity, eternity, 
being"— which, driven by a profound disdain for materiality, resulted in an ai1 of 
‘impoverishment’ instead of the Dionysian “overfull power pregnant with the future”.'*^** 
Nietzsche contended that, “[f]or art to exist, for any sort of aesthetic activity or perception 
to exist, a certain physiological precondition is indispensable: in to x ic a tio n " a condition 
which resonates with the superabundant power of the ‘higher’ man: “The essence of 
intoxication is the feeling of plentitude and increased energy. From out of this feeling one 
gives to things, one compels them to take, one rapes them- one calls this process 
idealizing.”'*^  ^ The self-styled philosopher-poet had no patience for any alleged neutrality 
of art: “[Wjhat does all art do? Does it not praise? By doing all this it strengthens or
production [...] a lyiic, tragic spectacle, and one o f utmost fascination [....]” [Safranski 324-325]
Zeitlin 171. Though Nietzsche would have also applied his universal standard of Tife-enhancement’ to 
gage the relative worth o f values.
GS 163-164.
«0 WP 445-446 [1885-1886].
Intoxication encompasses sexual excitement, military vanquishing, cmelty, destmction, celebration, 
indulgence in narcotics, the change o f seasons, and “the intoxication o f an overloaded and distended will”. 
[TI 82-83]
TI 83.
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weakens certain valnations.”'*^  ^ The image of artist and Ûbermensch apparently merge as
Nietzsche elucidated the topic of intoxication:
In this condition one enriches everything out of one’s own abundance: what one 
sees, what one desires, one sees swollen, pressing, strong, over-laden with energy. 
The man in this condition transfonns things until they minor his power- until 
they are reflections of his perfection. This compulsion to transform into the 
perfect is— art.'*^ '*
The will to art would resonate in its most ambitious manifestation within the philosophical 
vision of the Überldlnstler himself— the drafting of a destiny, the sculpting of the species.
F. Breeding the Species:
In an 1884 notebook entiy, Nietzsche equated the artist with an unrelenting desire 
for dominance:
Misunderstanding o f egoism— on the pait of common natures who know nothing 
whatever of the pleasure of conquest and the insatiability of gi eat love, nor of the 
overflowing feeling of strength that desires to overpower, to compel to itself, to 
lay to its heart— the drive of the artist in relation to his material.'*^^
Nietzsche had no qualms over couching this drive for mastery within metaphysical motifs. 
Hence, he once abrogated the powers of the Creator within the creative potential of certain 
men:
There is a slavish love that submits and gives itself; that idealizes, and deceives 
itself— there is a divine love that despises and loves, and reshapes and elevates the 
beloved. To gain that tremendous energy of greatness in order to shape the men 
of the future through breeding and, on the other hand, the amiihilation of millions 
of failures, and not to perish of the suffering one creates, though nothing like it 
has ever existed
423 TI92.
TI 83. The particular thi*ust o f the phallic overtones o f a patriarchal vision o f masculinity bear down 
full-tlnottle in this passage.
WP 467 [1884].
WP 506 [1884]. Strong highlights the significance of breeding in Nietzsche’s thought as well as the 
‘facile’ manoeuvres by which commentators attempt to avoid this political minefield. [274] He focuses 
specifically upon the doctrine of eternal recun ence which, Nietzsche hoped, will instigate a 
“neurophysiological” transformation in man. [Stiong 285] Golomb argues: “The ti ansfiguration of our 
nature and the sublimation of our desires and psychological makeup, which provide the necessary and 
sufficient conditions o f the morality of positive power, distance Nietzsche fi om Nazi eugenics or racism 
based on a given or prefeired set of biological traits.” [“De-Nazify” 40] By this point, there is no need to 
repeat my objections to a revaluation o f Nietzsche’s power as self-masteiy, as much as I agree with Golomb 
that Nietzsche should not be unfairly condemned as a proto-Nazi sympathizer. Although he writes.
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Much of his model for crafting the species was derived from the personal impact 
which Scliopenliauer had upon him. He once described Schopenhauer’s legacy as the 
knowledge that,
[n]either riches nor honours nor emdition can lift the individual out of the 
profound depression he feels at the valuelessness of his existence, and how the 
striving after these valued things acquires meaning only tluough an exalted and 
transfiguring overall goal: to acquire power so as to aid the evolution of the physis 
and to be for a while the con ector of its follies and ineptitudes.'*^^
Wagner was another methodological influence, whose music “transmits the fundamental 
impulses in the depths of the persons represented in the drama directly to the soul of the 
listeners” with gi'eater impact than the gestures and words of the characters.'*^  ^ Further 
development was fostered while Nietzsche ruminated over the inadequacies of Darwin’s 
theory of species, begging the question of how one might str engthen the race.'*^ ®
In a letter dated July, 1883, Nietzsche wrote: “We should persevere in realizing our 
idea of man; we ought to be adamant about enforcing it on others as well as on ourselves, 
and thus exert a creative impact!”'*^** Nietzsche’s project of shaping the species represents 
a nexus of several key emphases in his thought: the primacy of the natural, physical world, 
the revaluation of human ‘good’ and human ‘evil’, the attempt to control nature tluough 
cultural institutions, the creative mastery of the artist, the universal telos of constructing 
larger power units, and the predominance of a ‘commanding idea’, which endeavours to 
“implant a need” in the human breast so that “out of a vigorous need there will one day
“Actually, the only idea of race that Nietzsche ever looked upon with favor was that o f a mixed race (as mixed 
as possible)-- a European race sprung from innumerable intermamages between ‘the best aristocracy o f 
Europe’ and tlie Jews (D, 205; HH 1:475)”, [“De-Nazify” 41] one might question how such a selective 
grouping represents ‘as mixed as possible’ a race.
UM 142. For the influence of the caste-endorsing Laws ofManii, which represents “a clever impolitic o f 
breeding tliat would prevent degeneration”, see Safranski 311.
UM 239. His indebtedness to Wagner is reflected by the artistic auia radiated by tlie Ûbermensch. 
Nietzsche’s own writings strongly parallel his analysis o f Wagner’s self-commentaries: “They are attempts 
to comprehend the instinct which impelled him to create his works, and as it were to set himself before his 
own eyes; if he can only manage to transfonn his instinct into knowledge, he hopes the reverse process will 
take place within the souls of his readers: it is with this objective that he wiites.” [UM 248] This may 
partially explain why Nietzsche later insisted that Untimely Meditations 3 and 4 were ultimately about 
himself and his personal development as a thinker. [UM xxx]
‘‘^ ^HA 139.
Safranski 167.
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arise a vigorous deed.”'*^ ’ Even his aphoristic style, Tanner notes, was calculated towards 
“transfonuing the reader’s consciousness”/^^
In his role as philosophical breeder, Nietzsche considered himself to be a veritable 
‘blood’ hound: “I have in this sensitivity psychological antennae with which I touch and 
take hold of every secret: all the concealed dirt at the bottom of many a nature, perhaps 
conditioned by bad blood but wliitewashed by education, is known to me almost on first 
contact.”'*^  ^ And yet, he simultaneously sought to effect a change in the cultural and 
philosophical climate of his era to bolster better the emergence of his delicate, ‘tropical’ 
superspecies. The fostering of “a more virile, warlike age” is instramental for the 
evolution of an even higher age: “To this end we now need many preparatory courageous 
human beings who cannot very well leap out of nothing, any more than out of the sand and 
slime of present-day civilization and metropolitanism [... Enthralled by the measured
upspring-ing and upbringing of the aristocracy, Nietzsche believed that the discovery and 
conquest of brave new worlds— philosophical or otheiwise— rely solely upon those who 
are “bom or, expressed more clearly, bred for it”.'*^ ^
Rejecting the “shrunken, almost ludicrous species, a herd animal, something full of 
good will, sickly and mediocre [which] has been bred, the European of today”,
Nietzsche sought “forefathers and ancestors of the Ûbermensch" those who strive 
“[n]ot to bear their race to the grave, but to found a new generation of this race”.'*^  ^ Such 
an artistic ‘medium’ demonstrates biological as well as cultural/ philosophical superiority, 
boasting a psychological ‘genome’ which can- to a certain degiee— be philosophically 
engineered. As early as 1884, he contended, “A doctrine is needed powerful enough to 
work as a breeding agent: strengthening the strong; paralysing and destructive for the
UM 82. On implanting habits, see also HA 76.
Taimer Nietzsche 23.
EH 18.
GS 228.
BG 145.
BG 339. Nietzsche singled out Germans for special censure in this regard. Their resuscitation depended
upon “a matter of will, o f work, of discipline, of breeding”. [WP 68 (1885)]
437
438
Z 110. 
UM 106.
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world-weary.”'*^® The extent to which a judgment is “ life-advancing, life-presei*ving, 
species preserving, perhaps even species-breeding” formed the basis of his philosophical 
and moral assessments.'’*’® This ‘commanding thought’ would remain witli him tlnoughout 
his writing career. Hence, even as his demoralization grew over the rampant dissemination 
o f‘slave’ culture across Europe, he mused, “The increasing dwarfing of man is precisely 
the driving force that brings to mind the breeding of a stronger race— a race that would be 
excessive precisely where the dwarfed species was weak and gi'owing weaker (in will, 
responsibility, self-assurance, ability to posit goals for oneself).”'*'**
To recapitulate, Nietzsche was able to consolidate his validated exercises of 
power— moral revaluation, the destmction of deleterious ‘tmths’, the brave acceptance and 
volitional approval of suffering, the deployment of cmelty to self and to others, and the 
aestheticization of the material world — within the role of ‘philosophical breeder’, whose 
job description entails the giandiose and ‘god-like’ project of “stiengthening and 
enhancement for the human type.”*’'’^  While humankind supplies the ‘raw materials’ for 
this illustrious progi'am of ‘philosophical eugenics’, as defined by “we fiee spirits”, the 
philosopher remains “the man of the most comprehensive responsibility who has the 
conscience for the collective evolution of mankind”, who alone is capable of selecting and 
rejecting diverse cultural components— religious, political, economic, etc.— “for his work 
of education and breeding”.'’'’^
G. Conclusion:
Thi'oughout Nietzsche’s elaborate development of the will to power, one can 
obseiwe a glowing thread of intentionality and puipose leading humankind thi'ough the 
winding recunences of nature’s magisterially indifferent ‘labyrinth’. All of the natural 
universe blindly surges towards the fonnation of laiger power units, and human beings
‘’^ ®WP458 [1884].
‘’‘’® BG 35.
WP 477-478 [1888].
GS 338.
BG 86. Hence, Nietzsche fiercely opposed Cluistianity’s ‘perverse’ attempts to ‘emasculate’ the species 
rather tlian “taking into sei-vice tlie great sources o f strength, those impetuous ton ents o f the soul that are so
must accept their deprivileged positions within this cosmic dynamo. According to
Nietzsche, humankind’s primary purpose is to better itself to the point of species
self-sacrifice, overcoming humanity in order to actualize the advent of the super-species.
As such, he did not endeavour to establish specific societal refonns or found new institutes
or hierarchies which differ significantly fiom the time-tested formulae of ancient Rome
and Greece.'*'*'* In a moment of self-eulogization, he once explained:
I am not a man, I am dynamite.— And with all that there is nothing in me of a 
founder of religion— religions are affairs of the rabble. I have need of washing 
my hands after contact with religious people.., I do not want ‘believers’, I think I 
am too malicious to believe in myself, I never speak to masses... I have a tenible 
fear I shall one day be pronounced holy [....] I do not want to be a saint, rather 
even a buffoon... Perhaps I am a buffoon... And none the less, or rather not none 
the less— for there has hitherto been nothing more mendacious than saints— the 
tmth speaks out of me.— But my tmth is dreadful: for hitherto the lie has been 
called tmth.— Revaluation o f all values: this is my foiinula for an act of supreme 
coming-to-oneself on the part of mankind which in me has become flesh and
445genius.
Given his feverish exuberance to embrace all of the material universe, Nietzsche 
would not waste one iota of fact or fiction. In its ideal fonn, even Chiistianity can be 
transfomied into something life-enliancing, both by promulgating peace and prosperity 
among a pacified populace, as well as by training exceptional individuals in honour and 
ascetic self-strengthening. In its more vimlent forms, Christianity becomes a menace to 
materiality, demolishing the barriers of rank and social privilege and inundating all of 
Europe with its slave values. While the Christian faith represented, for Nietzsche, a refuge 
and bastion of mediocrity for the motley masses who live in collective fear and hatred of 
exceptionality, it ironically comprised the sole sanctum for the safety and sanctity of 
exceptionality for another brilliant nineteenth-centuiy thinker who also went to gi eat 
lengths to keep his distance fiom the masses of Christendom.
often dangerous and oveiwlielming, and economizing them”. [WP 207 (1888)]
On tlie “banality” ofNietzsche’s proposed morality, see Nehamas 221-222.
EH 96. Safi anski posits that Nietzsche periodically toyed with the notion of a bicameral system o f culture 
which balances scientific knowledge with passion/ aestheticized ‘tmth’: “If he had held to it, he might well
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Chapter 4: To Have and Uphold; Kierkegaard’s View of the Universe:
I. The Cosmological Tier:
Because of the anti-systematic nature of Kierkegaard’s corpus, deliberately 
designed to thwart philosophical dissection, it is difficult to extract a particular theme- 
such as power— which is diffused throughout the authorship. On the basis of 
Kierkegaard’s theological convictions, the Cluistian’s relationship to power stems from 
her identification with Cluist, the par adigm for all human experience. However, the 
Incarnation is inextricably embedded within the all-encompassing goodness of divine 
Providence. Thus, in order to comprehend his concept of power on an individual level, it is 
necessary to examine the over-arching principles of cosmology, divine and human identity, 
and authority which permeate his writings. The following two chapters will adopt the same 
three-tier approach in the analysis of Nietzsche’s thought. However, Kierkegaard’s model 
will be more extensive, given his acceptance of a supernatural or eternal reality in addition 
to ‘created’ reality. Subsequently, each tier incorporates a dichotomy: the cosmological 
tier explicates the relationship between the temporal and the eternal; the antlunpological 
tier examines the relation between the crowd and the individual; the tier of authority 
explores the relation between the sens ate and the spiritual, between individuals both inside 
and outside the authentic Christian church.
A. Outlining the Divisions:
The main reason for emphasizing the bifurcation of the eternal from the temporal is 
to indicate the centrality of Kierkegaard’s insistence on the incommensurability between 
the ‘quantitative’ sphere of the created order and the ‘qualitative’ sphere of the eternal.'*'*^  
This ‘ Athanasian’ choiismos^^^ was particularly crucial for Kierkegaard due to the
have spared himself some o f his mad visions of grand politics and the will to power.” [200]
BA 38.
A qualitative baixier which expressed the ‘chasm’ o f heterogeneity between God and creation, as insisted 
upon by Athanasius during his debates against the Arians. [Athanasius 121]
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prevalent cultural and intellectual assimilation of the religious by the aesthetic sphere.'^ '^  ^
On the surface, this stark dichotomy might suggest either a denigration of the created order 
in favour of the eternal—justifying Nietzsche’s abhorrence of transcendental escapism— or 
a spectacularly remote God, safely sterilized in an inaccessible, ‘shrink-wrapped’ seal of 
oimiipotent insouciance. However, both would be gross misrepresentations of 
Kierkegaard’s personal beliefs, particularly in light of his scathing critique of Hegelianism 
for obliterating the contingent via the ideaL"^ "^ ^
There are at least tluee central nexuses in Kierkegaard’s thought which cracially 
link the temporal and the eternal. First, the created order is entirely dependent for its 
existence upon God and his ongoing participation in history,"^ ^^  a relationship which is 
intrinsically giounded in divine freedom and love: “What is it that really binds the temporal 
and the eternal? What is it other than love, which therefore is before everything else and 
remains when all else is past.”"^^^ Because God has brought everything into being, humans 
are responsible for maintaining an attitude of giatitude and love towards the world and 
everything in it; hence, for Kierkegaard, transcendental escapism is not an option, as it 
betrays a fundamental mistrust in Providence.'^^  ^ Second, temporality and eternity are 
forever wedded in the quintessential paradox and central tmth claim of CMstianity, the 
Incarnation: “that the eternal once came into existence in time”."^ ^^ Moreover, when 
individuals enter a moment of decision before God, that “moment” entails a ‘meeting’ of 
time and etemity.'* '^^  Third, every human being represents a bond of created matter and
448 UP 1432.
For example, BA 22 [July 4, 1840]. Contraiy to Hegel’s epistemological tyranny ofthe ideal, Kierkegaard 
maintained, “But actuality (historical actuality) stands in a two-fold relation to the subject: partly as a gift that 
refuses to be rejected, partly as a task that wants to be fulfilled.” [Cl 276] In response to Lessing’s contention 
that ‘accidental tmths’ are incormneiisurable with ‘essential tniths’, Climacus observed: “The basis o f tire 
paradox of Cliristianity is that it continually uses time and the historical in relation to tire eternal.” [UP I 95] 
Accordingly, it was Platonism and rrot Clrristianity which ineversibly devalued the temporal world by 
reducing the historical to a mere “occasion” for trutlr. [PF 60] The Christian must, as Mooney explains, 
renouirce ‘claims’ to the finite without renouncing ‘care’ for the firrite. [108-109] For a rrrore thorough 
refiitation of Kierkegaard’s alleged acosmism, see Keeley 96-108.
‘‘"“JPIII 321 [1850].
WL 24.
JPIV 49-52 [1840-1841]. See also BA 212, where he declared that, “the divine inhabits and finds its task 
in the firrite.” In UD 259, he deirouirced existential escapism as “not the expectarrcy o f the etenral but a 
superstitious belief in the future.”
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BA 38.
TM 630 n. 1. Climacus explicitly connected the “moirrent” and Cluist by referring to Galatians 4:4: “Let
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spirit:'^ ^^  “A human being is a synthesis of the infinite and the finite, of the temporal and the 
eternal, of freedom and n eces s i t y . Hence ,  in “Two ‘Notes’ Concerning My Work as an 
Author”, Kierkegaard stated, “[T]o be a human being is to have kinship with the divine.”"^^^ 
Moreover, the central paradox of the Incarnation supremely grounds and upholds the 
temporal universe in the unwavering love of God whereby, “[E]very Christian is Cluistian 
only by being nailed to the paradox of having based his eternal happiness on the relation to 
something h i s to r i ca l . Th us ,  according to Kierkegaard, genuine faith validates
temporality— it does not vitiate it 459
The limitations of this dichotornous stnictrrr e also pertain to the division between 
‘sensate’ and ‘spiritual’ authority in the following c h a p t e r . I  have chosen the term 
‘sensate’ to denote any human authority— whether intellectual, moral, or political- which 
is not self-consciously derived from God for several reasons: it is not an over-used term, it 
is found in translations of Kierkegaard’s writings,"^ ^^  and it largely avoids the problematic 
and/or pejorative connotations of words such as ‘natural’, ‘material’, ‘classical’, 
‘contingent’, ‘worldly’, ‘sensual’, ‘transitory’, ‘accidental’, or ‘secular’. A s  with every 
element of temporality for Kierkegaard, sensate authority possesses the potential for a 
transformational ‘renewal’ through a restored relationship with God.'^ ^^  An obvious 
limitation of the word is that it may seem to suggest an authority which is merely physical
us call it: the fullness o f time.” [PF 18]
JP III 338 [1854], CD 141, WL 12, UV 195, CA 85, UD 163.
456 ^ 3  Kierkegaai'd attributed the human consciousness of time to “the eternal within him”, lest a man
live ''totally in the purely momentary”, [CD 77-78; UD 17] and regarded the unity between one’s “divine 
necessity” and “accidental finitude” as “implicit in consciousness, which is the point of departure for 
personality.” [BA 212] Although the human spirit could be “fmitized” when lacking inwardness, Vigilius 
contended, “Inwardness is therefore eternity or the constituent ofthe eternal in man.” [CA 151] Perkins 
rightly obseives tliat Kierkegaard reâised to articulate the ‘nature’ of a human being: “Each person must, 
within the context of the given, define himself or herself as the person he/ she is and would be.” [“Politics” 
35]
PV 106.
UP I 578.
UD 260.
Prof. Trevor Hart has pointed out the problematic nature of associating the ‘spiritual’ with tlie ‘eternal’, 
since most Cluistian traditions posit the existence o f a ‘created order o f unseen spiritual realities which are, 
therefore, contingent upon creation.’ I’ve attempted to address this concern by restricting my usage of  
‘spiritual’ to authority in the realm o f human individuals.
For example, TM 460 [1854], PV 48, PC 158, UD 379, 382.
I am particularly indebted to Dr. Michael Partridge for highlighting the tenninological difficulties and 
providing helpful suggestions.
See, for example, BA 150.
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in nature. However, ‘sensate’ is intended to include intellectual and emotional spheres and 
not only the realm of the physical senses. As long as this qualification is kept in mind, the 
temi will hopefully provide more clarification than consternation. In light of these 
considerations, I will begin by articulating Kierkegaard’s understanding of the eternal 
before examining his views on the created realm of temporality.
B. Kierkegaard’s Comprehension of the Eternal: The Attiibutes of God:
1. God’s Transcendental Otherness:
Kierkegaard outlined one of his fimdamental theological premises in ajournai entry 
written in 1851 : “I have often pointed out that Clrristianity can be presented in two ways: 
either in man’s interest (mitigating accommodation) or in God’s interest (true Chirstianity) 
[ ]”464 gecause of the oveiwhelming ‘compromise’ of the Danish church, Kierkegaai'd
sought to remain tme to Clrristianity by retaining a theocentric focus. Within his writings, 
God is not reduced to the sum of several self-contained properties; rather, attributes such as 
God’s goodness, omnibenevolence, and omnipotence remain interconnected and almost 
‘perichoretic’ in relation to one another. As he wrote in Upbuilding Discourses in Various 
Spirits, “Everything that a human being knows about the eternal is contained primarily in 
this: it is God who rules, because whatever more a person comes to know pertains to how 
God has naled or mles or will rule.”"^^^ He later described this divine governing as “the lule 
of God’s love”, which human beings are not expected to understand although, “[W]e 
certainly are required to be able to believe and, believing, to understand that he is love.”'^ ^^  
The unfolding of God’s communicated identity and expectations of human beings, which 
culminate in the Incarnation, is an essential manifestation of God’s mle: “Christianity is an 
existeîice-communication, brought into the world by the use of authority>r'^^^
If Kierkegaard’s theological foundation could be encapsulated in a single phi ase, a
"'^JPIV457 [1851]. 
UV 258.
UV 268.
JPÏ75 [1849].
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likely candidate would be Athanasius’ pithy response to Arianism— “God is not as 
man.”'^ ®^ Climacus echoed this sentiment by contending, “[I]f a human being is to come 
truly to know something about the unknown (the god), he must first come to know that it is 
different from him, absolutely different fiom him.”"*^  ^ It is fallacious to extend human 
concepts of existence to God for, as Climacus contended, “God does not exist, he is 
eternal.”'*^® Without God’s expressed self-communication, God would remain forever 
incomprehensible to human reason; therefore, Kierkegaard insisted that revelation must be 
approached on its own tenns. While criticizing ‘aesthetic’ and ‘ethical’ approaches to 
Christianity which inevitably dismiss the revelatory aspect, he declared: “A revelation-fact 
is, in qualitative dialectic, essentially different fiom everything else and in a qualitative 
dialectical sense essentially belongs in the essentially religious sphere, the 
paradoxical-religious.”"^  ^‘
If God were merely a ‘passive’, incomprehensible object for human knowledge, 
agnosticism would be justified; however, Kierkegaard believed that humankind is facing a 
God who is “pure subjectivity”,"^ ^^  who personally ensures that an accurate self-portrayal is 
transmitted."*^  ^ Human subjectivity is, therefore, not an isolated phenomenon for 
Kierkegaard, but a participation in the ultimate subjectivity of God: “It is perfectly tme, 
isolated subjectivity is, in the opinion of the ages, evil; but ‘objectivity’ as a cure is not one 
whit better. The only salvation is subjectivity, i.e., God, as infinite compelling 
subject ivi ty.Thus,  to present Cliristianity as “a sum of doctrines” which has no direct
Athanasius 90. 
PF46.
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UP 1 332. Climacus posited that human understanding works only where possibility is higher than 
actuality, whereas actuality eclipses possibility in Cluistianity, thereby incapacitating human reason. [UP I 
580] In PF 74, Climacus argued that God is “necessary” and, therefore, cannot come into being because he 
simply is.
BA 20.
JPIII345 [1854].
PF 42.
JK 184 [1850]. It is important to emphasize that Kierkegaard is not questioning the ‘objective’ veracity of 
the Cluistian faith with the concept o f ‘subjectivity’ [contia Hamilton 65]. The foiiner is taken on tiust rather 
than human rationalization: “It is Clirist’s personal authority, attested by his heterogeneity with fallen human 
nature, and manifested in his maieutic method o f communication, that certifies (even if it does not 
demonstrate with rational certainty) the objective validity o f tlie Cluistian world-and-life-view [....]” [Aiken 
25] Aiken helpfully suggests that “objective truth, subjectively appropriated” is a better understanding than 
the “potentially misleading Climacan maxim ‘Tmtli is subjectivity’.” [28] See also Evans Fragments 211, 
255-256, Schonbaumsfeld 528, and Wliittaker 86. I would want to qualify carefully Perkins’ statement that.
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bearing on the lives of the listeners was, for Kierkegaard, tantamount to paganism.'"^ 
However, humanlcind is without excuse, and Kierkegaard once maintained that genuine 
atheism— at least within the ranks of Cluistendom— does not exist due to the 
efficaciousness of divine revelation/^^ He insisted, however, that God’s power remains 
inexplicable and largely uimoticed according to human standards of power, since 
Kierkegaard identified “inferior externality and interior divine power as the characteristic 
mark of the divine, whereas paganism is interior emptiness supported by external 
ostentation.”"*^  ^ On account of human sinfulness and the contemporary prevalence of the 
‘aesthetic fallacy’, which measures internal realities based on external appearances,"*^  ^
Kierkegaard avened: “This is Cluistianity’s view: what is eternal, what is tme, camiot 
possibly win the approval of the moment, must inevitably win its disapproval.”"*^^
2. God’s Utter Incontestability:
God’s transcendental otherness, which remains incomprehensible to human reason 
apart from faith, is conjoined to the utter incontestability of God’s mle. On account of 
God’s uniqueness, God has no equals to either rival or assist him. Because the power of 
God cannot be contested, Kierkegaard believed that there is no need for God to respond 
immediately to human rebellion: rather, God waits, having all of the time in the world at his 
disposal."*^ ** In an upbuilding discourse, Kierkegaard carefully explained that speaking of
“the objective validity o f our subjective beliefs is and remains unknown, though they do make behavioral 
differences in the world” [Perkins “Habermas” 485], lest Kierkegaard’s ‘subjectivity’ appear to endorse 
moral relativism or religious pluralism. The existential ‘certainty’ o f the love o f God , tlie autliority of the 
Bible, and the historical particularity o f Clirist upon which the believer’s ‘eternal happiness’ is based seem to 
counter “the epistemic groundlessness of a person’s religious belief’. [Perkins “Habennas” 486] I believe 
that Kierkegaard would agree with V olfs assertion: “[T]here are values which ‘time and change’ camiot alter 
because ‘time and change’ did not bring them about.” [68] While endorsing Perkins’ recognition o f the 
Kierkegaardian theme that human formulations o f truth are always provisional, I don’t think that 
“authoritarian dogma” is more problematic for Kierkegaard than the dispai ity between ‘ espoused beliefs ’ and 
daily practice.
CD 214-215. See also PV 228.
JP III 662 [1844]: “[J]ust as no one has ever proved it [God’s existence], so has there never been an atheist, 
even though there certainly have been many who have been unwilling to let what they knew (that the God 
exists) get control o f their minds.”
JP IV 458 [1851].
478 WL 305.
CD 227. Climacus stated that only God “possesses the medium that is the cominensurability of the outer 
and the imier. But the human mind cannot see world history in tliis way.” [UP I 141]
480 TM 274. On God’s slowness to judge, see TM 304-305, UV 16. Kierkegaard’s principle of divine
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God’s ‘victory’ over anything is misleading, since the invincibility of God’s mle does not 
mean that God defeats all challengers and thi eats, but rather that nothing is even capable of 
challenging or thieatening God: “God’s omnipotence and holiness do not mean that he can 
be victorious over everyone, that he is the strongest, for this is still a comparison; but it 
means, and this bars any comparison, that no one can manage to fight with him.”"*^* Hence, 
God can never fight fair-- he’s simply too dam big!
According to Kierkegaard, this divine unthwartability encompasses everything that 
transpires in the cosmos. The problem with ‘the problem of evil’ challenges is that they 
fail to recognize “the differentiation that God accomplishes the good and merely permits 
the evil”."*^  ^ Divine providence remains undaunted by the most heinous acts, able to 
incorporate the gravest misfortunes within its incontmveifible scope of love. 
Subsequently, Kierkegaard once proclaimed, “[U]ltimately everything must be ascribed to 
God if there is to be a God and a godly view of life.”"**^ This conviction remains consistent 
thi'oughout the journal entries in which he comes to terms with suffering and tragedy in his 
own life."*^ "* Reflecting upon a personal en*or, he once wrote: “[I]t was still your 
governance which pennitted it to happen and promptly and lovingly lifted it up into your 
fatherly pui*pose for me, lovingly disposing of the millions of possibilities so that even the 
mistake would become tmly useful to me.”"*^^
incontestability informed his view o f hell: because only suffering for the tiiitli can be ‘recollected eternally’, 
hell is not a dungeon o f divine vengeance, but a state of ‘eternal torment of emptiness’ “by the painful 
thought tliat your life was wasted, filled with what camiot be recollected eternally!” [TM 298] Kodalle 
posits, “The new Kierkegaardian way of thinking and tlie fi eedom that comes with it leave the traditional 
view of God behind, that is, God as an onmipotent being ruling in the mode of domination.” [400]
481 y y  2 gg God’s ‘victory’ does not transpire in time but is trans-clironologically rooted in eternity. 
Subsequently, Kierkegaard praised “the blessed assurance that comforts beyond all measure- that eternally 
the good has always won the victory”. [UV 63]. See also BA 225. For a fascinating survey o f the elision of 
divine and human power in medieval and renaissance tliought, see Oakley 444-447.
"^^TM 390 [1846].
UD 386.
Hence, “Governance” employed depression and “a troubled conscience” to ‘hold me in rein’, [CD 421
(1848)] in addition to expanding biographical incidentals into significant principles such as “that single 
individual”-  originally a reference to Regine Olsen. [WA xviii] Events such as publication pressures, 
anxiety over authorship, and the death o f Regine’s father were regarded as ‘hints from Governance.’ [PV 226
(1849)]
JP III 575 [1850]. His views had changed substantially from early entries where he regarded the deaths of
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3. God ’ s Omnibenevolence :
If God was characterized only by sheer otherness and utter incontestability, the 
universe would be little more than one tyiannical system in which human free will was a 
mere illusion. At times, Kierkegaard seems to subscribe to such a view. For example, in 
his interpretation of Matthew 6:24, “No one can serve two masters [....]”, he concluded 
that a person serves God no matter which choice one makes, so one might as well serve 
God w i l l i n g l y . A  similar strand o f ‘Christian fatalism’ occurs in Without Authority: 
“God’s will is still done anyhow; so strive to make a virtue of necessity by unconditionally 
obediently doing God’s will.”"**^ However, Kierkegaard asserted that God’s mle, 
incontestable and beyond the gi asp of human rationality or manipulation, is 
simultaneously characterized by his omnibenevolence: “God is pure subjectivity and in 
love it pleases God to be concerned about man.”"*^  ^ Because God is transcendent and 
omnipotent, God lacks nothing. Hence, Climacus concluded, “But if he moves himself and 
is not moved by need, what moves him then but love, for love does not have the satisfaction 
of need outside itself but within.”"*^  ^ Anti-Climacus defined “divine compassion” as, “the 
unlimited recklessness in concerning oneself only with the suffering, not in the least with 
oneself, and of unconditionally recklessly concerning oneself with each sufferer”."*^® 
God’s compassion is itself indefatigable, based upon “the omnipotence with which God the 
omnipotent One bears all your s o i t o w  lightly as nothing”."*^*
The doctrine that God is love was indispensable to Kierkegaard, who once declared 
that, should anyone observe a single event “that is incompatible with the idea that God is 
love”, it would constitute sufficient proof that God doesn’t exist, “for if God is not love, 
and if he is not love in everything, then God does not exist at all.”^^  ^ God’s love is not only 
evident in the universe he has created, but also in the fact that he remains a self-giving God.
his mother and sister as “the punisliment o f God”. [JK 39 (1835)]
CD 83. See also WA 197 [1847].
WA 30.
JP III 345 [1854].
PF 24.
PC 58.
WA 43.
UV 267. He added; “But no human being would be able to endure tliis hoiTor [....]” [UV 270]
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This applies to the Incarnation, as well as to the ongoing work of the Holy Spirit, whose 
promptings constitute “God’s gifts in a far deeper sense than food and clothing, not only 
because it is God who gives them but because God gives himself in these gifts
4. God’s Constancy:
The final attribute of God which is prominent in Kierkegaard’s writings forms the 
ciux of his favourite passage of scripture, James 1:17-21 : God never changes/^"* Despite 
the suffering which God brings upon himself in his intimate involvement with a ‘fallen’ 
creation characterized by misused freedom, Kierkegaard comforted those who suffered for 
the tmth: “[B]e assured that in love God suffers more than you are suffering, but he cannot 
be changed by that.”"*^  ^ Accordingly, he once described “divine fatherly love” as “the one 
single unshakable thing in life, the tme Archimedean point.”"*^  ^ Because of his extreme 
otherness, utter incontestability, unshakable love, and immutability, God’s ability to will 
the good for temporality and his ability to accomplish that will remain intrinsically 
interconnected and ultimately unthwaitable. Having briefly outlined Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of the eternal, it is necessai y to examine his views of the universe which 
God has created.
C. Kierkegaard’s Comprehension of the Temporal: The Limitations of Actuality:
1. Contingent Knowledge of God:
In contrast to the otherness, incontestability, omnibenevolence, and immutability of 
God, the temporal universe— everything that exists, i.e., was created by God— is 
characterized by contingency and limitation. It is primarily limited in acquiring tme and
CD 253.
494 TM 268, Cl 476 n. 70. Although Kierkegaard never systematically expounded the doctrine of the Trinity, 
Climacus alluded to it in his ruminations of existence, necessity, and divine iimnutability. To suimnarize, all 
existing matter is possible but not necessary— centr a Aristotle— since the necessary must always have been, 
otherwise it isn’t truly ‘necessary’. In light of its complete independence from existence and role as “free 
acting cause”, [PF 75] Climacus stated: “[I]t is constantly related to itself and is related to itself in the same 
way and excludes all change.” [PF 77]
TM 295.
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complete knowledge of who God is. Kierkegaard adamantly maintained that God is 
clearly beyond the ordinary purview of human rationality and tliinkability."*^  ^ Hence, in a 
journal entry on God’s creative power, he maiwelled, “It is incomprehensible that 
omnipotence is able not only to create the most impressive of all things— the whole visible 
world— but is able to create the most frail of all things— a being independent of that very 
omnipotence.”"*^  ^ Without God’s personal self-disclosure, humankind would remain 
trapped within mythological constructions and projections. According to the Danish 
thinker, eiToneous interpretations of God’s transcendence take two contrary forms: either, 
God is held ‘too close’ by a religiousness of immanence and thereby encased within the 
temporal order of creation and made subject to its laws and bounds; or, God is held ‘too 
distant’, whereby people fail to recognize God’s intimate interactions with creation. 
Hence, he maintained, “[T]he eternal is the dominant, which does not want to have its time 
but wants to make time its own and then permits the temporal also to have its time.”"*^^
It is tempting to conjecture on Kierkegaard’s attitude towards natural revelation. 
He clearly believed that creation displays the beauty and handicraft of God. Thus, while 
explaining the imago Dei, he stated: “The upright gait is the sign of distinction, but to be 
able to prostrate oneself in adoration and worship is even more glorious; and all nature is 
like the great staff of servants who remind the human being, the mler, about worshiping 
God.” *^*** However, such praise likely arises after recognition of and reconciliation with 
God’s primary revelation— the life and person of Jesus Christ.^ *** Hence, the pagan 
mistakenly stiove to emulate the divine by ruling rather than by humble adoration: “To 
worship is not to rule, and yet worship is what makes the human being resemble God, and 
to be able truly to worship is the excellence of the invisible glory above all creation. The 
pagan was not aware of God and therefore sought likeness in inling.” *^*^
496 TM xii.
The natural outcome of the encounter between um-egenerate humanity and God is, therefore, offence. See 
PC 75-144. For parallels with Hume’s limitation of reason to categories outside of faith, see Gardiner 
Introduction 81.
WL [revised] 405 [1846].
11.
500 UV 193.
Kierkegaard also believed that God’s will is explicitly revealed “in Holy Scripture and in my conscience.” 
[JK 203 (1850)]
^^UV 193.
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Due to Kierkegaard’s aversion to Hegelian ‘quantification’— the assimilation of the
eternal within temporal formulations— he adamantly attacked the view that Christian faith
is merely one stage in the unfolding evolution of humankind which must be superseded by
a higher stage of development/**^ Christian faith entails the ‘collision’ whereby the
temporal encounters the eternal on its own tenns. Hence, Kierkegaard had little tolerance
for religions o f ‘immanence’: “Temporality, as it is laiowable, cannot be the transparency
of the eternal; in its given actuality, it is the refraction of the eternal.” *^*"* He denied the
efficacy of any human-made artifice— whether physical or intellectual— to communicate
God directly to any individual .Thus,  Climacus ironically observed:
No anonymous author can more slyly hide himself, and no maieutic can more 
caiefully recede fi'om a direct relation than God can. He is in the creation, 
everywhere in the creation, but he is not there directly, and only when the single 
individual turns inwards into himself [...] does he become aware and capable of 
seeing God.^ **^
2. Redeeming the Fallen Realm:
In stark contrast to the immutability of the eternal, temporality is characterized by 
its intrinsic changeability and susceptibility to cormption,^**  ^ Subsequently, Kierkegaai'd 
believed that clinging to the uncertain is tantamount to insanity,^ **^  for, "\0]nly the eternal 
can be gained eternally At the same time, however, temporality is bound to God’s 
loving purposes and “God’s plan of existence— that time is purely and simply
503 UP j 291-294. The incoixuuensurability o f Cliristianity with human development is deeply connected to 
the paradoxical nature o f tlie eternal entering the temporal in the Incarnation. See BA 175: “The apostle has 
something paradoxically new to bring, the newness of which, just because it is essentially paradoxical 
and not an anticipation pertaining to the development of the human race, continually remains [....]”
504 UV 90.
WL [revised] 409 [January 1847].
506 UP I 243. He continued: “The direct relationship with God is simply paganism, and only when the break 
has taken place, only then can there be a true God-relationship.” Kierkegaard owed much o f his emphasis on 
‘indirect coimnimication’ to Socrates’ ‘maieutic’ relation to his pupils. See UP I 247.
WA 40. Kierkegaard’s famous image o f ‘floating out upon the depths of 7,000 fathoms o f water’ 
expressed “how uncertain eveiytliing is.” [CD 255]
CD 256.
CD 137.
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development, prior complication, and eternity the solution.” *^** Even political events, such 
as war and revolution, are incorporated within God’s indefatigable plan for temporality. 
Hence, in reflecting upon the tumultuous events of 1848, he contended: “And when the 
preliminary, the convulsive seizure, has run its course, the human race will be so exhausted 
from sufferings and loss of blood that this matter of eternity might at least be allowed to 
receive consideration.” *^* Although Vigilius contended that it is the nature of “the 
demonic” to fear the iixevocable annihilation of the temporal by the eternal, he insisted: “In 
eternity [...] all contradiction is cancelled, the temporal is permeated by and preseiwed in 
the eternal [.. ..]” *^^  Just as the ‘lower’ spheres of existence— the aesthetic, ethical, and 
Religiousness A— are not negated as in Hegelian ‘mediation’,^ *^  but swept up in an ‘Elijan’ 
whirlwind of fire and transfigured into something higher by Religiousness B,^ *"* likewise 
the temporal is not discarded but transformed into perfection.^ *^ In order to investigate the 
implications of sin and redemption more closely, the argument will now focus on 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of humanity.
WL 236.
232 [October 1848],
CA 154.
EG 1478 [1837]: “Hegel’s subsequent position swallows up the previous one, not as one stage o f life 
swallows another, with each still retaining its validity, but as a higher title or rank swallows up a lower title.” 
Gardiner argues that the ‘ti'ansfiguration’ of the aesthetic stage to the ethical is ‘Hegelian in tone’, 
{Introduction 52] and ponders whether “tliere is anything that could not, with a little ingenuity, be inteipreted 
as ‘living aesthetically’”. [51] Norris points to the use of aesthetic strategies (e.g., narrative fictionalizing o f 
the past to justify Kierkegaard’s broken engagement) by the ‘religious’ perspective o îPoint o f View as proof 
of overlap in tlie stages. [94-96] Since the higher stages both embody and perfect the lower, there will 
naturally be coimnonalities.
See Gardiner Introduction 67: “While the importance of moral requirements is not as such denied, the 
absolute sovereignty o f the ethical can no longer be assumed [....]” Hong shares this interpretation in WL 
[revised] 316 n. 40: “The becoming o f the person, or ‘stages on life’s way,’ thereby involves ‘cutting the tap 
roots’ o f the esthetic, the ethical, and tlie imraanental religious, but not abrogating them, and in the life of 
faith catching them up in ‘spontaneity after reflection.’” Dooley rightly interprets the ‘teleological 
suspension o f the ethical’-- contra Levinas— as an unwavering pronouncement of the provisional, contingent, 
and fallible nature o f human laws and government, [xviii] See also Westphal “Abraham” 77, where he 
argues that the teleological suspension o f the ethical is directed against Hegel’s concept o f ‘ethical life’. 
[Sittliclikeitt] Quinn obseives that the Cluistian ethics o f ‘commanded love o f neighbour’ and ‘required 
imitation o f Christ’ “are likely to look harsh and inliuman if  viewed from outside a Chi istian worldview or if  
recourse to grace is disallowed. [374]
See, for example, BA 21, where Kierkegaard contended that the ethical requirement defends the religious 
sphere against the aesthetic sphere’s attempts to reduce it to ‘art:’ : “The religious sphere includes or ought to 
include the ethical [....]” In speaking of love versus faith and hope, he wi ote: “[T]he greatest must be able to 
undertake the business o f the lesser ones (if I may put it this way) and makes them more perfect.” [WL 213] 
On the need for sexuality to be “transfigured” ratlier than nullified or repressed, see CA 80. See also CA 70, 
where the ethical is not nullified but “receives a completely different expression”, and EO 1205 where Mr. A 
describes Faust as a later ‘reproduction’ or ‘stage’ o f Don Juan: “[T]o reproduce another stage does not mean 
only to become that but to become that witli all the elements o f the preceding stage in it.”
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IL The Anthi’opological Tier:
A. The Universal: Abortion of Selfhood Through Collectivity:
1. The Gift of Free Will:
Within the glorious cosmos which God has ft eely created, humankind occupies a
unique and privileged position. For Kierkegaard, one of the greatest expressions of God’s
love— and equally expressive of God’s supreme otherness and utter incontestability-- is
human fr eedom: “The gr eatest good, after all, that can be done for a being [,..] is to make it
ft ee. In order to do just that, omnipotence is required.”  ^ Contrary to many philosophical
and theological disputations of the inherent contradictions between divine and human
fr eedom, Kierkegaard believed that the existence of human free will is a miracle created
and perpetually sustained by the omnipotent love and creative liberty of God:
[I]f a human being had tlie slightest independent existence over against God (with 
regard to materia), then God could not make him fr ee. Creation out of nothing is 
once again the Omnipotent One’s expression for being able to make [a being] 
independent. He to whom I owe absolutely everything, although he still 
absolutely controls everything, has in fact made me independent.^*^
He contended that true independence can only be given by one who can completely remove 
all vestiges of obligation and dependency from the recipient.^ Subsequently, the gift of 
liberty cannot represent a loss of liberty on the part of the giver, othei*wise, Kierkegaard 
argued, the recipient will be bound by the gift and not tmly liberated: “If in creating men 
God himself lost a little of his power, then precisely what he could not do would be to make 
a human being independent.” *^^
‘^^ TM 390 [1846].
^'^TM 390-391 [1846].
TM 391 [1846]: “God’s omnipotence is therefore his goodness. For goodness is to give oneself away 
completely, but in such a way that by omnipotently taking oneself back makes the recipient independent.” 
This presumably would be Kierkegaard’s response to the dilemma o f gift-giving raised in Jolm Milbank’s 
seminal essay, “Can a Gift Be Given?”
TM 390-391 [1846]. Creation ex nihilo becomes a vital doctiine for Kierkegaai'd, imderscoring the 
qualitative difference between temporal and divine power and creativity: “A human being caimot bear to 
have his ‘creations’ be something in relation to himself; they are supposed to be nothing; and therefore he 
calls them, and with disdain, ‘creations’. But God, who creates fi'om nothing, omnipotently takes fiom 
nothing and says, ‘Become’; he lovingly adds, ‘Become something even in relation to me’. What wonderful 
love; even his omnipotence is in the power of love.” [CD 127]
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The gift of tme independence requires great subtlety. In Works o f Love, 
Kierkegaard claimed: “[T]he greatest benefaction cannot be accomplished in any way 
whereby the recipient gets to know that he is indebted,”^^** If someone argues that man has 
nevertheless become ‘indebted’ to God for his freedom, Kierkegaard might respond that 
God hasn’t lost or gained anything from his gift and, therefore, there is neither a genuine 
debt nor a ‘contractual’ obligation for repaying an ‘impossible’ because eternal gift. On 
account of God’s utter incontestability and limitless power, only God can tmly liberate a 
living being:
All finite power makes dependent; only omnipotence can make independent, can 
fonn from nothing something that has its continuity in itself tlnough the 
continuous withdrawing of omnipotence. Omnipotence is not ensconced in a 
relationship to another, for there is no other to which it is comparable— no, it can 
give without giving up the least of its power, that is, it can make independent.^^*
This suggests that, for Kierkegaard, tme power is represented by the ability to empower
another without enslaving that person to either the giver or to the gift- a task
accomplishable only by omnipotence. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Kierkegaard
contended that it is only tlirough willingly relinquishing the temporal that a person tmly
gains both the temporal and the eternal,^^  ^an act made possible only by giace: “Only with
the help of the eternal is a person able to let go of the lost temporal thing in such a way that
he loses it only temporally. If the eternal does not help, then he loses much more than the
temporal.”^^  ^ Michael Matthis lucidly explains that the Christian attains tme selfliood
before God, which is unavailable to the aesthetic or ethical ‘self, each of which,
seeks to simplify the complexity of selfhood and find a solution within 
hmnanence to the problem of selfliood that the religious self faces in going 
beyond the immanent, i.e., beyond the control of its own powers, that problem 
being the reconciliation of the total fr eedom that selfhood demands and the fact 
of otherness without which that fr eedom becomes a mirage, a mere play of
WL 256.
TM 391 [1846]. See also UP I 260, where Climacus stated: “[N]o one is as resigned as God, because he 
communicates creatively in such a way that in creating he gives independence vis à vis himself.” Constantin 
endorsed this view in his critique of Hegelian mediation: whereas immanence caimot contain true movement 
on account of its self-referential nature, fieedom “always emerges— by virtue not of an immanence but o f a 
transcendence.” [FT 308] Pattison argues that, “the impossibility of being absorbed into or by the other, or 
of absorbing the otlier into myself, is a key element in his antliropological starting-point.” [161]
CD 134, 143.
CD 142.
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fantasy/^"*
Subsequently, before a truly omnipotent God, the individual’s freedom is recognized and 
ratified by an Other who can neither tlueaten nor be tlneatened by this freedom.
God’s loving omnipotence is not merely required to create ‘independent’ humanity
ex nihilo, since Kierkegaard believed that God’s omnipotence is constantly required to
prevent creation fr om being oveiivhelmed by his abundance.^^^ Divine power is as much a
‘holding back’^ ^^  as a holding fo r th , s i nce  true power need not be “conspicuous” in its
depo r t me nt . As  Judge William explained,
[Tjhere are different ways of measuring strength. When Holger Danske squeezes 
sweat out of an iron glove, that is strength, but if he were handed a butterfly, I am 
afr aid that he would not have sufficient strength to take it properly. To mention a 
sublime example, God’s omnipotence appears gieat in having created everything, 
but does it not appear equally great in the omnipotent moderation that can permit 
a blade of glass to grow its season/^^
Hence, in God’s continuous interaction with humanity, God’s compassion is expressed by 
the refrisal to impede the freedom of his creations through either the blatant use of his
Matthis 422. He continues: “[UJnless the self sunenders its pretensions to sufficiency, first annihilates 
itself and then comes into being thi ough the absolute ottier, then the self is not tmly fi ee, but is merely 
detennined by immanent factors witliin the self.” [425] Mattliis aigues tliat Kierkegaard’s model fails, 
however, by dismissing tlie [finite] “social otlier as an obstacle along the path to fiill development”. 
[428-429] He surmises: “[I]f the social other poses such an obstacle to the self’s fi eedom that Kierkegaard 
eliminates such an other fiom contact at the soul’s center, how much greater must the obstacle be to tlie self’s 
fieedom when that other is itself absolute and all-powerfiil?” [429-430] Matthis’ analysis appears valid in 
lieu o f many statements in which Kierkegaard delimits human relationships. However, Worlcs o f Love 
certainly argues for more than an ‘insti-umental’ attention to the social other, and Cluistians are under direct 
orders to ‘love thy neighbour’ fiom the liighest o f authorities. Matthis himself cites WL 253: “[T]o have 
individuality is to believe in the individuality o f every other person; for individuality is not mine but is God’s 
gift by which he gives me being and gives being to all.” [436] From the perspective o f sinfiilly autonomous 
humankind, God must indeed constitute the ultimate ‘thieat’, since such a person is blind to the 
incommensurability between God and humanity which Kierkegaard insists upon. For the Cliristian, 
however, it does not follow that, if  humans are a tlneat to the se lfs freedom, then God must be even more so, 
since God’s power is qualitatively different.
Jürgen Moltmami develops a similar view o f  divine self-limitation, building upon Isaac Luria’s docti ine 
of zimzum. See Moltmann God 86-88, and Trinity 108-111.
Kodalle 400.
Matthis argues that tliis is not a violation of the principle o f contradiction, “since it occurs at the level of 
the transcendent”. [431]
SW 144.
SW 144. See also WA 42: “God the Omnipotent One canies the whole world and all its sonow [...] with 
extieme lightness.”
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power/^** or an oppressive-- because oveiwlielming— divine disclosure. Thus, 
Kierkegaard wrote, “[I]n your goodness you conceal yourself from him [man], and your 
omnipotence makes it impossible for him to see you, since in that case he himself would 
become nothing
It would be somewhat of a misnomer to label Kierkegaard’s position as ‘kenotic’, 
given that God’s ‘holding back’ is, paradoxically, an invisible display of his unwavering 
oimiipotence!^^^ What then seems ‘powerless’ fr om the perspective of temporality is, in 
fact, the frill and radical entrance of God in time. In addition to the gift of liberty itself, 
lovingly bestowed from fr eedom for fr eedom, Kierkegaard believed that human free will 
receives a second inestimable honour— God deigns to render himself an object of human 
choice: “Do you know any more overwhelming and humbling manifestation of God’s 
complaisance and indulgence toward human beings than that in a sense he places himself 
on the sti aight line of choice with the world just in order that the human being can choose
For Kierkegaard, the major implications of this divine ‘self-restraint’ in light of 
human independence are two-fold. First, in peiinitting his creations to choose to reject 
him, God makes himself vulnerable to suffering. This vicissitude is eloquently illustrated 
in Climacus’ parable of the love-struck king, who seeks to woo a peasant maiden without 
oveiwhelming her by his grandeur: “Wlio grasps the contradiction of this sorrow: not to 
disclose itself is the death of love; to disclose itself is the death of the beloved.”^^"*
UV 62.
UD310. See also PF 26-30.
For an interesting discussion on the ‘kenotic nature’ of grace as a commonality between Arminius and 
Kierkegaard, see Jackson 235-256. The impression o f God’s literally having to ‘shove over’ to make room 
for human fieedom seemingly implies a cominensurability between divine power/ fieedom and human 
power/ fieedom, which would be untenable fiom a Kierkegaardian perspective. Hence, 1 believe 
Kierkegaard would have agreed with Bonlioeffer’s assessment: “[T]he doctrine of kenosis tried to reduce the 
claims o f the divine nature until ultimately divine and human nature would fit togetlier.” [Bonlioeffer 97] 
God’s otherness must be an ‘other’ otherness fiom human ‘otherness’. Hence, 1 strongly disagree with 
Golomb’s suggestion o f ‘imputed transcendence’: “Kierkegaard maximizes the distinction between man and 
God to make religious faith the most authentic authoritative experience imaginable. The gap between God 
and man is infinite because it was man who made it so.” [“Ladder” 79]
533 UY 206. This accounts for the eternal peril o f choosing not to choose God or avoiding the choice 
altogether. [UV 207]
PF 30.
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Climacus then pressed his point concerning human illusions of power: “The human mind 
so often aspires to might and power, and in its constant preoccupation with this thought, as 
if achieving it would transfigure everything, it does not suspect that there is not only joy in 
heaven but so ito w  also [.. Second, it also indicates that there is a dialectic at work 
between human and divine freedom. In Works o f Love, the author obseiwed that,
'"'‘eveiything which shall be kept alive must be kept in its element. But love’s element is 
infinitude [.. ..]”^^  ^ In order for human love to be sustained, it must exist within the bounds 
of divine love. Similarly, one might argue that, in order for human fr eedom to be 
sustained, it must flourish within the confluence and effluence of God’s freedom.
2. ‘Crowding Out’ God: Sin as Revaluation:
Unfortunately, humankind chose to misuse its fr eedom in order to pursue a sinful 
autonomy fi'om God, a travesty of ti'uth which persists, with ever evolving cunning, to the 
present. Commenting on the widespread indolence inlierent in a cost-fr ee ‘giace’, 
Kierkegaard wrote: “Man thinks he will have the easiest time of all when there is no God at 
all— then man can play the lord. After that God becomes at most a handsome ornament, a 
luxuiy item— for there is no duty toward God.”^^  ^ One of tlie most important results of 
human rebellion for Kierkegaard is the intentional loss of individual identity before God by 
conglomeration en masse, fostered by fear of “the risky odyssey of becoming a s e l f H e  
maintained, “The same people, who as individuals are able to will the good in tmth, are 
immediately coimpted as soon as they unite and become many [.. ..]” "^*** In a criticism of
PF30. 
WL 176.
533 
536
Rumble argues, “Kierkegaard’s Romantic leanings are evident in his emphasis on the choice of the self 
and the free appropriation o f every influence foreign to the subject.” [84] However, this crucial dialectical 
interplay distances Kierkegaard from Romantic proclivities, which reduce God to merely anotlier source of 
human ftilfillment. As well, Rumble bases much o f her analysis on Kierkegaard’s earlier pseudonyms, 
whose attempts to ‘reclaim finitude’ amount to “yet anotlier attempt to be God, enveloping finitude within an 
infinite subjectivity and thereby drawing its sting.” [93] Kierkegaard claims that these aesthetic productions 
were always part of a larger religious project, whereas Rumble suggests that, once he reached the age o f 34 
against his father’s prediction, “the urgency o f Kierkegaard’s attempt to subsume all powers separate from 
his own will may have subsided.” [101]
Cited in Westphal “Sociology” 145. See also Rumble 84-85.
Kodalle 405. Kodalle posits that collectivization is also motivated by “the dynamic structure of our 
rationality with its virtually inherent tendency to dominate.”
UV 96. See also WA 76, WL [revised] 404 [1846], EO I 31.
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Bernard of Claii-vaux’s ci*usade-rousing orations, Kierkegaard declared: “[T]his is working |
in the direction of the animal-category, to work men together into— a crowd.” "^** When i
humans ‘band’ together, rebellion rises, God is forgotten, "^*  ^and a Babel-like assault upon !
the ‘heavens’ is inevitable. Thus, Anti-Climacus stated: |
Once people are allowed to merge in what Aristotle terms the animal category- j
the crowd, then this abstraction (instead of being less than nothing, less than the |
least significant individual human being) becomes regarded as some tiling. And !
then it isn’t long before this abstraction becomes God.^ "*^  i
In Kierkegaard’s writings, the crowd represents both the epitome of conformity and :
the demise of the particular, “the degradation to copies”.^"*"* He did not, however, condemn
all foiins of congregation,^"*  ^but merely those associations which elevate the worth of the
crowd over the worth of the individual, a reversion to “tlie old paganism” wherein the
particular is reduced to mere specimens of the general race or species.^"*Hence, the
danger ofthe crowd lies specifically in its ability to thwart individual selfliood. Within this
context, '’''Kierkegaard seeks to un-socialize the individual in order to un~deijy society
According to Anti-Climacus, the human being is a synthesis of the finite (which
‘combines’) and the infinite (which ‘expands’). If the infinite is allowed to expand without
being called back to itself, the individual becomes ‘fantastic’:
When emotion becomes fantastic in this way, the self is simply more and more 
volatilized and eventually becomes a kind of abstract sensitivity which inliumanly 
belongs to no human, but which inhumanly participates sensitively, so to speak, in 
the fate of some abstraction, for example, humanity in abstracto.^^^
As a result, the individual loses all particularity and becomes “a cipher, one more person,
IV 219 [1853],
WA 17.
SD 151.
JP 111333 [1854].
In fact, he argued that individuals cannot truly unite without particularity. [TA 91] See also JP 1155 
[1848]: “[T]he defect in tlie life o f Cluistendom [...] is that people [...] live too remote fiom each other.” 
Perkins suggests that Kierkegaard’s view o f community is partly informed by Hegel’s idealization o f ancient 
Greece: “One suspects, however, that tlie New Testament view of the church is more important.” [“Critique” 
213]
"‘”^ PV 107.
Westphal “Politics” 325.
SD 61. While the idealist ‘dissipates’ the self into abstiaction, the detenninist “suffocates” the self 
because, “[l]t is impossible to breathe necessity alone” [SD 70]
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one more repetition of this peipetual Einerlei [one-and-the-same].” "^*^ This constitutes the
worst sort of despair— when a person denies her responsibility of having to become a self, a
possibility which is actualized only by intentional living in the presence of God/^**
Kierkegaard contended that only the individual himself could thwart his own selfliood:
People continually think that it is the world, the enviromnent, the circumstances, 
the situations that stand in one’s way, in the way of one’s fortune and peace and 
joy. Basically it is always the person himself who stands in his way, the person 
himself who is bound up too closely with the world [...] so that he is unable to 
come to himself, to find rest, to hope.^^*
Contraiy to Socrates’ belief that truth resides within the immortal soul of man,^^  ^
Kierkegaai'd posited that animosity ‘naturally’ arises between humanity and truth. As 
Climacus indicated, to live in a state of “untmth” entails not being “merely outside the 
tmth” but being fundamentally opposed to the truth.^^  ^ Instead of preoccupying itself with 
truth, Anti-Climacus claimed: “The world really only interests itself in intellectual or 
aesthetic limitations, or in the indifferent [.. Sin, therefore, becomes the ultimate 
human revaluation, “For worldliness is precisely to ascribe infinite value to the 
indifferent.”^^  ^ Anti-Climacus insisted that any created being which attempts to attain an 
autonomy independent of the eternal power which establishes it is bound to failure and 
despair.^^  ^ By attempting to replace God, Kierkegaard claimed that temporality “becomes
SD 63. See also SD 170 n. 22, where the difference between a non-Clmstian and a “spiritual person” is 
“like that of a statue to someone living; they are human beings only in appearance, like the elves who are 
hollow at the back.”
SD 64. Anti-Climacus concluded, “Naturally the world has generally no understanding of what is truly 
honifying.”
CD 109-110.
Climacus scrutinized the Socratic tenet o f recollection in PF 9-11. Rumble contends that Climacus has 
obscured the boundaiy between the Socratic and the Cluistian in his attempt to “derive the transcendent from 
the immanent”. Hence, “Climacus remarks with wonder upon the fact that the Clu istian pole o f his thought 
experiment is already expressed within a human language supposedly too self-loving to have conceived it.” 
[98] Rather, this reflects the hints o f higher ‘spheres to come’ which Kierkegaard worked into the writings, 
both to prompt the reader to frirther undertakings as well as to refute any notion that the religious motivation 
behind his entire authorship was merely a shift towards piety in ‘old age’.
PF 15.
SD 63.
SD 63.
556 gj^ qg Anti-Climacus would take issue with interpreters who grant individuals the ability o f willing the 
‘leap’ from one existence sphere to another. See, for example, Cutting 84-85 and Cope 557, who examines 
the difficulties o f assigning responsibility to non-leapers if  the leap is not volitional. To understand the stages 
as viable options for the self to choose fr eely downplays Kierkegaard’s insistence upon tlie se lf  s proclivity 
for self-escape and self-deception. See Matthis 42. Fereirra helpfully proposes the tenu “leap to faitli” to 
depict more accurately that the leap is not initiated by the leaper’s own faith. [207] See her excellent article:
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something by stealing the power of eternity from a person and then in return remains with 
him and makes him its slave.”^^  ^ Subsequently, sin precipitates a catastrophic revaluation 
whereby ‘death’— a separation fi*om the source of life and freedom, God— is deemed ‘life’ 
and ‘life’— a relationship of intentional submission before God— is regarded as ‘death’
If individuals are truly living out of a pseudo-self based on this value inversion, any 
attempt to strip them of this centre of existence will be met with stiff resistance and the 
generation of offence/^^ Because of the “infinite, qualitative difference between man and 
God”, God must ‘disrupt the learner’ and radically reconfigure her— for Kierkegaard, there 
is literally no room for ‘improvement’/*’* As Anti-Climacus avened, 
“[S]elf-abandonment is the self, and the self is acquired through self-abandonment.”^^ ' 
Subsequently, Kierkegaard wrote: “[T]o speak merely humanly, God is indeed your mortal 
enemy. Indeed he wants you to die, to die to the world; he hates specifically that in which 
you naturally have your life, to which you cling with all your zest for life.” *^’^  The 
Christian truth demands that one must relinquish personal autonomy in lieu of a life of 
personal obedience to God and acknowledge one’s failure to meet divine expectations for 
human life, a ‘natural’ impossibility since, “No human being is able to say, of his own and 
by himself, what sin is, for sin is the very thing he is in.”^^  ^ Hence, Kierkegaard explained: 
“It is therefore very consistent for Luther to teach that a person must be taught by a 
revelation concerning how deeply he lies in sin, that the anguished conscience is not a
M. Jamie Feixeira, “Faith and tlie Kierkegaardian Leap,” in The Cambridge Companion to Kierkegaard, ed, 
Alastair Hamiay and Gordon D. Marino (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1998), 207-234.
CD 99.
See, for example, UD 377- “There is a condition o f tlie struggle that removes eveiy doubt, consequently a 
condition o f the struggle that makes the contender truly joyful and intrepid, and tliis is the condition: if  he 
loses, then he is victorious.”— and UV 181 : “[T]o be dependent on God, completely dependent— that is 
independence”. Due to the illusions of sin, Kierkegaard contended that, contrary to the claims of Feuerbach 
and others, temporality- and not the eternal— seives as a crutch for tlie weak. [FS 114]
FS 140: “It is the New Testament’s most definite statement— that Cliristianity and being a tnie Cliristian 
must to be highest degree be an offence to the natural man, that he must regard Clu istianity as the greatest 
treason and the true Cluistian as the meanest traitor to being a human being [....]” See also PF 49-50.
TM 393 [1847].
SD81.
TM 177. See also JP III 733 [1851] and FS 177, where he described Cluist as the ‘ultimate tlireat’ to “that 
ill which we human beings have our lives.” Unlike tlie religion o f immanence which constitutes subtle 
self-reliance tluough “inward deepening”, [UP I 561] the religion o f tianscendence insists that one “become 
something else”. [BA 113]
SD 127. See also CD 102, UV 285, UP I 585.
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natural consequence like being h u n g r y . F r o m  a divine perspective, sinflil humankind is 
living in a self-destmctive delusion which must be shattered to facilitate a necessary 
‘refoimatting’ of our ‘coiTupted files’. For Climacus, any attempt at a human solution to 
sin is as futile as allowing the ‘disease’ to prescribe its own remedy.
3. ‘Particular’ Losses:
Kierkegaard presented three major ramifications of the abortion of individual
selfliood tluough ‘over-crowding’. First, the individual loses the ability to consolidate the
will and centre one’s focus upon God,^^  ^seeking instead to hide fiom God beneath the
foliage of abstract collective categories. As Climacus dourly observed, “Because of the
jumbling together with the idea of the state, of sociality, of community, and of society, God
can no longer catch hold of the single individual.” *^’^  hi ajournai entry, Kierkegaard once
compared this psychological anonymity of ‘herdism’ to demonic possession:
[Tjhis demonic lust, a lust to lose oneself in order to evaporate in a potentiation, 
so that a person is outside of himself, does not really know what he is doing or 
what he is saying or who it is or what it is speaking tlir ough him, while the blood 
rushes faster, the eyes glitter and stare fixedly, the passions boil, lusts seethe.^^^
Truly there is— or so the masses insist— safety in numbers from God’s judicial scrutiny.
The second implication of the loss of self to the crowd is one’s imprisonment 
within lateral comparisons wherein the true ideal and ti'ue community vanish. Instead of 
holding herself accountable to an unshakable standard, a person justifies her behaviour 
based on both the underperformance o f ‘the o t h e r s a n d  the apparent futility of opposing 
the majority: “[H]ow could one individual be able to stand against the crowd, which has the 
p o w e r ! H e n c e ,  Kierkegaard expounded, “[T]he crowd either produces impenitence 
and irresponsibility or at least weakens the individual’s sense of responsibility by making it
WL [revised] 407 [1846].
565 y p  j j 2 2 . This is why ethics must fail, according to Vigilius. [CA 16] 
UV 127.
UP I 544.
JP IV 167 [1850].
WL 121, SW 440.
WL [revised] 404 [1846].
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a fractional c a t e g o r y . H e  attributed this tendency to the rise of anthropocentred living: 
“The more that culture, education, and understanding get the upper hand, the more that 
people begin to live by way of comparison [..
The third result of loss of selfhood thiough ‘over-crowding’ is increased fear and 
subsequent thirst for power. Kierkegaard once wrote, “Deep within every man there lies 
the dread of being alone in the world, forgotten by God, overlooked among the tremendous 
household of millions upon millions.”^^  ^ He maintained that every person especially fears 
the true means of gaining the self, the risk of interaction with tmth: “[A]nd that is what is 
human, for tmth is related to being ‘spirit’— and that is very hard for fresh and bone and the 
physical lust for knowledge to bear. Between man and tmth lies mortification™ you see 
why we are all more or less afiaid.”^^"* The power craved by the masses, however, is 
transient, depersonalized, and “cannot be defined humanly but can be more accurately 
defined as the power of a machine, [...] the power of the crowd is always liorse-power.”^^  ^
Ironically, like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard believed that past abuse of power by the nobility 
had gr eatly contributed to the rise of populist power: “This, you see, is the result of 
centuries of fighting against popes and kings and the powers that be, and, on the other- 
hand, regarding the people and the crowd as holy.”^^*’ Kierkegaard thought that populist 
movements represent the gr eatest kind of tyr-anny, “for how is it possible to get hold of the 
crowd.”^^  ^ In the wake of the deleterious impact of human sinfulness, it is necessary to 
examine the divine solution as Kierkegaard perceived it.
B. The Particular: The Salvation of the One:
Despite his intense aversion to the false cornmunitarianism which permeated 
nineteenth-century Europe, Kierkegaard remained hopeful that salvation is possible and
JP III 307-308 [1847-1848]. 
BA 109.
573 JK 129 [1847].
’^“JK 202 [1850].
WA 229 [October 1848].
” '^JPIV 141 [1847].
JP IV 141 [1847]. As Westphal obseives, “Napoleon has his Waterloo and Nixon his Watergate [....] The 
amoral herd long survives [....]” [“Politics” 330]
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provides effective ‘crowd control’:
And this is my faith, that however much confiision and evil and contemptibleness 
there can be in human beings as soon as they become the irresponsible and 
unrepentant ‘public’, ‘crowd’, etc.— there is just as much truth and goodness and 
lovableness in them when one can get them as single individuals.^^^
Anti-Climacus inextricably conjoined self-conscious, individual existence with true
knowledge of God when he lamented over the man who
never became decisively, eternally, conscious of himself as spirit, as self, or, what 
is the same, [...] he never became aware— and gained in the deepest sense the 
impression— that there is a God there and that ‘he’, himself, his self, exists before 
tliis God, which infinite gain is never come by except through despair.
Contrary to Hegelian aspirations, Climacus emphasized that, “the task is not to move from 
the individual to the race, but from the individual thiough the race (the universal) to reach 
the individual. Kierkegaard’s focus on ‘that individual’ \]xiin Enkeltef^^ was not 
fostered by the atomist tendencies of secular culture, but rather “corresponds to the fact that 
the tmth was in one person, in Cluist, in opposition to the whole race”.^ ^^  It also reflects 
the scope of Cluist’s sacrifice on Calvary: “The sacrifice he offered he did not offer for 
people in general— and it camiot be done that way either. No, he sacrificed himself in order
578 pY 10-11. For this reason, Kierkegaard opposed all ‘mass’ programs o f reform; “[T]he essentially 
Cluistian reformation means to turn against the mass, for the essentially Cluistian reformation means that 
each person must be refonned, and only then is the most ungodly of all uncluistian categories overthrown: 
the crowd, the public.” [JP III 307 (1847)] Cf. Luther’s disdain for the ‘masses’: “[T]he world and the masses 
are and always will be uncluistian, although they are all baptized and are nominally Christian.” [Selections 
371]
SD 57. Kierkegaard even went so far as to deny authentic ‘selfliood’ to pagans : “The lowly pagan, he is 
without God in the world and therefore is never essentially himself (which one is only by being before God 
[....]” [CD 44] He was, however, confident that God provides ample means of salvation for eveiyone: “That 
is, the need brings its nourislunent along with it [....]” [CD 244] On the prospects of living ‘truthfully’ 
though one does not possess the tmth, see UV 25,35; UP 1 199; TA 64. I don’t believe Kierkegaard intended 
to flise God with human subjectivity in the maimer which Dooley describes: “For Kierkegaard, therefore, 
God is not a what, or the subject o f disinterested objective analysis; God is, rather, a how, or a practical and 
active engagement with others in tlie world.” [18] See also Dooley 85: “God is the guiding ethical idea that 
acts as a cohesive force between individuals.”
UP 1428.
Perkins Ages xiii.
JP III 341 [1854]. Kierkegaard’s formulation is strongly influenced by Socrates who, he claimed, had 
used the categoiy o f ‘single individual’ to ‘disintegrate paganism’ [PV 123] and practiced “closing himself in 
with himself in order to be expanded in the divine.” [CA 134] Even the ‘aesthetic’ pseudonym Mr. A could 
distinguish between the ancients’ participation in the Greek gods, in which human power is personified in a 
god and worshiped, and the Incarnation, in which “the full plenitude of life is in the single individual, and this 
is for the others only tluough their beholding it in tlie incarnated individual.” [EO I 63]
112
to save each one individually [.. Authentic human identity, for Kierkegaard, is thus 
based upon a ‘relational individualism’-- ‘individual’ because one stands and acts alone 
before God, but ‘relational’ both in its foundation o f‘relating infinitely to the e t e r n a l a s  
well as its outworking in non-preferential love towards one’s neighbours/^^ As Kinnmse 
aptly notes: “Genuine humanity and genuine happiness are in the sphere of religion. In 
effect then, anthropology is theology.”^^ ^
Kierkegaard’s understanding of conversion parallels orthodox Christian beliefs in 
which no quantitative ‘upgi ade’ or amelioration takes place, but rather a complete 
transformation or metanoia: “This life-giving in the Spirit is not a c/h ecr heightening of the 
natural life in a person in immediate continuation fiom and connection with it [....] it is a 
new life.”^^  ^ For this reason, a person cannot even perceive the need for renewal prior to 
receiving the renewal.^^^ Due to the universal sinfulness of human beings, Climacus 
contended, “[T]he teacher, before beginning to teach, must transfonn, not refonn, the 
learner. But no human is capable of doing this; if it is to take place, it must be done by the 
god himself.”^^  ^ Anti-Climacus stated that this was only possible through
583 CD 272.
Rae succinctly states: “There is really no such categoiy as ‘tlie individual’ in Kierkegaard’s work. It is 
ratlier ‘the individual before God’ who is the focus o f Kierkegaard’s concern.” [145] See also Brandes 9.
See Perkhis “Envy” 116. For a lucid examination of Kierkegaard’s sociology, see Westphal “Sociology” 
133-154.
Kinnmse Golden 412-413.
587 pg 2 6 . $ 0 6  obseives tliat Kierkegaard’s view of the centrality of redemption, which “must come from 
God”, was fomiulated by the time he was twenty-two. [55] Kierkegaard maintained this cluistological focus 
until his dying day. When Emil Boesen asked if  he could die in peace, Kierkegaard responded affmnatively. 
When asked if  this was because of ‘the grace o f God in Christ’, he replied, “Yes, naturally, what else?” [Soe 
70] For a comprehensive examination o f Kierkegaard’s understanding of Cluist, see Murray Rae, 
Kierkegaard’s Vision o f the Incarnation: By Faith Transformed (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1997).
588 pjp j Kodalle identifies reason’s implicit ‘dominating’ tendencies as in particular need of 
transfoiming: “The antiutilitarian dimension o f meaning in the God-relationship is disclosed only to a mode 
of thought that does not shy away fr om the absurd effort o f thinking against the grain of the quasi-inbom 
mechanisms of reason and its manifest or hidden instmmental constractions [....]” [406] See also Aiken 25. 
Kodalle argues that this, in no way, represents a fideistic jettisoning o f rationality since, “[T]he task with the 
paradox is to grasp its unthinkableness and that requires full use o f the categorical power o f reason.” [Kodalle 
407] See also Dumiing 20-21. By contrast, see Gardiner “Kierkegaard” 236, and Rae 98: “[T]he appearance 
of God in time judges humanity, calls into question the criteria by which we presume to decide what is and is 
not possible for God, and requires that we relinquish our allegiance to the categories within wliich we have 
understood the world. This is the human decision and the only human contribution— to let go o f the 
understanding.”589 PF i4_i5_
113
‘contemporaneous’ interaction with Christ/^** Because this crucial encounter can only take 
place in the present moment/^' Kierkegaard avoided an idealistic annulment of human 
history, as in Plato or Hegel where the historical seiwes as a mere ‘vanishing point’ for 
apprehending the tmth of Ideal foiins or Geist.^^^ Climacus identified this as the central 
pai'adox of the Christian faith: “That an eternal happiness is decided in time by the relation 
to something historical”/^^
To summarize, Kierkegaai'd believed that humankind cannot ‘naturally’ choose to 
respond positively to God prior to the divinely initiated “collision of the eternal and the 
temporal in the moment”/^ "* In light of Christ’s sacrifice, however, every individual is 
given the choice to either embrace or reject these divine overtures, which transform the 
unspeakable horror of one’s consciousness of sinfulness before God into “sheer leniency, 
gi'ace, love, mercy.”^^  ^ The refiisal to accept God’s grace on the grounds that one is 
‘beyond redemption’, according to Kierkegaard, constitutes extraordinary aiTogance: “It 
would be presumptuous and blasphemous if someone would think that by his 
unfaithfulness he has the power to change him [Clirist], the power to make him less loving 
than he was [.. ..]”^^  ^ The Incarnation of the Second Person of the Trinity would not 
merely provide a means for transfoiming the broken autonomy of individual sinful human 
beings into right relationship with God- Chiist himself would deliver a supreme judgment 
upon rebellious sensate authority, which will be examined in the following chapter.
PC 34. See also PF 67-69. 
PC 63, PF 62.
^^^ PF 13.
UP 1 369.
167. 
PC 67. 
CD 285.
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Chapter 5; Abundant Power: Kierkegaard’s Concept of Power:
III. The Tier of Authority:
During the past few decades, many commentators have focused increasing 
attention upon the socio-political implications of Kierkegaard’s thought.^^^ In his 
magisterial treatment entitled Kierkegaard in Golden Age Denmark, Bruce Kinnmse 
writes,
Kierkegaard’s social and political views are often inteipreted as being those 
which were shared by his Golden Age contemporaries, and he is thus depicted as 
having no politics at all, or, what amounts to the same thing, as having embraced 
a nostalgic, traditionalist, and iirational authoritarianism, a misty reverence for 
hierarchy and monarchy which was completely irrelevant to the emerging social 
and economic realities of his time.^^^
Several scholars trace an ‘exodus’ fi*om the conservative political views of the cultural and 
intellectual elite, to which Kierkegaard was initially allied as a young man, to a more 
‘liberal’ acceptance of egalitarianism and democracy following the social and political 
tumult of 1848, which roused Kierkegaard from his political slumbers.^^^ Kinnmse 
conectly highlights his gi'owing acrimony towards the political and religious establishment 
of the day, which climaxed in Kierkegaard’s staggering attack upon Christendom, 
employing the ‘popular’ media in his campaign.^®® He definitely disdained the 
‘aristocratic’ elitism with which the wealthy disregarded the lower classes, and cheerfully 
mingled with anyone he happened to meet. This explains Kierkegaard’s deep pain at being 
ostracized following The Corsair scandal:
You common man! 1 have not segregated my life fr om yours, you know that; 1
See, for example: Merold Westphal, “Kierkegaard’s Politics,” Thought 55.218 (September 1980): 
320-332; Robert L. Perkins, ed. International Kierkegaard Commentary: Two Ages (Macon, GA: Mercer 
University Press, 1984); Mark Dooley, The Politics o f Exodus: Kierkegaard’s Ethics o f  Responsibility! (New 
York: Fordham University Press, 2001), 1 n. 2, and Robert L. Perkins, “Habennas and Kierkegaard: 
Religious Subjectivity, Multicultmalism, and Historical Revisionism,” International Philosophical 
Quarterly 44.4 (December 2004): 481-496.
Kirimnse Golden 3. He defines ‘Golden Age conservatism’ as “a conservative, apolitical, urban, and 
hierarchic (‘organic’) view o f society, in which the institutions o f absolute monarchy settled all vulgar 
political matters, allowing matters of social worth to devolve upon an aristocracy, not necessarily o f money 
or birth, but o f ‘culture’.” [197]
For a thorough discussion o f these events, see Kirmrnse Golden 65-73.
See Kinnmse Golden 451-481. Pattison observes that Kierkegaard routinely culled resources from “the 
world o f popular culture”. [48]
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have lived on the street, am known by all. Furthermore, I have not become 
somebody, do not belong to any class-egoism. So if I belong to anyone, I must 
belong to you, you common man [..
Kinnmse rightly states,
Precisely because of his otherworldly Christian moorings, Kierkegaard does not 
feel the need to cling to what is known and personally advantageous in worldly 
matters— namely, the aiistocratic conseiwatism to which his peers and his social 
background would noiinally have led him.^ ®^
However, in keeping with his wariness of ‘human’ politics eliding into religiousness, his 
aversion of ‘mass movements’, and Christian sensibility towards the sinfiihiess of 
humanity, I am less certain that Kierkegaard’s subsequent views may be regarded as 
“variants of liberalism and populism”, in s o f a r  as they seem less informed by such 
contemporary political developments than by his understanding of the Bible , though he 
maintained a constant dialogue between the two to avoid an abstract or culturally irrelevant 
faith.
In The Politics o f Exodus: Kierkegaard's Ethics o f Responsibilit)!, Mark Dooley 
represents a more pronounced example of severing Kierkegaard’s ‘theological content’ 
from his ‘ethical/ political’ concerns, giving the impression of ‘demythologizing 
Kierkegaard’ for the sake of contemporary relevance. Dooley emphasizes “his more 
radically liberating idea of identifying the God-man as ethical prototype par excellence, the
TM 346. Evidently, Kierkegaard did not consider his independently wealthy status to be an obstacle to 
rabbing shoulders with the ‘common man’ since, “[M]yself o f humble descent, I have loved the common 
man or what is called the simple class”. [PV 90] It is likely that Kierkegaard partially patterned his 
‘marketplace’ meanderings after Socrates. He once stated that he occupied “a preferential position that 
ethically places him down in a lower class.” [PV 120] Kinnmse describes Kierkegaard as “half peasant, half 
urbane aristocrat”. {Golden 26]
Kinnmse Golden 4.
Kirimnse Golden 4. He continues tliat Kierkegaard “in the end came not only to resign himself to the age 
of the common man, but positively to welcome it”. I’m more inclined to side with Perkins that Kierkegaard 
grew increasingly sceptical that any sort o f political reform could untangle the jumble of “reflection, 
constitutional discussion, chatter, an ill-proportion between authority and responsibility, and a mystification 
about where real political power lay” in the aftermath o f 1848. [“Critique” 211] See also Haimay 286.
Kinmnse disagrees: “Kierkegaaid drew his real political nourislunent not fiom the verbal shadow of the 
cloud of culture which hovered over Copenliagen but fi om the solid substance o f the democratic social 
revolution which was taking place in the countryside.” {Golden 5] He does identify sti ong Pietistic 
resonances in Kierkegaard: “Pietism placed great stress upon personal piety, conversion, and the conduct of 
life rather than upon doctrinal niceties. It viewed tlie Church not as the administrative responsibility of the 
clergy but as the collective responsibility o f the entire congregation. Much emphasis was placed upon 
forcing tlie individual to an either-or decision for Cluist [....]” {Golden 29]
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imitation of which engenders a sensitivity to the other qua neighbour” over “his tendency 
to advance the strictly Lutheran idea that the individual’s private salvation is realized 
through an ‘absolute relationship’ to God.”^^  ^ While Dooley argues that his approach does 
not constitute “hermeneutical violence”, it does not bode well for a project aimed at 
elucidating “genuine community”, w h i c h  first strips a potential dialogue partner of 
‘extraneous’ and/ or ‘undesirable’ ideological accoutrements before he is allowed to 
participate in “mainstr eam ethical and political debate”.^ ®^ Instead of specifically 
analyzing the sphere of politics separately fi om his Christian beliefs or politicizing his 
f a i t h , I  intend to foreground Kierkegaard’s Christian concerns to show how his theory of 
power is rooted in and stems from this theological core, thus avoiding the ‘Grundtvigian’ 
pitfall wherein, “Politics (‘the human’) remains related to religion (‘the Christian’) as its 
anteroom, its preparation.”^^ ^
A. The Anival of Christ:
Tliroughout his life, Kierkegaard expressed a childlike wonder over the divine 
motivation which lies at the heart of the incomprehensible truth of Cliristianity.^^^ As 
Climacus mused, “The absurd is that the eternal truth has come into existence in time, that 
God has come into existence, has been bom, has grown up, etc., has come into existence
Dooley xv.
Dooley xxi.
Dooley xiii. In retrospect, liis somewhat acerbic intioduction gives way to a cogent and fruitfiil 
comparison o f Derrida and Kierkegaard, which is even appreciated by a ‘purist’ like m e- he just needs to 
replace his prefatory ‘welcome mat’!
Nicoletti addresses similai- concerns. [184]
Kinnmse Golden 221. This explains my squeamislmess over the political associations which may be 
attached to the claim tliat Kierkegaaid was “a ‘liberal’ with respect to his sink-or-swim individualistic notion 
of salvation.” [Kinmnse Golden 276]. This would make him as ‘liberal’ as St. Paul and the Gospel wi iters! 
[Mt. 28:19-20, Gal. 3:28] Kiminise himself is well-aware o f Kierkegaard’s “prioritarian view”— “What is 
required is thus that one give eternity its due, that one respect its priority', tlien, far h orn being removed from 
one’s worldly social responsibilities, one is better able to shoulder them” [291]— and the directional flow 
flom ‘Clnistian’ into ‘citizen’. [339] However, at times, in his justifiable eagerness to conect the historical 
‘apolitical’ inteipretation o f Kierkegaard, Kierkegaaid’s theological enteiprise is seemingly subsumed by his 
political views. See, for example, p. 410: “[H]is entire authorship is informed and guided by his vision of 
politics and society and [...] the concluding, polemical phase o f his authorship must be understood as an 
expression o f that vision in a post-1848 world.” In fairness to Kiinimse, an explicit focus on Kierkegaard’s 
theology falls beyond the comprehensive socio-political emphasis o f this impressive work.
Matthis observes that Kierkegaard’s understanding of Chi'istianity as paradox was fonnulated by the time 
he was 25. [438 n. 11]
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exactly as an individual human being, indistinguishable from any other human being 
[... * It may appear counter-intuitive to locate discussion of the Incarnation under the
third tier and not in either the cosmological tier under ‘God’ or the anthropological tier. 
There are two main reasons for this positioning. First, it illuminates the sovereign 
uniqueness and extreme heterogeneity of Christ, rendering it well-nigh impossible to slot 
him neatly within any categorical schema. Second, it accords with Kierkegaard’s 
theocentric methodology, which stiives to locate Christ at the centre of Christian • 
existence.^This chapter will demonstrate that, for Kierkegaard, the coming of Cluist 
entails the ‘collision’ of the two types of authority. On the one hand, Christ embodies the 
perfect power of God, an omnipotence simultaneously manifested and masked by its 
inconspicuous nature. On the other hand, Clirist embodies a perfected human power, one 
which does not seek its own interests, but seeks to guide and uphold the disernpowered 
individuals around him. It is not suiprising that both his unchallengeable authority as God 
and his example of proper human authority posed a colossal tlir*eat to the coniipt temporal 
authorities of his day. The discussion will first probe Christ’s revelation of authority, 
before investigating the differences between sensate and spiritual authority.
1. Christ as Saviour; Revelation of Divine Power as Omni(m)potence:
Of all the truths of Cliristianity, the Incarnation remains its incomprehensible
central mystery, graspable only by faith.^'^ As Anti-Climacus explained.
The God-man is not the union of God and man— such terminology is a profound 
optical illusion. The God-man is the unity of God and an individual human being. 
That the human race is or is supposed to be in kinship with God is ancient 
paganism; but that an individual human being is God is Christianity, and this 
particular human being is the God-man.
UP I 210. See also BA 183, SW 658 [1849], Cl 221. Rae elaborates on the incommensurability o f the 
Incarnation with human rationality: “The juxtaposition o f time and eternity in the person of an individual 
human being strains the credulity of the Western mind in particular, which has long believed that time and 
eternity, the transcendent and the inunanent, God and man, are teims which describe mutually exclusive 
realities [....] It is to propose an absurdity which reason cannot accept.” [68]
As Mai’k C. Taylor states, “Kierkegaard’s inteipretation o f Clu ist is the keystone o f his entire 
philosophical and theological position.” [167]
PC 77, UP 1210.
PC 82. This theological ‘heir-splitting’ distinguishes CMstianity fiom the religion o f immanence which 
Feuerbach critiqued with his famous statement, ‘All theology is antlnopology. ’ See Feuerbach 57.
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Kierkegaaid subscribed to the orthodox doctrine of Christ’s full divinity, insisting that it
was not sufficient for God to put on a mere ‘disguise’ like Socrates’ pretence to simplicity
or a king in peasant’s garb:
For this is the boundlessness of love, that in earnestness and ti'uth and not in jest it 
wills to be the equal of the beloved, and it is the omnipotence of resolving love to 
be capable of that which neither the king nor Socrates was capable, which is why 
their assumed characters were still a kind of deceit.^
Climacus contended that only ‘the god’, whose life and teaching are one, can impart the 
condition for receiving the truth, enabling the learner to think the thought that thought 
camiot think.^^^
As the Son of God, Jesus came to impart an undiluted divine presence upon a 
rebellious world that was in dire need of transfoimation.^’^  In order to combat the effects 
of sin, Kierkegaard argued that Jesus required the full power of God, the perfect mediation 
of divine holiness and compassion, which was “equally present in every moment, no 
greater when he breathed his last on the cross than when he suffered himself to be bom.” *^^  
In contrast to a kenotic emptying of power prior to the Incarnation, he contended that 
Cluist’s undiminished omnipotence was essential for thiee reasons. First, his loving 
omnipotence was always necessary to shield the temporal world fiom being ovei-whelmed 
by God directly entering into human history; subsequently, “[H]e uses the power of 
omnipotence to ensure his continually being nothing! Anti-Climacus reasoned that the 
very possibility of overshadowing his deity with the seiwant form entailed “an
615 pF 3 2  Kierkegaard explored the idea of omnipotence coming in the form o f a humble servant as ‘divine 
deceit’. See BA 170, TM 414 [1851].
See PF 26-30.
I strongly disagree with Matthis’ depiction of Kierkegaard’s Cluist as, “Not being an external object but 
the essence of personliood, ‘pure subjectivity’”. [432] By unequivocally emphasizing the historical 
particularity of Jesus, Kierkegaard insured that the individual is not assimilated into the divine Geist as with 
Hegel. Instead, eveiy individual relates individually to God thiough a frilly human intemiediary, Cluist. I 
also disagree with Rumble’s ‘Romanticized’ view o f ‘union with God’; “Kierkegaard never fully renounces 
the belief that a shattered self-assertion might give birth to undifferentiated unity with tlie godhead.” [100] 
She appears to be reneging on her earlier contention: “Ultimately, Luther rans deeper in Kierkegaard’s blood 
than Fichte, and absolute subjects never fared well on Danish soil.” [92] Kierkegaard sought restored 
relationship between God and ‘that individual’, not frision.
WL 107. See also PC 301 [1849].
619 pg 1 7 4 . See also PF 45. In a Trinitarian ‘flicker’. Judge William stated that Supreme Power would have 
dismpted all normalcy had it not sent a representative on its behalf: “If his royal majesty had his lord 
chamberlain attend a cluistening party, it can perhaps heighten the mood of those present; but if  the king
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omnipotently maintained incognito”.^ ^^  Second, Christ’s omnipotence protected him from 
succumbing to temptation or despair as his mission wound its arduous way to Calvary: “He 
uses equally gi*eat powers not to budge an inch fr om the position he has taken, where he 
will stand— before the eyes of all, in the middle of actuality where he wants to express: My 
kingdom is not of this w o r l d . T h i r d ,  Christ used his omnipotence to perform miracles 
which insured that the attention of Israel would be riveted upon him as he effected his 
ultimate sacrifice.^^^
At the same time, Kierkegaard was careful to qualify this omnipotence as
characterized by self-limitation and restiaint, particularly with regards to respecting human
freedom and eliciting a love which was genuine and unforced. In contrast to the sentiment
that Cluist endured all of his temptation during the 40-day wilderness suiwival stint,
Kierkegaard maintained: “[H]is whole life is a story of temptation”, the temptation to
“secularize his calling” by using his divine power to accomplish his goal but iixevocably
transforming his kingdom into an ‘earthly’ one.*’^  ^ As Anti-Climacus maiwelled,
It is a strange kind of dialectic: that he, omnipotent, binds himself and does it so 
omnipotently that he actually feels bound, suffers under the consequence of his 
loving and fr ee decision to become an individual human being— to that degi'ee 
there was earnestness in his becoming an actual human being.^ "^^
Consequently, omni(m)potence did not entail a pleasurable, pain-free existence for Jesus. 
Rather, Chiist’s life was characterized by profound, unmitigated suffering, according to 
Kierkegaard. His ‘external’ suffering consisted of the scorn and derision he experienced 
fr om a sinfril and rebellious world,^^  ^as well as constantly battling every possible human 
temptation.^^^ This was compounded ad infinitum by the ineffable, ‘internal’ tonnent of 
being separated from God on Calvary; hence, Kierkegaard was shocked by “the sublimity 
under which (to put it as strongly as possible) even the Saviour of the world sinks— that
himself were to attend, it perhaps would disturb [....]” [SW 99]
PC 131. See also SW 99, 144; PF 32, UD 310.
FS 174.
FS 174, PC 96. On Cluist’s substitutionary atonement, see WA 123, 181; CD 299; PF 16.
FS 58-59.
PC 132. See also PF 31-32, 55.
PC 95, 271 [1848].
WA 122; PV 161 [1848]. Kierkegaard believed that Jesus, “as far as his own life was concerned was sure 
of only one thing: that he would be sacrificed.” [CD 182]
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God who is love yet can abandon him and do it out of love [. Furthennore,
Kierkegaard argued that Jesus suffered from a profound awareness of the effects of his 
coming: the realization that he could not spare his followers fr om a g o n y , a n d  the 
excmciating awareness that, by coming ‘in person’, he would be intensifying the 
condemnation of those who obstinately rejected him. As Kierkegaard obseiwed, “Wliat 
heavy suffering: to have to be the stumbling stone in order to be the Savior of the 
w o r l dC on s eq u en t ly ,  omnipotence camiot forcibly secure its ultimate aim— that none 
should perish:
[H]is whole life was sheer suffering of mind and spirit tln ough belonging to the 
fallen human race, which he wanted to save and which did not want to be saved, 
that a living person cruelly chained to a coipse cannot suffer more torturously 
than he suffered in mind and spirit by being embodied as man in the human 
race!^ ®^
2. Chiist as Servant: Revelation of Human Power:
Recently, Merold Westphal has suggested that a new designation is necessai y to 
reflect Kierkegaard’s theological developments following Concluding Unscientific 
Postscript: “[Wjhereas in Religiousness B, Cluist is the paiadox to be believed, in 
Religiousness C he is also the Pattern or Paiadigm to be imitated, most particularly in his 
compassion for the poor and poweiiess.”^^ ’ Kierkegaaid recognized the heterogeneous 
nature of Chiist’s sacrifice and perfect obedience to God which is humanly impossible to
“ ^JPIV 583 [1854].
628 pg 174; “What torment, not to be able out o f love to lower the price tlie least [....]” See also UV 224. 
However, Kierkegaard carefully asserted, “[T]here is an eternal chasmic abyss between his suffering and the 
human being’s.” [UV 281] See also JP III 571 [1849-1851].
UV 254. See also SD 159-160: “He can debase himself, take the fomi of a servant, suffer, die for men, 
invite all to come up to him, offer up every day o f his life and every hour of the day, and offer up his life— but 
the possibility o f offense he camiot take away. Ah!, singular work of love. Ah!, tlie unfatliomable grief o f  
love, that even God cannot— as in another sense neither will he, nor can he will, but even if  he wanted to— 
camiot make it impossible for this work of love to turn into just the opposite for man, be the utmost misery!”
CD 259.
Westphal “Hegel” 120. However, I am leery o f Westphal’s designation of “Religiousness C” to separate 
tlie ‘Cluist as Paradox’ emphasis of Religiousness B from the ‘Cluist as Pattern’ emphasis of his ‘later’ 
cluistological focus. [“Religiousness” 535] I prefer to see the latter as an extension or outworking of 
Religiousness B into Christian praxis, rather than inadvertently imposing an ‘artificial’ banier between 
‘Cliristian thought’ and ‘Clnistian practice’— something Kierkegaard rigorously opposed and Westphal 
presumably does not intend.
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However, in order to challenge the spiritual indolence reclining within a
‘populai*’ doctrine o f ‘cheap giace’, he underscored Chiist’s role as ‘Prototype’ for human
b ehav i ou r . Fo r  this reason, Kierkegaard once mused that, if he could broadcast one
sentence to the social-climbing, comfort-seeking Danish ‘Cluistians’, it would be: “Our
Lord Jesus Cluist was a nobody”.^ "^^  Anti-Climacus attributed Clirist’s desire to adopt
seiwant-fonn to self-mastery, “this superiority over oneself of wanting to be incognito in
such a way that one seems much lowlier than one is”.^ ^^  However, Climacus had no
patience for a “childish orthodoxy” which reduces the Christian paradox of power to
Christ’s social status as a humble caipenter; rather, the Incarnation itself— regardless of
station— entailed inconceivable condescension: “It is not more adequate for God to be a
king than to be a beggar; it is not more humiliating for God to become a beggar than to
become an e m p e r o r . F o r  Kierkegaaid, Christ’s greatest pronouncements on power
pertained not to his choice of profession but to his absolute freedom from envy or thirst for
sensate power. Hence, he once wrote:
[0]ne could indeed say: He chose a differential, since he chose to be a poor and 
insignificant man rather than to be prominent. But this is not tme, for he was not 
a poor and insignificant man in contrast to prominence and wealth; if that were 
the case he would have belonged to the solidarity of the poor and insignificant.
He was purely and simply man, who felt no pressure to own anything 
(consequently he was not poor) and found blessedness in being nothing 
(consequently he was not insignificant, either).^^^
TM 423 [1853]; “But he still is not altogether literally the prototype, because he is, o f course, 
heterogeneous to an ordinary human being by a full quality [....]” Thus, Kierkegaard maintained that the Old 
Testament law is still an effective force in underscoring the “eternal yawning abyss between tlie Godrinan 
and every other human being”. [WL 108]
WL [revised] 471 [1847]. By raising the costs of following Clirist, Kierkegaard hoped tliat individuals 
would existentially realize the impossibility of pleasing God by their actions and tlirow themselves daily 
upon the grace of God. Hence, he once wrote, “I want to apply the Cliristian requirement, imitation, in all its 
infinitude, in order to place tlie emphasis in the direction o f grace." [TM 425 (1853)] See also FS 191. 
Dooley obseives tliat, “on Kierkegaard’s telling, to shike the riglit synthesis between the finite and the 
infinite requires that one adopt as one’s unconditional ethical goal and criterion tlie Clmst-figure.” [17-18] 
However, having severed this ‘ethical’ impetus fiom its theological foundations, the Lutheran doctrine of  
grace, Dooley misses the real goal and intent o f Kierkegaard’s ‘ethical turn’, and exposes himself to 
Nietzsche’s damning critique of utilitarianism— that one cannot lop off the theological head of Cluistianity 
and still vivify the ethical ‘body’ of the chicken.
JP III 574 [1850]. See also SD 124.
*SpC 129.
UP I 596.
JP IV 172 [1850]. This places a serious qualifier on those who link Kierkegaard with liberation theology; 
e.g., Dooley 133. See also JP IV 549 [1850], where Kierkegaard argued tliat one couldn’t turn specific 
requests which Jesus made to particular individuals— such as the rich young man’s directive to sell 
everything he had, or the ‘mouiuer’ to not stay and buiy his father— into universal maxims. Anti-Climacus
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Christ’s living example entails a divine revaluation of all that human beings— in
their state of sinful autonomy— en oneously es t eem.Hence ,  Anti-Climacus posited,
“Chiist has never wanted to be victorious in this world. He came into the world in order to
suffer; that he called being victorious.”^^  ^ Cluist provided the ultimate démonstration that
tiiie power does not maintain a hierarchical distance— upon which such ‘independence’
paradoxically depends— but rather overcomes all obstacles to reconciliation and union.
Kierkegaard contended.
Thus his life was reti*ogi*ession instead of progi ession, the opposite of what the 
human mentality naturally thinks and covets. In a worldly way, a person ascends 
mng by lung in honor and prestige and power [....] But he, in reverse, descended 
mng by mng, and yet he ascended [..
The loftiness and power of the heavenly kingdom manifests itself in sheer opposition to the 
loftiness and power celebrated by sinful humanity— an omnipotent delimitation of 
othei*wise overwhelming divine presence which simultaneously lowers itself in order to 
raise others and patiently endures the most supreme injustice given the identity and 
authority of the recipient.^ "^^  Kierkegaard emphasized: “He did not descend from heaven in 
order to become poor, but he descended in order to make others richP^^^ It is extremely 
significant that Jesus never sought to appropriate sensate authority for his own cause. Such 
qualitatively heterogeneous power can be neither a thieat nor a boon to the Kingdom of 
God. Hence, Christ acknowledged political authority over non-religious matters—
laughed incredulously: “To want to proclaim him king- him! It is just as strange and mad as to want to hand 
over all the wealth o f the world to someone who under a sacred vow lived in poverty— [...] what would he do 
with royal power, he who of all people was most indifferent to all tilings worldly!” [PC 169] Kierkegaard’s 
point is tliat the offence of Cluist and the Gospel is not limited to ‘the establislunent’— it is an ajfront to sinful 
human autonomy in all walks and stations o f life. See, for example JP IV 316 [1854]: “Cliristianity is the 
greatest, the most intense, the most powerful restlessness imaginable; it disturbs human existence at its 
deepest level [....] It explodes eveiything, bursts eveiything.”
He once posited that Chiist’s entire life consisted o f “a ten ible collision with the merely hmnan concept of 
what love is.” [WL 115] On the utter heterogeneity between the church and the nonchurch, see FS 96.
PC 224. See also UD 379: “The sensate person will not understand what the highest is, will not 
understand what the good fight is, what it is to be victorious and to lose [....]”
CD 277. Anti-Climacus emphasized that such radical identification with humankind is particularly 
indispensable in light of universal suffering: “If someone wants to invite the sufferer to come to him, he must 
either alter his condition and make it identical with tlie sufferer’s or make the sufferer’s condition identical 
with his own, for if  not, the conti ast makes the difference all tlie greater.” [PC 13]
JP IV 156 [1848]: “That supreme power is impotence is seen in tlie impotence o f Cluist, the only one who 
never got justice, for even his death became a benefaction, even to his murderers.”
642 CD 122-123.
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‘rendering unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s’^ "^ —^ and rejected all attempts by the 
temporal powers that be to ratify, preseiwe, or “deify him”.*’'*'* The Danish theologian later 
concluded, “[I]t actually would be comical or ridiculous if Chiist had come in earthly 
loftiness and splendor, because the loftiness he was supposed to express was the very 
opposite of that.”^^
3. Judging the ‘Powers’:
As the Roman and Jewish authorities could do nothing to win divine favour, 
support Cluist’s cause, or obstmct God’s puiposes, Kierkegaard believed that Jesus’ 
example conveys everything a Chiistian needs to know about power: “God has walked in 
lowliness on earth and in this way has judged all such worldly power and might to be 
n o t h i n g . H e n c e ,  for Kierkegaard, Christ’s coming in the foiin of a lowly servant 
expresses the vital tmth that, “no one should feel himself excluded or think that it is human 
status and respect among one’s fellows that bring one closer to God.”^^  ^ Thus, even the 
most historically disadvantaged person “believes that this prototype, if he continually 
struggles to resemble him, will bring him again, and in an even more intimate way, into 
kinship with God, that he does not have God only as a creator, as all creatures do, but has 
God as his brother.” "^^^
For those who value hierarchy and inequality over their ‘brethren’, however, 
Christ’s coming simultaneously represents a supreme rejection and judgment over sinful 
socio-political structures. For this reason, Kierkegaard declared that “Clu-istianity is 
incendiarism”, a  fire that consumes the comiption of religious tiuth since, “Christendom 
is precisely the very thing Christ wanted to thiow out entirely, the very thing he came into
Kierkegaard’s exegesis reads; “Clirist clearly means this: Tf you want to be a Clnistian, then snap your 
fingers first and foremost and above all at politics.” [cited in Nicoletti 186]
644
645
PC 47-48.
JP III 418 [1850].
CD 52.
SD 161.
CD 43.
^^TM51. Cf. Luke 12:49.
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the world to annihilate,”^^  ^ Chiist’s example of non-truncated divine power in servant 
form further conveys a human model for true strength and leadership. Hence, Kierkegaard 
observed,
Cluist has no scepter in his hand, only a reed, the symbol of impotence— and yet 
at that very moment he is the greatest power. As fai' as power is concerned, to 
rule the whole world with a scepter is nothing compared to ruling it with a reed— 
tliat is, by impotence— that is, divinely.^^’
If Chiist did not come to be served but to serve, Kierkegaard reasoned, how much more
should Cluistians reject temporal means as an escape from seiwice:
God does not use force to tear man out of the devil’s power. No, Christ allowed 
himself to be bom, to suffer, to die— to save man from the devil’s power.
Injustice also has its lights, and in considering injustice it is injustice to want to 
commit an injustice against it: it is simply unchiistian. The essentially Cliristian 
is: in suffering to pennit injustice to have all its rights down to the least detail— 
and thus to win, to conquer it.^ ^^
The heterogeneity of Christ’s message and example is reflected in the hostility he 
invoked. Through the course of his writing, Kierkegaard offered two reasons for why 
Clirist incurred the wrath of his contemporaries. First, tlie demonstration of the obvious 
power he possessed, as testified by his miracles, authoritative teaching, and massive 
following, both intimidated the political and religious authorities and incited them to envy. 
Understandably, the leaders recognized the direct and implicit challenge to their authority 
represented by his insuperable “collision of pietism with the established order”: “Quite 
properly the established order poses the question: Who does he think he is?”^^  ^ Second, 
Jesus’ genuine independence and liberty fi om conventional means of power sparked 
resentment in those who either sought to co-opt his influence for their own schemes of 
personal or nationalist aggi'andizement,^^"* or strove to indebt him to their service by
JPIII426 [1854].650
JPIV 184-185 [1851].
IV 401 [1851].
PC 86. This point is cogently expanded by Dietrich Bonlioeffer, Christolog)>, trans. Edwin Robertson 
(London: Collins Fount Paperbacks, [1933] 1981), 36. Kodalle cites a passage from the journals [JP #4901] 
with remarkable parallels to Bonhoeffer: “In the unconditioned all teleology vanishes [....] Only when every 
‘Why?’ vanishes in the night o f the unconditioned and becomes silent in the silence of the unconditioned, 
only then can a man venture everything; if  he dimly glimpses one ‘Why?’ something is impaired.” [409]
JP IV 163 [1850]: “It is obvious that one o f the factors in Cln ist’s death was that he repudiated 
nationalism, wanted to have nothing to do with it.”
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assisting Chiist’s cause.^^^
Who, in Kierkegaard’s view, killed Jesus? Arguably, he attiibuted Chiist’s death to
a collaboration of sensate authorities rising up against a common tln eat to sinful human
autonomy. In fact, Anti-Climacus alluded to such an alliance: “So the people turned away
fiom him, and the powerful spmng their trap [., A more complicated and eo ipso
‘Kierkegaardian’ alternative would be that Cluist’s cnicifixion represented the betrayal of
these authorities working at times in collusion, at times in competition. Hence, certain
Jewish authorities felt thieatened by Jesus and sought to employ Rome’s political power by
depicting Cluist as a political threat. Rome [i.e., Pilate] saw tlu*ough this mse and sought to
keep Jesus alive because he thieatened to destabilize the religious leaders’ power base and
would provide some political leverage or— at the very least— an amusing distraction.^^^ As
a goad against Jewish national identity and the religious establishment, Jesus apparently
galvanized the Roman political leadership of the day.^^  ^ Vexed by Cluist’s refusal to seek
political aid in securing his release, and stymied by the tlu eat of imperial treason levied by
the religious leaders and the incited crowds, Pilate’s pride was salvaged and his officiously
washed hands relinquished Chiist for cmcifixion. Although this argument is an
extrapolation from Kierkegaard’s thought, it is consistent with his refusal to blame Cluist’s
death entirely upon Israel or Cluist’s first-century contemporaries:
The death of Cluist is the result of two factors— the Jews’ guilt plus on the whole 
a demonstration of the world’s evil [....] Cluist’s fate is an eternal fate; it 
indicates the specific gi avity of the human race, and the same thing would happen 
to Christ at any time. Christ can never express something accidental.^^^
Anti-Climacus especially blamed the ‘crowd’ for crucifying Cluist “because he in no way wanted a crowd 
for support, [...] would not fomi a party, did not allow balloting, but wanted to be what he was, the truth, 
which relates itself to tlie single individual.” [PC 109] H. H. exposed the hypocritical ‘self-idolization’ in the 
people’s attempt to endorse and thereby “idolize” Cluist as ‘one of their own’. [WA 61] Kierkegaard 
directed a similar charge at the contemporary ‘worshiper’ in CD 129. If Clirist’s ‘authority’ hinges upon 
human recognition and endorsement, it ultimately reflects an antliropocentred power.
PC 56. See also WA 59-60.
Kierkegaard soundly denounced Pilate’s intended method o f ‘saving’ Clirist: “Judas sold him for thirty 
pieces o f silver, but Pilate wanted to sell him at an even lower price, wanted to make him a poor wretch o f a 
man, an object o f pity for the compassion of the raging mob.” [UV 255] Pilate then used the cross “to show 
the Jewish nation how wretched and weak it was.” [WA 62]
Luke 23:12: “That same day Herod and Pilate became friends with each other; before this tliey had been 
enemies.”
WA 208 [1847]. Kierkegaard’s statement is a welcome coiTective to anti-Semitic tendencies in certain 
theological formulations.
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Arising from Clirist’s demonstration of tme power and exposure of coiTUpted human 
authority, it is necessary to explore the concept of sensate autliority.
B. Struggling for Supremacy: Sensate Authority:
1, Defining Sensate Authority:
Froni the Tower of Babel to the systematic juggernaut of Hegelianism, human 
beings have chionically engaged in ‘quantification’, the aiTogation of power by the illusory 
negation of the qualitative abyss between God and temporality.^*’® Because of this 
nefarious bluning of the boundaries between the temporal and the eternal, Kierkegaard 
strove to reinforce “the perhaps most important ethical-religious concept: authority.” ®^’ 
Anti-Climacus employed the temi ‘sensate’ to denote the fallen human reality within the 
temporal order: “[T]he sensate, the secular, the momentary, the multiple— in itself it is 
nothing, is empty. In the last resort, it camiot be said to draw to itself; it can only 
deceive.”®®^ It is important to clarify that, fiom Kierkegaard’s perspective, all sensate 
authority is temporal— i.e., belongs to the created universe— and ‘fallen’. However, not all 
temporal authority is sensate, as Cluist demonstrated by entering fiilly into temporality and 
empowering his followers with spiritual authority, the means of contesting fallen human 
authority. Furthermore, sensate authority does not encompass only bmte force; instead, it 
represents a human-centred authority derived fi om human recognition and directed 
towards human ends.®®^  H. H. maintained, “/« the sphere o f immanence, authority is 
utterly unthinkable, or it can be thought only as transitoiyP^^‘^
In contrast to an anthropocentric concept of authority, which relies upon fallacious 
because transient ‘certainties’, Kierkegaard once wrote:
‘Authority’ does not mean to be a king or to be an emperor or general, to have the
660 “Everywhere there is and must be existentially an either/ or. And the demoralization o f our age is 
precisely the continuous substitution or quantification.” [JP IV 179 (1851)].
WA 240 [1849].
MG PC 158.
Hence, Kierkegaard acknowledged the temptation to be a “builder, a teacher, or a disciplinarian” as a 
means “to nile over others”. [WL 206]
<564 W A  9 9 .
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power of aims, to be a bishop, or to be a policeman, but it means by a him and 
conscious resolution to be willing to sacrifice everything, one’s very life, for his 
cause; it means to articulate a cause in such a way that a person is at one with 
himself, needing nothing and fearing nothing. This infinite recklessness is 
authority. Tme authority is present when the truth is the cause.
As opposed to spiritual authority, which cannot be represented by externality, H. H. 
observed, “In the transitory relations of authority between persons qua persons, authority 
will as a mle be physically recognizable by power.”®®® Moreover, should a church leader 
attempt to impose her authority using sensate power, she would ineluctably compromise 
both the heterogeneity of the Gospel and the divine authority [guddommelig Myndighed] 
with which she was invested.®®^
2. Sensate Authority Proper: The State®®^
Although Kierkegaard was a rigorous opponent of totalizing systematization, he 
finnly believed in carefi.il philosophical definitions and categorization. Many eiTors result 
when an individual unthinkingly transposes the assumptions and methodologies of one 
category onto another.®®® According to Kierkegaard, categories can be readily identified 
by their teleology. Hence, he once distinguished the political sphere from the religious as 
follows: “[T]he political begins on earth in order to remain on earth, while the religious, 
taking its beginning fiom above, wants to transfigure and then to lift the earthly into the 
heavenly.”®^® In addition to their respective ends, the two spheres are ultimately 
distinguishable by their anthiopocentric or theocentric power sources: “[P]olitically, 
everything turns on getting numbers of people on one’s side, but religiously on having God 
on one’s side.”®^^
M5JPI73 [1847].
WA 105. Kierkegaard once advised tliat an individual “ought not be a niler with direct recognizability as 
such” since, “This is a lower fonn o f human existence [....]” [JP IV 178 (1851)]
WA 105.
This is not to suggest tliat the state represents the only proper sensate authority, as opposed to the Pluman 
Rights Commission, the World Health Organization, or the Royal and Ancient’s authority on golf. Rather, it 
is tlie form with which Kierkegaard was most concerned.
669 p y  109. By contrast, when subjects are examined within their proper disciplines, the result is a 'conect’ 
concept as well as a ‘tme’ mood. [CA 14]
PV 103. For politics as “externality”, see TC 54-55.
TM 537 [June 9, 1855]. In light o f this and other statements which delimit sensate authority regardless of 
democratic or autocratic fonnat [See Section III B 5-6], I am not entirely convinced of the benign ‘neutrality’
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Typically, the Danish thinker seldom wrote exclusively on contemporary political 
and social affairs, since he regarded sensate glory, accomplishments, and power as 
intoxicating “vapors”.®^  ^ However, Kierkegaard was no naive idealist who believed that 
states or cities can be run solely upon ‘spiritual’ principles. Subsequently, he did not 
anarchically oppose all political authority, but rather sought to confine it within its proper 
bounds. Michele Nicoletti rightly obseiwes that Kierkegaard does not condemn politics but 
the “sacralization of politics”, the absolutist utopianism to which it had been wed.®^  ^ As 
Kinnmse explains, “‘Genuine politics has to do with associations of people who have been 
tln ough the individuating process of religious inwardness, and such politics will not 
transgiess upon the religious sphere [.. ..]”®^"^ With regards to political systems, 
Kierkegaard was somewhat conseiwative, a finn supporter of the traditional monarchy,®^ ®
which Kierkegaard allegedly embraced, wherein he allowed that the state “may or may not find it pnident to 
adopt some appropriate form o f majoritarianism”, [Kinmnse Golden 415] particularly in the destructive 
wake of the French Revolution, [JP IV 149 (1848)]
WL 160. Kierkegaard believed tliat such ‘externalities’ can neither help nor hinder one from becoming a 
Clnistian. [TC 54-55] Frater Tacitumus asserted, “It is a contradiction to be willing to sacrifice one’s life for 
a finite goal, and in the eyes o f poetiy such behavior is comic, akin to dancing oneself to death [....]” [SW 
410] Similarly, Kierkegaard had little patience for political platforms for equal human rights, asserting that 
such misguided attempts to dislocate true human egalitarianism- found only as individuals stand ‘before 
God’— into temporality, merely produce a ‘counterfeit equality’. [BA 230 (October 1848)]. On the 
impossibility o f ‘external’ equality, see UD 143. Hannay states, “Kierkegaard accepts the value of  
associative links in which people preseive and even strengthen their individual differences.” [292] However, 
“It is only when tliey amount to injustices, and hence constitute disrespect for persons, that differences should 
be eliminated.” [298] Kinmnse comments, “[I]t is o f crucial importance that the reader note that— with the 
exception o f SK’s own personal judgment that, as a practical matter, worldly equality is unattainable— SK’s 
stance is completely open and ‘agnostic’ on the question of politics perse, be they conservative, egalitarian, 
etc.” [Golden 324]
Nicoletti 187. By contrast, Bergmann argues that Kierkegaard “remained antipolitical in the initial 
meaning of the tenn, i.e., disputing the secular”. [6]
Kinmnse Golden 272.
Climacus obseived, “Of all forms o f govermnent, the monarchical is the best. More than any other fonn 
of government, it encourages and protects the secret fancies and the imiocent follies o f private persons.” [UP 
I 620] Kierkegaaid once instincted King Cliristian VIII on how to rule properly. [JK 155-157 (1849)] He 
was, however, less enamoured o f politicians, comparing them to “the Church Fathers’ descriptions of 
demons.” [JP IV 134 [May 21, 1839] Did Kierkegaard relinquish his monarchism for more democratic 
sympathies following the 1848 upheavals as Kinnmse contends? Although most of his explicitly 
monarchical statements were written prior to 1848, highly critical statements concerning populism and 
liberalism appear well after that year. Nicolai Grundtvig, “who remained, socially, a staunch partisan of 
peasant egalitarianism, but who was, politically, a resolute supporter of the monarchy” [Kinnmse Golden 
55], demonstrates how one might shift on some political fronts but remain conservatively entrenched in 
others. I concur heartily with Kinnmse’s contention, “If culture, then, is taken to be that which constitutes 
the core and meaning o f human existence, Kierkegaard will seem to be a radical egalitarian who attacked the 
prevailing elitism of the Golden Age.” [Golden 85]; however, tliis response reflects Kierkegaard’s 
theological critique o f the ‘aestlietic’ sphere of existence, which was fonnulated well before 1848. Plekon
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which upheld- at least in principle- the dignity and importance of the individual chosen 
by ‘gi'ace’ rather than ability,®^ ® in contrast to recent democratic movements which, he felt, 
sacrificed the individual to a dehumanizing collectivism.®’  ^ Originally, he agreed with 
Hegel that the state represented the highest vehicle of virtue and amelioration,®’  ^but later 
chided himself for such ‘childish babble.’®’® As Westphal succinctly writes of the 
Christian ideal,
It does not merely demand that I abandon my criminal or immoral ways and 
confoim to the prevailing mores of my society; it subjects social morality itself to 
the test of an infinite demand and deprives social confonnity of an ultimate 
comfort. It tells me, as it told Socrates, of old, that to be a good Athenian one 
must be more than a good Athenian.®^ ®
Kierkegaard eventually concluded that the state protects an indolent status quo and, 
though it often tlneatens the emergence of the individual,®^  ^ it is a “necessary evil” which 
provides “a safeguard against egotism by manifesting a higher egotism which copes with 
all the individual egotisms”.®^  ^ The state can even exert a positive impact upon the
obseives tliat Kierkegaard was not a ‘pure’ conseivative even before his 1848 ‘sliift’ “precisely because his 
social theory focuses so nearly on the individual.” [“Apocalypse” 47] Moreover, he notes that Kierkegaard 
attacked both liberals and conseivatives for endorsing “the synthesis of Cluistianity and culture” and “a 
capitalist political economy.” [“Apocalypse” 48] In light o f the increasing clamour for populist-driven 
refonns, it would have been too risky for Kierkegaard’s theological project to throw his hat into the 
‘democratic’ ring.
JP IV 135 [August 8, 1839].
He concluded that populism is an effective if  deplorable means of securing power: “[T]o love the crowd or 
pretend to love it, to make it the authority for the truth is the way to acquire tangible power, tlie way to all 
kinds o f temporal and worldly advantage— it is also untmth, since the crowd is untrath.” [PV 111] His worst 
nightmare was that the crowd is permitted “to vote on Cluistianity.” [PC 365 (1851)] He blamed the 
lamentable rise of spurious populist movements and demands for refonn on weak leaders in positions o f  
authority. [BA 149] In response to his pleas to Bishop Mynster that ecclesial leaders must ‘properly grasp the 
reins’, Kierkegaard wrote: “He then usually answers that it is futile to want to tyiamiize.” [PC 364 (1851)]
EO II485 n. 29.
JP IV 199-200 [1854]. Perkins contends that, while Hegel accommodated himself to the contemporai y 
‘divorce’ o f rights and duties, and ratified authority in constitutional monarchy, Kierkegaard remained 
sceptical that any new political anangement could legitimately mle the cuixent disorder. [“Critique” 
208-209] For Kierkegaard’s politics as a rebuttal to Hegel’s deification of the state as the ultimate instmment 
of Geist, see Dooley chapter 2, and Westphal “Abraham” 76. Westphal, however, argues that Kierkegaard 
shares Hegel’s aversion to “analytic or compositional individualism” in which wholes are composed of 
smaller pre-existing parts, which led to Hegel’s initial formulation of Geist. [“Politics” 321] However, he 
states, “[T]he issue between Hegel’s philosophy and Kierkegaard’s faith is that of apotheosis vs. incarnation. 
Does man become God or does God become man?'” [328] For speculative philosophy’s eradication o f tlie 
“infinite qualitative distinction” between omniscience and human thought, see Aiken 25.
Westphal “Sociology” 138.
JP IV 147 [1848]. On history’s pendular swinging between individuality and collectivism, see JP IV 130 
[December 11, 1836].
JP IV 200 [1854].
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development of the individual, for the innate pressures which the state directs upon 
individuals in order to maintain peace thr ough confonnity can serve as a vital stimulus 
which helps to inculcate the necessaiy str ength to stand alone. Thus, Kierkegaard opposed 
attempts either to subsume the individual within the state or to remove the individual from 
the state’s jurisdiction.®^®
To the extent that sensate authority is confined to its proper sphere, Kierkegaard 
advised Christians to remain loyal to the state: “Christianity teaches: ‘You shall fear God, 
honor the king’; a Clnistian is to be, if possible, His Majesty’s best subject. But, 
Christianly, the king is not the authority; he is not and caimot and shall not and will not be 
the authority in relation to a kingdom that at no price wants to be of this world [.. ..]”®^'* In 
ajournai entry, he once wrote: “Christianity is political indifference; engrossed in higher 
things, it teaches submission to all public authorities.”®*® For Kierkegaard, every Christian 
possesses, as Pattison explains, “the double-citizenship of time and eternity”,®*® whereby 
he is a committed earthly citizen so long as this does not compromise his identity as a 
‘citizen of heaven’.®*’ Hence, Kierkegaard stated: “With responsibility before God and 
after having tested himself in his conscience, he [the Cliristian] attaches himself to the 
whole as a limb and takes it as his task to be faithful in the reproduction [of “the established 
order in his life”], while the responsibility of eternity saves him fr om the purely animal 
category: to be the crowd [....]”®** According to this model, “The individual is primarily 
related to God and then to the community, but this primary relation is the highest, yet he
JP IV 184 [1851]: “Why did tliese men become heroes? Precisely because tliere was tlie established order 
that could bring pressure poweifully to bear and by tliis pressure upon the single individual brought out the 
ti'uth in him, made it a matter o f conscience with the result that he did not make a mistake and go off 
half-cocked.” As Haimay indicates, even levelling can have a positive effect in that it “puts the individual in 
a position where a radical choice can no longer be avoided”. [288]
113.
685 JP jY lyg 1], Perkins elaborates: the religious is ‘political indifference’ insofar as, “[t]he religious 
has always the same strnggle, whatever the politics: the creation o f inwardness or perhaps even o f a new 
being.” [“Critique” 216]
Pattison x.
®’ W A100,JPIV154[1848].
BA 149-150. The “ordinai-y individual” seeks to "Teproduc lively renew the life o f the established order 
within himself by willing, under eternal responsibility, to order himself within it”, whereas tlie 
“extraordinaiy individual” seeks to reform society itself "by bringing a new point o f departure for it [...] by 
submitting directly to God”. [BA 150]
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does not neglect the second.”®*® From the perspective of the “merely human”, however, he 
asserted, “[T]he state is the highest human authority”.®®®
3. Limitations of Sensate Authority:
Although Kierkegaaid retained a life-long aversion to the ‘crowd’, he 
acknowledged that political power in general and democracy in particular can play a vital 
role: “[W]ith regard to all temporal, earthly, worldly goals, the crowd can have its validity, 
even its validity as the decisive factor, that is, as the authority.”®®^ He vehemently opposed 
the erroneous conclusion that temporal successes within an appropriate sphere of activity 
justify its deployment in all aspects of human life. While refonns “in street lighting, in 
public transportation [...] do perhaps best come from the public”, he emphasized, “but that 
a religious refonnation should come from the public is untruth and, Christianly understood, 
a mutinous untmth.”®®^
In contrast to spiritual authority, sensate authority is vastly limited for several 
reasons. First, because it is “accidental”— i.e., possessed by ‘good fortune’— and not 
eternal, sensate authority ‘perishes’ and can never be ‘tmly’ possessed.®®® Judge William 
declared, “[I]t is always despair to have one’s life in something whose nature is that it can 
pass away.”®®'^  Furthennore, Climacus ai'gued that, to base one’s individuality on 
‘external’ privileges, which are unavailable to all but the randomly privileged, constitutes 
existential “flabbiness” in contrast to the “ethical victory” of becoming an individual “in 
the same sense as eveiyone else is capable of being”.®®®
JP IV 138 [1846]. Kierkegaard did not forbid Cluistians from holding positions o f sensate authority, since 
such positions cuixy neither divine favour nor displeasure in and of themselves, [CD 60, WL 95] so long as “I 
don’t allow what I become in the world to be the earnestness of life [....]” [FS 167] Thus, such Cluistians 
must be ceaselessly vigilant to ensure that their faith isn’t compromised. [CD 55, UD 9] Due to the added 
temptations, and risks o f office, he emphasized tlie need to pray for political leaders: “[T]he higher a person 
stands, the more he needs God.” [UD 305]
TM 149.
PV 106.
692 FS 19.
CD 222, 225, UD 169,317.
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Second, because sensate authority represents a finite means for finite ends, it can 
delude the possessor by its transient accomplishments, masking the despair of spiritual 
dissolution.®®® Wliether the person whose motto is * Caesar or nothing’ achieves that goal 
or not, Anti-Climacus aveixed that the end result is despair over herself-- either by 
becoming Caesar and thus ‘getting rid of herself or by failing to do so and thus being 
‘stuck with herself.®®’ Subsequently, temporal authority is powerless to liberate an 
individual fiom the tln aldom of despair.
Third, sensate authority remains enslaved to the outcome and may be spectacularly 
thwailed by the most seemingly innocuous contingencies.®®* For instance, the use of 
sensate power may equally bolster an opposing cause as soon as desti’oy it.®®® Even the 
best philantliropic ventures can unleash debilitating spiritual effects, compounding 
material poverty with spiritual impoverisliment.’®® Hence, Vigilius obseiwed that a person 
may be “an omnipotent Ansich [in-itself]” and yet be a slave to fate.’®*
Fourth, sensate authority is impotent in and of itself and must rely upon external
opposing forces and resistances to strengthen and define itself against.’®^ For this reason,
Kierkegaard wrote, “There is no earthly power for whom you are nothing [ ....]”’®® Even
the most powerful tyrant rules precariously, since he must constantly convince his subjects
that rebellion is against their better interests.’®"* Kierkegaard contended that,
to mle secularly [...] is an indulgence, and therefore is based upon and is 
possible only in proportion to this: that the far, far gi*eatest number of people 
either are so completely unaware that they are not part of (political) life or God­
fearing enough not to want to bother themselves with it.’®®
Climacus argued that willing finite goals ultimately finitizes the will itself. [UP I 394]
SD 49. See also CD 74.
EO 1 25.
This is particularly tme when it came to dispelling a cherished but illusory belief. [PV 43]
WL 298, UD 146.
CA 99.
UP I 507. Anti-Climacus sardonically argued that, for this reason, “one is loath to abolish God—just to 
become even more important by being the opposition.” [SD 148] Judge William lauded maternal love as 
‘tme power’ since, “[Wjithout receiving any impulse or any increment o f force tlnough external 
catastrophes, it is motivated solely within itself, is nourished by itself [....]” [SW 138]
CD 128.
JP IV 200 [1854]. Even then, the tyrant is not iimnune to subversive attacks of hypocrisy from those 
unable to revolt externally. [TM 189]
BA 235 [1848]. On account of increased public awareness via tlie media, Kierkegaard contended tliat
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Furthennore, there are immense problems for the prospects of peacefiil succession, since 
the successor must establish an independence from one’s predecessor; thus, sensate 
authority, unlike divine authority, can seldom be bestowed without some degree of seizing 
or tendency towards a will to ingratitude.’®®
A closely related fifth limitation of sensate authority revolves upon its inherent
‘unjust’ nature, in that it is based upon associations which unavoidably exclude or ostracize
others and emphasize external differences between individuals.’®’ Because it belongs
solely to the finite realm, Kierkegaard maintained that such authority is a ‘limited
resource’, which will always engender want, envy, and discord at some level: ""Eveiy
earthly or worldly good is in itself selfish, begrudging; its possession is begrudging or is
envy and in one way or another must make others poorer— what I have someone else
cannot have; the more I have, the less someone else must have.”’®* He continued:
The unrighteous mammon (with this tenn we perhaps may indeed designate every 
earthly good, also worldly honor, power, etc.) is in itself unjust and makes for 
injustice (quite apart here fr om the question of acquiring it or possessing it in an 
unlawful manner) and in itself cannot be acquired or possessed equally.’®®
Climacus posited that, once a person focuses exclusively on sensate accomplishments, the 
justification of immoral means follows “[a]s soon as the will begins to cast a covetous eye 
on the outcome”.’*®
Sixth, sensate authority is unable to transcend itself; thus, the individual remains 
bound by her temporal limitations and abilities. According to Kierkegaard, self-mastery is 
a mere illusion.’* * Denouncing Kant’s ethical autonomy as an avenue for “lawlessness and
‘genuine’ governing power was at an end. Kierkegaard’s comment that, “in our time each individual is 
already on the way to being too reflective to be able to be content with merely being representecf' [cited in 
Nicoletti 189] is presaged in Luther’s admonition: “[T]he common man is learning to think, and the prince’s 
scourge, which God calls contemptum, is gathering force among the mob [....]” [Selections 391]
See PF 155,UD 15.
144.
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CD 115. 
CD 115. 
UP I 135.
UD 18. According to Mr. A, the attempt to ‘absolutize’ oneself and transcend one’s historical 
particularity renders one “ludicrous”. [EO I 145]
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experimentation”, Kierkegaard exclaimed that a person cannot bind herself in earnest to a 
self-imposed law “any more than Sancho Panza’s self-administered blows to his own 
bottom were vigorous.”’*^  Subsequently, he believed that the sensate can only truly be 
overcome by the eternal.’*®
Seventh, sensate authority is all-enslaving, partially because any human life which
does not consciously enter relationship with God is “as pitiable as children’s play if it
supposed to be earnestness.”’*"* In addition to distracting the mling or mled-bver
individual from the true basis of temporal authority— inwardness cultivated by standing in
the presence of God— the individual is peipetually compelled to manifest her authority
externally in order to ‘prove herself. Hence, in contrast to God, who need not retaliate
instantly against rebellion, Kierkegaard observed:
Only a weak and soft person wants to have his rights at once, wants to be 
victorious in the external realm at once, simply because he is weak and therefore 
must have an external proof— that he is the stronger. The person who in truth has 
power and in tmth is the stronger calmly grants the weak one a free hand [.. ..]’*®
Furthermore, such ‘proofs’ unavoidably enslave individuals to the audience upon which 
proof of one’s independence paradoxically depends!’*® Thus, Kierkegaard once 
exclaimed, “Wliat else is worldly power but dependence; what slave in chains was as 
unfree as a tyi ant!”’*’
JP I 76 [1850]. Hence, arguments that Nietzsche envisions power as self-mastery rather than power-over 
otliers [e.g., Kain 133, Golomb “Authenticity” 249, KaufmamiMetei'c/m 312] would be a moot point for 
Kierkegaard, who posited that all sensate power is inefficacious, and rejected the notion that one can attain 
“self-constitution” [Detwiler 96] without impacting one’s neighbours.
For sensate authority’s powerlessness to secure a soul, see UD 171-172.
UD 265.
‘^^ UV 40-41.
716 jjp j Climacus later noted that one may ‘show powerlessness simply in showing power’. [UP I 515] 
UV 29. This criticism holds tme regardless o f whether the political system is a classic tyranny or a 
democracy: the authority is still antluopocentric; i.e., based on human recognition and submission. Hence, 
Kierkegaard reasoned: “Tyr anny and democracy hate each otlier just as the one potter hates another— that is, 
it is the same form o f govermnent, only in tyraimy one is the tyr ant, in democracy, the masses.” [JP III 486 
[1854] Quidam observed that any govenmient which relies upon force quickly finds itself compelled to rely 
solely upon the ‘sword’ rather than base its rale upon creativity, love, and trath. [SW 324]
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4. Abuses of Sensate Authority:
The gi'eatest abuse of sensate authority for Kierkegaard is its insistence in either
assisting or aborting the pumew of spiritual authority. Such abuse stems from “a complete
misconception of Chi'istianity” as homogeneous with human power and history.’** For
Kierkegaard, this constituted the most heinous crime of Christendom: “[T]hey have shifted
the sphere of the paradoxical religious back into the esthetic”.’* ® The consequence of this
categorical eiTor is chaos, according to Climacus:
In our day everything is mixed together; one responds to the esthetic ethically, to 
faith intellectually, etc. One is finished with eveiything, and yet scant attention is 
given to which sphere it is in which each question finds its answer. This produces 
even gi eater confusion in the world of spirit than if in civic life the response to an 
ecclesiastical matter would be given by the pavement commission.’ ®^
For this reason, Kierkegaard remained a passionate advocate for a carefully qualified 
‘secularization’, the separation of church and state: “[L]et us not secularize the religious 
but eternally separate the religious and the secular precisely by earnestly thinking about 
them together.”’ *^
The chief underlying aim of secularization is apparently to secure human 
autonomy;thus,  “[W]e aie governed, educated, and brought up according to mankind’s 
conception of what it means to be a human being.”’ ®^ Kierkegaard identified two complex 
manoeuvres which occur in the process of secularization: the nonchurch appropriates what
TC 54-55. Hence, he lamented that, “tlie Church and the state are treated exactly alike”. [JP 1239 [1848]. 
See also PC 223.
BA 173. See also TM 129, PV 130.
UP I 324.
UV 125. Nor was Kierkegaard the first to make such an appeal. Bishop Hosiiis o f Cordova (A.D. 
296-357) exhorted the Arian Emperor Constantins: “Do not interfere in matters ecclesiastical, nor give us 
orders on such questions, but learn about them fiom us. For into your hands God has put the kingdom; the 
affairs o f his Church he has committed to us.” [Bettenson and Maunder 21] Anti-Climacus theorized that the 
relegation of church to internal, private life stems fi om die realization that sound faith does not ensure public, 
external success. [PC 215] See also Nicoletti 184-186.
See SD 114: “[I]t can be so easily forgotten tiiat everything, speaking humanly, can be more or less as it 
should be in tiiese respects, and yet the whole life be sin, that notorious kind o f sin: the splendid vices, a 
willfulness which, either spiritlessly or shamelessly, remains, or wants to be, in ignorance of in how infinitely 
far deeper a sense a human self is under an obligation to obey God— in its every secret desire and thought, in 
its readiness to grasp and willingness to follow every slightest hint fiom God as to what is his will with this 
self.”
723 FS 86.
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it desires from the church; the church appropriates what it desires from the noiichurch. In 
both cases, however, the church is rendered ‘unchurchlike’, disempowered of its eternal 
heterogeneity, and ignominiously reduced to “a kingdom of this world”.™ In 
nineteenth-century Demnark, this resulted in the ‘finitization’ of Clnistian faith primarily 
through three avenues: its intellectual conflation with philosophy, the political 
amalgamation of church and state, and the existential bluning of personal security and 
sacrifice.
a. Intellectual Finitizing: Philosophy and Faith:
In his unpublished treatise on Adler, Kierkegaard attributed the universal upheavals
of the nineteenth century to widespread rebellion:
The calamity of our age in politics, as in religion and as in everything, is 
disobedience, not being willing to obey. One only deceives oneself and others by 
wanting to make us think that it is doubt that is to blame for the calamity and the 
cause of the calamity— no, it is insubordination— it is not doubt about the truth of 
the religious but insubordination to the authority of the religious. But 
dialectically self-willfulness has two forms: either to want to overihiow the mler 
or to want to be oneself the mler [..
In light of this revolt, Anti-Climacus accused speculative philosophy of aiTOgantly
eradicating the heterogeneity between God and humankind— in Rumble’s felicitous
phrase, the “speculative forgetfulness of finitude”— in conjunction with an indolent
dogmatic orthodoxy:
What has gone basically wrong with Christendom is really Cluistianity, that being 
preached day in and day out, the doctrine of the God-man (safeguarded in the 
Chiistian understanding, be it noted, by the paradox and the possibility of 
offence) is taken in vain, that the difference in kind between God and man is 
pantheistically revoked (first with an air of superiority in speculative philosophy, 
then vulgarly in the streets and alley-ways).’ ’^
Wlien humans attempt to speculate on the realm of the eternal, the result is inevitably a
171.
725
726
BA 5. 
Rumble 89.
SD 150. Evans rightly indicates that Kierkegaard did not reject all philosophical and metaphysical 
enteiprise {Fragiyients 5], but especially denigrated attempts to rationalize the faith: “Woe to the person who 
betrayed and broke the mystery o f faith, distorted it into public wisdom, because he took away the possibility
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metaphysics or religiousness of immanence, a mythological projection of human traits and 
desires upon a cosmic canvas, a subtle self-celebration of human act and creativity in 
which, as Anti-Climacus remai ked, “[T]o be God becomes a direct superlative of what it is 
to be a human being.”’ *^ Kierkegaard was paiticulaify cognizant of the duplicitous nature 
of this ‘existential ventriloquism’ in his era. As Vigilius obseiwed, “[N]o age has been 
more skilful than our own in producing myths of the understanding, an age that produces 
myths and at the same time wants to eradicate all mytlis.”’ ®^
Kierkegaard identified Hegelianism in particular as the predominant intellectual 
incursion upon the eternal, whose proponents “understand carelessly what Hegel has 
carelessly taught, that his philosophy was the highest development of Cluistianity.”’®® He 
criticized the epistemological ‘imperialism’ at the heart of the Hegelian systematize!*, who 
sought to disregard and negate particulaiity in grasping after totalizing universalities: 
“[W]hen the phenomena are paraded, he [Hegel] is in too much of a huriy and is too aware 
of the gi eat importance of his role as commander-in-chief of world history to take time for 
more than the royal glimpse he allows to glide over them.”’®* Ironically, in attempting to 
‘preserve’ Chiistian faith within a philosophical system, Hegel had severed the 
‘wildflower’ fi om its roots and pressed it into the pages of his tomes, preseiwing while 
destroying its vitality in one fell swoop.’®^
Kierkegaard was well awai*e of the tremendous power of intellectual authority in 
present-day Europe. Contrary to the Romantic era of passionate revolution, he wrote: “An 
age that is revolutionary but also reflecting and devoid of passion changes the expression
o f offence!” [WL 193] 
PC 104.
729 CA46.
BA 94. He particularly abhoixed Hegel’s condescending attitude towards faith as a more ‘primitive’ stage 
o f existence which humankind must ‘move beyond’. [JP IV 458 (1851), SW 486, FT 37, CA 10] According 
to Westphal, Hegel falsely presupposed faith as a given: “[S]ince the pre-philosophic self is already religious 
it needs to be led not to faith butjfi om faith to the more adequate knowledge o f God which philosophy offers. 
[“Politics” 326]
Cl 222.
In keeping with Hegel’s controversial tenn, aufheben. See CA 225 n. 16. Judge William obseived the 
“cunning politics” behind Hegel’s dialectical strategy: “[E]xpressly to divide and to secure dominion by 
means o f this division, inasmuch as the powers that in alliance are invincible, now separated and alien, cancel 
one another, and the understanding retains dominion.” [EO II 151]
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of power into a dialectical tour de force: it lets eveiything remain but subtly drains the 
meaning out o f Although many of the Christian foiins were retained, devoid of
passion, they remained as lifeless as children’s toys without batteries: “[W]e are willing to 
keep Christian temiinology but privately know that nothing decisive is supposed to be 
meant by it.”’®"* Hence, God becomes a figurehead on the ‘good ship’ Humanity— 
ceremonially leading the tlii'ong, with absolutely no bearing upon the rudder. As 
Kierkegaard insisted, “To place a crown of thorns on his head and spit on him is 
blasphemy, but to make God so lofty that his existence becomes a delusion, becomes 
meaningless— that, too, is blasphemy.”’®®
The roots of this sensate assault on the eternal extended back to the Greek 
philosophers, whose systems presupposed the homogeneity between faith and intellect as 
human-based, human-centred activities, and thus exuded the humanistic optimism that, “if 
we only understand the right it follows automatically that we do it.”’®® Once faith is 
banished to the abstract realm of the mind, decision and action are forever aborted in 
endless deliberation about what constitutes true proof that faith is warranted— 
demonstrations which are open to unceasing debate and subject to the unquestioned 
authority of human reason.’®’ Hence, Kierkegaard warned, “The basic meaning of human 
deliberating is to weigh the temporal against the eternal [.. ..]”’®* By definition, he 
maintained that faith can never be proved or disproved, otherwise faith is commensurable 
with human reason, and human beings become the higher authority who judge eternal 
tmth.’®® Kierkegaard was especially critical o f ‘Christian’ and biblical scholarship which 
reduced the life of Cluist to historical data for ‘scientific’ scmtiny. To judge Cluist for his
TA 77. On how Hegel used his “enormous authority” to foist the “illusion” of “conceptual mediation” 
upon people, see BA 286. Kinnmse identifies Two Ages as “SK’s most specifically political work”. [Golden 
265]
^^“TASl.
WL 208.
FS 116.736
On transforming ‘oughts’ into ‘thoughts’, see CD 205.
UV 309.
FS 18, 125; WL 273; UP 1 11, 30; CA 139. In contrast to false security, Kierkegaard contended: “[A]s 
long as one lives it is still possible that one could be lost”; hence, “[T]here will always be fear and tiembling”. 
[CD 283] The lack of such certainty seives as a safeguard against the deployment o f force, as Quidam 
quipped, “If only I were absolutely confident in my view of life so tliat I would dare to use force [....]” [SW 
267]
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historical impact is blasphemous, since it reduced him to a mere human participantJ'^^ It is 
also blasphemous to ask whether Chiist was ‘profound’, “as if he were up for examination 
and should be catechized instead of being the one to whom all power is given in heaven and 
on e a r t h . A s  H. H. explained, “To ask if a king is a genius, and in that case to be willing 
to obey him, is basically high tieason, because the question contains a doubt about 
submission to authority.
In contrast, Anti-Climacus insisted that faith does not pertain to the intellect but to
the will: “Faith is: that the self in being itself and in wanting to be itself is gi'ounded
transparently in God.” "^^  ^ Hence, he argued that sin is not “weakness, sensuality, finitude,
ignorance”, but a being-wide rebellion against God which can only be acknowledged
pending “a revelation from God”.^ "^"^ If faith and ‘subjective’ commitment are supplanted
by deliberation and ‘objective’ content, Chiistianity quickly collapses into a frinctional
gnosticism, a “professorial-scholarly Christianity” whose chief power-broker is the
“assistant professor”.^ "^  ^ By presumptuously applying itself to categories which only a
religiousness of transcendence can address, philosophy misconstmes both doubt-
rendering it a thought category instead of an existential act of rebellion— and also freedom.
Thus, Vigilius contended:
When freedom is apprehended this way [i.e., as the capacity to do as one pleases], 
it has necessity as its opposite, which shows that it has been conceived as a 
category of reflection. No, the opposite of fr eedom is guilt, and it is the gi eatness 
of fr eedom that it always has to do only with itself, that in its possibility it 
projects guilt and accordingly posits it by itself. And if guilt is posited actually, 
fl eedom posits it by itself. If this is not kept in mind, fr eedom is confused in a 
clever way with something entirely different, with force?^^
In summary, by offering its ‘protective’ seiwices to Chiistian faith, human rationality in 
general and Hegelian philosophy in particular aiTogated a higher authority and subverted 
that of God and theology. In return, theology achieved a dubious respectability and
PC 23, UP I 599. 
’‘‘‘ BA 183. 
’‘’’ WAIOI.
SD 114.
SD 129-130.
FS 196.
CA 108.
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short-lived legitimacy from this intiinsically ‘Faustian’ aiTangement.
b. Political Finitizing; Church and State:
The incredible degi ee of fusion between the Danish govermnent and the official 
church is unveiled in Kirmmse’s penetmting study on ‘Golden Age’ Demnark. He 
obseiwes, “Except for such few exceptions as the Crown might make, official Danish 
‘citizenship’ during the absolutist period (1660-1849) was extended only to baptized and 
confinned members of the Lutheran State Church.” '^^  ^ The church had tmly become 
merely “another arm of royal administration”/'*^  This is the second avenue of the 
finitization of the Chiistian faith. Kierkegaard attributed most of the church’s usefulness to 
the state to ‘Constantinian’ motives of political unification: “The state thought it prudent to 
accommodate this teaching of eternity and instructions about another world in order to 
tranquilize people and thus be better able to control them.” '^*^  Contrary to the message of 
the suffering Messiah, Christianity was marketed as a strategy for material blessing: “To be 
a Christian, so it was said, is sheer happiness Indeed, to be a Clnistian is the only 
thing that really gives meaning to life, savor to joys, and relief to sufferings.”^^  ^ This 
unfortunate union fostered the revaluation of the eternal based on the aesthetic fallacy 
whereby, “[Ejvery striving for the infinite is measurable by finite rewards and 
advantages’’.^ *^
Within the context o f ‘Golden Age’ Demnark, Perkins observes that
This detemiined one’s right to mamage, relocation, and university education, among other things. 
[Kirmmse Golden 27] Thus, in Perkins’ words, baptism became “the ecclesiotheological glue that binds the 
society together”. [“Politics” 45] It is telling that Mynster ordered the mandatory baptism o f Baptist children 
on the grounds that sacramental independence from the state church entailed “political disloyalty to the 
crown”. [Perkins “Politics” 48]
Kimunse Golden 28. Lowrie recounts how Kierkegaard once had to seek the king’s permission to 
withdraw his request for a parish. [59]
’“^ JPIV203 [1855].
TM 190. Kierkegaard declared that objectifying God by transfonning him into a means of attaining 
temporal success “is not venturing in reliance upon God; this is taking God in vain.” [FS 100]
TM 330. For this reason, Kierkegaard denounced medieval asceticism, since it was a societally 
sanctioned means of attaining honour and prestige. [FS 205, SW 253, UP 1407] He was particularly critical 
of the Jesuits: “The Jesuits wanted only one thing: to have power, influence, domination over men. The 
surest way to achieve that end is to live more austerely oneself— otherwise all esteem is lost— and to 
demoralize men by making life easy for them.” [JP III 421-422 (1850)]
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“Cluistendom” entailed,
a combination of the ‘conservative’ forces that included the ‘liberal’ state and the 
cultural institutions, [...] which had as its aim the maximum possible preservation 
of the social and cultural aixangements of pre-1848 Denmark in a post­
revolutionary parliamentary democracy
Kierkegaard contended that what people truly seek is a means of christening their desires 
and actions with the ‘champagne’ of divine approval, “a divine confiiination of the pursuit 
of the f i n i t e . T h i s  results in what Anti-Climacus called the “deification of the 
established order”: “the smug invention of the lazy, seculai' human mentality that wants to 
settle down and fancy that now there is total peace and security, now we have achieved the 
h i g h e s t . H o w e v e r  Kierkegaard derided the self-proclamation of any ‘Chiistian nation’ 
as illusory,^^  ^and predicted that the commandeering of the eternal for the purpose of 
statecraft would inevitably end in revolt.^^  ^ The merging of church and state imbued the 
state with divinely ‘sanctioned’ because appropriated ‘infallibility’, thus “abolishing the 
authority of Chiistianity and substituting the authority of the state”.^ ^^  The end result, he 
contended, is “a sophisticated esthetic and intellectual paganism with an admixture of 
Christianity.
The state’s use of the church was not one-sided, however, as this symbiotic 
relationship allowed for a cozy settlement in which the more inconvenient Christian 
elements of personal sacrifice and risk-taking were eliminated, while obtaining
752 Perkins “Habenmas” 492.
TM 453 [1854]. See also PV 130. This included die “hierarchical ‘People’s Church’”, the newly 
christened Danish state church under the 1849 constitution. [Perkins “Habermas” 492]
PC 88. He considered the deification of worldly cunning to be “precisely the idolatry of the age”. A prime 
example was the revaluation of genuine “earnestness” as spiritual ‘showboating’ [FS 34] and the eradication 
of Cln istian risk-taking on the grounds that, “To venture beyond the bounds of probability is to tempt God.” 
[FS 102]
TM 36, SD 134. This was particularly vexing for Kierkegaard, since the illusion that everyone was 
Clnistian was safeguarded by die ‘guardian illusion’ that the church and the state are one. [TM 107]
JP IV 203 [1855].
TM 556 [1855]. Kierkegaard graphically compared ‘official Cliristianity’ to the hollow husk o f a 
cateipillar that has been consumed by a wasp laiwa from the inside out. [JP IV 189 (1853)]
758 pY yg ggg also FS 202-203: “The ordinaiy kind of Cluistianity is: a secularized life, avoiding major 
crimes more out o f sagacity than for the sake o f conscience, ingeniously seeking the pleasures o f life— and 
then once in a while a so-called pious mood. This is Clmstianity— in the same sense as a touch of nausea and 
a little stomachache are cholera.”
142
government salaries and pensions for its ministers/^^ Furthermore, Kierkegaard charged 
that government ‘protection’ “teaches Christianity the most loathsome bad habits: in the 
name of Chiistianity to use police force.”^^** The intolerable alliance between sensate and 
spiritual authority also had a detiimental impact upon sensate authority,^ *^ * rendering it as 
‘ludicrous’ as if a mayor were to offer protection to a citizen who turns out to be the king in 
civilian clothes
According to Kierkegaard, the most invidious assault of sensate authority upon 
spiritual authority entailed the foimer’s attempts to ‘protect’ the latter. The deleterious 
effects of this compromise were two-fold. First, “deplorable confusion” arises, since it 
implies that God, like Napoleon, needs assistance to achieve his aims; instead, Kierkegaard 
exclaimed, “God does not need anything at all in order to be victorious; he is fi'om eternity 
to eternity the strongest.”^^  ^ Moreover, such a human-brokered relation to the eternal 
inevitably ‘usuips’ the eternal it was intended to ‘establish’.S ubsequen tly , Kierkegaard 
posited:
The foiinula is very simple: a cause which is seiwed by the refusal of human 
assistance— yes, it may be arrogance, but it may also be God’s cause; but a cause 
which is served in such a way that one accepts the assistance of men is politics.
To set God’s name to it does not turn the scales any more than to say: Now in 
God’s name 1 am going out to steal, or— in the name of our Lord Jesus Chiist I 
shall go out and hang myself
TM 556 [1855]. Hence, Jesus becomes “the greatest monetary object that ever appeared in the world”. 
[TM 44] Kierkegaard stridently compared tliose “sheer worldlings” who sought to make a career of ministry 
to “cannibals” feasting upon the bloody sacrifices o f the martyrs. [TM 321] By contrast, Kodalle exclaims, 
“The God-relationship should no longer be made to serve life’s puiposes. Or, to put it more drastically: The 
Absolute is pointless.” [398]
’^°TM 158-159.
Bonlioeffer concurs: “There is a state, in the proper sense, only when there is a Church.” [63] However, 
Kierkegaard might balk at the potential for political deification in Bonlioeffer’s assertion, “The state is God’s 
‘rule with his left hand’ [....]” versus the Church as God’s ‘right hand’. [Bonlioeffer 64]
’ ’^ TM 112-113.
BA 255 [1846-1847]. No one was more guilty o f this debacle than Luther, who “became impatient” and 
“accepted the help o f the princes, i.e. he really became a politician, to whom victory is more important than 
‘how’ one is victorious; for religiously tlie one important thing is the ‘how’, just because the religious person 
is infinitely certain that he or his matter will be victorious, indeed that it is already won [....]” [JK 204 (1850)] 
Lutlier’s folly is particularly evident in ordering the princes to repress mercilessly the peasant revolt: “On! 
On! On! Let not your sword grow cold [....]” [Docu?nents 121] He later commented, “Strange times, these, 
when a prince can win heaven with bloodshed, better than other men with prayer!” [Luther Documents 125] 
Bailh agreed with Kierkegaard’s censure o f Luther. See Lutlier Selections xiii.
’‘“‘ u p  II 161 [1850].
JP IV 189 [1853].
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Anti-Climacus obseiwed that such ‘Pharisaical’ veneration of one’s own helps and systems 
constitutes a worship of one’s own ingenuity and, subsequently, “makes a fool of God”/^^ 
Kierkegaard thus concluded: “Just as many a cause may have been lost because the world’s 
assistance failed to come, so also is many a cause ruined because the world was allowed to 
help.”™’
The second deplorable effect of sensate authority’s ‘assistance’ in the Christian 
‘cause’ is an over-realized eschatology, which prematurely heralds tlie historical 
actualization of Chiist’s reign on earth, supplanting the ‘church militant’ with the ‘church 
triumphant’ As a result, the church can enjoy maximum comfort in this life as well as 
the next— a temptation to which Luther himself succumbed, according to Kierkegaard/®^ 
Climacus soundly castigated this “singing and ringing” triumphalism,^^® while 
Anti-Climacus scoffed, “[I]n short, we hear nothing but sennons that could more 
appropriately end with ‘Hurrah’ than with ‘Amen’.”^^ * Subsequently, Kierkegaard 
contended, “[T]he ‘Church triumphant’ has triumphed over the world in an external sense, 
that is, it has in a worldly way triumphed over the world”/^^ On account of this spiritual 
smugness, Kierkegaard maintained that contemporary Christians behave “even more 
sensately” than pagans “because they have this confounded security that basically they are 
Clii'istians.”^^  ^ In light of the predominance of sensate authority, he underscored the 
complete incommensurability between the means and the ends of church and nonchurch: 
“[T]he Cluistianity of the New Testament, which teaches asceticism, voluntary 
renunciation, requires the most unconditional heterogeneity to this world, abhors all use of 
worldly power Because he believed tliat New Testament Christianity had all but
766 pQ p2. On the “religious character o f autarchic philosophy”, see Peperzak 35.
UV 340. A sentiment in line with Ezra 4:2-3. See also FS 127; UV 61, 338.
PC 207.
769 JP jy  jgp p  g5 3 j Bishops Mynster and Martensen receive similar censures. [TM 6]
770 pF 107.
PC 107. Fie later hypothesized on the diabolical origins of this contagion o f complacency: “Then Satan 
said to himself: I shall not conquer in this way [i.e., by overt persecution]; and he changed his method. Little 
by little he deluded the Clnistian Church into tliinking that now it had been victorious, now it should have a 
good rest after the battle and enjoy the victoi-y.” [PC 229-230]
CD 229.
™ PV 48.
TM 517 [Januaiy 1855].
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expired in his world, Kierkegaard compared his polemic battles to those of Don Quixote, 
“an individual stmggling to uphold some venerable, idealistic cause [...] that can no longer 
be said to ‘exist’”/^ ®
c. Existential Finitizing: Security and Sacrifice:
The third avenue of finitization of the Clnistian faith pertains to the personal lives 
of priests and laity alike: the Gospel is duplicitously shorn of its self-abnegating, 
risk-taking elements and transformed into a bourgeois, ‘eternal life’ insurance policy. 
Kierkegaard was scandalized that, “[t]here is a secular mentality that no doubt wants to 
have the name of being Clnistian but wants to become Christian as cheaply as possible.”^^® 
On account of such complacency, Kierkegaard asserted: “To have lived this human life in 
such a way that we have let others be sacrificed for us and to have lived this human life in 
such a way that we have been sacrificed for others— between these two lies an eternal 
qualitative difference.”^^  ^ He did not completely disregard the spiritual solace provided by 
Christian faith, but emphasized that such periodic respites constituted temporary ‘rest 
stops’, not pennanent ‘rest homes’. H e n c e ,  he wrote: “Clnistianity is taken in vain, 
however, when the infinite requirement is either made finite [...] or it is even left out 
completely and grace is introduced as a matter o f course
Kierkegaard radically broke with Chiistian tradition in blaming the apostles for 
coiTupting Christ’s message by reducing the cost of Chiistian discipleship; consequently, 
whereas Jesus amassed eleven followers in three-and-a-half years, the disciples gained 
three thousand ‘in one hour’. He exclaimed: “Either the follower is greater than the 
Master, or the truth is that the apostle is a bit hasty in striking a bargain, a bit too hasty
Ziolkowski 139.
FS 16. He continued: “[I]n eveiy human being there is an inclination either to want to be meritorious 
when it comes to work oi\ when faith and grace are to be emphasized, also to want to be free from works as 
far as possible.” See also TM 151.
” ’ JP III 335 [1854].
” *TM408 [1850].
779 PY Feuerbach levelled a similar charge at the indolent promulgation of “spiritual fr eedom [...] which 
demands no sacrifice, no energy”. [163]
145
about propagation; thus the dubious already begins here.”^^® Kierkegaard maintained that 
this apostolic compromise has been ‘faithfully’ followed by tlieir successors tlnoughout 
the centuries. As a result, “Instead of whales, we have caught sardines— but countless 
millions of them.”^^ * He accused Bishop Mynster of allowing the Clnistian ideal to vanish 
via a ‘Hezekian’ compromise in order to secure a ‘worldly’ peace which would “last the 
few years I have to live.”^^  ^ Kierkegaard denounced Mynster and his successor, P.L. 
Martensen, for ‘playing at Clnistianity’: “to remove all dangers (Christianly, witness and 
danger are equivalent), to replace them with power (to be a danger to others), goods, 
advantages, abundant enjoyment of even the most select refinements”.’®^
In view of the fatal compromise of the Danish church, Kierkegaard concluded: 
“No, whatever true Clnistianity there is to be found in the course of the centuries may be 
found in the sects and the like, except that being a sect outside the Church is no proof of 
being true Chiistianity.”^^ '* On account of the unmitigated scorn Kierkegaard exuded, 
Kimimse argues that his attack on Chiistendom ended in “an apparent rejection of the 
Church (‘the concept of congiegation’) as such.”^^® Having examined the detrimental 
impact of Christianity’s ‘merger’ with sensate authority, the discussion will examine the 
traditional dichotomy of roles, before demonstrating how these roles break down in 
Kierkegaard’s analysis of sensate authority.
’®° TM 181. This is one of the more blatant shortcomings o f Kierkegaard’s understated pneuniatology. Rae, 
however, alleges that there has been “widespread neglect of Kierkegaard’s understanding o f tlie Holy Spirit”. 
[170]
’®' JP III 338 [1854]. See also JP VI 538 [1854], FS 259 [1851].
’®’ FS 258 [1851]. Cf. II Kings 20:19. Kinnmse endorses Olesen Larsen’s evaluation of Mynster’s faith as 
“bourgeois humanism which has been united with a faith in Providence and dressed in orthodox 
expressions.” {Golden 107]
’®^ TM 6. Hence, Dooley observes: “Kierkegaard’s antipathy to organized Cluistianity, or Christendom, 
stems from his belief that the genuine etliical message the Cluist-figure brought tluough his deeds and actions 
has been occluded by the powers that be as a means o f self-preservation and self-deification.” [142]
’®‘* JP IV 183 [September 23, 1855].
’®^ Kinnmse “Out” 43. While Kinimise contends that, “during the attack on the Church, Kierkegaard 
decided, finally, that he did not need to have authority in order to speak as an adult to others; being ‘a person 
of character’ was sufficient”, [“Out” 36] I would instead argue that Kierkegaard— albeit cautiously- 
exercised a spiritual authority over against the sensate authority of misguided ecclesial leaders. See Section 
III.C.4 below. Plekon argues that Kierkegaard remained a “theologian of the Church” until his dying day. 
[“Theologian” 4]
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5. Positions of Sensate Authority:
Traditionally, positions within sensate authority have been divided into two main 
categories: those in control, the ‘masters’, who lai'gely deteiinine tlie goals of a society and 
allocate resources to achieve those objectives; and those in submission, the ‘slaves’, who 
largely supply the means whereby these goals are attained/^® On one level, Kierkegaard 
acknowledged this division of human society. Hence, commenting on first-century Israel, 
he wrote: “[Tjhat little nation [...] is divided, as tends to be the case, into two groups: the 
mighty and what is called the masses.”^^  ^ For Kierkegaard, however, the predominant 
straggle of history is not the clash between masters and slaves, but rather the doomed 
rebellion of sinftilly autonomous humans against the incontestable power of God. 
Therefore, the distinction between master and slave becomes significantly bluned in 
Kierkegaard’s writings. The inlierent futility of positing human independence and 
well-being based on an antlnopocentric foundation for power constitutes what Kierkegaard 
may have tenned, ‘the myth of mastery.’
a. The ‘Slave’:
By now, it is not suiprising that Kierkegaard remained antagonistic against 
anything to do with ‘the masses’ as a categoiy, which became synonymous with 
mediocrity, whether spiritual or otherwise.^^^ Attempts at populist politics were criticized, 
since they were still based upon human recognition and seiwitude: instead of one tyrant, 
however, the nation was ruled by the tyrannical will of a faceless abstraction— public 
opin ion .Hence ,  Kierkegaard critiqued communism^^® and democracy with equal 
fervour: “[l]t [democracy] flatters their arbitrariness that the govermnent they obey is of
Esquith and Smith 803-807.
FS 171.
’®® JP III 179 [1855].
789 JP JY [1848]; “But another fonn of tyramiy is a corollary of equality— fear o f men.” See also PC 16.
For the pivotal role of media power in defining ‘public’ interest, see TA 91. Kierkegaard derided tlie media 
for ‘inciting’ rather than ‘informing’ the public, [TM 386 (1845-1846), FS 48] and he experienced its potency 
firsthand during The Corsair affair. Pattison writes that Kierkegaard’s ‘noble sacrifice’ o f privacy and 
reputation constituted “both his ‘martyi dom o f laughter’ and a ‘comic drama’ that he ‘allowed’ Copenliagen 
to stage.” [70]
SD61, JPIV 148 [1848].
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their own making. It is like the pagan worshiping the god he himself has made— it is about 
the same as worshiping oneself.” ®^*
However, Kierkegaard reseiwed gieater contempt for political egalitarianism 
which, he felt, seeks to level all individual distinctions and reduce humankind to a 
collective of spiritual clones, which are “as exchangeable as a coin of the realm.”^^  ^ He 
acerbically obseived that, by banishing ‘first place’, the ‘second class students’ are de facto 
promoted to “number 1” without any merit on their paif.^ ®^  This, in Perkins’ pithy phrase, 
is “equality with a vengeance”, w h e r e  exceptionality and extremities are supplanted by a 
dehumanizing confonnity and moderation— the abhonent “eveiything to a certain 
degree”.^ ®® Subsequently, Kierkegaard complained that any attempts to distinguish 
oneself hom the crowd are condemned as ‘elitist’ due to a hyper-politicization of reality: 
“Everything is understood politically (but ‘they’ do not necessarily have a gi*eat 
understanding of politics), with the result that the religious person comes to be hated as 
being proud, aristocratic, and the like.” ®^® Even an over-ambitious, flamboyant sinner is 
far preferable to “mediocrity’s sensate enjoyment of life”. Hence, Anti-Climacus stated:
“The person who gets lost in possibility soars with the boldness of despair; but the person 
for whom all has become necessary strains his back on life, bent down with the weight of 
despair; but the petty bourgeois mentality spiritlessly tiiumphs.” ®^^
b. The ‘Master’:
Compared to the slaves, Kierkegaard’s attitude towards the master class appears
JPIV 148 [1848].
SD 64. See also TA 87.
TM xvi., FS 199.
Perkins “Envy” 125. On the political implications of envy, see Perkins “Critique” 215-216.
TM 93.
JP IV 164 [1850]. Hannay explains, “Kierkegaard is saying not tliat certain activities are wrongly 
regarded as political, but that the large and important range o f activities properly regaided as political are 
improperly regarded as being no more than that.” In otlier words, they have left out the infinite. [276] 
Kierkegaard once blamed populism on Luther; “[Y]ou overtlirew the Pope- and set the public on the tlirone.” 
[JK 233 (1854)] He posited that the Refbnnation was actually a political movement swaddled in religious 
clothes. “There will be a reaction (opposite to that o f the Refbnnation); what looked like and imagmed itself 
to be political will explain itself as a religious movement.” [BA 234 (draft 1848)]
TM 460 [1854].
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somewhat ambivalent. On the one hand, he advocated that everyone must be treated 
altruistically: “One ought to exist for all men and not caste-consciously and egotistically to 
seek his own advantage.” ®^® He once hypothesized that his stunning ‘defeat’ during The 
Corsair scandal transpired because the poor ridiculed him as ‘eccentric’ for refusing to act 
elitist while the privileged ironically withlield their support for the exact same reason.^ ®® 
On the other hand, the populist upheavals of 1848 initially incited him to support the 
monarchy in light of the moral and religious vacuum which ensued following populist 
uprisings. Hence, his indignation rose against “a people who each day provide new 
evidence that there is no public morality in the land— a people who must either be saved by 
a tyiant or by a few martyi’s.” ®^*
Like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard indulged in a measure of romanticism by idealizing
the self-assured aristocrat of a vanished, glorious past.^ ®^  The importance of individual
identity in Kierkegaard’s theology afforded a natural affinity with the nobility’s proclivity
for manicuring strong personalities.^®  ^ He acknowledged the veracity of Plato’s principles
for how lulers should exercise power:
[Gjiven the presupposition that there is competence, the disinclination to rule is 
an excellent guarantee that the mling will be true and competent, whereas the 
power-seeker too easily becomes one who misuses his power in order to 
tyrannize, or one whom the desire to rule brings into a concealed relation of 
dependency on those whom he is supposed to rule, so that his ruling actually 
becomes an optical illusion.^ ®'*
Rather than incite a revolution, Kierkegaard sought to ‘support’ “governing by those who 
are officially appointed and called, that fearing God they might stand finn, willing only one
™ SD 72. See also UD 143.799 JP JY j^Q [-jg4 5 j jje especially criticized the upper class for ‘playing at Cluistianity’ and tlius 
succumbing to “the most aristocratic o f diseases, to admire socially what one personally regards as tiivial, 
because the whole thing has become a tlieatrical joke”. [TA 73] Judge William criticized elitists who used 
brazen evils to distinguish themselves from “the common herd”. [EOII226-227]
800 PY 5 2 . On the complicity o f tlie silent intellectual elite, see Perkins Ages xxi. Kierkegaard’s inherited 
wealth located him in the privileged class of society. He once identified himself as a “master”, who lacked 
“the authority to order his seiwant to go to a place of disrepute.” [TO 184]
JP IV 146 [1848].
For example, see his criticism of the “new Napoleon” who conducted himself more like a ‘tense gambler’ 
than a ‘self-contained hero’. [JP IV 186 (1851)]
®“ JK 244 [August 1854].
804 TM91.
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thing— the good.” ®^® He attributed the political tumult of 1848 to two deplorable factors: 
“the mistake from above”, a government founded upon secular ‘sagacity’ rather than fear 
of God, and “the mistake from below”, a disastrous desire by the masses to reject all fomis 
of tme government/®®
On account of his desire for genuine refomi over revolt, Kierkegaard originally 
argued that, rather than undennining the Danish church. Practice in Christianity “is 
certainly the potential defence for an established order if it understands itself.” ®^^ With 
regards to ecclesiastical hierarchy, he did not seek to topple bishops or minimize their 
spiritual authority- if anything church leaders were guilty of being too lax and granting too 
many concessions to the increasingly powerfril masses/®^ Instead, he believed that power 
must rightfully be wielded by an educated elite over the chaotic masses, and always “in the 
service of an idea” so as to qualify as “the best power”/®^  Subsequently, Kierkegaard 
sought to convert the ecclesiastical elite to his own understanding of faith so that, thi'ough 
their considerable influence, they might sway the rank and file/*®
6. The Myth of Sensate Authority:
Within the sphere of sensate authority, Kierkegaard favoured a strong centralized 
leadership which kept the dangerous forces of depersonalizing collectivism in check. 
However, within the sphere of spiritual authority, Kierkegaard theologically undeixnined 
political distinctions. While he upheld the temporal differences between rulers and 
subjects, he vigorously championed the spiritual equality of all individuals before God. In 
an attack on elitist society, he once charged: “[H]ow are you really any different fr om what 
you most detest— lack of culture, the coarseness of the masses? You differ in that you do 
the same as they do, but you obseiwe good fonn, do not do it with unwashed hands— O
806
PV 18. 
PV 19.
807 PY jg Kinnmse aptly dubbed the book an “ultimatum” to the state church. [Golden 379]
®°® Hence, he advised them to repent o f their weakness and “grasp the reins again.” [PC 360 (1850)]
CD 321.
TM 440 [March 1854]. This is why he waited in silent anticipation for Mynster’s recantation and did not 
publish any flirtlier criticisms of the church until the elderly prelate’s death.
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human culture.”®* * Kierkegaard did not naively regard sensate power as a prelude to 
greatness. Rather, as Tacitus obseiwed of Agrippa, the possession of power often 
highlights the mediocrity of the bearer.®*  ^ Contrary to sensate proclivities towards 
hierarchy, the Gospel has irreversibly levelled all socio-political power distinctions. On 
account of Clirist’s teaching and example, the nobility can no longer live in exclusivity, but 
must accept responsibility for the welfare of all others.®*^  Clnist’s sacrifice on Calvary 
constituted his supreme rejection of sensate authority, either to save his life, bolster his 
cause, of place him at the ‘mercy’ of aristocrat or artisan, Emperor or Everyman, patriot or 
pagan.®*'*
Upon closer examination, any delineation between ‘master power’ and ‘slave 
power’ is problematic fr om Kierkegaai d’s perspective for four primary reasons. First, they 
are both founded upon human premises which are instilled by and instil fear in others, the 
envy and angst of comparison.®*® Subsequently, he did not differentiate between the 
soul-damaging capacity of sensate authority possessed by the masters and the slaves’ 
desire for such power: “Far be it from us to strengthen anyone in the presumptuous 
delusion that only the mighty and the famous are the guilty ones, for if the poor and weak 
merely aspire defiantly for the superiority denied them in earthly existence instead of 
humbly aspiring for Christianity’s blessed equality, this also damages the soul.”®*® 
Although conceding that the populist demands for ‘external’ equality may eradicate all of 
the ancient tyi'amiies— “emperor, king, nobility, clergy, even money tyianny”— they 
merely establish a new tyranny, “the omnipotence of public opinion”, whereby one is still
FS 64.
®‘" TC 164 [January 7, 1846]: “[J]ust as Tacitus detected the contemptible slave mind in the Jewish King 
Agrippa, because he exercised tyramiical power, so contemptibleness is always seen most readily when it 
possesses power.” As ‘lord of the flies’, Domitian also exemplified small-minded obsession despite 
immense power. [WL 253]
WL [revised] 411 [1847]: “The aristocrats take for granted that there is always a whole mass of people 
who go to waste. But they remain silent about it, live secluded, and act as if these many, many human beings 
did not exist at all. This is the wickedness of tlie aristocrats’ exclusiveness— that in order to have an easy life 
themselves they do not even make people aware.”
'^‘‘ FS 171.
Kierkegaard regarded envy as “the negatively unifying principle in a passionless and very reflective age.” 
[TA 81] Climacus rejected comparison as soul-aborting, since it obliterates tlie ethical by delaying action. 
[UP I 546-547]
®“^ WL81.
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enslaved by ‘the other’/*^ Populist power is especially insidious for Kierkegaard “in part 
because it is not directly obvious and attention must be called to it.”®’® Furthermore, he 
regarded “tyranny of the equal” to be “the most dangerous slavery” because it seeks to 
eradicate individual differences and thus “do away with every individual’s relation to 
God”.®’® Whether a person seeks to accentuate ‘aesthetic’ differences, like certain 
‘masters’, or to eliminate those differences, like certain ‘slaves’, external differences still 
remain the foundation for power.
Second, both master power and slave power are founded upon the presupposition of
sinful human autonomy. Although he is speaking specifically about material wealth,
Kierkegaard’s words arguably apply to sensate power:
It is coiixiption when the poor man shrivels up in his poverty so that he lacks the 
courage of will to be built up by Clnistianity. It is also coiTuption when a 
prominent man wraps himself in his prominence in such a way that he slninks 
from being built up by Clrristianity. And it is also connption if he whose 
distinction is to be like the majority of people never comes out of this distinction 
through Clnistian elevation.®^ ®
Any temporal element— whether wealth, power, or prestige— which becomes an ‘obstacle’ 
between God and the individual has entered the realm of the sensate. Although sinful 
separation from God allows individuals to take more liberties over other humans with 
apparent impunity, they ultimately squander their opportunities to become more fully 
human and embrace tme fr eedom through obedient submission to God.®^ ’ Based on the 
inexorable limitations of sensate power, a person cannot exercise autonomy without 
elevating herself above other individuals, without infringing upon the personhood of those 
around her and relegating them to abstraction— ‘the public’. Kierkegaard once wrote: “The 
tyrant was egotistically the individual who inhumanly made the others into ‘the masses’, 
and mled over the masses [.. ..]”®^^
CD 403 [March 27, 1848], TA 108. 
CD 383 [1848].
UV 326-327.
WL 85.
821 WL253.
JK 151 [1848]. Only the martyi* had the ability to ‘translate the masses back into individuals tlirough his 
suffering love of humankind.
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According to Kierkegaai'd, the social elite are particulaiiy susceptible to this 
pernicious posturing: “[T]his distinguished comiption teaches the men of distinction that 
he exists only for distinguished men, that he shall live only in their social circles, that he 
must not exist for other men, just as they must not exist for him.”®^® Although a tyi'ant may 
do this overtly, even the lowliest slave suixeptitiously participates in the negation of the 
other: “The inliumanness and unclnistianness of this does not consist in the manner in 
which it is done but in wanting to deny one’s relationship in the human race with all men, 
with absolutely eveiy man.”®^'* Within populist movements, H. H. demonstrated that the 
masses’ endorsement of a leader is merely an extension of personal power, a subtle 
self-celebration by conferring one’s support behind a ‘favourite’, which can instantly be 
revoked if the ‘leader’ fails to please his democratic ‘masters’.®^®
By contrast, Kierkegaard dismissed all attempts to become a self on one’s own 
teiins— or avoid doing so— as profoundly rebellious and futile, whether by masters 
elevating themselves above the masses or by slaves ‘losing themselves’ in the crowd.®^ ® In 
the throes of human cleverness, even disempowerment can serve as a powerful distinction 
for excusing oneself from basic existential responsibilities owed to God and neighbour.®^  ^
Nevertheless, fearing that unchecked rebellion against the masters would foster further 
insurrection against all higher authorities—namely God— ICierkegaard had ironically 
followed Luther’s precedent and sided with the ruling elite: “As the crowd intimidates the 
king, as the public intimidates counsellors of state and authors, so the generation will 
ultimately want to intimidate God, constrain him to give in, become self-important before 
him, brazenly defiant in their numbers, etc.”®^® This anxiety led to a rare breech of 
principle whereby sensate authority, albeit indirectly, ‘bolsters’ eternal authority. Perhaps 
Kierkegaard feared the onset of Old Testament chaos: “In those days there was no king in
823 WL 85. 
®-‘* WL 84. 
WA 82. 
WL 93.
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CD 385 [November 20, 1847]. See also Plekon “Apocalypse” 46: “He supported an orderly hierarchical 
s tincture reflecting God’s rule over creation, one in which the monarch rules with authority in matters of state 
and the church governs in the religious realm.”
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Israel; all the people did what was right in their own eyes. ,,829
The third reason why the distinction between master power and slave power is
obscured in Kierkegaard’s writing is that both are ‘enslaved to the outcome’. The most
self-assured master is precariously enslaved to the incontrollable vicissitudes of fortune,
external successes, and the submission— whether voluntary or coerced— of the masses over
which he mles.®®® Contrary to Hegelian distinctions, so-called ‘master’ power represents
the artful deployment of so-called ‘slave’ power, according to Kierkegaard:
The people is the force which has demolished kings and emperors; kings and 
emperors again have sometimes used the people to demolish the nobility or the 
clergy. The people has demolished the clergy, and the clergy has used the people 
to demolish the nobility, and the nobility has used the people to demolish the 
clergy. But always ‘the people.’®®’
Furthermore, even the mightiest monarch remains a slave to circumstance,®®  ^a pawn of 
power, a concierge to soul-eroding comparison with ‘the others’.®®® For this reason, 
Kierkegaard recalled Solon’s wisdom that a person can only be said to have enjoyed a 
happy life after he has died and is safe from temporal mutability.®^ '* In Christian 
Discourses, Kierkegaard compared the reliance upon sensate power, honour, and prestige 
to the ‘Praetorian guard’: once employed, ostensibly to seive some higher cause, it quickly 
becomes the controlling cause— the preseiwation of its own domain against all threats— and
®^  ^Judges 21:25. Jones claims that Kierkegaard falls prey to a ‘vicious’ circularity: “[W]e need a usable 
criterion for identifying what does have God’s authority, and we seem confronted with either deriving the 
criterion from relative authorities or with justifying the criterion by appeal to God’s autliority.” [“Authority” 
245]
®®® WA215 [1848], BA 157.
®^‘ JP IV 146 [1848]. In light of such a sentiment, Perkins posits: “[I]n reality the crowd is not represented; it 
is manipulated.” [“Critique” 213] Kierkegaard’s attitude on power was markedly influenced by Pascal. See 
Pascal 220: “Power rules the world, not opinion, but it is opinion that exploits power. It is power that makes 
opinion.”
®^  ^UP I 137.
®^  ^See SD 111: “[A] master who is a self directly before slaves, indeed really [...] is not a self— for in both 
cases there is no standard for measurement.” This standard can only be supplied by God, “that directly in the 
face o f which it is a self.” See also SD 50: “[W]hen there is someone beneath it [one’s loftiness], tlien tliere is 
something beneath it, and then tliere is also the abyss beneath it.” The inadequacy of the ‘defeated’ slaves’ 
recognition/ ratification o f the master’s authority has been observed by theorists as varied as Hegel [Hegel I 
184], Jolin Stuart Mill [Agonito 243] and Charles Taylor. [50]
®^'* WL 46, CD 255. Hence, only the dead possess tine strength, “the strength o f unchangeableness”. [WL 
327] The laughter of Pascal may be heaid in tlie background of Kierkegaard’s critique. See Pascal 43, where 
he chuckled at how “[t]he mind of tliis supreme judge o f the world” may be dismpted by a ‘buzzing fly’. See 
also Pascal 133-134.
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shackles him whom it professes to serve/®® Moreover, sensate prestige was a transient and
fickle thing:
[L]ike the world’s contempt, the world’s honour is a vortex, a play of confused 
forces, a deceptive element in the divisiveness, an illusion, as when a swann of 
insects in the distance seems to the eye like one body, an illusion, as when the 
noise of a crowd in the distance seems to the ear like one voice.”®®®
Kierkegaard also recognized that, even under the most ruthless dictator, the poor 
can undeiinine his authority with the bitter blade of passive resistance: “But a disguise of 
hidden exasperation and a remote intimation of painful dejection will transfonn the glory 
and power and eminence into a plague for the mighty, the honoured, the eminent, who 
nevertheless cannot find anything specific to complain about.”®®He knew that 
victimhood could paradoxically become a position of power, particularly since a 
heavy-handed response by persons in authority inadvertently legitimizes the ‘weak’ as a 
threat, heaping fiirther ridicule and antipathy upon those in power.®®® For this reason, he 
advised King Clnistian VIII to remain silent in the face of uinuly accusations for, “[T]he 
‘masses’ were like a woman with whom one never fought directly but indirectly, and 
helped them put their foot in it, and since they were wanting in intelligence they would 
always lose in the end [ .. ..]”®®® Hence, Kierkegaard contended that there is strength 
behind human ‘weakness’ and weakness behind every exertion of human ‘strength’.
The fourth reason for the obfuscation o f ‘master’ versus ‘slave’ power distinctions 
is that all humans, regaidless of position and power, possess the most terrible power of all- 
the ability to reject God. For this reason, even under the most oppressive tyrant, no one is 
tmly powerless.®'*® As Anti-Climacus explained, “The powerful can cmelly have a person 
be tortured— but the weak can cmelly make it impossible for love to help them, alas the 
only thing for which love asked and so ardently.”®'** This represents ‘tme’ power for
835
836
837
CD 48. 
UV28.
WL 90.
®^ ®TA 108, SW213.
JK 155 [1849]. See also SW 51.
CD 128.
PC 77. From a Cliristian perspective, both masters and slaves also wield the homfic power of being able 
to compound the damage o f transgressions by willingly witliliolding forgiveness. [WL 275]
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Kierkegaard, the power to witlihold one’s self from the Grounds of all being and thereby
lose one’s immortal soul. Hence, he dismissed sensate authority and privilege as mere ;
pretence. The actor who plays a king or the child who pretends to be emperor becomes j
ludicrous and pathetic when he expects obeisance in real life, “[bjecause the play and the |
child’s game are a nomeality. But neither is it reality, in the Chiistian sense, to be eminent }
in actuality; the real is the eternal, the essentially Chiistian.”®'*^ Subsequently, Kierkegaai'd j
condemned sensate power whether wielded by master or slave: I
Wliat else is worldly power but dependence; what slave in chains was as unfr ee as |
a tyrant! No, the worldly is not one thing; multifarious as it is, in life it is j
changed into its opposite, in death into notliing, in eternity, into a curse upon the i
person who has willed this one thing.”®'*® j
In short, master power per se is, therefore, a myth since no one is truly powerful. Slave 
power per se is, likewise, a myth since no one is tmly powerless. It is now necessary to 
elucidate Kierkegaard’s Christian alternative to the transient and inefficacious authority of 
fallen humankind.
C. Striving for Service: Spiritual Authority:
1. Defining Spiritual Authority:
Whereas sensate authority is bound to the temporal sphere both in its foundation 
and its goals, Kierkegaard posited that spiritual authority is conjoined with the eternal as 
both its basis and its telos, with tmth as the cause it sei'ves.®'*'* Climacus distinguished 
between two categories of truth: temporal tmths, which require talent to expose and 
express, and spiritual tmths, which can only be disclosed by authority from God.®'*®
CD 53. Again, there is a strong resonance with Pascal. Cf. Pascal 217, where he commented on Plato and 
Aristotle: “If they wrote about politics it was as if to lay down rules for a madhouse. And if  they pretended to 
treat it as something really important it was because they knew that the madmen they were talking to believed 
themselves to be kings and emperors.”
UV 29-30.
844 JP J ^2 [1847]. On the impotence of power without puipose, see UD 91. Dunning identifies five features 
of “divine authority”: ti anscendence, paradoxicality, heterogeneity, the tendency towards offence, and the 
tendency towards reduplication in the apostle’s life. [23]
PF 152. Dunning contends tliat, against ‘conventional’ belief that authority seiwes as the “foundation and 
wairant for faith”, Kierkegaard posited that, “it is faith that constitutes the foundation and wanant; divine 
authority can only occur witliin a context in which faith is already established.” [19] In light o f the fact that
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Although Kierkegaard insisted that both types of authority are necessary, provided that
they respect their mutual boundaries, spiritual authority is ‘superior’, for it does not issue
from the realm of temporality but fr om God,®'*® and exists independent of the talent,
lineage, and intellect of the recipient. As H. H. contended:
Authority, however, is something that remains unchanged, something that one 
cannot acquire by having perfectly understood the doctrine. Authority is a 
specific quality that enters from somewhere else and qualitatively asserts itself 
precisely when the content o f the statement or the act is made a matter o f 
indifference esthetically}^'^
For this reason, spiritual authority has no need for eloquence, brute force, or human 
genius. As soon as an individual seeks to embellish or rationalize an authoritative 
statement, that authority is ineluctably contested.®'*® The only proper response, for 
Kierkegaard, is immediate compliance: “I should show him [a prophet] religious 
submission, [ ...]!  should imprison my judgment in obedience under his divine 
authority.”®'*® Although spiritual authority is not qualitatively inferior to sensate authority, 
the latter may ironically obstruct an individual’s receptivity to the fomier.®®® As the
Kierkegaard (paradoxically?) addressed authoritative directives to his contemporaries in deriding them for 
their lack o f tme (‘New Testament’) faith, he would likely specify that divine authority can only be 
recognized as such tluough faitli, though its binding ‘jurisdiction’ over temporality is in no way contingent 
upon human acknowledgment.
JP I 74 [1847]. See also JP IV 128 [December 23, 1834]: “A great man is great simply because he is a 
chosen instmment in the hands of God.”
WA 98.
®‘*® WA 101.
BA 26. See JP II 587 [1847]: “[T]he very first begimiing o f deliberation about it is deflection, rebellion.” 
See also WA 24, BA 22, JP IV 459 [1851]. For his animosity towards biblical criticism which sought to 
overlook the ‘clear’ demands for obedience by focusing on obscure peripheral details, see FS 26-28. 
Kierkegaard avoided salvific legalism by contending that divine command is always conjoined with divine 
promise— ‘Thou shalt’ means not only that you will do a task but tliat you will be able to do it by the grace of 
God— [WA 32, 185] and by refiising to identify any prescribed ‘externalities’ with faith: “Now let these 
conditions be acts, specific conceptions, moods— who really knows himself so intimately that he would take 
the responsibility for guai anteeing that these conditions ai e present in him just as they ought to be and are not 
illegitimate children of doubtful parentage!” [UD 269] See also BA 100 “[T]he greater the need for a striking 
outer manifestation of the decision, the less the iimer certitude.” By conti ast, “The secular mind always 
needs to have decision externalized; otlieiwise it mistmstfully believes that the decision actually does not 
exist.” [WL 145] However, Kierkegaard’s later emphasis on Chiist as exemplar shows that he did not 
envision a purely idealistic faith with no external manifestations. Rather, he insisted that extenializations 
camiot always serve as accurate gauges of inward passions or right relationship with God for either oneself or 
others. See Dunning 31 n. 42, Evans Fragments 283-284, Nicoletti 186, Perkins “Politics” 50, Stack 
176-177. Evans does, however, admit tliat Kierkegaard occasionally “seems to fail to grasp the possibility of 
a positive expression for inwardness in man’s outer life.” {Fragments 284]
850 pg yy. »[Y]ou must die to your selfisluiess, or to the world, because it is only tluough your selfislmess that 
the world has power over you [....]” Subsequently, Kierkegaai'd believed that the Holy Spirit actively strips
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individual’s identity is ‘transplanted’ from the soils of sinftü autonomy to the ground of 
divine love, ‘we become lesser while God becomes gieater in our lives.’®®* Until that 
noetic transformation has taken place via individual encounter with God, sensate authority 
will invariably misinteipret divine authority and sinfril individuals will confuse life for 
death.®®^  Hence, Johamies de silentio stated: “Abraham was the gieatest of all, great by 
that power whose strength is powerlessness, great by that wisdom whose secret is 
foolishness, great by that hope whose fonn is madness, great by that love that is hatred to 
oneself.”®®®
As recipients of an authority which does not rightfully belong to or proceed from 
human sources, Kierkegaard drew a connection with the biblical motifs of stewardship and 
seiwice:
God in heaven surely knows best what is the highest that a person can aspire to 
and complete. But Scripture declares that no more is required of a person than 
that he be trustworthy as a steward. But a steward is more insignificant than the 
house and goods he administers.®®'*
Although humankind is intended to be “the niler of creation”,®®® he asserted: “[H]e is not 
the lord in such a way that he is not also a servant.”®®® Spiritual authority is also linked 
with the theme of descending in order to ascend, which reaches its paradoxical apex in the 
doctrine of the Incarnation, and Chiist’s death and resuixection.®®  ^ Contrary to comipted
individuals o f antlnopocentric power “in order to become the power in us.” [FS 87] He compared God’s 
apparent iieavy-handedness’ with a coacliman who lashes the horses to avert the coach from plunging into an 
abyss [FS 81]
See UP I 55: “[A]n eternal happiness is specifically rooted in the subjective individual’s diminishing 
self-esteem acquired tlnough the utmost exertion.” See also JP III 550 [May 14, 1839]: “God in heaven, let 
me rightly feel my nothingness, not to despair over it, but all the more intensely to feel the greatness of your 
goodness.” For Kierkegaard’s sheer amazement that tlie Holy Spirit can reside in ‘infinitely inferior’, 
‘self-deceptive’ individuals, see JP III 572 [1850].
In an 1854 journal entry, he identified “this frindamental idea in Cluistianity, that which makes it what it 
is: transfonnation o f the will”. [JP IV 551 (1854)] Kierkegaard attributed much of his personal suffering 
tluough The Corsair scandal to unjust charges o f vanity and cuiming: “Ultimately, it all comes down to this, 
that men are not able to conceive of an intelligent man not coveting status and power.” [TC 217]
FT 16-17. See also WL 144: “Cluistianity’s eternal power is so indifferent towards recognition in the 
external world [....]” Unlike early church history, Kierkegaard emphasized that one must not become an 
ascetic celebrity by flaunting such ‘indifference’. [WL 145]
UD 148.
UD 84.
UD 85.
For example, Johannes explained how, by subordinating himself to the universal domain o f ethics, the 
single individual may be raised above it. [FT 56]
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sensate authority, which seeks to mle by usiiiping God’s position, spiritual authority seeks 
to mle by ‘serving’ God in the sense of ‘obedience to’ rather than ‘facilitating the cause
Because the person invested with spiritual authority is representing the interests of
God, not humanlcind, she does not seek the approval of her audience/®® In stark contrast to
sensate authority, which is measurable by temporal accomplishments and tangible displays
of power, Kierkegaard regarded “tme human greatness” as a liberation from dependence
upon external effects: “Wliat, then, is tme human gi'eatness? Sure it is greatness of heart.
We do not by rights say that someone is great who has much power and dominion [....]
[T]he more profound person does not allow himself to be disturbed by externality.”®®® This
does not preclude a ‘gieat man’ from exerting a gieat influence in the world; however,
“[T]his would not occupy him at all, because he would know that the external is not in his
power and therefore means nothing either pro or co7î/ra.”®®’ For this reason, Kierkegaard
stated that the religious life view
does not overlook suffering, does not rashly hope in the world, but religiously 
wants success and failure to signify equally much, that is, equally little, and does 
not want the religious to have significance by way of or along with something 
else, but wants it to have absolute meaning in itself.®®^
For those who demand concrete proof of spiritual authority, ‘no sign will be
given’.®®® By rejecting the ‘cmtches’ of temporal appearances and results, spiritual
authority demonstrates both its independence from temporal limitation and its
heterogeneous origins, according to Kierkegaai'd:
Do you know, my reader, any stronger expression for superiority than this, that 
the superior one also has the appearance of being the weaker? The stronger who 
looks like the stronger sets a standard for his superiority; but he who, although 
superior, appears as the weaker negates standards and comparisons— that is, he is
JK 249 [1854]. For an interesting parallel, see Foucault’s notion of “pastoral power” in Religion 122-123. 
In fact, a Cln istian acts in response to her cultural context: “[I]f you fast out o f fear o f men, it is precisely 
not Clmstianity, and if men seek to browbeat you to give up fasting, then Clmstianity can mean fasting.” [JP 
11336(1854)]
®“°CD 291.
UP I 135-136.
862 TA 13.
Climacus alluded to Matthew 16:4 in UP 1414.
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infinitely superior 864
Such freedom fiom results does not issue from a humanly generated stoicism or ‘Vulcan’ 
will-to-passivity. Rather, it is rooted in the utter incontestability of divine power: “For one 
all-powerful cannot be a co-worker with you, a human being, without its signifying that 
you are able to do nothing at all; and on the other side, if he is your support, you ar e able to 
do everything.”®®® Subsequently, Kierkegaard posited: “Wliat a man achieves or does not 
achieve is not within his power. He is not the One who shall steer the world; he has one and 
only one thing to do— to obey.”®®® By her liberation from slavery to the outcome through 
faith in God’s ultimate victory, the Clnistian has thus ‘conquered the changeable’.®®*^
Kierkegaard insisted that fr eedom fr om basing one’s worth and authority upon
external effects can only come from a transcendent source. Nor can an individual break
free from the sinful human autonomy in which she is paradoxically enslaved:
[A]nd is it not doubt’s stratagem to make a person believe that he by himself can 
overcome himself, as if he were able to perform the mai*vel unlieard of in heaven 
or on earth or under the earth— that something that is in conflict with itself can in 
this conflict be stronger than itself!®®®
Because sin is a matter of rebellion rather than ignorance, Kierkegaard contended: “Those 
with authority, therefore, always address themselves to the conscience, not to the 
understanding, intelligence, profundity— to the human being, not the professor.”®®® They 
thus transfix the listener with the medusa-like gaze of Coleridge’s ‘ancient mariner’:
864 WL 228.
865 Y7L 333. See also UD 307; “[T]he highest is this: that a person is fully convinced that he himself is 
capable o f nothing, nothing at all. What rare dominion [....]”
WL 93. For this reason, he considered prayer to be “[t]he weapon o f the powerless”. [UD 311] There is 
stiong Scriptural precedence for this freedom from temporal results; e.g., Judges 7:7, II Clnonicles 20:17, 
Ephesians 6:13. Kierkegaard made specific reference to Romans 8:37 [BA 232 (October 1848)] and Psalm 
103:15-16 [UP I 135] in this regard.
UD 19. See also JP III 553 [1840-1841] and Cl 319.
UD 128.
JP I 73 [1847]. Aiken contends: “This Authority is concrete and personal insofar as it is grounded in the 
God-Man and his appointed witnesses, the apostles; but it is also objective insofar as these Sources proclaim 
and enact a teaching whose content stands over against both the private judgment o f the theoretical thinker 
and the evanescent spirit o f the age to which that judgment is beholden.” [28] Dumiing qualifies this position 
by regarding Scriptural authority as “derivative”: “[T]he authority o f Scripture is not an external, objective 
fact. It exists only in the relationship between the Word of Scripture and the obedient heart of the listener or 
reader.” [22] However, I contest the ‘objectivity-free’ implications of Dumiing’s view that, “the special 
quality o f Scripture resides not in what it teaches, but rather in how it teaches.” [22]
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“[DJivine authority [...] is like the single eye; it constrains the person addressed to see who 
is talking with him and then fastens its piercing look on him and says with this glance, Tt is 
you to whom this is said/”®*'® Anti-Climacus dourly lamented the loss of such authority in 
Christendom:
There was a time when it [Chiistianity], with divine authority, exercised 
dominion over people, when it addressed each individual briefly, tersely, 
commanding authoritatively with ‘You shalV\ when it shocked every individual 
with a rigorousness that hitherto was never known: eternal punislmient. This 
rigorousness helped; in fear and trembling before the inescapable hereafter, the 
Christian was able to disdain all the dangers and sufferings of this life as child’s 
play and a half-hour prank [....] [I]t made it really tme that to be a Chiistian is to 
be in kinship with divinity.®^ *
After having examined the nature of spiritual authority, it is necessary to elucidate 
Kierkegaard’s understanding of the loss of spiritual authority thiough an unlioly reliance 
upon sensate defences.
2. Benevolent Blasphemy: The ‘Apologetic’ Compromise:
One of the ultimate indignations for the Christian faith, according to Kierkegaard, 
was the aixogance of individuals who either seek to employ spiritual authority for temporal 
means, thus rendering the infinite ‘finite’,®^  ^or endeavour to defend spiritual authority by 
use of sensate authority, whether by imperial edict or human reasoning. In both cases, the 
faith was ‘secularized’, its heterogeneity negated hy a quantifiable commensurability with 
the temporal order, its transcendence inexorably supplanted by a religiousness of 
immanence or worse. Kierkegaard once sardonically remarked that Christianity was the 
only religion in world histoiy which had been destroyed precisely by flourishing.®^® 
Because the subject of employing spiritual authority as a means to temporal gain has been 
already explored,®^ '* the use of temporal authority to ‘protect’ spiritual authority will now 
be discussed.
WL 104. 
PC 229.871
873
TM 408 [1850]. On the cheapening of grace, see TM 151, JP III 335 [1854], PV 16, FS 16. 
TM 160.
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ICierkegaard’s primary accusation against the Danish state church was this: by
endeavouring to bolster faith with reason and material rewards or comforts, misguided
ecclesiastical leaders had conflated God’s mle with that of a human mler, who consolidates
power by means of favours and benefits confened upon his subjects. In addition, the
church had made faith commensurate with human reason in order to justify Cliristian belief
to non-Cliristians/^® Hence, he sarcastically charged: “They are embarrassed by obeying
God because he is God; and so they obey him— because he is a very great genius, perhaps
almost the gi eatest, gieater even than Hegel.”®*'® Kierkegaard regarded this action as
existential treachery against God, a fonn of benevolent blasphemy in which one appears to
be ‘doing God a favour’ but in reality reduces God to ludicrous dependence upon the
human defender.®*^ *' Kierkegaard scoffed at such megalomaniac presumption whereby,
“God in heaven has to sit and wait for the decision on his fate, whether he exists, and finally
he comes into existence with the help of a few demonstrations.”®^® The most fervent
defender unwittingly joins forces with the abject atheist’s aim “to make Christianity
pt^obablef that is, to ‘demythologize’ any supernatural claims and render it subject to
human definitions of temporal im/possibility.®^® This is why Anti-Climacus denounced
apologetics as the ‘second betrayal of Christ’:
[H]ow extraordinarily stupid it is to defend Chiistianity, how little knowledge of 
humanity it betrays, how it connives if only unconsciously with offence by 
making Cluistianity out to be some miserable object that in the end must be 
rescued by a defence. It is therefore certain and true that the person who first 
thought of defending Chiistianity in Christendom is de facto a Judas No. 2; he 
betrays with a kiss, except his treason is that of stupidity. To defend something is 
always to discredit it.®®®
In addition, this apologetic manoeuvre tacitly implies that certain Christians or offices are
See Chapter 5 III.B.4.
JP IV 463-464 [1850]: “Men simply refiise to be satisfied with acknowledging the absurd; so they 
substitute tlie most profound pro&ndity and the most sublime sublimity [....]"
JP 1 74 [1847].
On the logical incoherence of attempting to prove God’s existence, see PF 39.
®’® UD 242.
BA 39. See also Whittaker 85-86. Climacus blamed much blatant atheism upon, “[a] childish orthodoxy, 
a pusillanimous Bible inteipretation, a foolish and un-Chiistian defence of Clu istianity, and tlie defenders’ 
bad conscience about tlieir own relation to it”. [UP I 604]
®®° SD 119. Anti-Climacus’ sentiment is a reflection o f Pascal: “The extreme sin is to defend it [tmth].” [339] 
Climacus posited tliat the only way to account properly for a paradox was to show its paradoxicality — not 
attempt to resolve it. [UP 1219]
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more ‘valuable’ to God than others/®* and the spiritual authority of the apostle is 
surreptitiously replaced by the sensate genius of the exegete.®®^  Hence, Kierkegaard lashed 
out vehemently against the Danish clergy: “You rag of velvet, did Chiistianity come into 
the world in order to have help from human beings, or in order to help them [....]”®®®
Kierkegaard once compared the sheer preposterousness of offering God assistance
to “a child’s giving his parents a present, purchased, however, with what the child has
received from his parents”.®®'* The monumental achievement of human cunning is to
transfer the nexus of faith fr om the realm of the personal/ existential to the abstract/
intellectual, whereby obedience becomes contingent upon sensate proofs and credentials.
On the contrary, Kierkegaard contended:
It is claimed that arguments against Christianity arise out of doubt. This is a total 
misunderstanding. The arguments against Clnistianity arise out of 
insubordination, reluctance to obey, mutiny against all authority. Therefore, until 
now the battle against objections has been shadowboxing, because it has been 
intellectual combat with doubt instead of being ethical combat against mutiny.®®®
Kierkegaard strongly believed that no reliance upon sensate authority will benefit the
Christian cause. Christians are to be characterized by “righteousness”, which he defined as
the unwavering commitment to ‘seek first God’s kingdom’: “Neither is righteousness
power and dominion, because no human being stands so high that he is higher than
righteousness, so high that he would need to lay down his crown in order to have the
opportunity to practice righteousness.”®®® Instead, he argued: “It is said that by learning to
obey one learns to mle [.. ..]”®®^ Christians must always oppose the universal rebellion of
fallen humankind, but
not, of course, with shouts and conceited importance, not by domineering and 
wanting to force others to obey God, but by unconditionally obeying as an 
individual, by unconditionally holding fast to the God-relationship and the God-
®®‘ TM 43, CD 86, UP 178. Kierkegaard also derided the formulation of doctrines, “[b]ecause doctiine is the 
indolence o f aping and mimicking for the learner, and doctrine is the way to sensate power for the teacher, for 
doctrine collects men.” [JP VI 535 (1854)] Luther’s carelessness in this aiea led to “the same evil it fought: 
an exegetical slave spirit, a hyper-orthodox Lutheran coercion that was just as bad as the pope’s.” [BA 158] 
BA 5.
®®^TM44. See also UV 87.
884 t m  392 [1847].
885 pp 3 3 2  n. 30. For obedience as a precuraor to Cliristian understanding and not vice versa, see WA 24. 
®®®UV 210-211.
®®’ WA 24.
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demand and thereby expressing for his part that God exists and is the only master
The church’s reliance upon any means of sensate authority, whether his majesty’s prisons 
or reason’s ‘proofs’, instantly transfoiiiis Clmstianity into precisely its opposite— an 
earthly kingdom/®®
In contrast to conventional apologetics, Anti-Climacus contended that the model
for the church is not that of a ‘defence attorney’ but a ‘lover’:
A believer, after all, is someone in love; indeed, when it comes to ardor, the most 
infatuated of lovers is as a stripling compared with a believer [....] [Djon’t you 
think he would find it disgusting to speak in such a way as to offer thi'ee reasons 
for concluding that there was after all sometliing to being in love— more or less as 
when the pastor gives thi'ee reasons for concluding that it pays to pray, as though 
the price of prayer has fallen so low that three reasons were needed to help give it 
some crumb of esteem?®®®
Subsequently, a proper apologetics must always emphasize Clnistianity’s heterogeneity 
with human development and history, according to Kierkegaard: “Every defence of 
Clnistianity that understands what it wants must do the very opposite and with all its might 
and with a qualitative dialectic assert the improbability of Christianity.”®®* Moreover, the 
would-be apologist should wisely heed tlie words of Johann G. Hamann, as cited in Judge 
William’s defence of marriage: “There is doubt that must be dismissed with no reasons or 
replies but simply with a Bah!”®®^
3. Effects of Spiritual Authority:
a. Suffering and Persecution:
In stark contrast to those wielding sensate authority, bearers of spiritual authority
WL 121-122.
JP I 77 [1850]: “This is the way Cliristianity came into the world; it was substantiated by authority, its 
divine authority; consequently the authority is higher. Now for a long time the relationship has been 
reversed: men seek on rational grounds to demonstrate, to substantiate the authority. And yet this is supposed 
to be tlie same religion.”
SD 135.
BA 40. See also SW 662 [1850].
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do not receive wealth, power, and honour, but rather pain, disdain, and rejection: “In this 
mediocre, wretched, sinftü, evil, ungodly world the tmth must suffer- this is Christianity’s 
doctrine Hence, Climacus once asserted that, “religious existence is suffering,
and not as a transient element but as a continual accompaniment.”^^ '* For the Chiistian, 
persecution is an avoidable fact of life in a world of sinM autonomy and “grandiloquent 
illusions”.^ ^^  Regarding the non-Clnistian response to Chiistian witness, Kierkegaard 
contended: “Even if you say nothing, he notices, you may be sure, that your life contains, if 
it is tiiily related to God’s demand, an admonition, a demand on him- it is this which he 
wants to do away with.”*^  ^ Subsequently, the obvious and inexorable value differences 
between Chiistians and non-Clnistians cannot engender mutual tolerance: “[H]ow could 
the living, who cling with all their souls to this life and all that belongs to it, calmly put up 
with the presence of someone who has died.”^^  ^ Kierkegaard once declared that 
persecution is not a precursor to victoiy but the result of victory: "'"'Christianly one has in 
advance already been more than victorious. Therefore one does not suffer in order to be 
victorious, but instead because one has been victorious [..
Plainly, for Kierkegaard there is no divine ‘witness protection program’: “[Pjeople 
look on the world’s opposition as an accidental relationship to Christianity rather than as an 
essential relationship”.®^  ^ Quidam attributed the false presumption that God should 
prevent believers from suffering to “a Judaizing relic, a tiuncated particularism in
SW 695 n. 9.
TM 321. See also JP IV 155 [1848], UV 99, UP 1402.
UP 1288. Kinmiise adds, “We should take joy in our sufferings in this world because suffering is the 
occasion o f the individuation which the God-relation entails.” {Golden 304]
CD 385 [November 20, 1847]. Anti-Climacus carefully delineated between “authentic CInistian 
suffering” and “ordinary human suffering”: “What is decisive in Christian suffering is voluntariness and the 
possibilit}' o f offense for the one who suffers f  [PC 109] He earlier asserted that non-Clnistians are ignorant 
of what ‘genuine’ suffering [i.e., separation horn God] entails. [SD 38] Kierkegaard concurred in CD 103: 
“All temporality’s suffering is a mirage [....]”
WL 130.
FS 116. For accusations of the world’s “jealousy” over the believer’s love for God, see WL 125.
BA 233 [October 1848].
WL 187. See also PC 87, BA 148. Kierkegaard once queried why anyone would then subscribe to 
Clmstianity. He answered: first, “Clnistianity is the absolute [....]” and, second, that “the consciousness of 
sin” drives man to find no rest anywhere else. [TM 399 (1848)] Furthermore, eternal suffering far outweighs 
the ‘momentary’ suffering of temporality, “even tliough tlie moment were seventy years”. [WL (revised) 413 
(1847)]
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Chiistianity, or ordinary cowardliness and laziness”.^**** Suffering unjust treatment in a 
world hostile to God is such an intrinsic aspect of the CInistian life that it represents one of 
the few exceptions to Kierkegaard’s cardinal principle of incommensurability between 
inwardness and externalities: “[T]he degree of one’s faith is demonstrated only by the 
degiee of one’s willingness to suffer for one’s faith.” *^** He once stated that, whereas 
suffering on behalf of righteousness constitutes a believer’s ‘privilege’, “[I]t is his [God’s] 
disfavor which allows these rich and powerful ones etc. to become more rich and 
powerful.
Instead of undennining spiritual authority, external opposition inadvertently
underscores it, according to Kierkegaard:
To transfonn hardships into a witness for the truth of a teaching, to transform 
disgi ace into glory for oneself and for the believing congregation, to transfonn the 
lost cause into a matter of honor that has all the inspiring force of a witness— is 
this not like making the cripples walk and the mute speak
Furthermore, it unites the believer contemporaneously with Christ and the prophets of old, 
and ‘translates’ Calvary into the present. Hence, Kierkegaard described true 
contemporaneity as “to make present the life of the departed glorious one in such a way 
that you thereby would come to suffer as you would have suffered in contemporaneity if 
you had acknowledged a prophet to be a prophet.” *^^'* Authentic obedience to Christ is thus 
reflected by “poverty, abasement, mistreatment, persecution, suffering.” *^*^
Suffering injustice, thus, seiwes both apologetic and evangelistic purposes. 
Kierkegaard hoped that the illusions of some non-Cluistians might be jarred by witnessing
^  SW 374.
TM 324. See also PC 173 and JP IV 548 [1850]: “[I]f the voluntaiy goes, Christianity is abolished— and 
so it is. When the voluntary disappears, ‘spiritual trial’ disappears, and when spiritual trials disappear, 
Clmstianity disappears [....]” For suffering as “road signs” that the Christian is on the ‘stiaight and nanow’, 
see UV 227, 297, BA 154, UP I 507.
JP IV 408 [1852]. Ironically, believers had to endure suffering because of their very “willingness to 
suffer”. [JP IV 550 (1854)]
UD 83. See also WA 215 [1848] and SW 454: “The esthetic hero is great by conquering, the religious 
hero by suffering" Ironically, both Pascal and Feuerbach agreed tliat, “[s]uffering is a Clmstian’s natural 
condition.” [SW 460]
^°'*TM289. See also PC 171.
TM 289.
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such abject in justice ,H ence, he once paradoxically mused: “Truly Christianity does not 
want to force anyone. No, but Christianity wants its followers, suffering, to force the world 
to become Chiistian.” *^*^ The greatest endorsement of spiritual authority is martyi'dom for 
the Gospel, which not only conveys the conviction of the witness,^ **® but also highlights the 
impotence of sensate authority in eradicating belief,^ **^  and the wickedness of society.^ *** 
Due to the unflinching refusal to compromise in the face of death, “Christianity became 
power, power, became the power that was able to transform the world.” *^ * Hence, 
Kierkegaard triumphantly proclaimed, “In suffering, bold confidence is able to take power 
fi'om the world and has the power to change scorn into honor, victory into downfall As 
Nicoletti poignantly summaiizes, “[Rjeligion must relate itself inversely to politics, not 
tlu'ough a direct superiority but through a ‘suffering superiority’.” *^^
b. True Equality: The Power of Love:
In addition to engendering persecution, which both strengthens the believer and 
ultimately weakens the opposing powers, spiritual authority has the effect of fostering 
universal equality in the sight of God. Because suffering on behalf of the tiuth merely 
emphasizes the heterogeneity of spiritual authority, and spiritual authority is fi eely 
available to all who follow Cluist, the only person who can deny anyone fi om receiving 
spiritual authority is the person herself. In contrast to ‘accidental’ privileges such as an 
aristocratic birth or great intelligence, true earnestness— the highest distinction securable
0^^  TM 208, BA 234 [1848]. He observed that Clmstianity is both “the most tolerant of all religions insofar as 
it abhors most o f all using physical force”, as well as “the most intolerant of all religions, inasmuch as its tme 
followers know no limits when it comes to suffering constraining others, constraining them by suffering their 
mistreatment and persecution,” [TM 208]
JP 1243 [1851]. On ‘ forcing the hand’ o f his adversaries, see WL [revised] 412 [1847] : “I will make them 
strike me. Thus I will still compel tliem with evil. For if  they strike me first— they will surely become aware 
[of their tme wickedness]— and if  they kill me— then they will become unconditionally aware, and I will have 
won absolute victory.” He once compared the pastor’s patience towards persecution to the [pre-anaesthetics] 
doctor’s endurance o f “the patient’s abusive language and kicks during the operation.” [PV 179 (1849)]
90S p y
^  WA 74. Kierkegaard even (playfully?) mused over tlie possibility o f his own martyrdom for disturbing 
the ‘false peace’ ofClmstendom. [CD 187]
910 YQ 203. For an ‘extiaordinaiy’ person’s death as “the victory of the new point o f departure”, see BA 154. 
FS 129.
UV 331. This is another example of CInistian revaluation via redemption whereby, “the language a whole 
race speaks in unanimous agreement is still turned upside down”. [UV 333]
Nicoletti 191.913
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by an individual— stems from obeying God and, “[E]very human being, God be praised, is 
capable of it if he wills.” *^'* Kierkegaard emphasized that God judges individuals on the 
basis of who they become, not on biology or beginnings.^ Subsequently, nobody is 
denied the possibility of living in love, “the strongest power in a man.” *^^  Moreover, the 
Danish thinker maintained that true distinction entails excelling at something which 
everyone can theoretically do, rather than distinguishing oneself in a proficiency in which 
few can participate. Thus, he exclaimed, “Is it really so glorious to become the superior 
person no one else can become; is it not disconsolate instead
In proclaiming spiritual egalitarianism, Kierkegaard was remaining tme to his
Protestant heritage. Luther himself criticized the potential abuses and misunderstanding of
an artificial dichotomy:
It has been devised that the Pope, bishops, priests and monks are called the 
spiritual estate; princes, lords, artificers and peasants are the temporal estate.
This is an artful lie and hypocritical device, but let no one be made afr aid by it, 
and for this reason: that all Chiistians are truly of the spiritual estate, and there is 
no difference among them, save of office alone.^ *®
Unlike sensate power, talents, and knowledge, which elevate a person above the others, 
Kierkegaai'd claimed: “Love is not an exclusive characteristic, but it is a characteristic by 
which or in virtue of which you exist for others.”^ I n  light of Christ’s commandment to 
‘love your neighbour’, Kierkegaard regarded love as the great equalizer in the temporal 
world.^ *^* To transfonn one’s enemy into one’s friend and ‘vanquish’ them with love, 
Kierkegaard argued, is precisely what St. Paul meant by ‘more than conquering’. N o r  
does such temporally radicalizing love have its source in immanence. Hence, he 
maintained that, “kinship of all men is secured by every individual’s equal kinship with and
UV 123. See also SW 443, TA 62-63, and UD 335: “In the world of spirit, the only one who is shut out is 
the one who shuts himself out [....]”
CD 26.
^"^WL 160.
UV 226. Kierkegaard is massively indebted to Pascal on this point. See Pascal 75: “[T]he tme good must 
be such that it may be possessed by all men at once without diminution or envy, and that no one should be 
able to lose it against his will.”
Luther Docw/nen/s' 43.
WL 211, Cf. Luther Documents 50: “A Cliristian man is the most free lord of all, and subject to none, a 
CInistian man is the most dutihil servant of all, and subject to everyone [....]”
^^PV 111. See Westphal “Sociology” 150.
UV 303.
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relationship to God in Chiist.”^^ ^
Because everyone has an equal opportunity for actualizing “the possibility of the
good at every moment”/^ ® Kierkegaard denigi ated the withdrawal of hope for another
person’s eternal well-being as tantamount to ‘spiritual m u r d e r A t  the same time,
Kierkegaard insisted that the neighbour cannot even be acknowledged prior to the
life-transfonning deflation of an individual’s sinful autonomy: “It is only in dying to the
joys and happiness of the world in self-denial that the ‘neighbour’ comes into
existence.”^^  ^ As a ‘spiritual’ possession, therefore, love is an eternally renewable,
eternally renewing resource. Because of the inexhaustible reservoir of divine love
which supplies each Christian, he maintained:
Already sin feels its powerlessness; it camiot withstand love any longer; it wants 
to teai* itself away; then it insults love as painfully as possible, because it thinks 
that even love cannot forgive more than seven times. But see! Love could 
forgive seventy times seven times, and sin gi ew weary of occasioning forgiveness 
more quickly tlian love grew weary of forgiving.
For Kierkegaard, then, Christian love can never be defeated— it can only be fled.
WL 80, 158; UV 85. Practising love, however, is still no escape horn persecution “in a world which 
crucified him who was love”. [WL 339]
923 239. Those who lack material goods are at no disadvantage with regards to faith, [CD 157] nor are
those who possess less intelligence. [UP I 160] Faith is an equal opportunity for all, since nobody comes to 
God on their own strength or merit. [UP 1 383]
This explains his fascinating exegesis o f Matthew 5:21-22, forbidding hatied o f one’s brother: “Even if  
one does not take murder upon his conscience, he nevertheless gives up the hated one as hopeless and 
consequently takes possibility away from him. But does this not mean to kill him spiritually.” [WL 240] 
WL 359-360 n. 17. For ‘worldly’ love as self-centredly “preferential”, see WL 58. The command to love 
does seem a bit ludicrous, then, for it comes ‘naturally’ to a Cliristian anyway [WL 344] and non-Clnistians 
are incapable o f ‘genuine’ love to begin with. [WL 132]
CD 116. To avoid any pejorative dualism, Kierkegaard once defined temporal possessions as “less perfect 
spiritual goods.” [CD 119] Kierkegaard believed that, “it is love that preseiwes difference, because love does 
not seek its own but what is the neighbour’s”. [JP IV 181 (1851)] See also UD 143 on “the divine equality 
that opens the soul to the perfect and blinds the sensate eye to the difference, the divine equality that like a fire 
bums ever more intensely in the difference without, however, humanly speaking, consuming it.”
UD 64. See also SW 384, UD 380.
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4. Positions of Spiritual Authority:
a. The Apostle:
After examining the general characteristics of spiritual authority, it is necessary to 
discuss the two primary positions of spiritual authority for Kierkegaard. On account of his 
insistence upon Christianity’s heterogeneity with the sensate world and its intrinsic power 
hierarchies, he believed that it is categorically erroneous to distinguish oneself as an 
“extraordinary Christian”,^ ®^ for one can not possess faith “in an extraordinary degree, 
since the ordinary degi ee is the highest”.^ ^^  Because everyone is spiritually equal before 
God, nobody can introduce qualitative distinctions between followers of Christ. However, 
tlu'oughout history, God has fi'eely chosen to communicate himself directly to specific 
individuals wherehy, “God empowers a particular human being, makes him his 
instrument.”^^** Kierkegaard adopted the New Testament designation, “apostle”, to 
describe such individuals.^^*
Kierkegaard did not relegate the apostolic office to the canonical past, nor is it
entirely insensitive to its specific historical context. Hence, he once wrote:
In our age, just as in every previous one, there can indeed be tme extraordinaries 
appointed by God. But the world’s changes will still have a gieat influence on the 
outer appearance, even though the essence remains the same. Accordingly, for 
example, it would be suspicious if in our time a prophet appeared who resembled 
one of the ancient ones right down to the beard.^^^
As Stephen Dunning adroitly obseiwes, the apostle is “present” in two ways: by being 
present and involved in contemporary life, and by living consciously and humbly in the
929
930
TM 421 [1852]. Though Kierkegaard could be inconsistent on this point. See BA 150, where he 
distinguished the ‘ordinary’ individual from the ‘extiaordinaiy’ tlirough whom God ‘brings a new point of 
departure for tlie established order’, and PV 120 where he dismissed his own status as “a tmtli-witness in the 
stricter sense”.
WL48.
TM 424 [1853].
H. H. defined an apostle as “a man who is called and appointed by God and sent by him on a mission.” 
[WA 95] Apostles were by no means faultless. See TM 605-606 [August 23, 1855], TM 457 [1854].
BA 25. It is highly significant that Kierkegaard never upbraided Adolf Adler for claiming to have 
received a personal revelation. Instead, he criticized him for obfuscating the heterogeneous boundaries 
between transcendence and innnanence by announcing that his ‘revelation’ needed further revision— a mark 
of human origin. See Hustwitt 334-335.
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‘presence’ of God.^^  ^ In contrast to the religious poet, who relies on personal ability, the
only ‘prerequisite’ for the apostle is “a noble and pure simplicity (which is the condition for
being the instmment of the Holy Spirit”.^ '^* Hence, anyone can potentially be an apostle, if
chosen by God/^^ H. H. insisted Üiat attempts to regard apostles as religious ‘geniuses’
constitute categorical carelessness, where the ‘essentially Chiistian’ is fatuously relegated
to the aesthetic sphere.^^*’ Nor is it possible to account for the apostle within the natural
development of human thought or history:
The apostle has something paradoxically new to bring, the newness of which, 
just because it is essentially paradoxical and not an anticipation pertaining to 
the development of the human race, continually remains, just as an apostle 
remains for all eternity an apostle, and no immanence of eternity places him 
essentially on the same line with all human beings, since essentially he is 
paradoxically different.^^^
Unsurprisingly, the apostle seeks absolutely no support from either sensate 
authority or other temporal ‘proofs’. H. H. contended that he possesses “no other evidence 
than his own statement, and at most his willingness to suffer everything joyfully for the 
sake of that statement”: “[B]y using [...] power, he would define his endeavor in essential 
identity with the endeavor of other people, and yet an apostle is what he is only by his 
paradoxical heterogeneity, by having divine authority”.^ ®^ For this reason, the apostle 
never seeks to emulate sensate authority, but concerns himself primarily with his personal 
relationship with God.^^  ^ Accordingly, the apostle must, therefore, faithfully convey his 
message without taking responsibility for any results, proclaiming:
Dunning 27.
TM 464 [1854]. This accounted for his derision of pulpit ‘theatrics’, [WA 104] criticism directed 
specifically at Nicolai Grundtvig. [BA 185]
In a possible allusion to Peter, Kierkegaard wrote; “[T]he less promising tlie apostle was as a man the
greater was tlie impression of divine authority granted to him [....]” [WL 126]
WA 93.
9”  WA 94.
938 105. See also BA 154. In this sense, revelatory claims are “logically immune from objective
confirmation”. [Whittaker 83] Hamilton stumbles into the aesthetic fallacy by insisting that the divine 
messenger must “earn the right to speak in this way, say tln ough his experience of suffering or despair, or 
tlirough his moments of greatest joy— or tlnough both.” [70]
UV 334, BA 187, UD 330. Climacus asserted that the apostle is “a solitaiy man” who does not consult 
other apostles on what he should do. [UP I 57] Because of his unarticulated ecclesioiogy, Kierkegaard 
underemphasized the fact that the office of apostle is a gift ft om God for building up the church, and that 
church unity was a fundamental concern for the apostles in the New Testament, further exposing himself to 
Bishop Martensen’s criticism of “Dr. S. Kierkegaard, whose Clmstianity is without Church and without
histoiy, and who seeks Chiist only in the ‘desert’ and in ‘private rooms.’” [TM 361]
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[I]t is God himself or the Lord Jesus Cluist who is speaking, and you must not 
become involved presumptuously in criticizing the fonn. I cannot, I dare not 
compel you to obey, but through the relationship of your conscience to God, 1 
make you eternally responsible for your relationship to this doctrine by my having 
proclaimed it as revealed to me and therefore by having proclaimed it with divine 
authority.^ '***
As John Whittaker explains, one con ective for the categorically impaired Rev. Adler is as 
follows: “To acknowledge their character as revelations, he should have resided in them, 
expressing in his person the changed disposition which faithfulness reqtnres. Then his 
own obedient example would have effectively transmitted the authority by which he was, 
supposedly, called.” '^*'
Although he believed that he was supplying a vital corrective for the Danish
church, Kierkegaard assiduously eschewed any personal claims of apostleship: “1 am not
an apostle or the like; 1 am a poetical-dialectical genius, personally and religiously a
penitent.” '^*^  He further elaborated:
1 do not have an immediate God-relationship to appeal to, nor do I dare to say that 
it is God who directly contributes the thoughts to me, but that my relationship to 
God is a relationship of reflection, inwardness in reflection, since reflection is the 
predominant quality of my individuality [..
Whereas the apostle’s authority stems directly fi'om God regardless of any natural talents 
he possesses, '^*'* Kierkegaard’s role as church “auditor” was based on ‘ordinary’
940 BA 177.
Whittaker 87. Whittaker tends, however, to conflate the role o f apostle and truth-witness. Hence, he 
observes of ministers, “All too frequently, however, they lack the genuine authority o f apostolic witnesses, 
which comes from heartfelt compliance with the regulatory role o f religious ideas.” Kierkegaard would 
probably reiterate that apostles do not receive authority based on their authentic lifestyles— apostles are 
imperfect people who just happen to be selected by God to receive a direct coimnunication which is totally 
based on grace, not merit. Many o f Whittaker’s comments would fall under the classification of 
Religiousness A. See, for example, p. 93: “Genuine witnesses rest themselves in their beliefs, and by so 
doing they become new selves (‘new beings’); and it is the impact o f this self-confidence that leads others to 
re-examine themselves in the light of their teachings. For these witnesses appear to have found themselves 
[....]” Rather, Kierkegaard would insist that it is they who have been found!
PV XV. He was partly motivated to publish explicitly non-religious works to prevent people from making 
this en oneous assumption, “something I am a veiy long way from being.” [CD 418 (1848)] For his.faith as 
“an approximation” of Cluistianity and not “tme Cliristianity”, see FS 208.943 PY 74
WA 95, BA 86-87. Because faith is not contingent upon ‘having all the facts’ o f Jesus’ life, Climacus 
[brazenly] proclaimed: “Even if  the contemporary generation had not left anything behind except these 
words, ‘We have believed that in such and such a year the god appeared in the humble fonn o f a servant, lived 
and taught among us, and then died’— that is more than enough.” [PF 104]
172
intellectual prowess. '^*  ^ Subsequently, Kierkegaard could hone his message using human 
artistry and reason, since even his devotional writings were mere ‘Christian addresses’ and 
were, therefore, ‘without divine authority’.^ '*^
b. The Tmth-Witness:
i. hitroduction: The Importance of Witness:
All human beings— as well as apostles- are called to lives of ‘proper’ pietism, “in 
the sense of witnessing for the tmth and suffering for if ’.^ '*^  If Christ received so bmtal a 
reception, how can his followers expect better?^ '*® Kierkegaard’s understanding of witness 
diverged from the classical Cliristian emphasis insofar as he deplored the evangelist’s 
presumption that ‘My soul is safe, so now I can preoccupy myself solely with saving 
o t h e r s . B e c a u s e  grace can only be directly communicated by God himself, the witness 
was responsible for engaging in “ethical-religious communication”, which ‘depicts the 
requirement of ideality’ in order to enhance an awareness of one’s need for gi ace, as well 
as a refusal to take giace for gianted.^ *^* Hence, Johannes de silentio insisted that, “[t]he 
true knight of faith is a witness, never the teacher”. T h e  witness is, in no way, to exert 
power over his neighbours, since his reward is “to be satisfied with mling over himself 
instead of over the world, to be satisfied as a pastor to be his own audience, as an author to 
be his own reader, etc.”^^  ^ The greatest Christian witness is the necessary correlation 
between word and deed, doctiine and praxis, an unwavering commitment to living the tmth 
regardless of material advantage or disadvantage.^^^ Hence, Kierkegaard contended:
TM 463-464 [1854].
In contrast to sennons, see WL 11.
JP III 524 [1850]. His radical emphasis on identifying tiuth-witnesses and suffering led Bishop Martensen 
to accuse him of restricting the category to martyr s alone. [TM 361]
FS 169, CD 172, UV 338. Moreover, the earthly comfort of Mynster and Mar tensen indicated precisely 
how little they acted as witnesses to the truth. [TM 6]
TM 607 [August 23, 1855], UP 1454. For his deprecation o f ‘hell-fire’ evangelism as ‘aesthetic’, see CD 
192.950 p y  227 [1849P
FT 80. As Quidam retorted [with doctoral candidates in mind, obviously!], “[F]ortunate is the person who 
is so sure of himself that he dares to accept money for teaching.” [SW 258]
TA 89.
PV 119, FS 10.
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“[T]he highest a person is capable of is to make an eternal tmth tme, to make it tme that it 
is tme— by doing it, by being oneself the demonstration, by a life that perhaps will also be 
able to convince others.”^^ '*
As with the apostle, Kierkegaard emphasized personal boldness and existential 
solitude as distinguishing traits: “The qualification truth-witness is a very imperious and 
extremely unsocial qualification and scmpulously allows itself to be joined only with: 
being nothing otheiivise. Truth-witness relates to Cluistianity’s heterogeneity with this 
world [.. ..]”^^  ^ He acknowledged that there is an element of paradoxical pride in 
dissociating oneself from others: “CInistian humility, as with eveiything Chiistian, 
involves a dialectic, so that its humility presupposes a pride which caiiies its head higher 
than proud human humility but which then humbles itself Although the Christian 
boasts a superior ‘power source’, her authority is dedicated to uplifting, not overilnowing, 
those around her. Hence, Kierkegaard declared: “But all true helping begins with a 
humbling. The helper must first humble himself under the person he wants to help and 
thereby understand that to help is not to dominate but to sei*ve [.. ..]”^^  ^ Kierkegaard 
maintained that the tmth-witness demonstrates ‘abilities’ which God has granted to 
everyone, should they choose to follow his ways.^ ^® Methods of bearing witness to the 
tmth are as myiiad as the individuals God calls, for “Clirist doesn’t require everyone to 
become the d i s c i p l e s Hence, he once mused: “No, there is not one person alive who 
shares my task, and, in my opinion, not one person among these millions shares a task with 
another [.. Because every individual must pursue the tmth in an individually truthful 
mamier, intellectual Christians are not to castigate the simplicity of other believers, nor are 
the ‘simple’ to indulge in anti-intellectual elitism.*^ *^
CD 98. Kierkegaard sought to avoid both cheap grace and works righteousness. Hence, he emphasized: 
“No, infinite humiliation and grace, and then a stiiving bom o f gratitude— this is Cluistianity.” [FS xi]
TM 10. On the heterogeneity between tiuth-witnessing and “politics”, see PV 109.956 JP jY [1854]. On Kierkegaard’s ‘belonging’ to the lower classes, see TM 346, PV 90, 120.
PV 75.
JP VI 535 [1854]. See TC 195, where Kierkegaard lauded the ability “to be consistent to the uttennost, 
humble before God, proud toward men, which, God be praised, God has granted to every human being if  he 
wills it.” See also TA 92.
FS 99. Though all must become disciples. [FS 207] See also CD 186.
JP VI 535 [1854].
UP 1228. Hence, in his own life, writing became more than a vocation but a means of living the tiuth 
Cluistianly, Kierkegaard’s “divine worship”. [PV 73] However, he also claimed to possess “too much
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ii. Responding to Context: Task of the Tmth-Witness:
In order for the tmth-witness to bear humble yet relevant testimony, she must
respond careMly to her particular historical and cultural context:
Above all, generality is not for upbuilding, because one is never built up in 
general, any more than a house is erected in general. Only when the words are 
said by the right person in the right situation in the right way, only then has the 
saying done everything it can to guide the single individual to do honestly what 
one otheiwise is quick enough to do— to refer everything to oneself.
For Kierkegaard, human history is characterized by movements which veer between 
extremes: “[A]s Luther says, the world continues to be like the dmnken peasant who, 
helped up on one side of the horse, falls off the other side.” *^"^ During the Romantic period, 
society sought representative individuals who frilly embodied its ideals and conventions, 
whereas the Enlightenment responded to the excesses of powerfril individuals by 
advocating a “cosmopolitan system” which attempted to unify diverse elements.^ '^* 
Subsequently, Kierkegaard viewed his theological task as supplying a counter-balance or 
“coiTective” to contemporary extremes.^^^ Such a “pendulum swing” is particularly 
pronounced when a culture is preoccupied with “finite objectives”, Kierkegaard 
contended, which results in a bi-polar fixation between “craving (for the fortunate)” and 
“despair (for the unfortunate)”; therefore, the proper Christian response is that, “eternity 
should be continually introduced counteractingly.”^^ ^
Kierkegaard maintained that Cluistianity itself is not exempt fr om the pendulous 
exaggerations of the prevailing culture and must, therefore, continuously adjust its 
message accordingly since, “[T]he ensuing corruption always coiresponds proportionately 
to what is introduced.”^^  ^ Further imbalances result when previous coiTectives are 
transfonned into universal, authoritative truths regardless of changing contexts.^^® Hence,
imagination and much too much o f tlie poet to dare to be called a tmth-witness in the stricter sense.” [PV 120] 
UD 276.
727 [1846-1847].
^  JP IV 19 [March 1836].
JK 200 [1850]. For ‘coiTective’ as “prophetic utterance”, see Aiken 31.
^ J P V I  202 [1855].
^^JPVI 531 [1854].
See, for example, his criticism of Luther’s endorsement of marriage: “In this context it is distressing to me
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he once wrote: “Lutheranism is a corrective— but a conective made into the normative, into 
the sum total, is eo ipso conflising in the following generation (where that for which it was 
a conective does not exist [.. Spiritual laziness had partially contributed to 
redefining ‘faith’ as unthinking intellectual assent to a set of abstractified tenets safely 
removed from practical daily living, a religion by rote. For this reason, Kierkegaard 
advocated the provisional nature of Christian doctrine, which must remain relevant and 
explicitly counterbalance the contextual exaggeration of its contemporary sitz im leben.
Kierkegaard’s willingness to set aside significant doctrines would have alarmed
more conseiwative dogmatists. For example, he was perfectly willing to divert attention
fi'om the salvific role of Christ’s death to focus on Christ as exemplar in order to inflate the
bargain prices of ‘cheap gi*ace’ which permeated the indolent church:
The misfortune of Christianity is clearly that the dialectical factor has been taken 
fi'om Luther’s doctrine of faith so that it has become a hiding-place for sheer 
paganism and Epicureanism; people forget entirely that Luther was urging the 
claims of faith against a fantastically exaggerated asceticism.^ ^**
Due to the withering religiosity which arose from contemporary biblical studies, he once 
quipped: “In the main a reformation which sets the Bible aside would have just as much 
validity now as Luther’s breaking with the pope.”^^ * Near the end of his life, he even 
criticized Protestantism itself as a necessary correction for a certain time which was then 
wrongfully institutionalized.^^^
that an eminent person like Luther came to such an erroneous position. He should have understood that his 
maiïiage was an exceptional act, a corrective [....]” [JP IV 578 (1854)].
452 [1854].
JK 166 [1849]. See also JP 1325 [1849], FT 121. Kierkegaard believed that Luther had rightly responded 
to medieval monasticism, which had reduced faith to a series o f ‘petty obseivances’. [FS 16] Flowever, the 
institutionalization o f Luther’s emphasis on ‘grace alone’ culminated in a spiritual laxity which took grace 
for granted. [FS 194-195] Hence, Kierkegaard asserted: “When the ‘monastery’ is the deviation, faith must 
be affirmed, when ‘professor’ is the deviation, imitation must be affinned.” [FS 195] He once qualified his 
own exaggerated emphasis on the individual to counteract the coiiTipted communitarianism o f his day: 
“[E]stablishing a party and fonning a school may be something inferior to what I am doing [...] and it can be 
something superior, as with Socrates and Cluist. It depends on the situation in which or the stage at which a 
person does it.” [JP IV 191 (1854)] In supplying a conective to Kierkegaard’s conective, one might posit: 
‘When “society” is the deviation, the individual must be affinned, but when “se lf’ is the deviation, 
conmiunity must be affinned.’ Another contextual exaggeration, the Hegelian appropriation o f Geist, may 
have partially contributed to Kierkegaard’s understated pneumatology.
’^‘ JP I 84 [1848].
TM 41. Kierkegaard’s ‘dialectical dogmatics’ could be construed as an argument for relativism, were it 
not for his assiduously maintained core of tlieological non-negotiables: notably, the character o f God, human
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Ultimately, contextual exaggeration is paradoxically the proper response to
contextual exaggeration. In contemplating the backlash to his ‘anti-communitarianism’,
Kierkegaard responded:
The person who is to provide the ‘corrective’ must study the weak sides of the 
established order scmpulously and penetratingly and then one-sidedly present the 
opposite— with expert one-sidedness [....] Nothing is easier for the one providing 
the coiTective than to add the other side; but then it ceases to be precisely the 
con ective and itself becomes the established order.
He also forewarned future readers not to misjudge his polemical stridency: “You have 
scarcely any idea of the degree to which the whole established ecclesiastical order is, 
Christianly, an unüTith, and, what makes it worse, the degi ee to which the persons involved 
are themselves aware of it. Therefore, judge slowly if you see me press so hard [... In 
response to the contemporary over-simplification of Cluistianity and its demands, the 
Danish theologian deliberately wrote to make things ‘more difficult’. His purpose was 
partially to fend off potential ‘followers’, partially to avoid igniting a false ‘external’ 
refonu.^^^ This strategy also ensured that ‘that single individual’ did not place her tmst in 
yet another human doctrine or teacher, but solely upon God. As Frater Tacitumus 
contended, “[Bjelieving is just like swimming, and instead of helping one ashore the 
speaker should help one out into the deep.”^^  ^ Perhaps Kierkegaard even consciously or 
unconsciously reprised the role of Abraham in Fear and Trembling by playing the 
theological ‘bogeyman’ for the benefit of the next generation, reasoning that, “it is better 
that he believes me a monster than that he should lose faith in you [God].”^^ ^
sinfulness, creation ex inhilo, the heterogeneity of Cluistianity, the full deity and humanity o f Cluist, the need 
for self-risk and sacrifice among believers. Climacus carefLilly differentiated the religious dialectic fiom the 
Hegelian dialectic which rendered eveiything “sophistically relative (this is mediation)”. [UP 1 525]
TM 403 [1849].
TM 525 [1855]. See also UV 340.
See UP I 186 and CD 385 [November 20, 1847]: “As long as I am living, I cannot be acknowledged, for 
only a few are able to understand me, and if  people began tiying to acknowledge me, I would have to exert all 
my powers in new mystifications to prevent it.”
976 SW 4 4 3  See also PC 289 [1849].
977 FT 11.
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iii. Indirect Communication: The Means of the Truth-Witness:
Although the CInistian’s life revolves on bearing witness to the truth, Kierkegaard i
carefully qualified this witness within the rubric of indirect communication. If the 
predominant philosophical problem facing Socrates was, ‘How does a man learn 
something he doesn’t know and therefore camiot r e c o g n i z e ? t h e  ultimate
Kierkegaardian quandary was, ‘How does a man teach another individual something that is |
intrinsically ‘unthinkable’ and can only be learned hom God?’^ ^^  How can the eternal be
conveyed in temporal foimulations without compromising its heterogeneity with the j
contingent world and merging with paganism?^ ®** As a further corollary, ‘In an age where |iexternal authority has been thoroughly corrupted and mistmsted, how does a man oppose I
sensate authority without himself becoming a sensate authority?’^ ®' Hence, as Climacus
lamented the rise of populist leaders, he exclaimed:
The umecognizable recognize the seiwants of levelling but dare not use power or 
authority against them, for then there would be a regression, because it would be 
instantly obvious to a third party that the unrecognizable one was an authority, 
and then the third party would be hindered from attaining the highest.^®^
How does a Cliristian teach people to think for themselves without enslaving them to his 
instmction: ‘We should think for ourselves because Kierkegaard says so’? Likewise, how 
can he, in good conscience, ‘command’ them to be individuals?^®^
Despite the fact that direct communication is appropriate for conveying temporal 
infomiation, as well as previously unknown tmths, in the case of the apostle,^ ®'*
Kierkegaard believed that it is impossible for one individual to communicate tnith directly
978 p p  9
979
980
In Vigilius’ words, to ‘allow thought to collide with the unthinkable’. [CA 27] 
UP 1243.
On Kierkegaard’s strategy of confounding professorial or institutionalized pastoral authority, see 
Armstrong 27-31.
UP 1 109. Haiinay posits, “The age needs Socratic leadership, leaders who disown authority and help the 
individual, less by attraction than repulsion, to become autonomous.” [287]
This plight is mai-vellously depicted in Monty Python‘s Life o f Brian, when Brian, the reluctant ‘messiah’, 
shouts at his unwa(iTa)nted followers, “You are all individuals!” to which they bray, “W e... are... all... 
individuals...” After a brief pause, a paradoxical voice squeaks, “I’m not!” This is a likely candidate for 
Kierkegaard’s favourite cinematic moment.
984 pjp j 7 ^^  243. Though the apostle must be careful lest “the believer would enter into a direct relation to 
him, not into a paradoxical relation.” [BA 186]
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to another individual for five reasons. First, given the heterogeneity between God and 
sinful humankind, an individual can only recognize the tiuth after she first receives the 
condition for receiving truth— a condition which God alone can bestow.^®  ^ Second, no 
CInistian may be so self-assured that she can neglect her personal pursuit of tlie tinth and 
focus upon others since, “[TJhere can be no schoolmaster, strictly understood, in tlie art of 
existing.” ®^^ Third, intimations o f ‘direct’ communication of tmth translate into sensate 
power, which ineluctably indebt the learner to the human ‘teacher’ instead of God. Hence, 
Climacus asserted:
[T]he secret of communication specifically hinges on setting the other fi ee, and 
for that very reason he must not communicate himself directly; indeed, it is even 
iiTeligious to do so [...] if the communicator is not God himself or does not 
presume to appeal to the miraculous authority of an apostle [.. ..]^ ®^
Othei-wise, instead of proclaiming ‘good news to the poor, healing to the broken-hearted, 
fieedoni for the captives’,^ ®® fiirther fear, obligation, and dismay are generated.^®  ^ Hence, 
Kierkegaard meticulously heeded Socrates’ cmcial lesson: “[TJhere is no direct relation 
between the teacher and the leamer”.^ *^* Fourth, the direct communication of Christian 
tmth without apostolic wanant negates existential immediacy and tends towards 
abstraction, robbing tmth of its ‘inward’ urgency towards decisive action.^^* As Aiken 
observes, “[A]ny attempt to impart Chiistianity by direct means of communication, such as 
professional lecturing, is a ‘monstrous eiTor’, insofar as evangelical tmth is not a
985 pp i 4 _i5  ^UD 136. Hence, he vehemently opposed any notion that Jesus’ divinity was eminently 
recognizable otherwise, “he is eo ipso a mythological figure.” [UP I 600]
986 jjp jj See also UP 174. However, Kierkegaard felt confident that he was applying the proper 
coiTective: “That I have understood the trutli I am presenting— of that I am absolutely convinced.” [PV 25]
UP 174.
Isaiah 61:1.
See UD 15: “If by my wishing or by my gift I could bestow upon him the highest good [...] then I could 
also take it from him, even if  he would not have to be afi-aid of that.” Hence, he concluded: “[N]o human 
being can give an eternal resolution to anotlier or take it fiom him; one human being camiot be indebted to 
another.” [UD 382] See also PF 12.
990 y p  j  2 4 7  S e e  also PF 10. The epistemological humility of Socrates’ maieutic method strongly influenced 
Kierkegaard’s model of indirection. See TM 341 [September 1, 1855]: “The only analogy I have before me 
is Socrates; my task is a Socratic task, to audit the definition o f what it is to be a Christian— I do not call 
myself a Cliristian (keeping the ideal free), but I can make it manifest that others are even less so.” Following 
Socrates’ precedent was also contextually appropriate, given the proliferation of “sophistry” which plagued 
both ancient Greece and modem Cliristendoin. [TM 341 (September 1, 1855)]
UP I 236. This was a favourite tactic o f Clnistendom, according to Kierkegaard. [PV 52] On account o f  
the apostolic precedent, whereby knowledge o f God can be communication directly to individuals, I would 
want to qualify Golomb’s contention tliat Kierkegaard relied on indirection due to the linguistic limitations of  
language which faith ‘suspends’ in delimiting the authority of rationality. [“Ladder” 65-66] On indirection as
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possession of the mind but a form of being,”^^  ^ Fifth, direct communication may fatally 
disrupt the listener’s appropriation of the message by focusing attention upon the 
m e s s e n g e r . I t  is as fatuous as shouting, ‘Watch what you’re doing! ’ to a person using a 
chainsaw, who immediately looks up, maiming herself in the process.^ '^* This constituted 
Kierkegaard’s problem with identifying ethical ‘geniuses’: “People should not admire an 
ethicist; they should be precipitated by him into an ethical life.”^^ ^
The solution to Kierkegaard’s gieat dilemma was, “[I]n suffering to serve, to help 
i n d i r e c t l y . I n  order to love the beloved without imprisoning him in dependence upon 
the lover, Kierkegaard posited: “[T]he greatest benefaction camiot be accomplished in any 
way whereby the recipient gets to know that he is indebted [.. ..]”^^  ^ Without a direct 
relationship, Anti-Climacus claimed that there is no assertion of power on the paif of the 
author: “There is no direct communication and no direct reception: there is a choice. It 
does not take place, as in direct communication with coaxing and tlu eatening and 
admonishing [....] [T]o deny direct communication is to require faith [..
Kierkegaard’s personal strategy for implementing indirect communication had 
tluee components. First, he assiduously ensured that there were no direct dogmatic 
statements in his writings: “I do not have a stitch of doctrine— and doctrine is what people 
want. Because doctrine is the indolence of aping and mimicking for the leainer, and 
doctrine is the way to sensate power for the teacher, for doctrine collects men.”^^  ^ Second, 
Kierkegaai'd strove to remain personally enigmatic and politically aloof, eschewing direct
“a stiictly preludial function”, see Nonis 89.
Aiken 24.
160-161, UP I 100.
994 See UP 1277.
WL [revised] 422 [1847].
®^ ®UPI 109.
WL 256.
PC 140-141. See also PF 103.
^  JP VI 535 [1854]. Hence, reducing Cluistianity to “an objective doctrine” helps render it “a kingdom of 
tliis world.” [FS 171] This also accounts for Climacus’ injunction not to cite his book authoritatively in a 
direct quote since this missed the cmcial point o f indirection. [UP 1618] Holmer writes, “In this respect, he 
was not an originating thinker; for he was not caiTying further the thought o f the age and he was not 
suggesting an unlieard of mutation. Therefore, his works spoke to the age and yet were not what the age 
required.” [82] Furthermore, emphasis on doctrine is both detiimental to Kierkegaard’s project of 
emphasizing praxis over intellectually acknowledged ‘beliefs’ and also unnecessary: “My position has never
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relations with foes and followers alike,******* and he vigorously renounced all authoritative 
titles and ‘heroic’ feats. Hence, he once wrote: “[W]hen he [an author] says: I am a poet, 
only a poet— he is saying: Look at me and see that I am not great, I am not the ideal— but 
look at the ideal.”****** Third, Kierkegaard concocted a pantheon of pseudonymous 
speakers. As Louis Mackey explains, “A Kierkegaardian pseudonym is a persona, an 
imaginary person created by the author for artistic purposes, not a nom de plume, a 
fictitious name used to protect his personal identity fiom the thi'eats and embarrassments of 
publicity [....] [H]is purpose was not mystification but distance.”'****^ However, the 
pseudonyms do assist in preserving mystery to great religious effect, as Kodalle obseiwes: 
“[T]he existential center of the individual remains a mystery, kept intentionally from the 
inquisitive looks of others. Making it communicable would jeopardize the possibility of 
the absolute individuality of the other, who has the task of finding his own unique 
path.”‘““
These existential personas presented spiritual timths beneath ‘aesthetic’ 
camouflage,*****'* enabling Kierkegaard artistically to embody world views which were not 
representative of his own Christian understanding,*****^  and flirther protecting him fiom
been an emphasis on ‘doctrine:’ my view is that the doctiine is very sound.” [JP VI (1851) 402-403]
For example, JP IV 186 [1851]: “All who want to help me promptly mess up my cause by making it 
partisan in one direction or the other, and therefore I cannot use them.” See also BA 336 [March 1855]: “I am 
not veiy directly understandable and will never be imderstood by those who want to have anything direct.” 
He believed tliat such distancing was pivotal for the apostle Paul. [WL 337] Kierkegaard triumphantly 
claimed to have removed all overtly personal references from his papers. [JP V 226 [1843].
JPIV 178 [1851].
Cited in FT x-xi n. 3. There was a certain degree o f theatiicality involved, as Kierkegaard stiove to 
appear publicly as an ‘idler’ to avert suspicion that he was vigorously engaged in writing at the time. [PV 61] 
Kimimse estimates that the “cultivated audience” to which Kierkegaard would have been known consisted of 
tlnee to four thousand people maximum. {Golden 79] It is somewhat comical to envision Kierkegaard’s 
towering Saul-like figure vainly attempting to conceal itself behind the sparse ‘baggage’ of contemporary 
Danish literature.
Kodalle 402. For tlie pseudonyms as “therapeutic method”, see Gardiner “Kierkegaard” 238.
Kierkegaard attributed the idea for the pseudonyms to Sclileiennacher’s written experimentation, [Cl 425 
(October 1835)] and probably styled his epistemological approach after Clirist’s parables, which stymied his 
opponents while offering illumination “to the person who is honestly seeking.” [PV 34] Ziolkowski suggests 
that similar nanative conventions in Ceiwantes’ Don Quixote influenced this stiategy. [133] Kierkegaard 
wiestled witli the ethics o f willingly ‘deceiving others into the truth’. [PV 7] In an 1848 entiy, he identified 
“the arts o f the maieutic” as an “unclu istian way [...] even though useful for a time and relatively justified 
simply because Cliristendom has become paganism.” [CD 422 (1848)]
1005 PY  ^ p j^. Kierkegaard’s ‘representational perspectivism’ via the pseudonyms, see Pattison 238-241. 
Hamilton posits that the “collapse o f CInistian metaphysical tradition” which removed the “conceptual bite” 
from theological tenus necessitated Kierkegaard’s indirection. [68] Though I agiee with Hamilton’s analysis
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direct relationships with his readers.*****^  This tactic involved topics as well as perspectives 
in order to ‘lure’ aesthetically minded readers to his explicitly religious writings.*****^  Since 
Christendom revelled under the illusion that all were Cluistians,*****® Kierkegaard dismissed 
any direct assault, since it “only strengthens a person in the illusion and also inhiriates 
him”, and maintained: “[0]ne who is under illusion must be approached from behind 
[ ]’,ioo9 Because Danish ‘CMstians’ were existentially ‘choking’ on undigested
‘truth’,****** Kierkegaard sought to perform a henneneutical ‘Heimlich manoeuvre’ to 
dislodge the obstiuction. There was also a subtle polemics in his methods of indirection: 
by ‘wholeheartedly’ inliabiting an opposing ideal within a poetic personage, Kierkegaard 
was able to expose its intrinsic shoit-comings. Hence, he explained his ‘motif operandi’ 
behind Johannes Climacus as follows:
By means of the melancholy irony, which did not consist in any single utterance 
on the part of Johannes Climacus but in his whole life, by means of the profound 
earnestness involved in a young man’s being sufficiently honest and earnest 
enough to do quietly and unostentatiously what the philosophers say (and he 
thereby becomes unliappy)-- I would strike a blow at modern speculative 
philosophy.****'
The pseudonyms, thus, supplied a series o f‘masks’, each of which allows the tmth-seeking 
reader to adopt imaginatively an existential life view, realize its limitations from an 
‘insider’s’ perspective,****  ^and safely discard it without incuiring any detrimental 
consequences in actuality.
that Kierkegaard is perennially confronting the problem of how to speak with authority, his motivation is not 
merely an aversion to “being just another empty voice” [69], but also to avoid becoming a sensate authority 
which impedes others by attempting to mediate anotlier individual’s relation to God.
1006 [1845]. In the case of Anti-Climacus’ heightened CIn istian ideal, Kierkegaard could “regard
myself as a reader of the books, not as the author.” [PV 12] Authorial ‘silence’ is reflected in the names of 
Joliamies de silentio and Frater Tacitumus: “Silence here means the humorous revocation o f the teleological 
relation.” [BA 87] For the ‘kenotic’ aspects of the aesthetic writings, see PV 25, 77.
1007 p y  4 4 . "|-Y]he religious author first o f all must tiy to establish rapport with people. That is, he must begin 
with an esthetic piece.” See also TM 130. Flence, he was wary o f giving too many clues into his methods: “A 
fisherman would not tell the fish about Iris bait, saying ‘This is bait.’” [PV 182 (1849)]
1008 p y
1009 p y  4 3  ggg also UP II 157 [1849-1850] and BA 142, where he cautioned against revivalist ‘thundering’ 
“which can so easily embitter people instead of bettering them.”
1010 U P  I  275.
PF xiii.
Westphal calls it, “the detemiinate negation o f positions which cannot survive the critical scrutiny o f  
being compared to their own, self-imposed standards.” [“Politics” 323] Rumble contends that Kierkegaard’s 
puipose is “not so much to present the reader with various existential possibilities as to render the dynamic of
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5. RefoHTiing Temporality:
In ajournai entry, Kierkegaard once warned that there were two perils in
attempting to influence people: “(1) men are lukewann and indolent, difficult to set in
motion; (2) once they are set in motion, there is nothing they are more inclined to do than to
mimic.”****^ Although he remained suspicious of external reform, contending that it
typically distracted individuals from true refonn-- the refonn of each individual tlnough a
personal and ‘inward’ relationship with God****'*-- and fostered “this disastrous confusion
of politics and Christianity”,****^ he carefully qualified his position:
Pennit me to add the following, lest what 1 say be misunderstood, as if it were my 
view that Christianity consists purely and simply of putting up with everything in 
regard to external foiins, without doing anything at all, as if Cluistianity did not 
know very well what is to be done [....] There are situations, therefore, in which 
an established order can be of such a nature that the CInistian ought not put up 
with it, ought not to say that Cluistianity means precisely this indifference to the 
external******
Kierkegaard’s challenging of The Corsair's unbridled media power****^  and tireless 
demands for the separation of church and state comprise two such personal appeals for 
‘justified’ external reform.
However, Kierkegaard’s aversion to employing sensate authority for spiritual ends
this conflict [between life views] on an external stage”. [87]
III 727 [1847].
In “Politics”, 334, Perkins obseives that Climacus/ Kierkegaard inverts Plato’s stiategy that one ought to 
alter the state in order to produce a more desirable individual. Climacus contended that a person has as much 
likelihood of trying to restrain her era as a passenger ‘trying to stop the train by clutching the seat ahead of  
him’ [UP I 164-165] Furthermore, attempts to alleviate temporal differences [e.g., equitable distribution of 
goods, equal rights for women] are ‘fiitile’ as they are impossible to achieve and ironically inflated the 
importance of those differences. [TM 444-445 (1854), FS 131, PV 103-104, CD 60, WL 87, 139-140, 145; 
BA 158, 230; UP I 504, TC 57, UD 330] However, his admonitions to the poor to ‘reconcile themselves to 
their position’ [JP IV 181 (1851)] ring hollow, coming from a highly educated, independently wealthy 
European male who never had to work a day in this life. As Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn rightly obseived, “How 
do you expect a man who’s warm to understand one who’s cold?” [23] Lowiie cites an entry dated Oct. 13, 
1853, which expounds his long-standing belief that, “I should never be tr ied by having to work for my 
living— partly because I thought that in consideration o f my peculiar cross God would spare me tliis suffering 
and proWem.” [52] Gardiner observes, “While freely admitting o f his extravagance, he insisted that his 
writing depended upon his living in a congenial style [....]” [“Introduction” 14]
TC 53.
1016 YQ 56. Hence, Kierkegaard moved beyond Luther’s injunction: “For no one must oppose the authorities 
except He who has instituted them; for it is rebellion against God.” {Documents 81]
Kierkegaard, thus, anticipates Denida’s indictment on media and pubic opinion. [Dooley 14-17]
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strongly influenced his approach to temporal refonns. For this reason, he eonfessed, “I am 
indeed suspicious of these politically achieved free institutions, especially of their saving, 
renewing power.”***'® He scathingly criticized religious reformer Nicolai Gnmdtvig for 
employing government power to enaet ecclesiastical refonn, maintaining: “[H]e actually 
has fought only for something earthly, civil fr eedom for himself and his adherents.”****^ 
Although Kierkegaard admitted that God could anoint a pailicular individual to challenge 
the external order,***^ ** he deemed it inappropriate to pine for such a leader,***^ * and chose to 
err on the side of conservatism: “[I]f there is no such man among us, then let us hold to the 
established order [.. ..]”***^  ^ Tine reform transpires through personal sacrifices and 
voluntary suffering, which only the individual can choose for herself. ***^  ^ Moreover, faith 
has to be worked out in living response to one’s particular historical context. Hence, he 
once observed, “Clirist did not come in order to abolish slavery, even though that will 
follow and does result from it [....]”***^'*
Amidst the traumatic political events of 1848, Kierkegaard once speculated on the 
possibility of a Cliristian society, which would only occur if God were related singly to 
every individual:
God now comes to be related to individuals neither through abstractions nor 
through representative individuals but becomes the one who, so to speak, takes it 
upon himself to bring up the generation’s countless individuals, becomes himself 
the schoolmaster who watches over everyone, each one individually. Here 
thinking halts. The shape of the world would resemble— well, I do not know to 
what I should compare it— it would resemble an enormous Christianfeldt [.. ..]***^ ^
With no small irony, he observed that “the two most powerful opponents”— communism
1018 YQ 5 4  Johannes da silentio criticized much social activism as egotism masquerading as sympathy. [FT 
80]
YM 208. See also WL 342 and Kinnmse Golden 221.
150.
102! YA 89: “It will do no good to appeal to and summon a Holger Danske or a Martin Luther. Their age is 
past, and as a matter of fact it is indolence on the part of individuals to want such a one [....]”
1022 pg 2  ] 2-213. See also TM 444-445 [1854]: “I am— in this respect— so conservative that if  I might have 
my way, not so much as one button will be changed on the assistant gravedigger’s frock, even if  the 
opposition ever so zealously insisted upon it.”
BA 101.
UV 242.
'025 \YA 215 [1848]. This was a small town founded by tlie Moravian Bretlnen, with whom Kierkegaard’s 
father and his friend Emil Boesen had connections. [WA 296 n. 18] Kierkegaard’s description strongly 
echoes Old Testament prophecies o f eschatological reform. Cf. Jeremiah 31:33-34; Isaiah 11:9, 54:13.
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and pietism— would offer similar visions for society, as both would insist:
[TJhere must be no distinction between persons; we should be brothers and 
sisters, have everything in common; wealth, position, ait, science, etc. are of evil; 
all people should be alike [...], dressed alike, [...] going to bed by the clock, 
eating the same food out of one dish in a definite rhythm, etc. etc.***^ ^
Kierkegaard did not expand upon this societal vision, presumably to
counterbalance the exaggerated clamour for political reform which was cunently
dismpting Danish society. Hence, he declared:
[WJhen existence itself undertakes to preach for awakening as it is doing now, I 
do not dare to jack it up even more in that direction; something extraordinary like 
that has not been entiristed to me and scai cely can be entinsted to any human 
being. In a soft, refined, overcultured time, I was and ought to be for awakening. 
At present I ought to draw nearer to the established order. ***^^
Hence, he continued to supply a politically ‘conservative’ conective to the contextual 
exaggeration of his day by refusing to postulate further what a Chiistian society might look 
like. Kinnmse describes Kierkegaard as “a ‘populist’ in his view of culture and Dannelse, 
[“the education which forms character”]***^® a pragmatic ‘agnostic’ in his view of political 
arrangements, and a ‘liberal’ with respect to his sink-or-swim individualistic notion of 
salvation.”***^  ^ However, from the view point of sensate authority, it is surely an ‘aimed 
agnosticism’, given the prioritization of the individual’s relationship with God which 
supersedes all externalized political foimations, his suspicion of populist power, and his 
endorsement of the early church’s model of ‘praying for the emperor’ without subscribing 
to nationalist self-deifications or ‘household gods’.***^**
If one is to condemn Kierkegaard for failing to prescribe a thorough blueprint for
1026
’“ ’ WA 216-217 [1849].
WA 216 [1848]. Perkins outlines general features of a ‘Climacan’ state in “Politics” 42.
Kinnmse Golden 273.
Kinnmse Golden 276. See also 327 where he discusses Kierkegaard’s response to women’s equal rights: 
“Here, as elsewhere, SK seems quite the classical liberal, non-dogmatic and agnostic with respect to political 
solutions, so long as they respect individual rights [....]” Similarly, Hannay deems him a “social nominalist” 
[300]— as long as the political stinctures allow individuals to be “accountable personally for tlieir 
bureaucratic actions and political decisions, the framework can be allowed to stand”. [295]
10.30 YQ jjjg degree that Kierkegaard remains ‘agnostic’ or indifferent towards political stinctures, many 
political and feminist theorists would inteipret his posture as a tacit endorsement of the status quo and thus 
regard him as politically ‘conseiwative’.
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social change or government infrastructure, this reticence may be attributed in part to the
‘over-politicization’ of life in nineteenth-century Europe, the prevalence of false
‘authority’, the fear of initiating yet another misguided— because solely exterior— reform
movement, and the Gospel’s own precedent in obviating socio-political, ethnological
distinctions, conventions, and stinctures in order to attend to the pressing spiritual needs
common to every member of sinful humanity.***®* Westphal identifies a passage from
Practice in Christianity as “Kierkegaard’s politics in a nutshell”:
Every human being is to live in fear and trembling, and likewise no established 
order is to be exempted fr om fear and trembling. Feai* and trembling signify that 
we are in the process of becoming; and every single individual, likewise the 
generation, is and should be aware of being in the process of becoming. And fear 
and trembling signify that there is a God— something every human being and 
every established order ought not to forget for a moment.***®^
Kierkegaard came closest to expounding a governing principle for fonning such a society 
when he once wrote: “If Cliristianity is supposed to be culture, it must be the culture of 
character, or education and culture aimed at becoming persons of character.”***®® 
According to Kinnmse, “The most general, basic rule SK lays down for ordering the 
religious-private and the political-social spheres in their proper relation is that one must 
relate infinitely only to the eternal.”***®'*
One further note is necessary before concluding this chapter. A certain tension is 
implicit in the temporal/ sensate division. At times, spiritual authority appears as a purely 
‘transcendent’ incursion into the world of temporality; the apostle apparently bears an 
utterly incommensurable authority from ‘beyond’. However, in other instances, 
Kierkegaard wrote of spiritual authority as if it was a ‘redeemed’ version of ‘sensate 
authority’, which tends to downplay the ‘CInistian’ ‘chasm of incommensurability’ 
between the divine and the created universe, and verges upon the Socratic ‘maieutic’ 
pattern. Are human beings passive recipients of spiritual authority or do they participate in
As Perkins obsei-ves, “Kierkegaard’s vision o f community is o f a kingdom not yet come and so is open to 
multiple political inteipretations.” [“Critique” 217] This also places existential responsibility upon tlie reader 
to think up and implement strategies consistent with the Gospel. [See Perkins “Political” 36, and Hannay 
278]
PC 88, cited in Westphal “Politics” 324.
FS 256 [1850]. See also Westphal “Politics” 331.
Kirnmise Golden 323.
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the redemption or emancipation of sensate authority? Part of the incongi*uity is due to the 
artificiality of my teiminological bifurcations, imposed in order to elucidate the dynamic 
components of an admirably sophisticated life view. However, part of the ambiguity is 
also based upon the fact that issues of fieedom and authority involve a complex dialectic 
for Kierkegaard, who himself emphasized one side or the other depending on the context. 
When confronting the rebelliousness of sinflil autonomy and the incursions of human 
rationality or nationalist politics into the sphere of Religiousness B, he adamantly upheld 
God’s incommensurability with humankind and its self-serving inteipretative schemas. 
However, concerning Christian responsibility towards the other, he accentuated the vital 
role of passionate commitment and altmistic involvement. Hence, in Works o f  Love, we 
read:
Therefore, giving thanks to God, he [the helper] declares: Now this individual is 
standing by himself— through my help. But there is no self-satisfaction in the last 
phrase, because the loving one has understood that essentially every human being 
indeed stands by himself— through God’s help— and that die loving one’s self- 
annihilation is really only in order not to hinder the other person’s God- 
relationship, so that all the loving one’s help infinitely vanishes in the God- 
relationship.***®®
Casting a sidelong glance at Hegel, Kierkegaard left no doubt as to the origins of Christian 
practice: “It certainly must never be forgotten that Christ also helped in temporal and 
earthly needs. It is also possible falsely to make Clirist so spiritual that He becomes sheer 
cruelty. After all, ‘spirit’, absolute spirit, is the gieatest of cmelties for us poor men’.”***®^
What is essential to understanding Kierkegaar d is, first, to be cognizant of these 
two fundamental truths of divine initiation/ empowering and human participation which he 
endeavours to hold together in his comprehension of freedom within the contingent realm 
of creation. Second, we must recognize that Kierkegaai'd never conflated the Gospel with 
its socio-political applications and/ or Christian ethical practices.***®^  Within its 
prescriptive homilies and treatises, organized religion typically employs a ‘slippery’ 
intransitive: for example, ‘To be before God is to minister to the poor.’ In such 
formulations, caring for the poor or advocating universal rights can easily be equated with
•035 (revised) 278.
From a 1849 journal entry cited in Soe 67-68.
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standing before God, so that human activity tacitly supplants the role of divine gi*ace upon 
which such activity is based. In his refusal to dictate prescriptive action, Kierkegaard 
strove to remind his contemporaries of the Gospel imperative to enter a right personal 
relationship with God— possible only thiough tlie efficacy of Cluist’s life, death, and 
resurrection— as the only proper giounds for passionate, ‘existential’ CInistian praxis. 
Subsequently, he did not seek to question the value of social action but rather to situate it 
theologically as following fi^om faith or being an expression of faith rather than being 
confused for  or equated with faith, a common tendency within the ‘aestheticization’ of 
Christianity in nineteenth-century Denmaik.***®® Hence, the pith of his ‘political’ message 
is admirably summarized by Nicoletti: “[T]he political sphere cannot satisfy the needs of a 
being capable of infinity.”***®^ Having thoroughly explored Kierkegaard’s dichotomy of 
authority, the following chapters will provide a comparative analysis of Nietzsche’s and 
Kierkegaard’s positions.
I owe this insight to an utterly indispensable ‘eleventh-hour’ dialogue with Prof. Alan Toixance.1037
Hence, Hamilton misinteiprets Kierkegaard as advocating a ‘religious spiritual stance o f resignation’. 
[77] Against Hamilton, see Nicoletti 186-189. She concludes: “Mysticism wants to remove both finitude 
and politics; mundanity wants to remove infinity. To realize a real government it is necessaiy to retain the 
specificities o f the two poles and tlieir dialectical relation.” [191]
‘“ ’’Nicoletti 189.
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Chapter 6: Worlds Apart: Comparing Perspectives:
The following two chapters will attempt to reconstmct a dialogue between 
Nietzsche and Kierkegaard with regards to their cosmology, anthiopology, and concepts of 
authority. The first half of each section will briefly outline Nietzsche’s contentions with 
regards to Cluistianity and the second half will contain Kierkegaard’s probable rejoinders 
and counter-criticism. The final chapter will examine some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of both positions and conclude with their relevance for contemporary 
discussions on power.
I. Cosmological Objections: The Accusation of Cowardice:
Upon reviewing Nietzsche’s coipus, there are two primary objections which he 
levelled at Christianity: the lack of objective tiTith in its tenets, and its devaluation of the 
temporal universe in light of otherworldly delusions.
A. Nietzsche:
1. Christian Doctrine as Myth:
It is not surprising that Nietzsche would vehemently oppose the majority of 
Kierkegaard’s postulations about the cosmos. Providence,***'*** sin,***'** revelation,***^  ^
God,***'*® the Incarnation,***'*'* salvation,***'*® and free will***'*^  are all presuppositions which 
he resolutely rejected. According to Nietzsche, the human self consists of fractured
1040 h a  77, BG l l l .T I  137.
HA 76.
HA 88.
HA 89.
HA 84, 102.
1045 g j  g. 8 5 , 2  59, WP 212 [1888]. It is important to obseive that Nietzsche’s rejection o f Christian 
tenets is not total. Like a hermit crab, he typically seized the emptied ‘shell’ o f CInistian doctrine when 
useful for his own ‘pincer’ movements. Hence, he formulated a secularized ‘remnant theology’ in which a 
humanly justified ‘salvation’ is accorded to a chosen few who shall tr anscend the ranks and rancour of tire 
‘irredeemable’ herd. On Christianity’s usefulness for culling a more docile slave, see WP 127 [1887-1888].
1046 2 6 , 4 3 j o s  169; WP 86 [1888], 357 [1883-1888]. He particularly opposed religions “when they 
themselves want to be final ends and not means beside other means.” [BG 87]
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inconsistencies, competing drives, and “a multiplicity of persons” and constitutes the
ultimate constraction of the imagination.*®'^  ^ Christianity plays upon this composition,
“raising to a principle the counterfeiting of psychological interpretation”.*®'*^ Hence, he
derided Christianity as:
A traffic between imaginary beings (‘God’, ‘spirits’, ‘souls’); an imaginary 
natural science (anthropocentric; complete lack of the concept of natural causes); 
an imaginary psychology (nothing but self-misunderstandings, interpretations of 
pleasant or unpleasant general feelings, for example the condition of the nervtis 
sympathicus, with the aid of the sign-language of religio-rnoral idiosyncrasy— 
‘repentance’, ‘sting of conscience’, ‘temptation by the Devil’, ‘the proximity of 
God’); an imaginary teleology (‘the kingdom of God’, ‘the Last Judgment’, 
‘eternal life’).*®^®
For Nietzsche, such postulations are merely man-made myths, existential ‘night lights’ to 
comfort fi ail-hearted individuals in a darkened cosmos devoid of divine love and 
purpose.*®^ * Such ‘truths’ represent humankind’s most ‘endearing’, enduring, even useful 
‘errors’. *®^^
According to Nietzsche, human beings remain hopelessly entrenched within their 
biological and historical context,*®^  ^not so much ‘actor’ as ‘acted upon’ by the inescapable 
forces and counter-forces which comprise the temporal realm. *®^'* Within this 
environment, even self-knowledge becomes illusory. *®^  ^ Nor does Nietzsche have any 
tolerance for the use of paradoxes to explain apparent inconsistencies: “[F]or what are 
par adoxes but assertions which carxy no conviction because their author himself is not 
really convinced of them and makes them only so as to glitter and seduce and in general cut 
a figure.”*®^®
In contrast to this existential cowardice which fails to face fully the harsh realities
‘®‘” WP 209 [1888].
WP 263-264 [1887-1888]. 
io«w P 94 [1887].1050 Ti 137
BT 22.
GS219.
GS 121.
BT 18, GS 168.
'“ ^UM 129.
134.
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of existence, Nietzsche found reason to celebrate, to triumph over the ‘telos-lessness’ of 
nature. The tmly powerful man is able to accept unflinchingly this state of affairs, to 
recognize the arbitrariness of human fomiulations of tmth, “to grasp that injustice is 
inseparable from life”,*®^  ^to forsake his ‘astrological pride’ and transcend the 
challenges of existence. As Tanner explains, Nietzsche juxtaposed “unblinking 
recognition of tlie fhiitfiilness of life with a stubborn detennination not to be subdued by 
it ”1059 gy  (defiantly acting in the face of life’s eternal ‘ends-lessness’, humankind faces 
fate with stentorian gr avitas and nobility, simultaneously shaking a fist at the void while 
embracing its vicissitudes and vagaries with relish.
2. Christian Devaluation of Life:
Nietzsche remained hyperbolically suspicious of any doctrine which eroded 
significance from the natural world in favour of an illusory hereafter. The ‘sin against life’ 
is indubitably the ‘unforgivable sin’: “If one shifts the centre of gravity of life out of life 
into the ‘Beyond’— into nothingness— one has deprived life as such of its centre of 
gt'avity.”*®®® Such transcendental escapism engendered his unmitigated scom for Christian 
“afterworidsmen”. **  Nor would he admit any theological impediments to the free 
expression of man’s natural instincts under the façade of heavenly ordinances. “For what 
is freedom?” he once asked: “That one has the will to self-responsibility.”*®®^ 
Subsequently, he rejected Clrristianity for attempting to imprison what is free, domesticate 
what is fierce, and foster '''‘hostilityf to life, a furious, vindictive distaste for life itself’.*®®^ 
He explained:
Hatred of the ‘world’, the condemnation of the emotions, the fear of beauty and 
sensuality, a transcendental world invented the better to slander this one, basically 
a yearning for non-existence, for repose until the ‘sabbath of Sabbaths’— all of 
this, along with Christianity’s unconditional resolve to acknowledge only moral 
values, struck me as the most dangerous and sinister of all possible manifestations
HA 9.
I.e., the belief that “the heavens revolve around the fate o f man.” [HA 16] 
16.
TI 167. See also HA 85, 230.1061 2 59
1062 T I  1 0 3 ,
1063 g j
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of a ‘will to decline’, at the very least a sign of the most profound affliction, 
fatigue, sullenness, exhaustion, impoverishment of life.'”®'*
For Nietzsche, the Cluistian attempt to impose an ethical stiucture on the intrinsically 
amoral universe and its creation of a false psychology of guilt and fear inject a fatal poison 
into the veins of human vitality.*®®®
In light of these contentions, Nietzsche would probably accuse Kierkegaard of
cocooning his existential fears within the ‘swaddling clothes’ of superstition and
hemieneutical hocus-pocus: “When a misfortune strikes us, we can overcome it either by
removing its cause or else by changing the effect it has on our feelings, that is, by
reinterpreting the misfortune as a good, whose benefit may only later become clear.”*®®®
Moreover, he would have adduced Kierkegaard’s sundry references to guilt and
self-toiinent*®®  ^as symptomatic of Christianity’s diseased, counterfeit psychology. As a
proponent of nature, health, and happiness in material reality, the German philosopher
subsequently sought to jolt the inert and lifeless human world with the defibrillators of
“dangerous knowledge”:
the emotions of hatred, envy, covetousness, and lust for domination as life- 
conditioning emotions, as something which must be fundamentally and 
essentially present in the total economy of life, consequently must be heightened 
frirther if life is to be heightened further.'”®*
He would likely cite several instances where the Danish thinker ‘denigrated earthly life’ by 
espousing ‘hatred for the world’ for the sake of chimerical eternal values, and upbraid their 
anti-naturalism.*®®® Kierkegaard would, thus, be a coward on two accounts: for rejecting 
the ‘real’ world of life and vitality, and for embracing an illusory world spawned by fear 
and escapism.
1065
1066
BT 8-9. 
BT9.
HA 77. See also GS 196.
'”®^ See, for example, TM 427 [1853], JP III 574 [1850], the centrality of despair in The Concept o f Anxiety’ 
and Sicimess Unto Death, and Quidam’s assertion that he could not dispel his depression since it “becomes a 
religious point o f departure.” [SW 375]
1068 BG 53.
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B. Kierkegaard:
1. Affinity:
Nietzsche’s response would likely constitute a refreshing change for Kierkegaard. 
Unlike scores of self-styled ‘Chiistians’, Nietzsche’s outi age at the preposterousness of 
Christianity indicated that the Gemian philosopher better comprehended tlie Cluistian faith 
and its radical implications than many of its so-called adherents.*®^ ® Hence, in ajournai 
entry, he mused: “[T]he state of Christianity has long been such that one cannot find out 
what Christianity is in the so-called Christian church [...] but has to seek it among the 
fr eethinkers.”*®^* From Kierkegaard’s viewpoint, Nietzsche’s indignation at Clrristianity’s 
hostility towards the amoral naturalism he espoused is both justified and understandable as 
the perspective of fallen humankind seeking utter independence fr om God.*®^  ^ Because 
Cliristian revelation is completely incommensurable with human history, thought, and 
culture, it ineluctably aggravates the human spirit in its ‘normative’ quest to celebrate its 
own powers, standards, and creativity. For Kierkegaard, this means none other than taking 
offence at the Gospel, the ‘natural’ response of one who lives in defiant autonomy. *®^  ^ In 
fact, Kierkegaard was more alarmed by a lack of offence in light of the Gospel, a sign of “a 
remarkable high degr ee of spiritlessness”. *®^^* Hence, in Kierkegaard’s eyes, Nietzsche’s 
response to Christianity was far from radical, but rather conventional and predictably 
‘human, all too human’: “All o f‘humankind’s’ sagacity aims at one thing: to be able to live 
without responsibility.”*®^®
For example, TM 312, 335; WL 124; FT 292 [1843-1844].
On the heterogeneity o f Clrristianity, see WA 100; SD 159; CD 63; WL 41; TM 10, 393 [1847]; BA 20, 
175; UP 1100,213-214; SW 440; CA 19; PF 36; FT 53. Kierkegaard separated the transcendent truth of the 
Gospel fi om the historical foibles of the church by affixing “an unshakable qualitative difference” between 
‘7/?e historical in Christianity’, (the paradox that the eternal once came into existence in time, this paradoxical 
fact)” and the “histoiy o f Christianity’”. [BA 38]
JP VI 532 [1854].
TM 177. See also JK 254 [1854], CD 97, WL 340, JP 111 733 [1851], UP 1461, and TM 335, where he 
described the tme essence o f Christianity as “hating oneself, to hate everything in which a person has his life, 
everything that for him is life, hating that for the sake o f which he selfishly wants to make use of God in 
attaining it or in being comforted if  he does not attain it or loses it”.
FS 35, 140; PC 81, 94; SD 155, WL 70.
SD 149.1074
TM 350. Climacus was wary of counterfeit means for “finite common sense [...] to preach indulgence.’ 
[UP 1 536]
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Furthermore, Kierkegaard would have concun ed with much of Nietzsche’s 
diagnosis o f ‘diseased’ Christendom, including the false psychological distortions which 
replace theological content with false sentiment,*®^ ® or the hypocrisy of self-love 
masquerading as love for spouse, society, and God.*®^  ^ Kierkegaard also expressed disdain 
for otheiworldly escapism which, he aveired, represents a supreme “distrust in God” for 
provision in this life.*®^  ^ Thus, Nietzsche would have seiwed Kierkegaard as an ally both 
directly and indirectly. He would be an ally directly by critiquing the fallibility of human 
notions of love and ethics, as well as Christendom’s fallacious representation of Clnist’s 
teachings:
[H]ow seldom Chiistianity is presented in its tme fonn, how those who defend it 
most often betray it, and how rarely attackers actually hit it, although they often 
[...] superbly hit Christendom, which certainly might rather be called the 
caricature of tme Chiistianity or an enoiinous quantity of misunderstanding, 
illusion, etc. sprinkled with a spar se little dash of tme Clnistianity.*®^®
Nietzsche would offer indirect assistance by the offence he took at the ‘unearthly’ demands 
which the heterogeneous Gospel imposes upon every individual. Nietzsche thereby 
supplies what Pascal dubbed an ‘indirect demonstration’ of Cliristian truths by his ‘natural’ 
resistance to its ‘otherworldly’ demands.*®^ ®
2. Rebuttal:
Never one to pass up a polemical challenge, Kierkegaard would have subjected 
Nietzsche’s cosmology to rigorous criticism and highlighted several cmcial problems and 
inconsistencies.
a. Chiistendom vs. Christianity:
Kierkegaard would first take issue with Nietzsche’s underlying presupposition that
For example, attributing the gradual dissipation of strong emotions to ‘divine forgiveness’. [HA 93]
HA 100; WL [revised] 473 [1847].
JP IV 52 [1840-1841]. See alsoFS 169, CD 261, JP IV 145 [1848], UP 1432, UD 259-260, Cl 328-329, 
BA 212 [July 4, 1840].
PV 80.
Pascal 163-164.
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Christendom equals Chiistianity.*®^* By contiast, he maintained that Chiistendom was the
world’s cunning method of overthrowing true Clnistianity.*®^  ^ Kierkegaaid carefully
distinguished between immanent religiousness and the genuine religiousness of
transcendence, though this was increasingly vanishing fr om Clnistendom.*®^®
Furthennore, he would strongly contest Nietzsche’s ‘facile’ equating Chiistianity with the
desires and interests of the lowest classes of society. Rather, Chiistendom represented the
non-Clnistian world’s vanquishing of the church by plying it with temporal power and
wealth— a decisive tactic of those in affluent positions who were able to disseminate such
privileges. Hence, the ‘slaves’ are not to blame for the church’s plight:
But in ‘Christendom’ it is actually the favored ones who have taken possession of 
Christianity, the rich and powerful who in addition to all their enjoyment of life 
also want all their power and might and wealth interpreted as proof of God’s 
grace and a sign of their piety [. ...]*®^ '*
Nor would Kierkegaard allow the admitted shortcomings of the visible church to excuse 
Nietzsche’s unbelief, since, “I regard it as an illusion for someone to imagine that it is 
external conditions and foiins that hinder him in becoming a Cluistian [.. ..]”*®^® To the 
degree that Nietzsche was repelled by ‘the good’, he was trapped in a “demonic” relation of 
fear and opposition towards the good.*®®®
b. Mythological Creatures:
Nietzsche once criticized Christianity’s belief in a ‘non-existent’ God by declaring, 
“There is not enough love and kindness in the world to pennit us to give any of it away to 
imaginary beings.”*®®^ However, Kierkegaard would quickly point out that Nietzsche’s 
alternative violated his own principle— the emulation of an über-hQÏng who has yet to 
appear in world histoiy.*®®® Hence, in Works o f Love, Kierkegaard declared: “The shrewd
1081
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1083
TM 107.
TM 188.
TM 39, UP I 555-556.
JP IV 408 [1852].
TC 54.
1086 j 1 9  Prater Tacitiimus described Quidam as “a demoniac character in the direction of tlie religious.’ 
[SW 398]
HA 89.
1088 2  1 1 7 . Ironically, Hollingdale speculates that Nietzsche modeled his concept o f the Übermensch after
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foolishly think that one wastes his time in loving imperfect, weak men [....] But to be
unable to find an object, to waste love in vainly seeking, to waste it in empty space by
loving the invisible— [i.e., the perfect man] this is tmly to waste it.”*®®® In response to
Nietzsche’s accusation that God is merely an antlnopomoiphic ‘projection’, Kierkegaard
might point out the suspicious resemblance between exceptional specimens and a certain
German philosopher.*®®® Nietzsche might not have evaded his own criticism directed
against Romantic pessimism:
It [the will to immortalize] can also be the tyramiic will of one who suffers 
deeply, who struggles, is toiinented, and would like to turn what is most personal, 
singular, and narrow, the real idiosyncrasy of his suffering, into a binding law and 
compulsion— one who, as it were, revenges himself on all things by forcing his 
own image, the image of his torture on them, branding them with it.*®®*
c. Self-Referential Incoherence:
Furthennore, if Nietzsche is coiTect that human beings are unable to comprehend 
themselves, much less the world around them,*®®^  if thinking is tmly “a quite arbitrary 
fiction, airived at by selecting one element from the process and eliminating all the rest, an 
artificial anangement for the puipose of intelligibility”,*®®® if there is no semblance of tmth 
but merely constmcted realities and competing henneneutics with varying degrees of 
usefulness which clash for ideological supremacy,*®®'* Kierkegaard would likely repeat
God liimself: “What the Clu istian says of God, Nietzsche says in very nearly the same words of the 
Superman, namely: ‘Thine is tlie kingdom, and the power, and tlie gloiy, for ever and ever.’” [Z 29] In “The 
Babylonian Captivity o f the Church”, Lutlier derided tlie bishops as “tliese high and mighty supemien.” 
{Selections 325] The parallels in sentiment are eerie indeed: “The clergy can almost be said also to regard the 
laity as lower animals, who have been included in the church along with themselves. Thus it arises that they 
make bold to conunand and demand, to tlueaten and urge and oppress, as they please.” [Luther Selections 
345]
WL 161.
See, for example, WP 520 [1888]: “He enjoys the taste o f what is wholesome for him [....] [H]e has 
illnesses as stimulants of his life; he knows how to exploit ill chances [....] [H]e does not submit; he is always 
in his own company, whether he deals with books, men, or landscapes; he honors by choosing, by admitting, 
by tinsting.”
GS 330.
WP 263 [1886-1887], 269 [1885-1886].
WP 264 [1887-1888]. See also WP 315 [1888]; “This is tlie greatest error tliat has been coimnitted, the 
essential fatality of eiTor on earth: one believed one possessed a criterion o f reality in the fonn of reason— 
while in fact one possessed them in order to become master o f reality, in order to misunderstand reality in a 
slirewd manner [....]”
For example, GS 300, WP 330 [1885-1886]: “The world with which we are concerned is false, i.e., is not 
a fact but a fable and approximation on tlie basis o f a meager sum of obseiwations; it is ‘in flux’, as something
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God’s Edenic exclamation: ‘Wlio told you?’*®®® If this is actually the case, how can 
Nietzsche himself confidently prognosticate the development of “a new habit” which will 
produce “wise, iimocent (conscious of their innocence) men” over the course of 
millennia?*®®® Despite Nietzsche’s asseifions, he is loathe to relinquish the optimism that 
humankind bumbles along an ameliorating if spiritual evolution, an optimism that 
underscores his own ‘priestly’ role of offering true— i f ‘human’— sacrifices on the altar of 
species transcendence. * ®®^
If, as Nietzsche maintained, the human will constmcts its own volitional fictions 
out of the ashes of everyday haphazaidness— “All ‘It was’ is a fr agment, a riddle, a 
dreadful chance— until the creative will says to it: ‘But I willed it thus!”’*®®®— what 
prevents his interpretation from being yet another delusional attempt to conjure order from 
the churning caldron of chaos in which we stew? Why should Nietzsche’s assessment of 
the human situation be privileged above that of Saint Augustine or Don Quixote? The 
Nietzschean world is thus riddled with the pynhic victories of inter-subjectivist politics, 
where tmth and what matters most is unapologetically reduced to metaphysical 
‘muscle-flexing’: “One seeks a picture of the world in that philosophy in which we feel 
freest; i.e., in which our most powerful drive feels fiee to function. This will also be the 
case with me!”*®®®
Moreover, if Christianity is derided for its endorsement of indemonstrable hopes, 
Kierkegaard would likely ask what confidence Nietzsche possessed in forcefully declaring 
teleology to be illusion**®® and life to be an endless cycle of recunences with neither 
redemption nor resolution.**®* To argue that one ‘necessary fiction’— the tenet of belliim
in a state of becoming, as a falsehood always changing but never getting near the tmth: for— there is no 
‘tmth’”.
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omnium contra omnes} *®^ for example— is better than another— the Chr istian doctrine of 
divine love- is to presuppose that there is an element of truth in the world by which such 
statements can be measured. Ironically, by making the metaphysical statement that there 
are no true metaphysical statements,**®® Nietzsche assumed that he inherently possessed 
the criteria of truth by which to justify such a grand pronouncement, regardless of how 
inconsistent such a statement might be. Thus, Kierkegaard would posit that Nietzsche, too, 
has his truth, an authoritative interpretation of human existence. Far from being a 
philosophical maverick, Nietzsche was fiiinly entrenched in a humanistically informed 
strand of Westeru philosophy, which presumes that human beings inherently possess the 
aptitudes, attitudes, and “requisite conditions” for recognizing truth**®'*— a presupposition 
Kierkegaard seriously contested in conjunction with the Cliristian doctrine of human 
sinfrilness.
In one sense, Kierkegaard was far more ‘perspectivistic’ than Nietzsche in his 
scepticism of human reason and interpretation.**®® With no small irony, Kierkegaard 
observed the preposterous self-myopia of the Cartesian thinking subject who, basing 
epistemology and self-awareness on doubt, treats everything doubtingly except doubt 
itself.**®® In light of the reality of self-deception and distortion, Kierkegaard insisted that 
relationship with God, the ultimate Subjectivity, is the sole means of escaping the errors 
and prejudices of rebellious human subjectivity, the only true way to become oneself.' *®^ 
Hence, in response to Nietzsche’s famous declar ation, “God is dead. God remains dead. 
And we have killed him”,**®® Kierkegaard would likely respond: “To slay God is the most 
dreadful suicide; utterly to forget God is a human being’s deepest fall [....]”**®®
Tamier claims that this concept was “never abandoned, though he often modified his fonmilations of it.” 
[BG 17]
Martin Heidegger made this observation. See Parsons 376.
CA 16. Climacus tiaced this confidence in self-immanent tmth to Socrates. [PF 11-12]
' Hence, he consistently applied the henneneutic of suspicion to everyone, including himself. [FS 44]
1106 pg gg Another point he owed to Pascal. See Pascal 64.
FS 106, SD 59, CD 40, WL 253, UP I 244.
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CD 67. Nietzsche himself acknowledged an internal coherence in Clu istian faith, though he doubted tlie 
veracity of its tenets: “If Clnistianity were right in its tenets of a vengefiil god, general sinfiilness, 
predestination, and the danger o f an eternal damnation, it would be a sign of stupidity and lack o f character 
not to become a priest, apostle, or hennit, and, with fear and trembling, work exclusively on one’s own 
salvation.” [HA 86] Obviously, many Cliristians would not endorse those ‘core beliefs’ as Nietzsche
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From Kierkegaard’s perspective, a politically and socially self-centred world is 
unavoidable when humankind attempts to quantify God, obviating the divine Other within 
the temporality of immanence. This merely highlights the inevitable need for grace to 
liberate human beings fi om the shackles of their own crippling self-reliance, to situate the 
existential ‘escape artist’ within the all-encompassing embrace of God, to free her from her 
own broken attempts at ‘freedom’. Such self-knowledge is regrettably foreign to 
non-Clnistians prior to the redemptive ti ansfbnnation of their wills and minds: “‘Do 
become reasonable, come to your senses, try to become sober’— thus does the secular 
mentality taunt the Cliristian. And the Cluistian says to the secular mentality, ‘Do become 
reasonable, come to your senses, become sober.’”* * *® Subsequently, Kierkegaard 
concluded that the proper corrective to widespread doubt is not apologetics but 
authority: * * " “Clnistianity by no means presupposes a direct need and desire for 
Clnistianity in the natural man (be he profound or simple) and therefore believes that it 
must itself command every man to become Christian, for otherwise he never becomes 
one”' " '
d. Losing the World:
Kierkegaard would have approved of Nietzsche’s emphasis on ‘becoming’ over 
‘being’, so long as it is restricted to fallible, tmnsient human forms and does not undermine 
faith in the existence of immutable eternal truths." *® With regards to Nietzsche’s 
accusation that Clnistianity ultimately devalues the natural world, Kierkegaard would 
claim that God’s radical love and fr eedom, as epitomized in the humanly inconceivable 
entrance of the eternal into history in the person of Jesus Clnist, constitutes the ultimate 
valuation and preseiwation of the temporal world. By contrast, Nietzsche’s focus on the 
self as the sole gi*ounds for love and tmth tends to reduce the world to a mere ‘vanishing
articulated them.
1110 PS 96. On the ‘dismption’ of the egocentered, autonomous self as the condition for receiving truth, see 
JK 202 [1850], CD 386 [1847], WL 173, WL [revised] 407 [1846], PF 14-15, UD 59.
WL 11, BA 5. Concuning with one of his main theological influences, he wrote: “Pascal says: The 
reason it is so difficult to believe is that it is so difficult to obey.” [JP III 418 (1840)]
JPII587 [1847].
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point’ in its spiralling egocentric preoccupation for self-actualization and 
empowernient.*"'* Although he intended to endorse the virtues of courageous action and 
existential heroism in defiance of a woiid-without-ends,"'® Nietzsche’s efforts were 
in’eversibly undennined by positing an artificially reconstructed world, where notions of 
tmth and justice are mere secretions upon which humanity slips across the jagged 
cobblestones of amoral temporality. If Josephus is correct in asserting that the belittling of 
an adversary withers the laurels of the victor," Kierkegaard may ask how tme heroics 
can possibly emerge in a world whose existence “is justified only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon”?" "  Rather than Christians abandoning the world, Kierkegaaid would 
regard Nietzsche’s ‘aestheticizing’ as “an emigration from reality.”"*®
By contrast, Vigilius contested that it takes genuine courage for an individual to 
face the reality of his inescapable sinfiilness in the presence of a holy, all-knowing God." *® 
Kierkegaard would probably accuse Nietzsche of fiitilely attempting to evade the mercy 
and justice of God, since he contended that genuine ignorance of God simply does not exist 
within conupted Chiistendom."'® He also based this assertion on the providential 
goodness of God: “Tmly, no more than God allows a species of fish to come into existence 
in a particular lake unless the plant that is its nourislmient is also giowing there, no more 
will God allow the tmly concerned person to be ignorant of what he is to believe.”"'* 
Furthermore, Kierkegaard might ask how effective Nietzsche’s gambols with the satyr 
choms are in light of the brokenness, dejection, and hopelessness in the world. The great 
Dionysian revel might itself seem a superlative act of denial, a heavily romanticized dodge, 
a wild assertion “that whatever superficial changes may occur, life is at bottom
See Climacus’ critique o f Hegel in UP I 307.
On the “apparent objective character of things” as “a difference of degree within the subjective”, see WP 
303 [1886-1887]. Climacus tiaced this anthropocentiic focus, which must ineluctably devalue the created 
order as a means or occasion for human self-awareness and expression, to Socrates; “In the Socratic view, 
every human being is himself the midpoint, and the whole world focuses only on him because his 
self-knowledge is God-knowledge.” [PF 11]
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indestiuctibly powerful and joyftil”.**" Mr. A’s commentary on Don Giovanni seems
uncannily applicable:
When one tlirows a pebble in such a way that it skims the surface of the water, it 
can for a time skip over the water in light hops, but it sinks down to the bottom as 
soon as it stops skipping; in the same way he dances over the abyss, jubilating 
during his brief span.**'®
e. Delusion Under Despair:
In a hauntingly foresightful pre-critique of the Nietzschean esprit as “a lust for life 
based on despair”, Kierkegaard commented: “This very remark [‘Eat, drink, and be 
meny...’] echoes with the anxiety about the next day, the day of annihilation, the anxiety 
that insanely is supposed to signify joy although it is a slniek from the abyss.”**''* Hence, 
he might rightly ask whether the ‘illusion’ of will to power can redeem life fr om its 
inlierent meaningless. Nietzsche himself confessed that the ‘free spirits’, precursors to his 
doctrine of the Übermensch, were ‘imaginary’ friends intended to comfort him in a time of 
evident hopelessness in human potential.**'® He ecstatically envisioned their advent: “I 
already see them coming, slowly, slowly; and perhaps I am doing something to hasten their 
coming when I describe before the fact the fateful conditions that I see giving rise to them, 
the paths on which I see them coming.”* *'® For Kierkegaard, however, the attempt either 
to grasp the finite infinitely or to measure the eternal against the temporal begins and ends 
in despair.
1 1 2 2  g - p 3 9
EO I 129-130.
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HA 5. See also HA 4: “[W]hen I could not find what I needed, I had to gain it by force artificially, to 
counterfeit it, or create it poetically.” For the Übennensch as a manifestation o f Zarathustra’s will to power, 
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IL Anthi'opological Objections: The Accusation of Enslavement:
A. Nietzsche:
1. Chiistianity as Slavery to Mediocrity:
With regards to their understandings of humankind, the main accusation which
Nietzsche would level against Chiistianity in general and Kierkegaard in particular is that
of forcibly confining the human race to the ‘backwaters’ of slave morality and,
consequently, intellectual and cultural mediocrity. Although Nietzsche once conceded that
Chiistianity had been distorted by being coerced “to propel the mills of state power”, ‘ he
generally equated it with hypocrisy, nanowness, and untruth.**'® Clnistianity achieves its
nefarious aim, according to Nietzsche, by undennining the noble values of the luling
classes through revaluation, “the most intelligent revenge”,**'® as well as by poisoning
human vitality and instinct thiougli engendering “a certain false psychology, a certain kind
of fantasy in interpreting motives and experiences”.**®® It then prescribes its own
fallacious ‘anti-venom’:
All psychological inventions of Chiistianity work toward this sick excess of 
feeling, toward the deep corruption of head and heart necessary for it.
Chiistianity wants to destroy, shatter, shun, intoxicate: there is only one thing it 
does not want: moderation, and for this reason, it is in its deepest meaning 
barbaric, Asiatic, ignoble, un-Greek.**®*
Such slavish réssentiment is reflected in the gospels’ repeated attack upon the “privileged 
class” of Pharisees and scribes.**®' According to Nietzsche, the ultimate hermeneutical 
revaluation for Christians remains the rendering of Christ’s ignominious death on the cross 
into “one more sign of how one ought to behave in relation to the authorities and laws of 
this world: not to defend oneself Subsequently, Clnistianity entails a most
HA 5-6.
“” HA 166.
"’*HA 144, GM 27.
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abominable ratification of the status quo, an acquiescence to mediocrity that is moral 
aesthetic, and cognitive in scope.
2. Clnistianity a s ‘UimaturaP:
According to Nietzsche, this infusion of weakness and infinnity at the heart of 
Clnistian faith is an inevitable reflection of the sickly physiologies of Chiistianity’s 
promulgators.**®'* Moreover, faith itself is a direct embodiment of weakness, “needed most 
urgently where will is lacking”.* *®® Due to Nietzsche’s strong conviction that, “the linfiee 
human being is a blemish upon nature and has no share in any heavenly or earthly 
comfort”,**®® he denounced Clnistianity as an ‘unnatural’ blight upon the unfolding telos 
of nature— the production of larger units of power— with their moral pettiness and 
preseiwation of inferiority. In addition to restraining the creative energies of the masters, 
the slaves began tyramiizing themselves with their self-flagellating ethics— “the morality 
of unselfing”* *®'— and world-annihilating renouncement. Hence, Nietzsche charged; “The 
whole morality of the Sennon on the Mount belongs here; man takes a voluptuous pleasure 
in violating himself by exaggerated demands and then deifying this something in his soul 
that is so tyramiically taxing.”* *®® The main motivation behind such ‘volitional mutilation’ 
is not love, but rather “the dangerous thrills of cruelty directed against h i m s e l f He 
contended that it was far ‘easier’ to suppress the self than “to assert one’s personality 
without vacillation or confusion”.**'*® On account of this craven duplicity, Chiistianity 
becomes a haven for mediocrity at both the general and individual level of existence, 
enslaving all in its wake.
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B. Kierkegaard;
1. Affinity;
Kierkegaard wouldn’t deny Nietzsche’s accusation that Clnistianity seeks to 
reduce humankind to subseiwience to the laws and ordinances of an omnipotent God. In 
fact, he would insist that Nietzsche had underestimated the radical nature of God’s claims 
upon humankind, “man’s serfdom in respect to God, to whom every man not by birth, but 
by creation from nothing, belongs as a bondseiwant, and in such a way as no bondseiwant 
has ever belonged to an earthly master”. * Fuitliermore, like Nietzsche, Kierkegaard was 
a fierce opponent of mediocrity, regarding it as “far more dangerous than heresies or 
schisms, where there nevertheless is passion.”* *^*' However, unlike Nietzsche, 
Kierkegaard identified mediocrity with the coiTUpted compromises of Christendom, which 
had sullied the heterogeneous excellence of Clnistianity. Hence, he utterly repudiated 
“official Clnistianity, calculated to seiwe human indolence, mediocrity, by leading people 
to think that indolence and mediocrity and pleasure are- Christianity.”**'*® In contrast to 
Nietzsche’s attack on the ‘Clnistian masses’, Kierkegaard denigrated the ‘crowd’ itself as 
“the most ungodly of all unclnistian categories.”* *'*'* Against Marx, Kierkegaard aveiTed 
that it is the masses which are the ‘opium’ of the people- not Chiistianity.**'*®
2. Rebuttal;
a. Anthropological Wastage;
The Danish theologian would probably have called attention to several crucial 
inconsistencies which characterize Nietzsche’s anthropology. For all of his unbridled 
enthusiasm for life and love of the world, Nietzsche was highly selective in his displays of
HA 97.
WL 119.
JP IV 177 [1854]. See also JP III 179 [1855], TM 460 [1854], TA 39.
TM 200. See also FS 188, SD 124.
JP III 308 [1847-1848]. See also JP IV 219 [1853], JP IV 167 [1850], PV 109, WA 229 [October 1848], 
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affection. Wliile showering praise upon the ahistorical Übermensch, Nietzsche discounted 
the vast majority of humankind as “a feeble and womi-eaten fruit!”**'*® Hence, his theoiy 
of spiritual evolution, entailing the production of a few exceptional specimens amidst a 
multitude of waste, requires the ‘squandering’ of billions of individuals, something 
Nietzsche attributed to nature’s “inexperience”.* *'*' As Kierkegaard once observed, 
“[T]here are probably thousands times thousands of people to one genius etc.— always this 
enomious waste.”* *'*® Hence, Judge William anticipated the Nietzschean project in 
deriding
an esthetic snobbery that thinks that accomplishing something in the world falls 
to the lot of a chosen few, that there are a few very talented individuals who 
accomplish something, that the rest of the people are numerous [ciphers], 
superfluities in life, extravagances of the creator.**'*®
b. Loss of Individuality:
Ironically, in his feiwour to undermine the fi-ee agency and subsequent moral 
accountability of human beings,**®® Nietzsche was unperturbed by the ensuing loss of 
individuality. This is pailicularly evident in his eai'ly writings, where the effacement of the 
self approximates Hegelian proportions.**®* By contrast, Kierkegaard’s understanding of 
the will-transfonning relationship between the individual and God presupposes a divine 
fr eedom of expression which lovingly respects the individual’s choice to ‘curse God’ or 
embrace him.**®' Although Nietzsche’s Übermensch appears to be his highest homage to 
individuality, Kierkegaard contended that any formulation which appeals to the 
evolutionary amelioration of the species is a reversion to “the old paganism” which
JPIII338 [1854].
144.
'“ ’ HA 177.
“''*TM 180.
EO II 294-295.
Interestingly, Nietzsche once attiibuted this ‘freedom from sin’ to Clnist, which “everyone can now 
attain tlu-ough science.” [HA 102]
''®' In BT 18, he refeixed to “mystical self-negation” and “an ecstatic reality, which [.,.] seeks to destroy 
individuality and redeem it with a mystical sense o f unity.” See also BT 52. Individuality is also tlneatened 
both by his disintegration of the acting, tliinking self, as well as the attribution o f singular acts or thoughts to 
general, species-wide instincts and drives. [UM 131]
" 5 2  p y  g i_
205
1153privileged race over individual, reducing individuals to mere “specimens”.
c. Slavish Sentiments:
Kierkegaard might expand his previous point by highlighting the strange
ambivalence which the ‘all-loving’ philosopher exhibited towards most of the human race.
Nietzsche once confessed: '"Disgust at mankind, at the ‘rabble’, has always been my
greatest danger.. .”* For all of his emulation of the gentry, Nietzsche displayed a
decidedly unaristocratic attitude towards the masses: given their superabundance of power
and ego, the masters would hardly have responded with hatred or imtation, but rather
indifference towards those ‘nonentities’ which pose neither tlneat nor consequence to their
position. This is splendidly portrayed in François Mauriac’s The Knot o f Vipers, when
Louis, the rich lawyer, explains: “I never talk to servants. It is not that I am a difficult or
umeasonable master, but simply that, for me, they don’t exist. I don’t see them.”* *®® By
regarding ‘slaves’ as a tlneat— and merely by regarding them at all— Nietzsche exposed his
own decidedly bourgeois bias, an attitude which sometimes elided into the réssentiment
which he attributed to slaves:
Entirely hatefiil and loathsome to it is he who will never defend himself, who 
swallows down poisonous spittle and evil looks, the too-patient man who puts up 
with everything, is content with everything: for that is the nature of slaves. 
Whether one be seiwile before gods and divine kicks, or before men and the silly 
opinions of men, it spits at slaves of all kinds, this glorious selfislmess.**®®
Moreover, by engaging in his own moral revaluation,**®' exposing the vices of slave 
morality and the virtues of master morality, the Geiinan philosopher was ironically 
engaging in the henneneutical tactics of the slaves themselves. Nietzsche’s insistence 
upon moderation would have fiirther distanced him fiom the superabundant excesses that
1153 pY j^ Q7  ii'onically, Feuerbach would contend that Kierkegaard’s individual-focused model better 
preseiwes fmitude than Nietzsche’s macrocosmic focus on the species; for, “Finiteness— in the metaphysical 
sense— rests, on the distinction of the existence from the essence, o f tlie individual from the species; 
infinitude, on the unity o f existence and essence.” [Feuerbach 42]
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' Z 209. Judge William criticized the move to aggrandize evil as an attempt “to have a little distinction 
fiom the common herd”. [EO II 226]
For example, Nietzsche’s ‘redemption’ of redemption, [EH 80] or Zarathustra’s blessing upon sensual 
pleasure, lust for power, and selfislmess. [Z 206]
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allegedly comprise the spirit of aristocracy. * *®® Hence, Kierkegaard might observe that, for 
a proponent of upper-class culture and mores, Nietzsche fights like a slave.**®®
d. Limited Explanatory Capacity:
Another inconsistency for which Kierkegaard may have taken Nietzsche to task 
pertains to his definitions of human victory and masteiy. Despite Nietzsche’s personal 
preferences, the so-called slave classes managed to overcome their ‘vastly superior’ 
masters and institute a cultural revolution whose impact has lasted for millennia. As 
Nietzsche acknowledged: “Never and nowhere has there hitherto been a comparable 
boldness in inversion, anything so fearsome, questioning and questionable, as this fonnula: 
it promised a revaluation of antique values.”**®® Nietzsche attributed this sui-prising 
occuiTence to both superior intellect and superior numbers of the slaves.**®* He also 
blamed the masters’ own cmelty and ineptitude for helping to incite the slaves’ uprising by 
inculcating the "instinct offi^eedoni' by the very ‘hammer-blows’ of their ‘artistic’ 
violence.**®' Furthennore, traitorous, disgruntled members of the aristocracy led the 
insurgence by forging a priestly caste against their own kind.* *®® For this reason, he blasted 
Dai-win’s ‘enoneous’ assumption that species “grow more perfect”, lamenting that nature 
is full of instances where the weak suiwive to the detriment of the strong.**®'*
Kierkegaard might respond by questioning the ability of Nietzsche’s perspective to 
explain adequately the unfolding of history. Undoubtedly, he would have discovered no 
small irony that “the victory of Chiistianity over Greek philosophy” represented the ‘bintal 
injustice’ that, “something more cmde and violent has tiiumphed over something more 
spiritual and delicate.”**®® The Christian life view can account for such ‘evil tidings’ via its
HA 85, TI 53. For moderation as a cliief tactic for ‘blending in with the crowd’, see SD 63-64. 
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account of sinful, rebellious humankind, but how can the ‘naturalist’ account for such a
glaring imbalance o f ‘evil’ over ‘good’— whether by Nietzsche’s definitions or
Chiistianity’s— in a tmly amoral and unteleological universe? Shouldn’t the odds have
suggested an equal occuiTence of both randomly appearing? Furthennore, given all of
their heightened biological, spiritual, and cultural advantages, how can the masters appear
so weak and in dire need of a moral and philosophical protector?**®® It is the strong who
have become the ‘endangered species’, who appear ludicrously vulnerable as they suckle
from the Nietzschean ‘wet nurse’, who has supplanted the Socratic ‘midwife’:
My man’s fare, my succulent and strengthening discourse, is effective: and truly I 
did not feed them with distending vegetables! But with wairior’s food, with 
conqueror’s food: I awakened new desires. There are new hopes in their arms 
and legs, their hearts are stretching themselves. They are discovering new worlds, 
soon their spirits will breathe wantonness.**®'
Subsequently, Kierkegaard would seriously question the heuristic efficacy of 
Nietzsche’s fonnulations: if the bonds of biology and culture are so strong, how could a 
generation of inferior lower classes, presumably impoverished physically, intellectually, 
and spiritually, and having docility inculcated in them for millennia, possibly rise en masse 
and invoke such a profoundly significant and long-lasting revolution against an aristocratic 
class who possessed such genetic and cultural advantages carefully crafted across the 
centuries? How could the church have arisen from the battered remnants of scattered and 
disillusioned disciples who had just witnessed their master ignominiously undergo an 
agonizing death? The suggestion that they did so by perpetrating a system of untmth and 
psychological forgery which has persevered undetected for nearly two thousand years 
seems at least as incredulous as the suggestion that God willed it so. Hence, Nietzsche’s 
view provides him with no conclusive capability to account for the spectacular rise and 
continued ‘success’ of the ‘slaves’ in light of seemingly oveiwhelming historical 
disadvantages. If he were to cite the slaves’ victory as an aspect of the uncontrollable 
nature of the design-less cosmos, Kierkegaard would then question the basis for 
Nietzsche’s confidence that his own philosophical project can instigate such 
‘seismologically’ significant shifts despite the ‘fickleness’ of fate.
See, for example, GS 131, WP 363 [1888].
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e. The Need for Epistemological Stability:
Despite the ‘radical’ challenge which Nietzsche’s morality of mastery poses to 
Clnistianity, Kierkegaard might contend that his perspective embodies an antiquated, 
pagan conservatism which presupposes a sociological immobility within classes. As 
Zarathustia exhorted, “Do not will beyond your powers: there is an evil falsity about those 
who will beyond their powers.”**®® Moreover, Nietzsche’s endorsement of a universe 
where man is free to alter his destiny to some degi ee situates Nietzsche frnnly within the 
Western philosophical tradition. His presuppositions immediately call to mind the moral 
autonomy of Kant and Hobbes, as well as Hegel’s and Hume’s optimism in humankind 
progi'essing ‘beyond faith’.**®® Even his aigument for privileging the strong based on 
observances in nature was voiced by Plato’s Callicles.**'®
Kierkegaaid would likely maintain that Nietzsche’s optimism in human autonomy 
and its ability to bind itself to self-legislated laws is hopelessly unfounded. Such 
expectations, he contended, would not be “rigorously earnest any more than Sancho 
Panza’s self-administered blows to his own bottom were vigorous.”**'* By contrast, 
Kierkegaard asserted that it is only through the objective, immutable standards levied by an 
impartial and franscendent God— who is beyond bribe or manipulation— and divine 
empowerment to attain these standards, that human beings are able to become tmly fr ee 
from self-servitude, arbitrariness, and relativism. From Kierkegaard’s perspective, 
freedom for a small elite of specimens does not constitute genuine fr eedom, but rather 
slavery for all. Human fr eedom and the intrinsic worth of every individual is irreversibly 
rooted in the non-negotiable standard of measurement— God’s holiness— and the universal 
opportunity for everyone to be enabled to meet its requirements in Christ through God’s 
love, if only each person is willing. The distorted desire to sever the self fr om relationship 
with the power in which it is established is, for Anti-Climacus, indicative of profound
Z300.1168
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despair.**" Without such eternal foundations, human beings succumb to “mediocrity’s 
fancied peace of mind”: “to become distinguished— precisely because the yardstick has 
been converted to our size.”* *" Hence, rather than avoiding mediocrity, by dispelling 
tianscendence and its incontrovertible standard, Nietzsche had unwittingly launched 
humankind on a flight deeper into mediocrity and, ultimately, slavery. Having explored 
the critique of Nietzsche’s cosmology and anthiopology from Kierkegaard’s point of view, 
the following chapter will concentrate specifically upon the topic of power and authority.
establishes itself with power.” [29] 
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Chapter 7: Power in Principle; Comparing the Masters:
III. The Tier of Authority: The Accusation of Power Mongering:
A. Nietzsche:
1. Church as Power Tool :
Nietzsche contended that all human and biological life on the planet is directed 
towards a single purpose: the accumulation of power and its reconfiguration into larger 
units.**'** According to Nietzsche, it was Schopenliauer’s legacy to have prepared the way 
for the nineteenth century to transcend a “valueless existence” tluough participation in “an 
exalted and transfiguring overall goal: to acquire power so as to aid the evolution of the 
physis and to be for a while the conector of its follies and ineptitudes.”**'® Subsequently, 
the human race advances only to the extent that dangerously knowledgeable individuals— 
the ‘master free spirits’— defy societal limitations and establish an ‘experimental’ 
precedent which radically shifts the horizons of the species and ushers in the arrival of the 
“superspecies”.**'® Ensuing periods of cultural conventionality are valuable for 
constraining mutually hostile forces and providing sociological stability so that power 
bases can be consolidated under relatively peaceful conditions.**" Since Nietzsche’s 
understanding of society miiTored his conception of the self as a conglomeration of 
conflicting drives which vie for supremacy within the psyche,**'® every individual’s 
aspirations reflect those of all organic life: to maximize personal pleasuie and minimize 
personal pain and/ or inflict pain,* *'® through the accumulation of power.**®®
As a product of human culture, the Christian church played an eminent role in
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power consolidation, according to Nietzsche, thougli its role has now been assumed by the
modem state.**®* Spuming the example set by Christ, the church had merely utilized his
teachings and bmtal execution as a foundation for a new system of religious tyranny.**®'
Nietzsche was keen to point out the ludicrous hypocrisy evident within a church that
“wages war, condemns, tortures, swears, hates,” embodies nationalist prejudices, and still
p r o f e s s e s  to f o l l o w  Clirist."** Hence, he s a v a g e ly  puiT ed:
What? A god who loves men, provided only that they believe in him, and who 
casts an evil eye and tlueats upon anyone who does not believe in this love?
What? A love encapsulated in if-clauses attiibuted to an almighty god? A love 
that has not even mastered the feelings of honor and vindictiveness? How 
Oriental this is! ‘If I love you, is that your concern?’ is a sufficient critique of the 
whole of Chiistianity.
However, Nietzsche expressed some admiration for the church’s ability to dominate
without recourse to ‘bmte’ force:
A church is above all a stmcture for mling that serves the highest rank for the 
more spiritual human beings and that believes in the power of spirituality to the 
extent of forbidding itself the use of all the cmder instmments of force; and on 
this score alone the church is under all circumstances a nobler institute than the 
state.**®®
The church’s depiction of God and its endorsement of secular authority as divinely 
sanctioned has iimnense repercussions for the polity of the state, hence its importance to 
the Machiavellian monarch. Nietzsche observed: “Men often deal with their princes in a 
similar way as with their God, since after all the Prince was often God’s representative, or 
at least his high priest.”* *®® To Nietzsche’s dismay, however, he recognized that there have 
always been certain pernicious elements within the church which oppose the glorious 
ideals of the master ‘free spirit’ and seek to limit the power of the nobility, thus creating an
UM 150.1181
WP 116 [1887-1888]. See also WP 97-98 [1888]: “What did Clirist denyl Eveiything tliat is today 
called Cluistian”. The fact tliat similar criticism is levelled by Tolstoy against the Russian Orthodox church 
suggests the prevalence of this protest across Europe: “And to not one of those present, from the priest and 
the superintendent [...] did it occur that this Jesus Whose name the priest repeated in wheezy tones such an 
endless number of times, praising Him with outlandish words, had expressly forbidden everything that was 
being done there [....]” [184]
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‘unnatural’ obstiuction in the cosmos-wide process of power expansion.**®' Within 
Kierkegaard’s own formulations, Nietzsche probably would have obseiwed a telling 
inconsistency. If God’s power is so heterogeneous and independent of ‘sensate authority’, 
why do populist incursions on the Danish monarchy effect an erosion of divine power? 
And in light of such incursions, was not Kierkegaard cunningly indebting God to his 
polemical seiwices in acting as “an insignificant official who by any means, by slyness, by 
force (that is, spiritual force) must confiscate all illusions and seize those aiTogant 
delusions based on efhonteiy toward God”?**®® Nietzsche would find this reliance upon 
‘force’— ‘spiritual’ though it may be— conclusive evidence that the Christian’s true 
assurance is still a ruse by any other name.
2. The Myth of Clnistian ‘Selflessness’:
Despite the church’s doctrinal protestations to the contrary, Nietzsche contended 
that every ecclesiastical activity, fiom the imposition of moral judgments,**®® to the praise 
of worthy examples,**®® from the dissemination of teachings,**®* to the dispensation of 
‘mercies’,* *®' is a demonstration of power. Nietzsche considered its ethic of ‘selflessness’ 
to be a ludicrous illusion for several reasons. First, even the best-intentioned philanthropist 
“has to do a great deal for himself in order to be able to do anything at all for the sake of 
others.”**®® Second, the Clnistian’s ‘selfless’ existence is ironically predicated by “the 
continued existence of loveless egoists incapable of self-sacrifice”, who supply the 
necessary objects of such ‘selfless’ munificence. * *®^* Nietzsche aigued that Christian virtue 
irrefi'agably thiives upon its dialectical relations with unclnistian atrocities; consequently, 
“[T]he highest morality, in order to endure, would have virtually to exact the existence of
HA 220.
‘ GM 22, 57. This is one reason for his denigration of the Judaeo-Cliristian era whereby he claimed, 
“[E]verything essential in human development occuned in primeval times, long before those four thousand 
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immorality (by which, to be sure, it would cancel itself out)."**®® Finally, to the degiee that 
such selflessness is a manifestation of “the ascetic ideal", it is part of one of the most 
refined and totalitarian ‘wills to power’ known to humankind.* *®® Nietzsche, thus, 
concluded: “Never has a man done anything that was only for others and without any 
personal motivation.’’**®'
3. Kierkegaard’s Quest for Power:
Nietzsche would probably cite several of Kierkegaard’s own statements on 
Cluistian authority and polemical joustings with the state church, the media,* *®® rival 
philosophical and ethical systems,**®® and “the two gieat powers in society, envy and 
obtuseness’’*'®® in order to substantiate his argument for the church’s primary 
preoccupation with power.*'®* Kierkegaard once confessed his love of intellectual 
pugilism: “By nature I am so polemical that I really feel in my element only when 
suiTOunded by human mediocrity and scui-viness.’’*'®' He justified his stance on the basis 
that, “[ajlthough I am so thoroughly polemical and was so even in my youth, still 
Christianity is almost too polemical for me.’’*'®® Bishop Mynster once accused 
Kierkegaard of ‘wanting to tyrannize’ after he urged the ecclesiastical leaders to rule more 
vigorously.*'®** Kierkegaard even instmcted his own king on how to rale with authority 
and “fight with ‘the masses’’’.*'®® Furthennore, according to Nietzsche, Kierkegaaid is
HA 92.
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guilty of committing ‘theoretical violence’ by constraining the amoral universe within 
artificial stmctures, thus exercising his own “will to power” His learned attempts to 
assist the reader, however indirectly, towards a closer relationship to God are merely subtle 
attempts at self-empowerment by gaining mastery over his readership. This is reflected in 
the duplicitous origins of indirect communication— Kierkegaard’s wilful deception of a 
naive Regine Olsen to evade an undesirable union, who “could be helped only by an 
untmth about me.” ’^ ®^
Nietzsche would not have accepted Kierkegaard’s ‘Socratic’ disclaimer that he 
possessed no authority of his own but wrote with the intention of merely seeking personal 
edification. Declaiations of intellectual ‘bankruptcy’ would not have dissuaded the 
Nietzschean power ‘creditor’ from exhuming the hidden ‘vaults’ of authority by which 
Kierkegaard sought to bankroll a resurgence against the political and religious leadership 
of his day. Undoubtedly, Nietzsche would have been impressed by Kierkegaard’s 
intellectual prowess, his solitude and strength of character, his abhon ence for the 
mediocrity of the masses, and his attempt to ‘make life difficult’ for them.^ ^®^  However, 
Kierkegaard’s ongoing stmggles with despair— the contamination of ‘bad conscience’ in 
Nietzsche’s view— and his ultimate confinement within the detiimental restraints of 
Christianity would have convinced Nietzsche that he, like Pascal, was yet another ‘noble’ 
casualty of the pernicious slave morality of Christianity: “I do not read Pascal but love him, 
as the most instinctive of all sacrifices to Chiistianity, slowly murdered first physically 
then psychologically, the whole logic of this most hoirible form of inhuman cmelty
Z 136, GM 57-58.
PV 249 [1850]. See also CD 386 [November 20, 1847], WL 398, BA 279 [1846-1847], UP I 625; TO 
195,211,227 [1848], 239 [1849]; SWxii.
UD X.
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B. Kierkegaard:
1. Affinity:
Unlike thousands of his contemporaries who masked their rebellion against God 
beneath the niceties and external conventions of religiosity, Kierkegaard would have 
lauded Nietzsche for openly expressing his rebellion against divine authority. Nietzsche’s 
suspicion of Cluistianity’s animosity towards (sinful) human autonomy was not without 
gi'ounds,^^^* as Kierkegaard articulated God’s desire to put the sinful, dissolute life ‘to 
death’ in order to imbue the individual with tme and everlasting life. On account of his 
pre-redemption state, Nietzsche exhibited a ‘natural’ aversion to what was ti*uly good while 
revaluating the ‘bad’ as good to both justify and assert his personal sensate authority.
As a member of the fallen human race, Kierkegaard would claim that Nietzsche 
unavoidably participated in a tragic bid for fi eedom which severs humankind fiom the very 
source of its life. The primary assault consists of quantifying God and reducing his 
transcendental power to temporal terms, allowing both Chiistians and non-Cliristians to 
co-opt divine power for sensate gains and objectives, to compromise divine power 
irreversibly by maishalling sensate power in its ‘defence’, or to dismiss it as antiquated 
superstition deemed iiTelevant to the lives of ‘modem’ man.* '^  ^ God is thereby 
antlu’opomorphized into a large-scale ‘human’, whose authority may be challenged, 
circumvented, appropriated, or altogether ignored. The apex of this universal revolt 
against God occuiTed when representatives fi om every rank and file of society elected to 
execute Jesus C h r i s t . W i t h i n  this theological fiamework, Nietzsche’s animosity 
towards Chiistianity’s heterogeneous standards and resolute expectations of human 
conduct ironically supported its transcendental claims.
On Chiist’s threat to power, see TI 156. 
JP III 419 [1850], I 77 [1854].
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2. Rebuttal:
a. Despair-Tumed-Boredom:
Kierkegaai'd insisted that divine power as embodied in Clnist remains primaiily
incomprehensible to a non-Christian perspective prior to redemption. In regarding
Nietzsche’s writings as expressions of sinftil despair, Kierkegaard’s initial response may
have been to call attention to a certain fundamental ennui which restlessly seeks fulfilment
in temporal externalities. The wide-eyed longing that
severity, force, slavery, peril in the street and in the heart, concealment, stoicism, 
the ail of experiment and devilry of every kind, that everything evil, dreadful, 
tyramiical, beast of prey and seipent in man seiwes to enhance the species ‘man’ 
just as much as does its opposite^^'^
could not possibly have been originated from a witness of the French Revolution or the 
One-Hundred-Y ear ’ s War, much less suiwivors from Auschwitz, Rwanda, or Fallujah. 
Instead, it suggests boredom, frustiation, the feeble mutterings of an ‘existential shut-in’ 
sitting at his desk as he gazes out the window through the ‘bars’ of a deadening 
bureaucracy, pining for a wai* or similar adventitious cause to rescue him fr om the 
smothering meaninglessness of his life. In a similar vein, I believe that Kierkegaard would 
have critiqued Nietzsche’s Faustian quest for ‘dangerous knowledge’ as aesthetic despair 
and over-romanticized idealism. As he commented in one upbuilding discourse, “Who 
would know how to speak about the delights of riches better than the one who lives on 
cmmbs, who would describe power and might more glowingly than the person who sighs 
in bondage [ . And yet chaos shows no favouritism in the afteraiath it wreaks. 
Wide-scale devastation would likely weaken the very institutes which propagate the 
aristocrats, who already require the protection of a philosophical overlord to preseiwe them
1216 pp 30-31^ UD 379. Hence, ‘secular’ accounts would evaluate Christ on the basis o f his historical 
accomplislunents and typically conclude that he had squandered his great potential. [PC 49, UV 91 ] The 
obseiver would ultimately be offended by the mere notion “that God proves to be the lowly, poor, suffering 
and finally powerless human being.” [PC 102]
BG 72. See also WP 33 [1888].
UD 93. Cf. Pascal 59: “Who indeed would think himself unliappy not to be king except one who had 
been dispossessed?” Unamuno derides Nietzsche’s philosophy as, “the doctrine of weaklings who aspire to 
be strong”. [65-66]
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from the ravaging rabble. Kierkegaard would likely contend that Nietzsche has 
idealistically and tragically overestimated the possibilities of creation fr om devastation, 
reconfigurations from chaos. Moreover, Nietzsche’s fundamental principle of agonism in 
‘nature’ appears as a blatant contradiction to his professed opposition to 
anthropomorphizing the ‘natural universe’.
b. The Idealized Aristocracy;
Another prominent feature of Nietzsche’s concept of authority which would invite
Kierkegaardian scratiny is his romanticization of the nobility. Nietzsche carefrilly
crafted an aristocrat whose magnanimity flowed fr om his “strong and godlike
selfhood”, who indelibly imprinted his paiiicular vision of honour and value with, a
presumptuous, volitional ti'anscendence fiom his own historical context. Such a figure
towers above a pygmied humankind with apparent demigod status: “The noble type of man
feels himself to be the detenniner of values; he does not need to be approved of, he judges
‘what haiins me is haimful in itself, he knows himself to be that which in general first
accords honour to things, he creates values This highly vaunted predecessor segues
seamlessly into the long-awaited Übermensch:
One does not reckon with such beings, they arrive like fate, without motive, 
reason, consideration, pretext, they amve like lightning, too fearftil, too sudden, 
too convincing, too ‘different’, even to be hated. Their work is an instinctive 
creation and impression of fomi, they are the most involuntary, most unconscious 
artists there are— wherever they appear, something new quickly grows up, a living 
structure of domination [....] *^ ^^
Kierkegaard would have endeavoured to inject some realism into the reverie. 
Nietzsche’s depictions of the chivalrous ‘knightly code’ among the nobility appear more 
fr equently in the medieval romances of Marie de France than in the turbulent pages of
This point is exquisitely made by Britain’s foremost philosopliical jesters, Monty Python’s Flying Circus, 
Episode #30, who parody a similar tendency in ‘nature’ programming: while showing a photo of a wolf, a 
German voice [a poke at Nietzsche?] intones: “Here we see an ant. This ant is engaged in a life-and-death 
straggle with the wolf [....]” [http://www.ibras.dk/Monty python/episode30.htm#6]
For other affinities with Romanticism, see Detwiler 190.
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European histoiy.^^ "^^  In The Genealogy o f Morality., he depicted the nobleman as a
paragon of virility, the perfect specimen whose lordship over village and value-system
alike stems from a superabundance of health:
The knightly-aristocratic value-judgments presuppose a powerful physicality, a 
rich, burgeoning, even over-flowing health, as well as those things which help to 
preserve it— war, adventuie, hunting, dancing, competitive games, and everything 
which involves strong, free, high-spirited activity/
Nietzsche’s highly selective idealization of the aristocracy as the puiweyor of fine human 
specimens, the repository of “collective self-esteem” which comprises “the great 
preparatory school for personal sovereignty”, “[t]hose great forcing houses for strong 
human beings”, conveniently overlooked the more pernicious themes of indulgence, 
cruelty, excess, tieachery, indolence, and early death which befell many a noble. His 
paeans to these phantasmal figures resonate with thick sentimentality for a ‘golden’ 
because idealized past. His pealing prose on unbridled heroism and ‘the discovery of 
values for uninvented scales’ possesses provocative parallels with the geriatiic grasping of 
Tennyson’s Ulysses, rallying his aging Argonauts for one last hobble into the breach.
By contrast, Kierkegaard’s personal acquaintance with Danish monarchs likely tempered 
any temptations to over-idealize the aristocracy.
One way Nietzsche might have responded to such criticism was by emphasizing
that it is not the aristocrats themselves but their institutions which are the decisive factor in
breeding fbremnners of the Übermensch Hence, he regarded material security as
the source o f a nobility o f the blood. Wealth necessarily produces an aristocracy 
of race, for it pennits one to select the most beautiful women and to pay the best
See, for example, GS 87: “[B]ut they aie doubly obliging toward their whom it would be 
honourable to fight if  the occasion should ever arise. Spuired by the good feeling of this perspective, the 
members o f the knightly caste became accustomed to treating each other with exquisite courtesy.” For “the 
channs of rareness, inimitableness, exceptionalness, and unaverageness— its aristocratic magic”, see WP 175 
[1887-1888]. Houlgate cogently traces Nietzsche’s ‘heroic’ emphasis to Greek tragedy. [Hegel 195] See 
also Burkitt 62.
GM 19. This stands in stark contrast to slave morality, which stems fi'om hatred and bitter invective 
against life. [GM 22]
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teachers; it allows a person to be clean, to have time for physical exercise, and, 
above all, to avoid dulling physical labour/
In less exuberant moments, Nietzsche contended that the gieatest specimens share a
symbiotic connection with their times:
Great men, like great epochs, are explosive material in whom tremendous energy 
has been accumulated; their prerequisite has always been, historically and 
physiologically, that a protracted assembling, accumulating, economizing and 
preseiwing has preceded them— that there has been no explosion for a long 
time/^^^
Hence, the ‘herd’, too, must be protected from excessive damage at the hands of a 
short-sighted ‘ exception’/^^  ^ Moreover, Nietzsche clearly acknowledged the existence of 
aristocratic ‘defects’ in a passage where he pondered the concept of mandatory castration 
“regardless of class” to eliminate societal ‘miscarriages’ / ^^ ^
Perhaps Nietzsche himself knew that his genealogical assessments contained some
wishful thinking, in attempting to inspire a dispirited age, to press back the
Schopenhauerian pessimism and the oveiwhelming tides of mediocrity which were
inundating nineteenth-century Europe. He once wrote:
History shows: the strong races decimate one another: tlirough war, thirst for 
power, adventurousness; the strong affects: wastefulness [....] [TJheir existence 
is costly; in brief— they ruin one another; periods of profound exhaustion and 
torpor supeiwene: all gi*eat ages are paid for— The strong are subsequently 
weaker, more devoid of will, more absurd than the weak average.
As with all imperatives urging a carpe deum perspective, Nietzsche’s strategy is effective 
so long as everyone does not strive to ‘seize the godhead’, to live as conquerors, 
imiovators, and t h i eve s . Pe r ha ps  this is one reason why Nietzsche addressed his books 
to a small, select audience, “the kind of people who alone matter: I mean those who are
‘^ '^UM231.
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c. Enslaved to the Outcome:
Another of Kierkegaard’s probable criticisms of Nietzsche’s concept of authority 
strikes at the very heart of his philosophical project. By absolutizing temporal power and 
human ability to shape hermeneutically the world which they inhabit, the human being 
enslaves herself to ‘fate’.*^ ^^  With the eradication of the transcendent Other, Kierkegaard 
argued that the individual is imprisoned between an unchangeable past and an uncertain 
future, confined to the domain of thieves, rot, rust, and the ‘slings and aiTOWS of outrageous 
fortune’, which constantly tlireaten to erode her basis of authority, culminating in avarice, 
anxiety, and despair. She becomes, in Climacus’ words, “a slave to the outcome”. 
Ironically, the more a person exchanges the ‘uncertainty’ of spiritual fieedom for the 
‘certainty’ of sensate power, the more she locates her self-worth in uncontrollable externals 
instead of a restored relationship with God, the more impoverished the self becomes, and 
the less power she is subsequently capable of wielding without succumbing to that 
p o w e r . B e c a u s e  the Chiistian’s identity and ultimate worth are rooted in the 
unshakable love of God, she is ‘freed’ from external accomplishments, and Kierkegaard 
contended that not even death can negate or ‘cut short’ her life’s work if she has been living 
in obedience to God.'^ "^ ^
In contrast to Nietzsche’s ever-giasping will to power, Kierkegaard concuned with 
Plato that the best rulers are those who don’t desire power, lest the tyr ant become enslaved 
by his own lust for power or enter “a concealed relation of dependency on those whom he 
is supposed to iTile”.’^ "^  ^ Hence, Anti-Climacus stated that the man who relentlessly bases 
his self-worth upon temporal achievements— adhering to the Nietzschean ‘either/ or’, 
“Caesar or nothing”— demonstrates tme weakness in failing to accept himself regardless of
GS 235.
1238 y p  j CA 96-97. Here the classical Hellenistic despair inlierent within Nietzsche’s neo-pagan 
framework becomes evident. See also EO I 38.
JP V I202 [1855], CD 48, UV 27, SW466, CA 61, FT 15, UD 10.
UP I 398.
WL 252, TA 7.>242 UY 142,
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weakness, not strength. [SW 473] A tyrant may be enslaved by bmte force when, having used it once, he dare 
not lay it aside lest he relinquish his hold on his subjects. [SW 324]
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whether he becomes Caesar or not/ '^ '^  ^ Kierkegaard contended that anything— such as 
sensate authority— which is possessed as a result of ‘accidents of fortune’ can never be 
confidently possessed/Reflect ing upon the mighty exploits of Napoleon, Climacus 
declared:
If Napoleon is as gi eat as the most reckless notion, if his whole life is like a fairy 
tale, then, just as in a fairy tale, there is in tmth still another fanciful figure. It is a 
shmnken old witch, a shiivelled being, a little creatuie, a spider on whose one 
feeler there are some numbers— they are the outcome. And the superhuman hero 
of the fairy tale, whom nothing, nothing can withstand, is nevertheless in the 
power of this little creature
For this reason, Kierkegaard emphasized that, “[a]ll finite power makes [a being] 
dependent
The lofty and ‘indifferent’ power which Nietzsche praised, “which is conscious of 
no witness around it; which lies oblivious of the existence of any opposition; which reposes 
in toe^fatalistic, a law among laws”,^ "^^  ^refers more to architecture than arch-dukes. Such 
security is poor comfort, according to Kierkegaard, in light of the incontestable power of 
God. Any temporal authority, which is necessarily dependent upon uncontrollable 
variables which must be continuously bolstered and maintained, thereby entails “hard 
and heavy slavery”. From the perspective of eternity, monarchs and nobility possess no
existential distinctions or privileges: they are as equally separated fi'om God and in need of 
redemption as any other human being. Subsequently, Kierkegaard maintained that 
‘sensate’ leaders lack any spiritual author i ty , though they unconsciously retain their 
sensate authority the grace o f To the extent that the strong and wealthy
protect the poor and promote justice among the nations, they are dutifiilly fulfilling their 
posts. As soon as rulers adopt a ‘pyi amidical’ mindset and subjugate their charges.
SD 49. See also UV 171. On the peril o f locating worth ‘outside oneself, see BA 23.
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Because God’s power is qualitatively heterogeneous, God shows complete impartiality as to whether a 
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Kierkegaard averred: “So God pushes over the pyramid and everything collapses- a 
generation later man begins this pyramid business again.”*^ '^*
d. Blindness to the Limitations of Sensate Authority:
Kierkegaard would probably press his offensive one step frirther and contend that
Nietzsche was blind to the inlierent limitations of sensate authority by his own desire for
power. Nietzsche’s totalizing reduction of human behaviour and action to ‘instincts’ and
unconscious drives entails the promulgation of natural deteiminism: even the most strident
ascetic measures and self-sacrifices are attiibuted to the innate instincts, which weaker
humans are “too degenerate” to rein in by moderat ion.Kierkegaard would indubitably
challenge Nietzsche on his definition of ‘fr eedom’ and ask whether it did not represent a
most repressive kind of bondage:
For what is fr eedom? That one has the will to self-responsibility. That one 
preserves the distance which divides us. That one has become more indifferent to 
hardship, toil, privation, even to life. That one is ready to sacrifice men to one’s 
cause, oneself not excepted. Freedom means that the manly instincts that delight 
in war and victory have gained mastery over the other instincts— for example, 
over the instinct for ‘happiness.
Because human nature is inextricably connected with its sociological context, 
according to Nietzsche, individuals are thus conditioned by cultural as well as biological 
detenninants.'^^^ He is, however, somewhat equivocal as to whether nature or nurture 
gains predominance. Although his entire philosophical project is founded upon the 
prospect of altering ‘nature’ using proper philosophical guidance, Nietzsche remained 
intensely sceptical of any refonnation of ‘tainted’ biological factors. Within his 
doctrine of eternal recun ence, humankind is encircled by a cosmic ‘hamster wheel’ which 
peipetually spins without going anywhere— another curious incongruence for a thinker
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who endorsed ‘becomings’. According to Anti-Climacus, Nietzsche’s motto of amorfati 
in a God-less universe would entail a most ti agic abrogation of human life and liberty; for, 
“The determinist, the fatalist, is in despair, and in despair he has lost his self because for 
him everything is a necessity.” Specifically, Kierkegaard would likely focus upon two 
primary components of Nietzsche’s theological ‘blindspots’ regarding the shortcomings of 
sensate power.
i. Grounding the Leaders:
Kierkegaard would first contend that Nietzsche’s position is highly unrealistic in its 
naive optimism concerning human capacities to transcend personal and societal contexts. 
Though Nietzsche held no utopian illusions as to the benefits of the aristocrats for their 
contemporaries, the nobility provided long-tenn ‘utilitarian’ benefits insofar as they 
advanced the species towards a spiritual freedom unimpeded by obsolete mores and 
religiosity. This optimism is paralleled by what Kierkegaard would deem an exaggerated 
hopefulness in humankind’s ability to master its darkest instincts once they have been 
u n l e a s h e d . I n  response to Nietzsche’s umealistic insistence that the noble leader can 
liberate himself from all pettiness and excel at ‘self-control and self-outwitting’,*^ '^ 
Kierkegaard would rejoin: “No matter how strong a person is, no person is stronger than 
himself.” From his point of view, it is an impossible and inane expectation, “as if he 
were able to perform the marvel unheard of in heaven or on earth or under the earth— that 
something that is in conflict with itself can in this conflict be stronger than itself!
Wlien Nietzsche asked,
Is a state of affairs unthinkable in which the malefactor calls himself to account 
and publicly dictates his own punisliment, in the proud feeling that he is thus 
honouring the law which he himself has made, that by punishing himself he is
SD 70.1259
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exercising his power, the power of the law-giver? 1264
Kierkegaard would have undoubtedly answered with a stentorian affimiative. Because, by 
Nietzsche’s own admission, the “bom aristocrats of the spirit” have nothing to prove— 
“The wish to create incessantly is vulgar, betraying jealousy, envy, and ambition [..
— Kierkegaard might validly ask by what motive they would instigate such pivotal and 
widespread spiritual revolutions. Wliat moves the ‘unmover’? On one level, Nietzsche’s 
assertion appears to echo Climacus’ contention that the tme ethical hero is oblivious to 
external pressures and accomplislunents : “[I]n the process he perhaps would produce a 
great effect in the external world, but this would not occupy him at all, because he would 
know that the external is not in his power and therefore means nothing either pro or 
contraT^^^^ However, according to Kierkegaard, the Christian is freed from basing her 
identity upon the uncontrollable throes of temporality precisely because her self-worth and 
being are founded entirely upon God. Hence, he declared that only “inauthentic 
exti'aordinaries” depend upon external results to prove their merit, and Climacus 
mocked “the independence that, independent of the world, needs the world as witness to 
one’s independence so as to be certain of being independent.” Kierkegaard would 
likely have attributed Nietzsche’s inconsistencies as characteristic of one who is blind to 
despair and firmly mired in the aesthetic fallacy, who thus oveiwalues temporal 
externalities to the detriment of eternal intemalities.
ii. Questioning the Breeder;
The second component of Kierkegaard’s accusation that Nietzsche was blind to the 
limits of temporal power consists of Nietzsche’s ambitious presumption that one man can 
deliberately mould tlie entire species and speed the arrival of a ‘higher’ race of bipedal 
behemoths. Nietzsche explained: “Breeding, as I understand it, is a means of storing up
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the tremendous forces of mankind so that the generations can build upon the work of their 
forefathers— not only outwardly, but inwardly, organically growing out of them and 
becoming something stronger [.. Zai*athustra’s intention to ‘walk among men as
among fragments of the future’ and ‘compose into one what is fragment and riddle and 
dreadful chance’ presupposes a transcendence and power of divine proportions/^^* 
Assuming that such a brash undertaking is even possible in theory, why should Nietzsche 
be the one to engineer the psychological ‘genome’ of the human species?
Such an aspiration appears inconsistent with the aspersions Nietzsche cast towards
the imposition of cause-and-effect fr ameworks upon the world. How could he labour to
effect a constmctive impact upon the entire race when he, along with Kierkegaard,
recognized that a person has no guarantee that her smallest action will produce the desired
effect in light of the world’s dynamic complexities?*^^^ According to Nietzsche’s
revisioned understanding of history— a paradoxical undertaking given his scepticism that
such hermeneutical endeavours are inherently flawed and untmthfrd, as Smith
indicates—*^ ^^  Chiistianity was a kind of ‘brace’ which once stabilized European society:
Protracted unfreedom of spirit, mistrustfril constraint in the communicability of 
ideas, the discipline thinkers imposed on themselves to think within an 
ecclesiastical or courtly mle or under Aristotelian presuppositions, the protracted 
spiritual will to interpret all events according to a Chiistian scheme and to 
rediscover and justify the Christian God in every chance occurrence— all these 
violent, arbitrary, severe, gruesome and antirational things have shown 
themselves to be the means by which the European spirit was disciplined in its 
strength, mthless curiosity and subtle flexibility
But now, according to Nietzsche, humankind has outgrown its ‘school-master’ and the 
support-tumed-strait-jacket needs to be removed. Here, Kierkegaard might interject 
objections to another methodological inconsistency: if Nietzsche tmly believed the
WP215 [1888].
161.
As Mr. A declared, “It also seems to me that with cause and effect the relation does not hold together 
properly. Sometimes enormous and gewaltige [powerful] causes produce a very klein [small] and 
insignificant little effect, sometimes none at all; sometimes a nimble little cause produces a colossal effect.” 
[EO I 25] Kierkegaard, too, was aware o f henneneutical games which the will plays. Subsequently, in the 
wake o f 1848, he wiote: “[P]eople must take a few days to fool one another into thinking that what occuned 
is what they wanted.” [WA 228 (1848)].
1273
1274
GM XXV.
BG 111.
226
conquistador creed that ‘that which does not kill us makes us stronger’ how could he 
hope to breed a super-being if he deprived his protégés of the very adversarial stimuli 
needed to test and develop the superiority of the ‘master spirits’? Furthennore, the 
identification of an ‘undesirable’ element such as Clii'istianity is inconsistent with 
Nietzsche’s claims to love unconditionally every feature of the eternally recuning 
universe/
Moreover, if all truth is conditional and all morality and principles are self-seiwing 
and power-enliancing, Kierkegaard might fairly ask why anyone should bother listening to 
Nietzsche’s ‘tmths’ since his formulations enjoy no privileged status in a world where all 
tmth is merely will to power. Consequently, it seems strange that Nietzsche should object 
vociferously when the majority of people refuse to acknowledge his trath-claims about 
universal untruth: “To recognize untmth as a condition of life: that, to be sure, means to 
resist customary value-sentiments in a dangerous fashion; and a philosophy which ventures 
to do so places itself, by that act alone, beyond good and evil,” '^ ^^  What is the basis of 
Nietzsche’s own philosophical authority if, indeed, “One seeks a picture of the world in 
that philosophy in which we feel fi-eest; i.e., in which our most powerful drive feels free to 
function. This will also be the case with me!”*^ ^^ ~ particularly when the gi eatest freedom, 
apart fi om that of the philosophical architect of the human race, is allotted to a small, 
excessively privileged elite? In light of his notebook writings, one must ask who 
detennines a “miscamed life” and how society “ought to prevent them”,*^ ^^  who possesses 
the “genuine charity” to dictate which human sacrifices must be made “for the good of the 
species”.
Even if Nietzsche could somehow aiTOgate such moral authority to himself, even if  
the strong were to thrive under Nietzsche’s philosophical regimen, the so-called
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‘supermen’ would ultimately remain in bondage to one person— Nietzsche h i m s e l f / H e
alone understood the tme value of the herd and protected their wanton destruction by
short-sighted “exceptions”/^^^ He alone appreciated the need to restrict the flow of
aristocratic blood and values to the elite and knew why horiible misunderstandings must
follow when class divisions are transgr e s s e d / H e n c e ,  Nietzsche himself easily
surpassed the limited brilliance of the ‘higher men’:
Very rar ely does a higher nature retain sufficient reason for understanding and 
treating everyday people as such; for the most part, this type assumes that its own 
passion is present but kept concealed in all men, and this belief even becomes an 
ardent and eloquent faith. But when such exceptional people do not see 
themselves as the exception, how can they ever understand the common type and 
arrive at a fair evaluation of the mle? Thus they, too, speak of the folly, 
inexpediency, and fantasies of humanity, stunned that the course of the world 
should be so insane, and puzzled that it won’t own up to what ‘is needfiil.’ — This 
is the eternal justice of those who are noble.
Nietzsche perhaps recognized the irony of his philosopliical supremacy in Beyond Good 
and Evil where he admitted that not all slavery is bad: “[I]t seems that slavery, in the cmder 
and in the more refined sense, is the indispensable means also for spiritual discipline and 
b r e e d i n g . I f  Nietzsche’s project entails a newer and more sophisticated slavery as a 
means of advancing the species, Kierkegaard would likely identify his promise of spiritual 
‘fi eedom’ as merely a rhetorical ploy for masking a more ingenuous mode of tyranny and 
as little entitled to the epithet ‘liberty’ as the Christian legalism he zealously denigrated.
e. The Myth of Master Power:
It is highly feasible that Kierkegaard’s gieatest attack upon Nietzsche would be to 
question the very existence of ‘master power’ per se: to charge that master power is, itself, 
a myth which western philosophy has constructed, on account of its dialectical 
interdependence upon so-called ‘slave power’ and vulnerability to change, Kierkegaard
142 [1888].
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contended that secular government is “an indulgence” whose powers teeter precariously on
the ignorance or passivity of its ‘subjects’ Master power may arguably be a form of
harnessed slave power benefiting a chosen few/^^^ Ressentiment, the hallmark of slave
existence, may arguably be the will to power par excellence:
For an ascetic life is a contradiction in terms: a particular kind of réssentiment 
mles there, that of an unsatisfied instinct and will to power which seeks not to 
master some isolated aspect of life but life itself, its deepest, strongest, most 
fundamental conditions
For this reason, Kierkegaard equated democracy with tyianny in tliat both amount to mle 
by fear of men: the difference is merely numerical, and the power of the people is 
prevalent— if closely contained— in all forms of goveimnent including monaidnes.*^^^ 
Hence, he insisted that the ‘common force’ employed in the ongoing power stmggles 
between king, clergy, and aristocracy is “always ‘the people’”/
The paradox of ‘master power’ is also evident when one considers Nietzsche’s 
assertion that a ‘gieat spirit’ must prove himself against opponents who are evenly 
matched. But should such a spirit defeat all potential challengers, he must despair and fall 
into mill, since he has deprived himself of the source of his strength— the existence of 
worthy because equally powerful threats. As Anti-Climacus obseiwed, “[A] master who is 
a self directly before slaves, indeed really [...] is not a self— for in both cases there is no 
standard of measurement.” * * For this reason, Kierkegaard wrote: “If a capability is 
actually to be a capability, it must have opposition, because if it has no opposition, then it is 
either all-powerful or something imaginary.” Moreover, if a mighty tyi ant were to arise
and successfully implement a new morality, the tyrant invariably makes life existentially 
easier for slaves and aristocrats alike, insofar as he removes their responsibility to think for 
themselves, thus volitionally weakening the Übermensch ‘stock’ and subsequently
‘-®^WA215 [1848].
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‘demoralizing’ men. 1293
Nietzsche probably would have responded that subjugating an opponent does not 
destroy the thieat they pose: “[Tjhere is in commanding an admission that the absolute 
power of the opponent has not been vanquished, incorporated, disintegrated. ‘Obedience’ 
and ‘commanding’ are forms of struggle.” However, Kierkegaard might counter by 
asking whether these never-ending battles for supremacy would pennit tliat stable status 
quo of prosperity by which the species accumulates its collective energy for the surge of 
future extraordinary specimens. Nietzsche’s concept of power still relies upon external 
r e s i s t a n c e s f o e s  to fight, conventions to revoke, an unsuspecting ‘bovine’ populace to 
coddle. Freedom is largely dependent upon open and unmitigated hostility between the 
self and the other,
The pathetic paradox of a ‘gi eat’ man who is paralysed by the absence of conflict is
cogently depicted by Charlotte Bronte when Jane Eyie obseiwes of St. John Rivers:
Well may he eschew the calm of domestic life; it is not his element: there his 
faculties stagnate— they cannot develop or appear to advantage. It is in scenes of 
strife and danger— where courage is proved, and energy exercised, and fortitude 
tasked— that he will speak and move, the leader and superior.
Perhaps Nietzsche projected something of himself into Schopenliauer when he once 
explained,
[L]et us not underestimate the fact that Schopenhauer [...] needed enemies to 
remain in good spirits; that he loved giim, green galling words; that he raged for 
the sake of raging, out of passion; that he would have fallen ill, become a 
pessimist [...] without his enemies, without Hegel, woman, sensuality, and the 
whole will to existence, the will to endure.
Even “systematic ingratitude”— to employ Taimer’s apt p h r a s e * c a n n o t  negate one’s 
dependence on those upon whom one treads. Ironically, Nietzsche even needed
For a similar charge that the Jesuits weakened men by placing ‘superhuman’ ascetic demands upon 
themselves, see JP III 421-422 [1850].
WP 342 [1885].
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Chiistianity, an ‘equal’ and ‘worthy’ opponent: “[T]o attack is with me a proof of good 
will, under certain circumstances of giatitude. I do honour, I confer distinction when I 
associate my name with a cause, a person: for or against- that is in this regard a matter of 
indifference to me.” *^**** In light of this essential reliance upon externality in general and 
‘slave power’ in particular, Nietzsche’s delineation o f ‘master power’ is, from 
Kierkegaard’s perspective, simply unfounded. Hence, he would concur with 
Mephistopheles:
No more! That privilege 1 gladly waive,
Of hearing about tyiant versus slave [....]
They fight, they say, dear fr eedom’s cause to save; 
But, seen more clearly, slave is fighting slave.”*^***
f. The Myth of Slave Power:
In order for this critique to be genuinely Kierkegaardian, it must be pressed even
further, beyond the far-ranging abstraction of superspecies-enhancements to bear upon the
existential circumstances of ‘that single individual’. Kierkegaard’s response to Nietzsche
may, thus, be extended by positing that, whereas master power is a myth, given the
inextricable interconnectedness of human action and influence regardless of class, slave
power is equally a myth, for all people— irrespective of rank or status— exhibit the hallmark
of aristocratic arrogance: the ability to reduce others into nonentities tlnough sheer spite
and/ or indifference. In Works o f Love, Kierkegaard wrote: “[T]his distinguished
coniiption teaches the man of distinction that he exists only for distinguished men, that he
shall live only in their social circle, that he must not exist for other men, just as they must
not exist for him.”*^**^ Distancing oneself from ‘undesirables’ maybe an aristocratic
ideal, *^**^ yet Kierkegaard denounced its universal practice:
Whether in the enjoyment of his haughtiness and pride one openly gives other 
people to understand that they do not exist for him, whether in the nourishment of 
his aiTogance one wants them to be sensitive to this by demanding an expression 
of slavish subjection fr om them, or whether stealthily and secretly, simply by
EH X.
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avoiding any contact with them (perhaps also out of fear that openness would 
incite men and put him in a dangerous situation), one expresses that they do not 
exist for him— these are basically one and the same things. The inliumanness and 
unclnistiamiess of this does not consist in the manner in which it is done but in 
wanting to deny one’s relationship in the human race with all men, with 
absolutely every man.*^ **"*
Kierkegaard proceeded to outline ‘passive aggiession’ as one subtle means by 
which the undeiprivileged slave can nullify the existence of the mightiest master, thus 
demonstrating “the strength of weakness”:* “But a disguise of hidden exasperation and a 
remote intimation of painfiil dejection will transform the glory and power and eminence 
into a plague for the mighty, the honoured, the eminent, who nevertheless cannot find 
anything specific to complain about [.. ..]”*^***^ The strongest tyiant cannot force an 
individual to do anything, according to Kierkegaard: the most he can do is to tlneaten 
death, which ironically further undeiinines his power by elevating the ‘victim’ with the 
mantle of martyrdom, as well as publicly legitimating his opponent as a serious tln eat 
which demands immediate and extreme measures. *^**^ Because the locus of the martyi ’s 
power is internal, her resolve is not impacted by external pressure; however, the tyrant, 
whose power is based externally upon oppositions and achievements, is ultimately 
weakened by the removal of external opponents like the martyr. The martyr, subsequently, 
demonstrates her superiority by forcing the tyrant’s hand in having her killed. *^**^ Even if 
the tyiant succeeds in aiTOgating all power from his subjugated populace, he would 
inadvertently fuel future rebellion by augmenting the means by which the ‘powerless’ may 
attain power— a glowing sense of desperation and will to power. *^**^
'504 84. See also JP IV 140 [1846]: “One ought to exist for all men and not caste-consciously and
egotistically seek his own advantage [....]”
*^°^WL277. See also 213. Judge William described this tactic a s ‘feminine’. See SW 142-143.
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In addition, Kierkegaard fimily believed that every individual possesses some 
power, though its efficacy is undemiined by mismanagement. * ^  *** The power to exclude 
and existentially nullify the other is not merely demonstrated when an individual shuns 
other people— it is characteristic of every individual’s attitude towards God prior to 
salvation. In The Concept o f Irony, Kierkegaard referred to the subjective detacliment of 
the ironist as ‘negative freedom’, “because he is not limited in another. Wlien the 
individual by being in his other is in his own, then for the first time he is in tmth (i.e., 
positively) fi ee, affinnatively free.”*^** Regardless of intention, both the societal ‘master’ 
and ‘slave’ are unified in collusion in the fondamental revolt of creature against 
Crea tor .Accord ing  to Kierkegaard, every individual naturally strives to live a life free 
from divine authority. Her appropriation of sensate power to secure this end becomes a 
thieving fr om eternity, an anogant anogation of authority after ‘deposing’ God.*^ *^
‘Slave’ power is, therefore, an illusion, for every individual, regardless of position, wields 
the most eternally influential ‘master’ power in existence— the ability to say ‘no’ to God. 
Because of the way in which God lovingly holds back his omnipotence to safeguard the 
fieedom of his creations, Kierkegaard maintained that “a person’s selfishness” becomes 
God’s greatest ‘opponent’: “There is only one who can hinder God, him who indeed is 
eternally strongest, in becoming the strongest— this one is the person himself.”*^*"* As 
Anti-Climacus stated: “The powerful can cmelly have a person be tortured— but the weak 
can cmelly make it impossible for love to help them, alas, the only thing for which love 
asked and so ardently.” '^
In reality, it is humankind which has abdicated its lofty and privileged position as
1310 y y  295-296. This occurs particularly when individuals misguidedly focus their wills upon attaining 
‘singular’ puiposes which are not, in fact, singular— temporal externalities which are notoriously transient 
and uncontrollable. Hence, Climacus contended: “[I]t is a contradiction absolutely to will something finite, 
since the finite must indeed come to an end, and consequently there must come a time when it can no longer 
be willed.” [UP I 394] Only a person who wills to obtain the unchanging favour o f God will possess an 
undivided puipose which, on account o f grace, can never be thwarted. [UV 25-27]
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one possible hindrance to wonder— and that is a person when he himself wants to be something.”
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worshiper of the one tme God, according to Kierkegaard,*^*^ and has thereby become an
existential brigand: “To forget God— is not this the same as stealing your whole
existence!”*^ *^  Subsequently, sensate authority is a limited and therefore limiting
resource, for it may be acquired illegitimately and necessarily deprives another: ’Eveiy
earthly or worldly good is in itself selfish, begimdging; its possession is begrudgmg or is
envy and in one way or another must make others poorer— what 1 have someone else
cannot have; the more 1 have, the less someone else must have.”*^ *^  This is why he
queried: “Is it really so glorious to become the superior person no one else can become; is it
not disconsolate instead!”*^ *^  Kierkegaard regar ded societal distinctions in class or rank as
illusory, “the enchantment of actuality”, comparing them to make-believe roles on the
stage: “But when the curtain falls, the one who played the king and the one who played the
beggar, and all the others— they are all quite alike, all one and the same actors.”* H e n c e ,
Kierkegaard asserted that all people, regardless of their temporal positions are
simultaneously spiritually weak yet existentially strong enough to resist God:
It is connption when the poor man shrivels up in his poverty so that he lacks the 
courage of will to be built up by Christianity. It is also cori*uption when a 
prominent man wraps himself in his prominence in such a way that he shrinks 
from being built up by Cluistianity. And it is also cormption if he whose 
distinction is to be like the majority of people never comes out of this distinction 
through Clnistian elevation. *^ *^
g. A Personal Defence:
As for Nietzsche’s accusation that Kierkegaard was curmingly accumulating power 
for himself tluough the influence he sought to exert over Cluistendom, Kierkegaard would 
have protested that he did everything possible to prevent the acquisition of either fame or 
following. His perennial aloofriess, pseudonymous subterfuge, avoidance of formulating 
dogmatic decrees, periodic disavowals of any apostolic authority and personal Clnistian
1316 4^ . the Cln istian knows that to need God is a human being’s perfection.” See also UV 193, UD
297.
'517 UY 2 1 1 . See also CD 99 where he wrote of temporality: “[I]t becomes something by stealing the power 
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power surrendered by the individual, see UD 18.
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‘excellence’, and public notoriety in the wake of The Corsair scandal thoroughly prevented 
his acquisition of sensate authority since, “[0]ne single person can never literally become a 
physical power.”*^ ^^  With regards to his writings and expertise on trne Cliristian belief, 
Kierkegaard would have maintained that he was only doing his duty as a tr*uth-witness, 
reminding himself as much as others of the need for humility and serwice, “not by 
domineering and wanting to force others to obey God, but by unconditionally obeying as 
an individual”/ I f  Nietzsche misinterpreted Kierkegaard’s true motives, it was merely 
because he, too, like the Danish masses, was unable “to conceive of an intelligent man not 
coveting status and power.”
h. The Ultimate Empowerment:
Contrary to the universal practice of negating the meaningfiil existence of otliers 
through indifference or animosity, Kierkegaard emphasized that, because every individual 
is equidistant from the opportunity of a salvifrc relationship with God, “[T]he possibility of 
the good exists at every moment for the other person”. Hence, in his interpretation of 
Matthew 5:21-22, he wrote: “Even if one does not take murder upon his conscience, he 
nevertheless gives up the hated one as hopeless and consequently takes possibility away 
fr om him. But does this not mean to kill him s p i r i t u a l l y . T h e  alteration of external 
conditions to redistribute power allocation was, for Kierkegaard, inelevant for alleviating 
the true spiritual plight of individuals. Hence, he cited the recent horxors of the French 
Revolution as an excrnrciating reminder that radical changes to societal conditions can 
neither end cruelty nor rehabilitate the human heart. The only means of trxie 
ernpowennent is spiritual freedom, the humble acknowledgement that all individuals stand 
equally prodigal and helpless before God.*^^^
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According to the Christian faith, “God exists and is the only master [.. On
account of the limitations of sensate authority, ICierkegaard insisted that God alone, whose 
power is qualitatively other and, therefore, incontestable, can truly free a human being 
without enslaving her through obligation, thr eat of the gift’s removal, or a slavish 
dependency upon the gift itself. Because love, “the strongest power in a man”,*^ *^* is 
universally available to all who are w i l l i n g , G o d  may truly liberate the individual from 
the tyr army of the foulest raler or the cruellest fate, abolishing slavery to the outcome and 
rendering God’s followers ‘more than conquerorsSubsequent ly ,  Kierkegaard 
proclaimed; “In suffering, bold confidence is able to take power from the world and has the 
power to change scom into honor, victory into downfall!”*^ ^^  Nietzsche was right to 
declare that human beings are ‘destined’ to rirle,*^ '^* according to Kierkegaard, but this nrle 
is not founded upon sensate power and oppression of the other, but rather upon, eternal love 
and service to the other.
Ironically, both Kierkegaar d and Nietzsche were probably aware of the paradox of 
sacrilege: that the ‘gods’ are only worth robbing so long as they remain the treasuries of 
value and significance in society. Kierkegaard has decisively shown that rebellion depends 
dialectically upon that which it rebels against. How long, he might ask, can “hatred, envy, 
covetousness, and lust for domination” remain “life-conditioning emotions” after love, 
peace, and harmony have all but disappeared? Furiherrnore, Nietzsche admitted that one 
can never destroy an enemy if one is to be continuously strengthened by ceaseless conflict, 
even an enemy as despised as Christianity: “The continuance of the Christian ideal is one 
of the most desirable things there are— even for the sake of ideals that want to stand beside 
it and perhaps above i t -  they must have opponents, strong opponents, if they are to become 
s t r o n g Without a robust church to rebel against, the victory becomes hollow and the
[WP 401 (1888)]
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detractor may be left with an unneiwing ambiguity of his own identity as to whether he is 
truly rebelling against Christianity or rather aligning himself with a righteously indignant 
‘remnant’, who— albeit inadvertently— assists the call for reform.
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Chapter 8: Conclusion: Expanding the Dialogue:
In conclusion, this chapter will briefly liighlight some of the strengths and 
weaknesses of both positions and suggest their theological relevance for contemporary 
debate on the issue of power.
I. Strengths:
Both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard must be commended for their brilliant and 
scintillating critiques of nineteenth-century excesses, their passion against mediocrity and 
theoretical abstraction, their insistence that, whatever it means to be human, it inevitably 
involves “a process of becoming”, their bravery to confront the brutalities, suffering, 
and incongi'uities of existence, their recognition of the uses and abuses of a personal 
hermeneutic by which people “fool one another into thinking that what occurred is what 
they wanted”, a n d  their integiity to resist endorsing the status quo, whether political, 
academic, or ecclesiastical.
In particular, Friedrich Nietzsche justly challenged the stagnancy and hypocrisy 
inlierent in a self-proclaimed ‘Christian’ nation which brazenly sanctioned modes of power 
and affluence which blatantly contradict the life and teachings of Christ.*^ '*** His exposure 
of subtler uses of coercion such as language, the henneneutical redaction of history— 
whether national or personal— and the deleterious dehumanization of the ‘less fortunate’ 
under the guise of ‘Clnistian charity’ is both provocative and poignant. Nietzsche’s 
exuberance for the ‘natural’ world and willingness to embrace topics such as passion and 
sexuality, which had been historically denigiated is both admirable and daring, offsetting 
the unhealthy existential escapism which often masquerades as ‘sound’ Clnistian theology. 
He lucidly reflected the dangers of overemphasizing an abstract, disembodied 
ti'anscendence: “For there is nothing at all we could state about the metaphysical world 
except its differentness, a differentness inaccessible and incomprehensible to us. It would
SD 60.
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be a thing with negative qualities.”* H e n c e ,  he offered a cogent reminder that 
Christianity is a historically embodied and ‘IncamationaT religion in more ways than one. 
However, Nietzsche’s desire to protect the ‘defenceless’ is noble, though restricting that 
category to the nobles is defenceless. His aversion to illusion and earnestness for tmth 
ironically paralleled the efforts of many who inhabited the robust centre of Clnistian 
ti adition, including Soren Kierkegaard, who would have heartily approved of such
■ • ■ 1342uncompromising passion.
Nietzsche rightly abhoixed the feeble ‘Chiistian’ rationalization that inward ‘faith’ 
does not culminate in consistent outward behaviour— under the pretence of avoiding 
‘works righteousness’— and, thus, argued for commensurability between internality and 
externality in order to combat existential indolence. Kierkegaard rightly opposed the 
evaluation of inward faith solely on the basis of external behaviour and argued for the 
incommensurability between internality and externality in order to combat hypocrisy. 
Kierkegaard provided invaluable assistance in preseiwing the importance of the individual 
in the face of collectivist pressures which sought haixnony and homogeneity at the expense 
of particularity. He unequivocally gi ounded human well-being, freedom, and identity 
upon the unchangeable and incontestable love and freedom of God, while unwaveringly 
emphasizing the qualitative ‘chasm’ of heterogeneity which separated God fr om creation. 
At the same time, he exposed the implicit dangers of immanence, wherein humankind 
re-casts God in its own image and thereby faces an ‘all-too-human’ autocrat, whose power 
and fr eedom— being merely quantitatively different— must rival, oppress, and/ or be 
supplemented by our own. His penetrating analysis of the shortcomings of sensate 
authority and the church’s catastrophic compromise of endeavouring to secure spiritual 
goals by means of sensate authority is both brilliant and timely. Undaunted by the 
assertion that a transcendental God is a mythological attempt to mask existential 
cowardice, Kierkegaard coherently argued that the Annulations of ‘master power’ and 
‘slave power’ are themselves mythological attempts at masking existential cowardice 
based on alienation fr om and avoidance of God.
18.
'342 need dynamic personalities, unselfish persons who are not immersed and exliausted in endless 
consideration for job, wife, and children.” [BA 224 (1847)]
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II. Shortcomings:
A. Nietzsche:
1. Methodological Inconsistencies:
The gieatest difficulty with the tenability of Nietzsche’s position centres on the
glaring inconsistencies of his variegated tlu eads of thought. Despite his suspicion of the
hermeneutical ‘shell-games’ of history and the contention that he was born ahead of his
time/^"*  ^Nietzsche promulgated his own historical schemas and emulated several traits of
the seventeenth century:
The seventeenth century is aristocratic, imposes order, looks down haughtily on 
the animalic, is severe against the heart, not cozy, without sentiment, Tin- 
Gennan’, averse to what is burlesque and what is natural, inclined to 
generalizations and sovereign confionted with the past— for it believes in itself. 
Much beast of prey au fond, much ascetic habit to remain master. The century of 
strong will; also of strong passion.
By conti'ast to seventeenth-century “Aristocratism”, “Descartes, rule of reason, testimony 
of the sovereignty of the will”, the eighteenth century was characterized by “Feminism”— 
“Rousseau, rule of feeling, testimony of the sovereignty of the senses, mendacious”-  while 
the nineteenth century revolved upon “Animalism”: “Schopenhauer, lule of craving, 
testimony of the sovereignty of animality, more honest but gloomy”. D e s p i t e  his 
aversion to piecemeal philosophy, Nietzsche himself was highly selective in his 
emphasis upon seventeenth-century ‘aristocratism’, eighteenth-century emotional 
epiphanies, and nineteenth-century ‘institutionalization’ of instinct. Though he delighted 
in ‘deconstructing’ previous philosophies- “[T]he philosopher believes that the value of 
his philosophy lies in the whole, in the building: posterity discovers it in the bricks with 
which he built and which one then often used again for better building [.. the
EH 39.
WP 59 [1887].
WP 58-59 [1887].
BG 40, Z 142.'^^NR33.
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disassembly of his own thought was insufferable.’^ '*^
Although Nietzsche vehemently opposed Clu'istianity as ‘sickness’ and “up till now 
mankind’s greatest misfortune”*^'*^— a blatant contradiction of his assertions that rendering 
moral judgments is the greatest i n j u s t i c e h e  endorsed it as a useful Machiavellian 
means for securing political s t a b i l i t y , a nd  based many of his fonnulations upon 
Lutheran doc t r ines .Despi t e  his abhorrence of plebeian ‘levelling’ and obvious love of 
diversity, he has, in one monumental revaluation, flattened all human value systems, 
civilizations, aifs, knowledge, love, and science into ‘mechanical’ manoeuvres for 
asserting power. Wliile Nietzsche deplored the Hegelian banisliment of the natural world 
and the Christian negation of ‘natural man’, he embarked upon a personal henneneutic 
which ultimately minimizes the world as a henneneutical, aesthetic constmct, and seeks to 
negate the human race itself— “the experimental material, the tremendous suiplus of 
failures” in his attempt to breed the superspecies. In doing so, Nietzsche focused on 
generalities such as ‘the species’ and ‘the race’, leaving little room for the individual in his 
gi'and fonnulations.’^ '^’ His naturalistic embrace of the amoral cosmos and his creative 
anti-realism which apparently collapses ontology into human subjectivity is highly
Z 195, EH 96.
TI 181.
NR 71-72.
1351 gQ  -pj 2 0 4  Presumably, Nietzsche was able to differentiate between the Machiavellian pretence of 
the ‘tnie inler’ and the “moral hypocrisy” o f contemporary leaders who “appear as ‘the first seiwant o f the 
people”’. [BG 120-121]
In his introduction to Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Hollingdale identifies no fewer than six major parallels: 
"amorfatV as the Lutheran acceptance o f God willing all events in life; ‘eternal recuiTence’ as Cln-istianity’s 
affirmation o f life and the unchangeable nature of God; ‘will to power’ as God’s inner grace which leads to 
outer victories; ‘living dangerously’ as the radical nature o f Jesus’ challenge to the religious conventions of 
his day; the ‘Great Noontide’ as tlie Second Coming of Cluist; and the ^Übermensch ’ as a model o f God 
Himself. [Z 28-29] I would also posit a strong dose of ‘remnant’ theology, tlie belief that only a portion but 
not the whole shall be saved, and ‘messianic’ theology, a characteristic feature of the destined Übermensch, 
who would, in effect, ‘redeem’ tlie entire chain o f historical unfoldings. He also boiTowed heavily h orn 
Cliristian asceticism, particularly in his insistence that self-mastery lies at the heart o f any ‘higher man’. [TI 
104] Despite his criticisms of Chiistianity on this point, [GM 49] Nietzsche, too, has negated the 
meaninglessness o f human suffering witliin a ‘salvation’ nan ative. Salome contends that he infused his 
personal narrative with “mystical significance” [153] In return, Luther might have levelled his castigation of  
the Pharisees’ ‘God-complex’ at Nietzsche: “Men of this kind wish to be like God, sufficient in themselves, 
pleasing themselves, glorying in themselves, under obligation to no one, and so on.” [Selections 90]
" "W P  380 [1888].
Feuerbach traces the ‘pagan’ roots of tliis approach: “The idea o f man as an individual was to the ancients 
a secondai-y one, attained tln ough the idea of the species. Though they thought highly of the race, highly of  
the excellences o f mankind, [...] they nevertlieless drought slightly o f the individual.” [151]
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incongi-uous. Yet another inconsistency lies in Nietzsche’s aversion to infinity as a tlneat 
to the material universe, which he ironically sought to ‘infinitize’ thiuugh endless 
henneneutical interpretations: “[T]he world has become ‘infinite’ for us all over again, 
inasmuch as we cannot reject the possibility that it may include infinite interpretations. 
While he championed release from outdated conventions and oppressive superstitions, he 
bound humanity with the shackles of determinism— both biological and sociological— via a 
loveless, goalless ‘Fate’, banishing humankind to perpetual revolutions on a cosmic 
‘canousel’ under the auspices o f ‘trne freedom’. Subsequently, Unamuno remarks, “And 
why does the lion laugh? 1 think he laughs with rage, because he can never succeed in 
finding consolation in the thought that he has been the same lion before and is destined to 
be the same lion again.” ’^ ^^
Furthennore, while he advocated endorsement of a plurality of perspectives and 
rejected the chimerical farce of arriving at ‘the trnth’, Nietzsche became curiously irate 
when his unique perspective did not receive privileged s t a t u s . H e  placed these words in 
the mouth of Zarathustra: “‘This is now my way: where is yours?’ Thus 1 answered those 
who asked me ‘the way’. For the way does not exist!”’^ ®^ Yet he later commented on this 
fictional character, “Zarathustra is more truthful than any other thinker.”’ The 
Heraclitean effort to preserve the ontological ‘flux’ by withstanding the solidification of all 
‘becomings’ into ‘beings’ seems far more ‘superhuman’ than Nietzsche admitted. To the 
extent that humans are expected to accept their allotted positions in society as either 
Übermensch forebears or aristocratic facilitators, Nietzsche’s views rest upon the “naive” 
presumption, according to Climacus, that, “if only the objective truth stands firm, the 
subject will be ready and willing to slip it on.”’^ *^^
Nietzsche’s optimism in the rise of new and stronger configurations of power fi om
GS 337.
Unamuno 110-111.
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the ashes of conflict and animosity, and his confidence that he can chisel new behaviours 
and attitudes into human ‘bedrock’ despite the seeming imperviousness of “bad blood”’^ ’^ 
seem audacious at best and contr adictory at worst. On the one hand, he espoused the 
ineluctability of cosmic movements such as eternal recun ence while, on the other hand, the 
formulations of a single man, such as Kant, can apparently derail the astoundingly ‘fragile’ 
inexorability of the natural universe’s drive towards developing quintessential units of 
power— or at least delay it.’^ ^^  The fact that the ‘telos-less’ cosmos in general and the 
pre-eminent ‘masters’ in particular require the assistance of a philosophical overlord and 
‘defender of the fate’ is rather ironical indeed, parficulariy when the strength of the 
forebears is predicated upon the existence of powerful opponents such as ‘Christianity’ and 
its so-called ‘slave morality’, which Nietzsche strove so valiantly to neutralize. This 
vociferous opponent of transcendence risked violating his own tenet in his derision of 
Cliristianity, for if humankind truly inliabits a ‘natural’ universe, does Nietzsche not posit 
an otheiworldly heterogeneity when he criticizes the Christian faith as ‘unnatural’? 
Indeed, how can anything be ‘unnatural’ in a universe where there is nothing but nature, 
and from what Archimedean point does Nietzsche presume to distinguish between the 
two? The incongruities in Nietzsche’s thought are legion. As he longed to preseiwe the 
present fiom the denigration of tyramiical historical traditions, he curiously drew upon a 
sentimentalized golden past of aristocratic supremacy in order to usher in a glorious ftiture. 
Wliile he expounded an Epicurean enthusiasm for the Dionysian delights of coiporeal 
existence, he also advocated a Stoic detachment in order to transcend the impact of 
e x t e r n a l s . H e  vigorously denied the efficacy of human powers of judgment and 
conscious fiee will, while at the same time championing the victor’s cry, ‘1 willed it thus!’ 
Nietzsche either had the worst sense of inconsistency or the gi eatest— and wickedest— 
sense of humour of any philosopher.
EH 18.1361
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2. Rudimentary Rehabilitations:
In order to consolidate the violent inconginities inlierent in Nietzsche’s thought, 
one must walk an epistemological tighti'ope between the extremities of ontological 
conservatism which fossilizes tmth, and a rampaging nihilism which utterly disintegiates 
it. The theorist must formulate Nietzsche’s insistence upon the commensurability between 
the external and the internal without enslaving the individual to the outcome. Ironically, 
Nietzsche’s spectacular inconsistencies may be better stabilized within a Judaeo-Christian 
reference point. Wliile Nietzsche regarded himself as an ‘outsider’ confronting the 
coiioption within Christian morality, he bore a marked resemblance to the biblical 
p rophe t s . Expos ing  hypocrisy, complacency, and indolence, Nietzsche charged that 
matters of truth and virtue do not lead to material advantages and prosperity but, in fact, are 
detrimental to one’s eaifhly wel l -being.Tl iough he himself rigorously disputed its 
motives, Nietzsche recognized that the pursuit of true virtue leads to self-debasement and 
loss, not personal aggmndizement and temporal successes. Furthermore, his ‘Big Brawl’ 
theory of the universe bears more than a passing resemblance to the CMstian doctrine of 
universal discord in the aftennath of sin.
Nietzsche also played the prophet when denouncing humankind’s ability to judge 
based on appearances of actions, recognizing that the intentions behind a morally 
courageous act are often rather ignoble— stubbornness, close-mindedness, cowaidice, 
pride, sel f i shness .Because of the opaque nature of the human heart, Nietzsche insisted 
that judgment must be suspended or at least tempered by an awareness of the judge’s 
hermeneutical biases and l imi ta t ion s . Wi t h  his uncanny ‘nose’ for spiritual mediocrity 
and an almost ‘priestly’ concern for purity, he relentlessly reminded Chiistendom that their
'33'^  Though Tamier would add, a ‘prophet o f the apocalypse’. {Nietzsche 32] Intriguing, Nietzsche’s 
favourite deconstractive metaphor was echoed by Jeremiah; “Is not my word like fire, says tlie Lord, and like 
a hammer tliat breaks a rock in pieces?” [Je 23:29] Salome regarded his greatest ‘intellectual disposition’ to 
be his “religious genius”. [24, 88] For Nietzsche’s impact upon early twentieth-century Russian religious 
thought, see Rosenthal 862-864.
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poor excuse for piety— their “religion of comfortableness”’^ ^^ — was a pathetic substitute 
for genuine moral courage, which relinquished the safe havens of conventionality and 
abandoned high ease for high seas. From his prophetic platfonn, Zarathustra exhorted: 
“And whatever harm the wicked may do, the hann the good do is the most harmful harm 
[....] For the good— cannot create: they are always the beginning of the end:— they crucify 
him who writes new values on new law-tables [.. With a prophet’s glacial glare,
Nietzsche predicted woe and suffering for the spiritually self-assured, who lackadaisically 
loitered around a lower-case Christianity, and sternly ordered them to ‘move along’.
In retrospect, some of Nietzsche’s most vimlent attacks were not directed at
Clu'istianity per se, but rather at its cori-uption in Cluistendom- a status quo spirituality of
complacency and decadence grown powerful to the point of undemiining the development
of human excellence for which Nietzsche longed:
1 have the greatest respect for the ascetic ideal in so far as it is honestl As long as 
it believes in itself and refrains from farcical play-acting! But 1 dislike all these 
coquettish little bugs- whose insatiable ambition is to give off the smell of the 
infinite, until ultimately the infinite smells of bugs
Arguably, Nietzsche even sought to strengthen Christianity by incinerating its dross for his 
own purposes of preparing a fitter mettle against which to steel friture generations of 
‘higher men’: “1 have declared war on the anemic Christian ideal (together with what is 
closely related to it), not with the aim of destroying it but only of putting an end to its 
tyranny and clearing the way for new ideals, for more robust ideals [. Hence,
Nietzsche’s tme enemies were not “the most serious Christians”, who “have always been 
well disposed toward me”,’^ ^^  but “the one kind of enemy who is capable of causing the 
ascetic ideal real harm: those play-actors who act out this ideal— for they arouse 
suspicion.”' K i e r k e g a a r d  could not have agieed more.
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B. Kierkegaard:
1. Temporal Shortcomings:
As with Nietzsche, Kierkegaard’s problems stem from the extremities of his
thought. Although his indefatigable insistence upon the incommensurability between
iiitemality and externality was a powerful deterrent against hypocrisy, it threatened to
reduce Clnistianity to a private, quietist religion if not coupled with a determined,
proactive resolve to passionate involvement in one’s society, something Anti-Climacus
emphasized when guarding against spiritual indolence:
The earnestness of life is not all this pressure of finitude and busyness with 
livelihood, job, office, and procreation, but the earnestness of life is to will to be, 
to will to express the perfection (ideality) in the dailyness of actuality, to will it, 
so that one does not to one’s own ruin once and for all busily abandon it or 
conceitedly take it in vain as a dream— what a tragic lack of earnestness in both 
cases!- but humbly wills it in actuality.
To the degi'ee that Kierkegaard solely emphasized a faith that is supremely focused 
‘inwards’ upon one’s relationship with God, his position is susceptible to Feuerbach’s 
criticism: ^'Nature, the world, has no value, no interestfor Christians. The Christian thinlcs 
only o f himself and the salvation o f his souV^^^^
Kierkegaard’s position is also not without its incongiuities: on one level, he 
emphasized the sinfulness of humankind and its natural aversion to the tiuth, yet he posited 
a seemingly contradictoi*y ‘transcendence’ in advocating the continuous refusal to 
secularize the Kingdom of God or employ the sensate powers of wealth, reason, or 
government to aid or abet Christian aims. He himself was not able to obey faultlessly this 
edict, relying upon his education, brilliant mind, and rich inheritance to sequester himself 
from vocational pursuits and write his long, sophisticated treatises as an integi al part of his 
Clnistian witness. By deploying his use of irony, keen rational abilities, polemical
'373 GM 134.
'37'^  See, for example, Prater Tacitiuiius’ statement: “The religious outcome, indifferent toward the external, 
is assured only in the internal, that is, in faith.” [SW 442]
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prowess, and literary skills, he, too, can be found guilty of indirectly committing the ‘sin of 
Uzzah’ and, reaching out to steady the apparent precariousness of the ‘ark of God’,'^ ^  ^thus 
‘weakening’ Christianity by the very act of ‘defending’ it.'^^  ^ Furthennore, if sensate 
authority truly poses no tlneat to spiritual authority, a sceptic can question the need for 
Kierkegaard’s highly spirited polemics.'
Although he strove to be freed from the impact of externality, Kierkegaard, too, 
was eventually worn down by the constant affliction and scorn he invoked— much of it 
intentionally— lapsing into further bitterness and isolation despite his recognition of the 
importance of love and neighbour. At the height of polemical frenzy, Kierkegaard 
committed the very atrocity he railed so forcefrdly against throughout his authorship: 
quantifying God within human limitations and standards. Hence, in The Moment, he 
presented an astonishingly ‘human’ description of God’s waning patience when he stated 
that the worst punishment is for God, “not to will to be aware [...] of the nothing that you 
are. For an omnipotent being it must, if one may speak this way, be an immense effort to be 
obliged to look after a nothing, to be aware of a nothing, to be concerned about a 
nothing.” He similarly appeared to anthropomoiphize God’s love when he once 
compared ‘petty prayers’ — prayers for attaining ‘worldly’ aims rather than their 
banishment- to the unwarranted badgering of an exasperated doctor by daft pai ents who 
repeatedly summon him for every ‘imaginary’ symptom of their c h i l d . H o w e v e r ,  such 
references are still exceptions to the predominant theme of unconditional divine love
‘373 Feuerbach 287.
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which is prevalent tlnmighout his corpus, and the fact that God loves sinfiil individuals 
inspires greater wonderment for Kierkegaard than God’s ability to create the universe ex
2. Making Applications:
In order to flirther Kierkegaard’s insights, one must relentlessly press his thought in 
the direction of community and commitment to relationality, lest a well-intentioned 
attitude of love atrophy into well-intentioned theory.Theological ly,  this could be 
accomplished by emphasizing the relational nature of the Gospel, preserving 
Kierkegaard’s central focus upon the individual’s relationship with God and re-articulating 
the communal nature of God himself in the persons of the Trinity, as well as the essential 
role of the Holy Spirit operating in the life, unity, and action of the Chr istian church. A 
fliller statement of Trinitarian theology, ecclesiology, and pneumatology would highlight 
the valuable contributions which Kierkegaard makes to Christian thought while 
demonstrating the real and practical nature of the Gospel’s power to unite and restore that 
which is alienated and damaged.
One must also challenge his epistemological flirtation with deception to avoid 
undermining the importance of truth for the C hr i s t i an . Th e r e  are three levels of divine 
‘deception’ in Kierkegaard’s writing: first, the inevitable distortions of tiirth which occur 
when it is communicated in a world saturated by untrirth;'^^^ second, Jesus’ ‘deceptive’ use 
of political terminology and playing upon Israel’s nationalistic expectations during the 
triumphal entry into J e r u s a l e m ; third, Anti-Climacus posited “a necessary educational
1382 CD 128.
'383 I disagree, however, with Matthis’ contention that Kierkegaard has subsumed ‘the other’ “as an idea 
within the se lf’, [419] a position espoused by Buber. [Comiell and Evans vii-ix] For the positives and 
problems of Kierkegaard’s “open-ended” conception of the individual, see Hannay 326-328.
'38"* Noms accuses him of fimctionally endorsing Nietzsche’s devaluation of tilth. [105] Although Noms is 
overstating his case, Nietzsche could have easily adduced. Kierkegaard’s duplicity in support o f his view that 
the will to tmth, when pursued in all earnestness, nihilistically exposes the fictitious nature o f its tmth claims. 
'385 See, for example, TM 414 [1851], BA 170, FT 185. The Incarnation is ‘deceptive’ insofar as it 
constitues “the absolute umecognizability, when one is God, then to be an individual human being”, 
entailing “the greatest possible distance, the infinitely qualitative distance, from being God, and therefore it is 
the most profound incognito.” [PC 127-128]
'383 WA 61-62. He softened this stance in FS 61 : “If he [Jesus] works for it [tmth] with all his might then he
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guile” whereby God— presumably temporarily- does not infonu the believer of the 
inevitable suffering which will ensue when seiwing truth in a world of untiuth.'^^^ 
Anti-Climacus justified deception on the basis that it was not ‘tme’ deception if it 
“deceived him into the truth”. O n  a personal level, the use of deception was justified by 
Quidam to break off his engagement with Quaedam, “provided I have not my welfare in 
mind but hers.” '^ ^^  Quidam linked this “teleological suspension of the ethical principle of 
speaking the whole tmth” with Christ’s decision to witlihold the entire truth fiom his 
disciples prior to his betrayal and execution because, “as yet they cannot bear it.”'^ ’^’ It is 
significant that Kierkegaard later rejected his deployment of indirect communication and 
all but abandoned pseudonymous composition.'^^' Although one must realistically 
confient the fractured realities of human existence, the heterogeneity of God’s freedoiu 
and power must be reflected by Christian resistance to deception as a means of confr onting 
deception if divine victory is as certain as Kierkegaard would have us believe.
III. Relevance for Contemporary Power Issues:
A thorough analysis of the implications of Nietzsche’s and Kierkegaard’s thought 
for contemporary discussion on the issues of power lies beyond the scope of this project;
is working himself toward certain downfall. On the other hand, if  he introduces the whole truth too quickly 
his downfall will come too soon. Consequently, working against himself, he must for a time seem to enter 
into illusions in order to ensure tlie downfall all the more thoroughly.”
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however, a few general observations may be offered. In the highly charged political 
landscape of the twenty-first century, both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard can seiwe as models 
for rigorously self-scrutinizing one’s personal, ethical position for underlying biases, 
self-interest, and blind spots. They also provide a particularly timely critique of liberal 
democracy, particularly for proponents who are advocating worldwide democraticization 
and consumer-based egalitarianism as a panacea for systemic problems of poverty, 
violence, and material inequities. As Jackson obseiwes, “No external power (neither 
Adam’s sin nor God’s grace) can compel a moral choice [.. — to which one might
add trade embargos, constitutional amendments, and pre-emptive stiikes. Both thinkers 
also provide extremely important reminders of how quickly human stmctures of power— 
whether political, economic, or ecclesiological— maybe ‘deified’ and incorporated into a 
new or existing status quo, how easily the name of ‘God’ can be invoked to sanction or 
excuse national interests or institutionalized injustices, and how susceptible our theological 
formulations may be to hierarchical ‘conosion’.'^ ^^  However, in light of the volatile and 
belligerent conditions in many regions of tlie world, Nietzsche’s attempt to subsume all 
human activity within a matrix of agonistic power relations seems reductionistic and 
ultimately unhelpful for arriving at more constructive means of mediating human 
differences within the fiamework of social j u s t i c e . S u c h  a presupposition may easily 
undennine mutual tmst and promote an atmosphere of suspicion and cynicism, levelling all 
overtures of peace, munificence, and good will as unmitigated self-interest.
Although the implications of Kierkegaard’s Cliristian world view seem dire from 
an outsider’s perspective— he does not dilute his pessimism towaids human beings’ natural 
receptivity to troth and justice, and many will take offence at his delimitation o f ‘sinful’ 
humankind’s ability to recognize and will the good his existence-communication is
'3®2 Jackson 251.
'3®3 See Ruether 28.
'3®“' On the absence o f social justice from his account of “creative, aristocratic polity”, see Ansell-Pearson 51.
*3®3 See, for example, WL [revised] 276: “[T]he world [...] simply cannot grasp why someone does not want 
to be selfish, but rather that a selfish person even more selfishly can wish to be regarded as unselfish.” 
Proponents of ‘autonomy over lieteronomy’ [Hampson “Autonomy” 2], a “politics of difference” or “basic 
self-detennination” [Gudorf380, 385] will also not see him as an ally in this regard. His distinction between 
Chi'istian and non-Cluistian capacity for truth would be regarded by some feminists as “the kyriarchally 
dualistic way o f thinking”. [Hunt 746] Plowever, to the degree tliat all remain sinners in dire need of divine 
grace, the dualism o f ‘us’ and ‘them’ is subverted. Furthermore, as Banneiji argues, a ‘politics of difference’
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permeated by grace and divine enabling which neither whitewashes atrocities nor evades 
the ‘Golgothas’ of fallen creation. Furthermore, Kierkegaard’s critique of human folly and 
fallibility is extended to both rich and poor, male and female; hence, he can criticize the 
victimizing powers of the world and yet resist an inadvertent ratification of victimhood.'^ '^^ 
Accordingly, everyone regardless of time, culture, or privilege is truly responsible to God 
for herself and for one another.
By emphasizing the qualitative difference which separates God fiom humankind, 
Kierkegaard addresses the theological fallacy of human identity being annihilated or 
impinged upon by God, which arises when a human concept of sensate power is projected 
onto God, Much of postmodern thought echoes Nietzsche’s cry: “[H]e who wants to 
become free has to become so tlnough his own actions and that fieedom falls into no one’s 
lap like a miraculous gift.” '^ ^^  Conversely, Kierkegaard asserted that human fi eedom is 
not tlneatened by divine omnipotence, but founded upon it as a fine and loving gift which 
neither diminishes the Giver nor enslaves the recipient. Yet, on account of the Incarnation, 
Kierkegaard’s emphasis does not lead to an abstract, inaccessible, unknowable 
transcendence. Because of God’s unlimited power, made readily available to all earnest 
seekers, promise is wedded to the paradoxical command to love thy neighbours in the 
central figure of Christ who is both human exemplar and divine Enabler.'^^^
The importance of the neighbourly ‘other’ for Kierkegaard provides gi'ounds for 
practical engagement, as opposed to the “tepidity” of Nietzsche’s amorfati where the line 
between universal affinnation and resignation is all-too-thin.'^^^ Due to the inseparable
as espoused by multiculturalism may harbour its own esseiitialist biases, [548] or subvert constructive 
political action altogether. [Segal 27] It is safe to say that Kierkegaard’s severe polemical tone, diiected 
towards a society indulging in its ‘Cliristian’ pretences, would be radically modified were Kierkegaard to 
address himself to a multicultural, post-Clu istian era.
'3®3 On the ‘passive complicity’ o f a victimized society, see Tombs 91. On the importance of recognizing the 
different sinfiil tendencies between the powerful and the weak, see Koontz 174. On the universal ability to 
exert ‘power over’, see Coakley 107.
*3®7 UM 252.
B98 Yhis two-fold focus obviates a self-centi ed focus on personal actualization, as articulated by J. B.
Ton ance: “More important than our experience of Cluist is tlie Clirist o f our experience.” [34] Houlgate 
obseiwes that, “Nietzsche ignores the immense importance of divine incarnation in Clnistian belief’. {Hegel 
40]
'3®® T?i\me.v Nietzsche 68. Tanner attiibutes the uncompleted status o f Nietzsche’s book on transvaluation to
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connection between his clnistocentric theology and his socio-political outlook, 
Kierkegaard’s position is more resistant to appropriation by fascist or tyrannical 
agendas/'*'''' Moreover, his heightened sensitivity to issues of authority, epistemological 
humility in vigilantly supplying con ectives in response to ever-changing contextual 
imbalances while extending henneneutical suspicion to one’s own views,*'*"' and 
awareness of the ease with which the Tearner’ may be obstmcted from finding her 
personal, unique, existential response to the troth by even the most solicitous ‘instroctor’ 
render Kierkegaard a particularly well-suited and prolific dialogue partner for 
marginalized individuals/'*"^ Recent history has painfully shown how a macrocosmic 
focus on species-wide amelioration all-too-easily sacrifices individuals and social justice 
upon the idealistic altars of deified ‘progi ess’.
A camiy observer might ask whether Kierkegaard’s view of the world steeled in 
sinful rebellion against its Creator-God is any less agonistic than Nietzsche’s perspective. 
But the Danish theologian would promptly assert that God, in his omnipotence, knows 
neither genuine tlmeat nor defeat. Moreover, this very rebellion is itself posited upon a 
perpetually upheld and uplifting foundation of divine love and freedom, which both 
establishes the worth and identity of every human being in history, and provides the 
requisite acceptance, forgiveness, and empowerment which every princess and pauper, 
standing equally hapless and helpless in the sight of God, desperately needs. Hence, 
Kierkegaard’s perspective is relevant and suggestive for those striving to hold together the 
existential tensions which celebrate unity in the face of disparity and difference in the face
spiritual rather tlian physical incapacity— “because in the end Nietzsche found himself at a loss.” [77]
*'*33 Houlgate contends that Nietzsche’s ethically suspect concept of “an aristocratic, tragic society” opens tlie 
door for such abuses. [Hegel 196] V olf derides “the Nietzschean kind of affinnation of life, which is a 
paradise for the strong but a hell for the weak, because it celebrates the way things are, which is to say the 
way the strong have made them to be”. [108] Perhaps Nietzsche would have responded to the National 
Socialists’ agenda with the abject honor of Ivan Karamazov when his father’s murderer confesses that he was 
‘just following Ivan’s orders’. But he is implicated nonetheless. Conversely, Nicoletti obseives that Geraian 
theologians such as Erik Peterson regar ded Kierkegaard as a source of solace and support in opposing 
Nazism. [192]
*''3'JK 127 [1847].
''*32 See Beny 212-213: “Kierkegaard’s emphasis on freedom is the antluopological corollary o f his emphasis 
on God as ‘Possibility,’ and is frrndamental to any theology of liberation.” For feminist rejections of 
‘power-over’, see Holmes 239, Jolmson 169, Fiorenza 143.
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of confomiity/'*"^
IV. Concluding Summary:
The preceding two chapters examined three nexus of a reconstracted dialogue 
between Friedrich Nietzsche and Soren Kierkegaard. With regard to cosmology, 
Nietzsche accused Kierkegaard of negating an amoral, ‘telos-free’ universe and escaping 
to an imaginary other-world of eternity, and of being, thus, guilty of existential cowardice. 
Paradoxically, Kierkegaard levelled the same char ge against Nietzsche, on the grounds that 
Nietzsche was negating a moral, telos-fi.il universe by escaping to an imaginary 
other-world of human rebellion. Both assertions were valid within their particular 
contexts: it takes courage to doubt— pace Nietzsche— when ‘faith’ is fashionable, and it 
takes courage to believe— pace Kierkegaard- when ‘doubt’ is fashionable.*'*"'* On the 
subject of what it means to be human, Nietzsche accused Kierkegaard of complicity in the 
promulgation o f ‘slave’ values and subsequent mediocrity, which obfiiscate human 
instincts and development. Ironically, Kierkegaard accused Nietzsche of complicity in the 
promulgation of ‘master’ values and subsequent mediocrity, which obfuscate human 
fieedom and spiritual advancement, asserting that it is only through Cluist that universal 
slavery to “tlie laws of the flesh and of the drives”*'*"^  and an inescapable determinism of 
individual, societal, and cosmic proportions is umnasked and ultimately transformed. In 
the comparison of their concepts of power, Nietzsche contended that the church in general 
and Kierkegaard in paificular typified human endeavours to consolidate personal power 
and minimize external thieats tluough such duplicitous constracts as ‘selflessness’ and 
‘divine love’. By contrast, Kierkegaard contended that humanity in general and Nietzsche 
in particular typified autonomous rebellion against divine authority, seeking to justify 
personal control and minimize existential accountability before God through such 
duplicitous constructs as ‘master power’ and ‘slave power’-  the myth of mastery.
‘‘'33 On the challenges and failures of the modem multicultural liberal state to address these tensions, see 
Taylor 37-39. For theoretical attempts to preseive otherness from assimilation by the selfr same, see Hirsch 
and Olson 94, Luce Irigaray 12-13, Spéculum 139, Jones “God” 110, Wasliboum 961.
*‘3“ See UP I 364-365.
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Nietzsche would have been right to protest that, in posing behind a cloud of feigned 
unknowing, Kierkegaard was cunningly able to exert a foimidable influence in an attempt 
to ‘deceive his reader into the troth’ As eager polemicists, both men unapologetically 
declared war against the illusions which, they believed, blinded nineteenth-century 
Europe, wielding considerable intellectual and rhetorical power in the process. But 
whereas Nietzsche sought to turn the world upside-down with his ‘dangerous knowledge’ 
and initiate a new era of extiaordinaries, Kierkegaard sought to avoid ineffectual societal 
‘renovations’, by testifying thiough— not in spite of-- suffering for the Gospel and the 
necessary offence and denigi ation it occasions in a world of revolt against God, He 
himself would likely have admitted to shortcomings in his presentation and, arguably, 
conceded the point that, amidst the uncertainty of political tumult in 1848, he unwisely 
ascribed an indirect link between the public’s endorsement of sensate authority and 
submission to divine authority. Despite some inconsistencies, however, Kierkegaard’s 
comprehension of the limitations of sensate authority and his poignant attempts to sever its 
unfortunate allegiance with spiritual authority demonstrate internal coherence, whereas 
Nietzsche’s formulation of power remains, from start to finish, a pluiality of paradoxes, 
both breath-taking in scope and magnificently flawed.
301.
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